The state and intellectual in Turkey: between liberal ethos and the myth of democracy by Coşar, Simten
TH£ STATE AHD iHTElLECTUAL IN TURKS / :  S£TWc£N LIBERAL 
ETHOS A N D  THE M’fTH Dr DEMOCRACY
4 « W ^ *«* 'C· 4 i W ^ i
;iNT U Hi VERS IT Y
* « T i "Vi. .i“ t i - t ‘ fc
THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL IN TURKEY: BETWEEN LIBERAL 
ETHOS AND THE MYTH OF DEMOCRACY
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University
by
Simten Coşar
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
in
THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
BILKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA
S i r v ı ^ â A
June 1997
•Al5
СЬ-:|-
Ï. ‘Î В 4 0 2
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in 
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
Political Science and Public Administration.
Prof. Dr. Metin Heper 
(Supervisor)
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in 
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
Political Science and Public Administration.
Prof. E^^Hzabeth Ozdalga 
Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in 
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
Political Science and Public Administration.
Prof Dr. Ahmefi: Evin 
Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in 
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
Political Science and Public Administration.
__ /oßfiC C\c.c^
Yrd. Doç Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in 
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
Political Science and Public Administration.
Yrd. Do^ Dr. Ay§e Kadioglu 
Examining Committee Member
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
Prof. Dr. Ali L. Karaosmanoglu 
Director
ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the liberal discourse in the 
Republican Turkey with a view to shedding light on the 
state-intellectual relationship. The aim is to elaborate 
the reasons for the lack of an intellectual tradition of 
liberalism in Turkey, The answer is searched in the 
historical unfolding of the state-intellectual 
relationship within a state dominant, ever-modernizing 
context.
The bulk of the study has been shaped by the 
periodization beginning from the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic and extending throughout the 1990s. The 
Ottoman period, especially, the Tanzimat era (1839-1876) 
has been examined with the aim of providing an historical 
background. The emergence of a liberal identity in 
different periods, has been analyzed in relation to the 
problématique that shaped the intellectual discourse in 
different periods, namely modernization, democratization, 
and liberalization.
In the study the state-opposition pendulum has been 
taken as the clue to gain an understanding of the impasse 
that the Turkish liberal intellectual has experienced. In 
this respect, it is concluded that the liberal 
intellectual in Turkey has always had to walk on a 
tightrope between the premises that fed his intellectual 
matrix and his self-identification with the state. His 
quest for liberty and salvation of the individual from
m
the constraints of the state was inspired by the West. 
Yet, due to his concern for the state he has had to 
construct the ideal individual which turned his liberal 
agenda into a project.
IV
ÖZET
Bu araştırma Cumhuriyet dönemine özgü liberal 
kimliği devlet-entellektüel ilişkisi çerçevesinde 
incelemiştir. Çalışma Türkiye’de, liberalizmin bir 
düşünce geleneği olarak neden oluşamadığı sorusu 
etrafında şekillenmiştir. Cevap devletin ön planda 
olduğu, sürekli modernleşen bir bağlamda devlet- 
entellektüel ilişkisinin tarihsel evrilişinde aranmıştır.
Çalışmanın çatısını Cumhuriyet’in kuruluşundan 
1990lara kadar uzanan dönem oluşturmaktadır. Tanzimat 
(1839-1876) döneminden itibaren meydana gelen gelişmeler 
tarihsel bir arka plan sağlamak amacıyla çalışmaya dahil 
edilmiştir. Liberal entellektüel kimlik birbirini takip 
eden dönemlerde entellektüel söyleme şekil veren 
problematikler etrafında incelenmiştir. Buna bağlı 
olarak, liberal kimliğin değişik dönemlerdeki farklı 
görünümleri entellektüelin içselleştirdiği misyona 
referansla anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır. Sözkonusu 
misyon(1ar) birbirini dışlamayacak şekilde 
modernleştirme, demokratikleştirme ve liberalleştirme 
olarak belirlenmiştir.
Çalışmada devlet-muhalefet sarkacı Türk liberal 
entellektüelinin karşı karşıya kaldığı açmazları anlamak 
açısından faydalı olmuştur. Türkiye'de liberal 
entellektüel, entellektüel kimliğini devletin tanımladığı 
çerçeve içinde bulmuştur. Batı'nın liberal öncüllerinden 
hareketle oluşturduğu kavramsal şeması ise onu ister 
istemez muhalif konumuna oturtmuştur. Dönemin
önceliklerine göre devlet ve muhalefet arasında gidip 
gelen sözkonusu entellektüelin son tahlilde vardığı nokta 
ise liberalizmi projelendirmek olmuştur.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Turkish Republican history has epitomized a pattern 
of modernization one encounters in a late-comer society.^ 
Not unlike the other late-modernizing countries,^ in the 
Turkish context, too, modernization has been perceived as 
a task to be fulfilled. It basically meant Westernization 
first in the institutional structure of authority and 
subsequently in the value system of the society. While 
the state has been the vanguard in this process of all- 
out change the intellectual turned out be its main medium 
as regards the transmission of the changes from the 
institutional level to the society. In the pursuit of 
this task the intellectual has been preoccupied with 
legitimatizing changes at the institutional level with 
recourse to the society.
However, the Turkish case did not evince a smooth 
process of modernization. Aside from the tension inherent 
in the task of modernization,^ the tension between the 
authority and intellectual which for Edward Shils is by
The term late-comer is borrowed from Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition 
and Modernity Reconsidered," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 9 (3) (April 1967), 291-346.
S. N. Eisenstadt, Wilbert E. Moore and Neil J. Smelser eds.. 
Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1966); Eisenstadt, "Post-Traditional Societies and the 
Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition." Deadalus, 102 (1)
(Winter 1973), 1-27; Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and Powers and
Other Essays (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 335- 
467.
Eisenstadt, "Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and 
Reconstruction of Tradition."
definition prevalent,^ forms one of the intriguing factors 
which have led the conduct of the present study. This 
congenital tension became all the more interesting in the 
Turkish context where the state has long constituted the 
locus of authority, whilst it also framed the object of 
intellectual vocation. Thus, the general framework of the 
study is drawn along the boundaries of the state- 
intellectual relationship in a modernizing context—  
Turkey.
The intellectual, as a category, has generally been 
studied as co-emergent with the transition to modernity.^ 
In the Western world, the category of intellectual 
connoted a breakthrough from the religious monopoly over 
knowledge. The intellectual of modernity has been taken 
as the possessor of an alternative medium of knowledge 
and formulator of universal values to provide the basis 
for the best form of order in society. Zygmunt Bauman has 
summarized this transformation while attributing the 
intellectuals of modernity the identity of legislators.® 
This new identity has accompanied the rise of the modern 
state, and the two were joined within the process of 
modernization. The process of modernization which 
characterized the Western historical development roughly 
from the sixteenth century onwards took on a new display
Shils, The Intellectuals and Powers and Other Essays, 17-8. 
Eisenstadt, "Intellectuals and Tradition," Daedalus^ 101 (Spring 
1972), 1-19; Shils, The Intellectuals and Powers and Other Essays;
Ron Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics (UK: Polity Press, 1994).
®. Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1987).
on the non-Western lands, ultimately turning into a 
project to be accomplished.
It is in this instance that the relevance of the 
intellectuals comes to the agenda since they have been 
perceived as the constructors of the new universe of 
modernity. The tension that is inherent in the course of 
modernization has gained a second dimension in the non- 
Western context since the intellectuals experienced a 
dichotomous disposition of denying the past (read as 
tradition) on the one hand, and formulating a ground of 
reconciliation between the tradition with the requisites 
for the achievement of modernity, on the other. Thus, if 
the state-intellectual relationship in a modernizing 
context forms the broader framework upon which this study 
has been drawn, the tense milieu that has ensued 
furnishes the contours of its topic of interest.
Specifically, the study focuses on the Turkish 
liberal intellectual with a view to defining his relation 
with the state. Throughout the text, a tripodal analysis 
is carried out. One aspect has arisen out of the emphasis 
on the overwhelming prevalence of state in the analyses 
of Turkish politics. A second aspect concerns the 
intellectuals of the Republic who have been assigned a 
missionary role in the Turkish modernization within the 
limits of their identity, predetermined by the state. The 
third aspect is related to the rather pendulous 
disposition of the liberal intellectual between his 
identification with the state and the universalistic 
claims that shape his liberal discourse, and thus to the
limits of liberal thinking in Turkey. The aim is to 
analyze the emergence of and (dis)continuity in Turkish 
liberal thinking with a view to Turkish modernization 
which in Eisenstadt's terminology corresponds to "split- 
up modernization," characterized by the existence of more 
than one way to modernity,’ as well as to unravel the 
liberal discourse in the specific social constellation of 
Turkey.® Throughout the work the discourse of the liberal 
intellectual is studied as symbolizing "the historical 
unfolding of Turkish liberal intellectual through the 
interplay of tradition, role, and context."®
A study which takes Turkish intellectual as its 
central category faces a number of problems. Apart from 
the general unease in reaching a precise definition of 
the intellectual, this is partly because of my personal 
experience that almost every individual with higher 
education in Turkey proclaims himself to be an 
intellectual. A second and more intractable problem is 
the difficulty to reach a consensus on a unique 
definition of the intellectual. In this work the problem 
is partly avoided by resort to the Shilsian term 
"institutional intellectual," which refers to those 
intellectuals in state service, higher institutions of
Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change, 67-9.
®. According to Karl Mannheim no individual can totally be free from 
the particular societal constellations and thus one has to search for 
social bases of opinion. Mannheim, "The Problem of the 
Intelligentsia: An Inquiry into its Past and Present Role," in Essays 
on the Sociology of Culture, ed. Bryan S. Turner (London: Routledge, 
1992), 91-166.
®. Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics, ix.
learning, and professionalized fields of study. The 
analysis of Turkish liberal intellectuals gives rise to a 
number of problems, due to the rather contentious meaning 
of the term "liberal." In the Turkish context the term is 
often used with reference to the sphere of economy, and 
hence the self-assured consistency of those political 
parties that assumed a "liberal-conservative" identity. 
This conceptual confusion is very well summarized in the 
phrase "liberal fallacy," coined by a social scientist in 
Turkey, in a critical evaluation of the conventional 
tendency in the approach to Turkish liberalism.!^
In the studies on Turkish political thought which 
are in fact extremely scarce, the recourse has always 
been to modernization as the central theme of analysis. 
This has turned the liberal thought into a sub-topic. 
More briefly, rather than directly focusing on the 
discourse of liberal intellectuals, there has been a 
tendency for selective analysis.The present study is
Shils, "Intellectuals and responsibility," in The Political 
Responsibility of Intellectuals, eds. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore 
and Peter Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 257- 
307.
!!. Nilüfer Göle, "Liberal Yanılgı," (Liberal Fallacy) Türkiye 
Günlüğü (24) (Fall 1993), 12-7.
Tank Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma 
Hareketleri (Westernization Movements in Turkish Political Life) 
(İstanbul: Yedigün Matbaası, 1960); Niyazi Berkes, The Development of 
Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University, 1964); Berkes, 
"Batı Düşünü ve Türkiye." in Felsefe ve Toplumbilim Yazıları 
(Articles on Philosophy and Social Science) (İstanbul: Adam 
Yayınları, 1985), 166-8; Şerif Mardin, Türk Modernleşmesi: Makaleler 
IV (Turkish Modernization: Articles IV), 2nd ed. (İstanbul: İletişim 
Yayınları, 1992); Ali Erkul, "Prens Sabahattin," in Türk 
Toplumbilimcileri (Turkish Social Scientists), ed. Emre Kongar, vol. 
1 (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1982), 83-150; Süleyman Seyfi öğün, "Bir 
Türkçü-lslamcı Eklemlenme Figürü Olarak Ağaoğlu Ahmet" (Ağaoğlu Ahmet 
as a Turkist-lslamist Articulation Figure), in Modernleşme, 
Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye (Modernization, Nationalism and Turkey) 
(Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1995), 195-203.
original since it attempts to arrive at a liberal 
tradition and pinpoint its (dis)continuities throughout 
the Repxablican era, with a view to the intellectuals as 
the formulators of a specific liberal discourse in 
Turkey. In a way, the burden of the study is to invert 
the general tendency noted above by employing 
modernization as an analytical tool in understanding 
Turkish liberal thought.
Apart from that, in relation to the above-mentioned 
fallacy, the studies which have incorporated an analysis 
of Turkish liberalism tended to refute the existence of 
and/or a potential for the survival of liberal discourse 
in the Turkish context. This has led to either focusing 
merely on evolution of economic liberalism, or ending up 
with a negation concerning the flourishing of a genuinely 
liberal identity in T u r k e y . I n  contrast, drawing upon 
Andrew Vincent's classification of approaches to 
liberalism, the present study analyzes Turkish liberal 
discourse as a theme specific to a particular national 
tradition while also reserving its reference to the 
distinction between Continental and British liberalisms.^^ 
Thus, it approaches the discourse of those intellectuals 
who proclaim to be liberals with a view to both their 
Western reference points as well as their contextual 
considerations and tries to avoid any surrender to the
Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiye'de Liberalizm (1860-1990) (Liberalism in 
Turkey (1860-1990) (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1992).
Ahmet insel, Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı (Crisis of Turkish 
Society) (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1990), 78-90;
Andrew Vincent, "Liberalism,” in Modern Political Ideologies
(Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1992), 24-5. Vincent adds two more sets
of approaches as class-based and constitutionalist approach.
impasse of preoccupation with an ought-to-be liberal 
identity. An additional concern is with discerning the 
unconscious inheritance of the past generations’ 
dispositions by the self-proclaimed liberal intellectuals 
in the subsequent periods of Turkish Republic (1923-1990) 
under study.
Chapter II takes up the three theoretical dimensions 
employed in this study. The focus derives from the 
selective aspects of Western liberalism as displayed in 
the related intellectual discourse, from the perspective 
of state-centric theory. A comparative analysis of 
liberal thought as regards the British example on the one 
hand and Continental European one on the other, is 
provided. In this respect, while the main terminological 
tools such as state tradition, stateness, and 
statelessness, which are employed in this work are 
clarified, the legacy of (non)existence of state 
tradition and/or the influence of a society high/low in 
stateness in the specificity of an intellectual layout in 
a particular context is unraveled. More briefly, the 
state-intellectual relationship is taken as the 
determining factor in the flourishing and evolution of 
liberal thought on a contextual and periodical basis. In 
the meantime, it should also be noted that due to the 
rather contentious nature of liberal identity, attention 
is placed more on concepts grounded in contexts rather 
than individual liberal thinkers.
Chapter III aims at establishing the historical 
framework for the analysis in the following chapters
within the context of state-intellectual relationship in 
the Ottoman Empire, especially after the inception of the 
Tanzimat era. The period was selected deliberately since 
the effect of modernity on the intellectual sphere was
first concretized in the Tanzimat Charter (1839) . The 
period is also important because it hosted the emergence 
of the first proclaimers of liberal identity among
Western-minded Ottoman intellectuals. Throughout the 
chapter, the main thesis of this study is substantiated 
with observations concerning the legacy of a state 
tradition on the conceptual matrix of the intellectuals. 
The clue is found in the overwhelming concern of the 
Ottoman intellectuals with "how to save the state." A by­
interest is spared for the internal tensions that the
Western-minded Ottoman intellectuals experienced due to 
their internalization of the critical disposition of 
their Western counterparts on the one hand and their 
self-identification with the state, on the other. 
Particular attention is given to Prens Sabahaddin as 
displaying the portrait of a liberal intellectual as well 
as of a more or less unorthodox Ottoman intellectual, due 
to his aloofness from active engagement in state service. 
All in all, the aim is to draw the historically
determining factors which destined the Ottoman-Turkish 
liberal discourse to be perceived as a sub-title under 
the grand topic of modernization as a project, as well as 
limited its conceptual matrix to statist concerns.
Chapter IV searches the (dis)continuities in state- 
intellectual relationship in a period of a proclaimed
8
break with the past that was epitomized in the task of 
nation-building (1923-1946). The period is important 
since it witnessed the employment of liberal discourse 
not only in the first attempts to form relatively 
independent political opposition, but also in the 
formation of loyal opposition by the state. Special 
attention is given to the writings and political 
activities of Ahmet Agao^lu, a self-proclaimed liberal 
intellectual as an illuminative example of liberal 
identity in a period when the state tradition was 
crystallized into a strong state. An additional aim that 
can be discerned between the lines is to substantiate the 
observation about the liberal intellectuals throughout 
the Republican era concerning their pendulous proclivity 
to sustain their identification with the state on the one 
hand, and to situate themselves in opposition, on the 
other, which furnished them with an on the edge identity.
Chapter V analyzes the simultaneity in the evolution 
in Turkish political life which experienced a definitive 
transition to multi-party politics (1946-1960), and in 
the intellectual sphere toward Anglo-American model. The 
period is marked with the consolidation of the Anglo- 
American cross-fertilization both at the institutional 
level and in the Turkish intellectual layout. The period 
is also important, since it signified the solidification 
of a new topic of debate between the state and the 
intellectuals, that is democracy, which however did not 
mutate the general relationship between them. Thus, 
during the era in question, state-intellectual
relationship displayed indecisive controversy and 
conjunction this time around the theme of democracy. By a 
periodic categorization between 1946-1950 and 1950-1960, 
the Chapter is designed to establish the impasse, 
particularly of the liberal intellectual of the Republic 
who was squeezed between the state and his theoretical 
framework. Apart from searching for the consequences of 
such a disposition, the chapter also problematizes the 
yet-to-be constituted consistency in the liberal identity 
for almost fourty years of Turkish Republic, as best 
exemplified in the inconclusiveness of such liberal 
initiatives as the Association for the Dissemination of 
Free Ideas, and the limits of the liberal identity of the 
Forum group.
Chapter VI covers the period between 1960-1990 
followed by some tentative remarks on the 1990s. The 
period between 1960 and 1990 is studied with a view to 
the rather debilitating evolution of the liberal identity 
as first represented in the Forum group, despite their 
initial applause for the 1961 Constitution as embracing 
the long-aspired liberal premises, and then in the 
writings of Aydın Yalçın and lastly in Yen! Forum group 
organized under his leadership. The main topic of 
interest is shaped around the evolution of a liberal 
identity in a society high-in-stateness alongside with a 
preoccupation to search for the contours of a tradition 
of a liberal appearance. The Chapter takes the post-1960 
Forum discourse which was ironically expressed in the 
phrase via media-due to the dynamics of the period-, as
10
exemplifying the victory of the 'socialist' identity to 
the detriment of its 'liberal' companion. The growing 
aggressiveness in the statist discourse of Aydın Yalçın 
after a hesitant political display between active 
politics and missionary intellectual disposition to the 
detriment of the former, especially in his writings in 
Yeni Forum, which in the final analysis left no room for 
a liberal identity, are viewed in terms of state-centric 
approach. The problem of the tacit negation of a liberal 
precedent by each generation of intellectuals who have 
assumed a liberal identity, is surpassed by a recourse to 
their past links as well as their disposition vis-à-vis 
the state. The Western cross-fertilization is 
additionally employed as a tool in substantiating the 
logic of analysis. Thus, as far as the post-1990 period 
is concerned. Liberal Düşünce group is analyzed as an 
attempt by the liberal intellectual to eradicate the 
tension that has been prevalent in the liberal identity 
throughout the Republican era. The assumed nouveaux 
identity of the group with its self-proclamation of a 
genuinely liberal standing for the first time in Turkish 
Republican history, is examined with a view to the 
eventual boredom on the part of the liberal intellectual
with his indecisive disposition between the state and
political opposition. Care is taken not to reach
definitive absolute conclusions about this last
generation of Turkish liberal intellectuals. Instead, the
breaks introduced by the conceptual matrix of these
noveaux liberal intellectuals from the preceding decades
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are observed within the broader framework of an 
institutional restructuration in the post-1980 period 
that brought with it a narrower locus for a stronger 
state. An equivalently meticulous attention is employed 
to elaborate the potential of their all out universalism 
to fall into abstractionism. It also aimed at initiating 
a critical view to the probable consequences of their 
almost monopolistic claim over comprehension of the one 
and only liberal theory.
All in all, throughout the study, the focus is on 
the emergence(s) of the liberal identity in the Ottoman- 
Turkish context with special reference to 
(dis)continuities between the state-intellectual 
relationship. The rather indecisive evolution that has 
been displayed by the topic of interest throughout the
Republican era engendered a particular hardship in the
conduct of the study. However, the consistency in the
internal tension experienced by the Turkish liberal 
intellectual as well as in his rather ambivalent 
disposition vis-à-vis the state in the context of a 
society high-in-stateness provided the main escaping 
gates for the author. Lastly, a supportive ease is
offered by a wider perspective which legitimized the 
problem-loaded nature of studying liberalism in general, 
since there are more than one liberalisms. Thus, at the 
risk of repetition, it is tempting to state that the 
present study pursues a comparative historical account of 
the liberal identity as framed in intellectual discourse. 
Throughout the text, the intellectual and the state
12
and/or the intellectual vis-à-vis the state in the 
Turkish political scheme forms the sketch against which a 
liberal identity is established. In the chapters that 
follow the liberal identity seems somehow to be treated 
as behind the scenes. This arises out of the fact that in 
the Turkish context, the identity and the conceptual 
matrix of the intellectual has to a great extent been 
influenced by the nature of the state.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL BACKDROP
THE STATE AS FOCUS OF ANALYSIS
In his chapter, "Do We Need a Theory of the State?" 
where he provides a brief account of different approaches 
to the state, Andrew Vincent has concluded that every 
theory has a different conceptualization of the state.^ 
This remark connotes the difficulty of developing a 
universal theory of the state. In this respect, 
consideration of history as an analytical tool has been 
proposed as a remedy for theory in explaining different 
types of the state across countries.^ This is the same as 
questioning the sufficiency of existing theories of the
state.3 The underlying schema of the studies from the 
late-1960s onwards which take the state as the focus of
analysis, have been formulated on this account of
insufficiency.
Most studies on the theory of the state which 
originate from this problématique of universalization.
Andrew Vincent, Theories of the State (Oxford, New York: Basil
Blackwell, 1987), 219-25.
Vincent, Theories of the State.
David Held et al., States and Societies (UK: Basil Blackwell,
1983) ; Roger King, The State in Modern Society: New Directions in
Political Sociology (Chatham New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers
Inc.^ 1986); Martin Carnoy, "Whither Theories of the State?,” in The 
State and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1984) , 246-61.
attempt to provide a classification. In this respect, 
Andrew Vincent has offered a broad categorization between 
juristic/normative and sociological/historical 
approaches.·* Starting from the same premise David Held has 
employed specific political approaches, determining the 
particular way in which the state is both conceptualized 
and evaluated as an observed empirical institution. More 
briefly. Held has distinguished between liberalism, 
liberal democracy, Marxism and political sociology.^ In 
his overview of political sociology Roger King has taken 
the state as the center of his analysis and outlined the 
development of the relevant literature with respect to 
changes in approaching the state. King has taken the lack 
of emphasis on state as a weakness of orthodox political 
sociology.®
Likewise, in the 1970s many studies on the state 
which arose from different theoretical frameworks have 
begun to present shifts in their conceptualization of the 
state. The most exemplary one can be observed in the 
structuralist variant of neo-Marxist literature.’^ Roughly, 
the structural approach responded to the problem of
Vincent, Theories of the State.
Held et al.. States and Societies, 2-3.
®. King, The State in Modern Society.
For an analysis of the neo-Marxist writings see Bob Jessop, 
"Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, (1977), 1 (4), 353-73. See also Philip Resnick, "The
functions of the modern state: in search of a theory," in The State 
in Global Perspective, ed. Ali Kazancigil (UK and USA: Gower 
Publishing Company Ltd., 1986), 155-83; David Held and Joel Krieger, 
"Accumulation, Legitimation and the State: the Ideas of Clauss Offe 
and Jürgen Habermas," in States and Societies, eds. Held et al. (UK: 
Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1983), 487-97; Carnoy, "Whither Theories of the 
State?."
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explaining the growing interventionist capacity® of the 
state with the concept of "relative autonomy.”® The state 
is accorded with the "objective function" of sustaining 
the capitalist structure.^® It is also acknowledged that 
in the pursuit of such a task, the policies of the state 
may run counter not only to the interests of the 
dominated classes but also to those of the capitalist 
class itself, since it is presumed to act in the "common 
interest of all members of a capitalist class society, 
and that is interpreted as the relative autonomy of the 
state. However, here one should not overlook the fact 
that the state in itself is not employed as an 
explanatory category, but still as dependent on the 
peculiar social fa c t o r s . is again located within the 
framework of a theory, rather than forming a theory in 
itself. Thus, the tendency to employ the social and/or 
economic factors as the main variable and continue from 
thereon remains unchanged. The changes were conducted not 
in the approach to the state as such. Instead, the state 
was continued to be perceived as merely an arena for or 
an instrument of the groups or classes in society which 
are taken to be the main actors on the historical stage.
Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, 
Mechanisms and Results," in States in History, ed. John A. Hall 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986), 113-36. Anthony Giddens, "The
Modern State," in Sociology: A Brief But Critical Introduction
(London: Macmillan, 1982), 77-96.
®. Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State."
Jessop, "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," 358.
Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State," 
New German Critique (1975), 6, 139.
2^. Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 79-104; Giddens, "The Modern State,"
82-3.
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Despite the divergence in the theories of the state, 
as regards its definition, Vincent has proposed a common 
denominator. Whatever it is, the state is identified in 
terms of the category of public power.This category is 
significant for the purposes of this study since it forms 
the central theme of its referential theoretical 
framework -i.e., the state-centric approach. In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, studies conducted within this 
framework have initiated a methodological shift in the 
field of political science. Contrary to the orthodox 
trend in state theory, this strand of analysis has taken 
the state as the parameter in the analysis of societies. 
The presumption was that state is an independent and 
determining figure in the social, economic and political 
spheres. In this respect, autonomy and sovereignty are 
taken as the identifying features of the state.
Nourishing on the Weberian approach to the state as 
"a distinct institution within society, the state­
centric approach goes one step further with respect to 
the autonomy and the independence of the state from 
economic and social factors. While its predecessor 
acknowledges the prerequisite of a certain type of 
economy - i.e.,capitalist economy for the sustenance 
of the state as such, the new approach holds that the 
state should be taken into account as an "organizational
Vincent, Theories of the State, 218.
Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaiim, The Sociology of the State, 
trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1983), 17.
Ibid.
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configuration,” in the analysis of political, social and 
economic developments.^®
Interpreted as "Tocquevillian" by Theda Skocpol, 
state along this line of analysis is viewed as an 
organization with a composition of its own and hence 
possessing an eventual capacity to affect the social, 
political and economic dynamics with a potential 
disregard of all the forces out of its own structure.^“' 
Skocpol has elaborated such a standing as 
"organizational" and "realist."^® In other words, there is 
neither a question about the grounds on which the state 
can found its legitimacy, nor a preoccupation to analyze 
the structure of the state on the basis of social and 
economic determinants. The concern is neither with how 
the state acquires and utilizes power within a specific 
economic structure -which is the case in Marxist 
writings- nor with the "strength" and/or "weakness" of 
the state to be analyzed on the grounds of state 
capacities -which is the case in neo-Weberian writings.^® 
Instead, the perception of the state as autonomous by 
definition leads to a concern with the existence of the 
state-as-such, and the way this affects the polity.
Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of 
Analysis in Current Research," in Bringing the State Back In, eds. 
Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 27.
Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 20-1, 28. This standing is 
also elaborated in Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge 
: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 3-43.
IS. Ibid., 31.
IS. Ibid., 31-3.
Evans, Ruschemeyer, and Skocpol, "On the Road toward a More 
Adequate Understanding of the State," in Bringing the State Back In, 
eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 351-2.
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society and e c o n o m y . in this instance, the term autonomy 
connotes an idea and practice of the state which is an 
organization in its own right, independent from any other 
social and/or economic body, in the formulation of the 
principles and objectives of its activities Thus, 
taking the state as the starting point of analysis leads 
one to study the state as it is, rather than formulating 
conceptions of a 'better' state.
The pioneering work in this strand was provided by 
J.P. Nettl, who has provided a framework for state­
centric analysis.In his analysis, he has employed the 
term "statelessness" for societies which lack the 
experience with the state-as-such.^^ On the other hand, 
according to Nettl where the state has been autonomous 
and determinitive vis-à-vis the society, one can talk 
about societies high in stateness.in such societies the 
state is autonomous in delineating the principles, 
objectives and the functioning of politics. Politics is 
run by the predefined principles by the state which are 
not necessarily determined in accordance with the flow of 
demands from the society.
Nettl has explicated the concept of stateness on 
the grounds of a set of criterion as the
2^ . Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 3-44.
22. Pierre Birnbaum, "State, Center and Bureaucracy," Government and 
apposition, 16 (1981), 58-77.
22. J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," World Politics, 
20, (4), (July 1968), 303-33.
2^ . Ibid., 304-5.
22. Ibid., 308-12.
2®. This corresponds to the sovereignty of the state vis-à-vis the 
society. Birnbaum, "State, Center and Bureaucracy."
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institutionalization of sovereignty, centralization of 
administration, and state dominion in the legal sphere.
To begin with, institutionalization of sovereignty 
means that sovereignty of the state is impersonal and 
pertinent to all individuals. This impersonality ascribes 
the state a distinct institutional identity. In other 
words, it is not the sum total of state officials or 
different state branches. On the contrary, the state 
officials are identified in terms of their particular 
roles within the state structure, Additionally, Nettl 
has pointed at the distinctive body of rules and 
regulations which determine the running of administrative 
processes in societies high in stateness. The 
administrative law delineates the sphere of function of 
the state, while the latter is the ultimate determiner in 
its formulation and execution.when the last criterion, 
that is the legal sphere is taken into account, one again 
faces the state, as possessing the authority to establish 
legal norms and influencing the running of the judicial 
system. The fact that law is provided with no sphere of 
its own outside that of the state is also reflected in 
the self-perception of the legal professionals as the 
"state servants.
In the reading of state-centric approach, one 
eventually sees the inherent link between the concept of 
modern state and the concept of state tradition and/or
Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," 319-25. 
Ibid., pp. 319-22.
29. Ibid., pp. 320-2.
30. Ibid., pp. 322-3.
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stateness. As noted above, the term stateness connotes a 
categorization of the societies with respect to the 
autonomy of the state as an institution both conceptually 
and empirically. The criteria that are used for 
assessing the different degrees of stateness among 
various countries overlap with those in the formulation 
of the conceptual matrix of the modern state, as far as 
its presumed distinctiveness, both structurally 
(corresponds to autonomy) and functionally (corresponds 
to sovereignty), is c o n c e r n e d . T h e  connection is 
further clarified in Theories of the State, whereby 
Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary have summarized the 
basic characteristics of the (modern) state. In this 
respect, the (modern) state is presumed to have a 
specific institutional structure which imposes a standard 
identity on all the state officials “whose recruitment is 
based on the prerequisite of specialization. The 
institutional distinctiveness of the state also ensures 
the separation between public and private realms and 
endows the state with final authority in the public 
realm. This distinct institutional identity also applies 
to the officials within the state s t r u c t u r e . I n  a 
similar vein. Held has also referred to state as a modern 
concept constructed on the development of European 
political system from the sixteenth century onwards.In 
his work. The State: Its Nature, Development and
. Birnbaxim, "State, Center and Bureaucracy.”
Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary eds.. Theories of the State 
(Hampshire and London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1987).
33. Ibid., 2.
3^ . Held et.al.. States and Societies, 1.
21
Prospects, Gianfranco Poggi has provided an historical 
analysis of the development of the state, tracing its 
origins back to the decline of feudalism. Poggi has not 
used the concept of the state in the case of those 
political structures predating the experience with what 
is termed as the modern state, and thus put reserve on 
the use of the term "modern.More briefly, the state as 
one form of the institutionalization of political power 
is itself taken as a modern phenomenon that came into 
being along with such other modern concepts as the 
individual, citizenship, nation, and bureaucracy.
Above all, the concept of the modern state includes 
an idea and practice of political rule by a territorially 
defined, centralized and autonomous institution with 
control over the population. Such a definition is 
adopted in state-centric studies of state. However, this 
link (with the modern state) can mislead one to view the 
state-centric approach as ahistorical. Here, the 
inclusion of the historical dimension into the 
methodology comes into help with its emphasis on state 
tradition -i.e., whether there is an historical 
experience with public power which assumes itself a 
distinct identity over and above the society.All these 
studies are also important methodologically in the sense 
that they put the state under an historical-sociological 
focus in the explanation of the distinguishing features
Gianfranco Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development and
Prospects (UK: Polity Press, 1990).
3®. Ibid., 25.
Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, 152, fn. 2.
Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," 308-12.
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of societies. The common point is the acknowledgement of 
the difficulty of a unique theorization, applying to all 
cases of modern states arising out of different 
historical, cultural and international contexts. The 
concern is more with the searching of differences to 
explain peculiarities of societies, than with reaching a 
universal categorization.
In Nettl's terminology, alongside with historical 
experience, cultural and intellectual dimensions are 
employed in the analysis of the degree of stateness.As 
far as the historical dimension is concerned, the 
question is whether the society historically has a state 
tradition. At the cultural level the question is more 
complex in the sense that it has to do with the way 
people perceive the state and define its identity and 
functions. Nettl searches the criterion in the everyday 
language of the individuals, which he views as one way of 
access to political culture. Similarly referring to state 
as ”...an everyday reality"^® among other things, Vincent 
has also emphasized the distinction between those 
societies where the state has become "...a customary 
disposition” and those where it has been perceived 
functionally, as merely a set of institutions.^^ Last but 
not the least, the intellectual dimension dwells upon the 
question whether there has been a theoretical 
preoccupation with the phenomenon of state, and the way
35. Ibid., 313-8.
Vincent, Theories of the State, 2-3, 
1^. Ibid., 219.
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it has been employed in the studies on society and 
polity.
Inspired from this framework, Badie and Birnbaum 
have applied the historical perspective in the study of 
state and took its analysis to the realm of sociology 
with the premise that state is itself an actor in the 
social system, but not necessarily a derivative of social 
factors.On the contrary, Birnbaum has argued that the 
emergence of the state itself should be taken as the 
determining factor in re-shaping the peculiar socio­
cultural and religious context from which it has arisen. 
Again, the state as a universal concept is avoided, and 
its emergence is linked to particular historical 
contexts.·*^ In other words, the assumption is that there 
is no unique pattern for the development of state which 
applies to all the societies. Rather, it is due to such 
historical contingencies in each society, as the need to 
provide social cohesiveness and/or detrimental external 
threat, and that the experience with the state differs 
from one society to another.
In this respect, Badie and Birnbaum have 
distinguished between the state and the center. The 
distinction is based on the (lack of) experience of state 
tradition in different societies. Briefly, the assumption 
is that one can talk about center in those societies
Badie and Birnbaum, "Sociology of the state revisited," 
International Social Science Journal (June 1994) (140), 153-67.
Birnbaum, "States, ideologies and collective action in Western 
Europe," International Social Science Journal, 32 (4) (1980), 671.
Badie and Birnbaum, "Sociology of the State Revisited."
Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State.
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which have been historically capable of sustaining social 
order themselves, and hence the sphere of function of the 
institutions of power has been limited to one of 
coordination.·*® The argument is elaborated by the examples 
of England and France. Badie and Birnbaum have taken 
England as the example for those societies whereby a 
center, but no "true state”*"' exists. On the other hand, 
the French state provides the most suitable case for 
those societies with high level of stateness. Such a 
modeling is linked to a wide range of historical 
peculiarities, as the need to organize a standing army, 
of the ever-continuing state hand in the organization and 
running of the economy, and of a distinct body of 
administrators -the precedents of modern bureaucracy- 
with exclusive power over the society.*®
As far as the criteria adopted by Nettl in his 
analysis of the level of stateness are concerned, the 
British case again stands as an example of societies low 
in stateness, while France stands on the other side of 
the spectrum. Specifically, in Britain there has been a 
strict separation between the administrative apparatus 
and the sphere of politics. This was enhanced by the 
prerequisite of resignation for the civil servants from 
political posts in order to run for office. The sphere of 
politics has been exclusively reserved to the
*®. Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, 103.
*^ . Ibid., 121-34. It should be noted that Birnbaum and Badie have 
employed the concepts of "true state," and "strong state" 
interchangeably; Badie and Birnbaum, "Sociology of the state 
revisited," 158.
*®. Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, 105-15.
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representative government, which fits well in the 
dominant concept of the minimal state. On the contrary, 
in France, the administration has had dominance over the 
politics through administrative law, whereby the mobility 
between the administrative and political posts was a 
common phenomenon. Apart from that, the English legal 
system has to a great extent been based on common law, a 
body of rules piled up of traditions. It was thus more a 
product of society rather than of a distinct branch of 
the state. This again contrasts with the case in France 
whereby there has been a distinction between public and 
private law. The public law -the administrative law of 
the state- has been constituted and regulated by the 
state itself, and thus ensured state power over 
society.
In his study on ideological movements, Birnbaum 
links variations in different countries -particularly 
France, Germany and England- to the nature of the state 
experienced historically.^® The state is again taken "as 
an independent variable around which the entire social 
system is molded. Such an analysis also corresponds to 
the thesis put forth by Nettl that the historical 
experience with high level of stateness eventually 
prompts dissensus.^2 This argument is based on the 
assumption that in societies with low level of stateness, 
the occupants of ruling posts act more as mediators, than
Ibid., 110-25.
Birnbaum, "States, ideologies and collective action in Western 
Europe," 671-86.
Ibid., 672.
Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," 312.
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as law-givers and regulators, which result in the 
resolution of conflicts through consensual procedure. On 
the contrary, in societies with high levels of stateness, 
the discontent of the masses or part of the masses are 
presumed to result in a dissensual positioning against 
the ensured sovereignty of the state.
Another study on the state is provided by Kenneth H. 
F. Dyson. Dyson has indulged in an historical analysis of 
the emergence of the state -both conceptually and in 
practice-, on a comparative basis, mainly with respect to 
the differing Continental European and Anglo-American 
c a s e s . I n  addition to the similar line of analysis with 
the above-sketched studies, Dyson has specifically 
dwelled on the intellectual tradition of the state, which 
is of ultimate importance for this study, since it 
highlights the mutual influence of the state on the one 
hand, and the intellectual layout on the other, with a 
view to the interaction in between.
THE STATE AND THE INTELLECTUAL: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN 
INSTITUTIONS AND CONCEPTS
When noting the necessity of integration of history 
with philosophy in studying the state, Vincent has relied 
on the state as more than an "institutional structure," 
but as a "mental category. In criticizing the Marxist
Birnbauiti, "States, ideologies and collective action in Western 
Europe," 671-86; Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," 322.
. Kenneth H.F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe: A
Study of an Idea and Institution (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980). 
Vincent, Theories of the State, 219ff.
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approach to intellectual work for ignoring the influence 
of "particular institutionalized types of states," on 
Theory, Birnbaum has formed the link between these two 
perceptions of state. In other words, these remarks 
point that intellectual work in a specific country cannot 
be isolated from the socio-political milieu in which it 
arises, and in particular from the nature of the state - 
which in turn influences the intellectual's 
conceptualization of the state. In this perspective, the 
assumption underlying this study is that the peculiar 
experience with the state both as a concept and as an 
institution affects the sphere of problématique of a 
particular strain of thought.
Some Conceptual Clarifications on the Category of the 
Intellectual
There has been extensive divergence among the 
arguments around the category of the intellectual. This 
is very much related to the rather controversial 
conceptions of the intellectual as regards to his 
historically commencing actual identity on the one hand, 
and "ought-to-be" social and political identity, on the 
other. This controversy has been expressed in two broad 
and eventually opposing approaches to the intellectual. 
On one edge stands the terminologically retrospective 
argument by Julien Benda, which endows the intellectual
Birnbaum, "States, ideologies and collective action in Western 
Europe," 673ff.
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with the engrossment in the interpretation and 
transmission of the "transcendental truth" and considers 
the politicization of the intellectual as a "betrayal" to 
his genuine task.^ '' As is the term intellectual, the 
involvement of the intellectual in political life is a 
modern phenomenon. In his work "Intellectuals between 
politics and culture," which has the same spirit with 
Benda's work, Jerry Scazki has distinguished between the 
political and cultural intellectual and referred to the 
latter category as detached from the particularistic 
conceptions of truth and hence possessing the ideal 
qualifications for the intellectual as set by Benda.
On the other end is the counter argument by Ernest 
Gellner that politicization of the intellectual is a 
natural outcome of his responsibility to the society. 
This strain of argument holds that the intellectual might 
be furnished by a political and social identity which 
does not necessarily avoid his search for the truth, 
while adding the task of searching for the best order in 
a particular culture and society. This 'extra' concern 
denotes a not necessarily distinterested posture towards 
the political and social concerns of his time. In this 
respect, the responsibility of the intellectual is
Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals, trans. Richard 
Aldington (N.Y. And London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969).
Jerry Scazki, "Intellectuals between politics and culture," in 
The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals, eds. Ian Maclean, Alan 
Montefiore and Peter Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 247-57.
Ernest Gellner, "La Trahison de la Trahison des Clercs," in The 
Political Responsibility of Intellectuals, eds. Ian Maclean, Alan 
Montefiore and Peter Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 17-29. See also, Edward Shils, "Intellectuals and 
responsibility," in ibid., 257-307.
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reinterpreted with respect to such particularistic 
phenomena as the culture, politics and economy that 
surround him.®° Nevertheless, the meeting point between 
the two edges can be found in the attribute of the 
intellectual as being in a critical quest for and the 
transmission of the universal truth.
The controversy in different approaches has 
naturally had connotations for the variety of methods in 
studying the intellectual as a category. On the one hand, 
the intellectual may be taken as over and above the 
historical and structural concerns. In this case, it is 
standardized with respect to a particular manner of 
thinking and acting. On the other hand, the study may be 
structurally oriented. In this case, one should 
distinguish between the class-based theories which mainly 
take the class identity of the intellectual as the 
starting point, and those which adopt a more 
comprehensive approach in relating the disposition(s) of
For an analysis of works of Marx, C. Wright Mills and Naom 
Chomsky along this line, see Kurt H. Wolff, "The Intellectual Between 
Culture and Politics,” in The World of Intellectuals, eds. Dharam Vir 
and B.P. Sharma (New Delhi: Classical Publishing Co., 1990), 119-32. 
For an historical analysis of the different functions -read as 
responsibities- attributed to the intellectual see Andrew Ross, 
"Defenders of the Faith and the New Class," in Intellectuals: 
Aesthetics, Politics and Academics, ed. Bruce Robbins (USA: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 101-32. For a series of 
comparative questions and proposed answers for the role of the 
intellectual with a view to the peculiarities of the pre-modern and 
modern epochs see, R. Radhakrishnan, "Toward an Effective 
Intellectual," in The World of Intellectuals, eds. Vir and Sharma 
(New Delhi: Classical Publishing Co., 1990), 57-99.
For a recent contribution on the collection of the class-based 
analysis of the intellectuals of the modern epoch see Bruce Robbins 
ed.. Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics and Academics (USA: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1990); Eyerman, Lennart G. Svensson, 
Thomas Soderqvist eds.. Intellectuals, Universities and the State in 
Modern Societies (California: University of California Press, 1987).
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the intellectual to historically arisen social 
situations.
As far as the second perspective is concerned the 
leading works have been provided by Karl Mannheim. 
Beginning with a particularistic conception of the 
intellectual, preoccupied with the "...interpretation of 
the world for a specific society,Mannheim has asserted 
that no individual can totally be free from the 
particular societal constellations, and thus, one has to 
search for the social bases of opinion. More briefly, 
what is more pertinent is searching for the historical 
and social conditions under which the intellectual 
formulates his disposition, rather than analyzing strains 
of thought at an abstract level.Belatedly, the role and 
function of the intellectual varies along with the 
historical and social peculiarities. On the other hand, 
apart from the wider social configurations which surround 
the intellectual and are free of him, Mannheim has also 
introduced such side factors as the social background, 
reference group, prevalent occupational standing, 
decisive in the analysis of the intellectual as 
category.^·* in this respect, even the "detached" or 
"unattached" intellectual is analyzed from this
Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the 
Sociology of Knowledge, trans. Louis Writh and Edward Shils (San 
Diego, New York and London: HBJ Publishers, 1985), 6.
Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia; Mannheim, "The Problem of the 
Intelligentsia: An Inquiry into Its Past and Present Role," in Essays 
on the Sociology of Culture, ed. Bryan S. Turner (Ldndon: Routledge, 
1992), 91-166.
Mannheim, "The Problem of the Intelligentsia," 158.
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perspective without relegating his indifference to his 
opinions in an isolated cognitive process.
Along the same line Ron Eyerman has provided an 
historical analysis of the intellectual with a view to 
three interlinked spheres, namely cognitive, 
institutional and self-referential.®® In this respect, 
Eyerman has tried to escape from a static definition of 
and role ascription to the intellectual. In its stead, he 
has analyzed the "intellectual as an emergent role 
constructed by actors out of cultural traditions in 
historical contexts."®"^
By and large, the term intellectual has been taken 
as the by-product of modernity, when knowledge was 
transformed from being a value in itself, to a means for 
alternative mediums of power.®® In line with developments 
throughout the age of Enlightenment and thenceforth, the 
term was assigned to those societal groups which held the 
monopoly of access to knowledge outside the religious 
sphere. However, when viewed from a wider perspective - 
i.e., according to the common denominator of intellectual 
activity - as the one who "...is inclusively preoccupied 
with reaching to and disseminating the facts about the
®®. Ibid.; Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 153-64.
®®. Ron Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics : Intellectuals in
Modern Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 20.
®\ Ibid., ix.
®®. According to the commonly held view the term intellectual was 
first used with political connotations during the Dreyfuss Affair 
with a rather negative sense to refer to those petitioners who 
supported Dreyfuss. See Seymour M. Lipset and Asoke Baseu,
"Intellectual Types and Political Roles," in The Idea of Social 
Structure, Papers in Honor of Robert M. Kerton, ed. Lewis A. Coser 
1975; Eyerman, Svensson, Soderqvist eds.. Intellectuals, Universities 
and the State in Modern Societies (California: University of
California Press, 1987), 1.
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man, society and universe, the term also becomes 
pertinent for the pre-Enlightenment ecclesiastics who had 
claimed to be the sole authority of the worldly and 
divine knowledge. However, by putting an end to the 
monopoly of the church over knowledge the intellectual of 
the Enlightenment took over the claim of the former to 
decide about the universal values to provide the basis 
for the best form of order in the society.It is in this 
respect that Zygmunt Bauman has referred to the 
intellectual of the Enlightenment as the "legislator.
Although he has comfortably been assigned the 
identity of legislator, the intellectual has always had a 
rather uneasy relation with Power. Edward Shils has 
summarized this uneasy relation in "the tension between 
the intellectuals and the powers -their urge to submit to 
authority as the bearer of the highest good, whether it 
be order or progress or some other values, and to resist 
or condemn authority as the betrayer of the highest 
values-... "■'2 This tension gains a new appearance in those 
societies high-in-stateness. In such societies existence 
of the state not only as an institution, but also as an 
active concept^^ transforms the tension between the 
intellectual and the Power to an internal one that the
International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (USA: The Macmillan 
Company and the Press Press), 399.
For the argument about the continuity between the clerics of the 
medieval era and secular intellectual of the Enlightenment with 
respect to the access to universal, see Gellner, "La Trahison de la 
Trahison des Clercs."
2^. Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1987).
2^. Shils, The Intellectuals and Powers and Other Essays (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 17-8.
Vincent, Theories of the State, 224.
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intellectual experiences in his disposition vis-à-vis the 
state. This is especially true for the Shilsian 
institutional intellectual. By the term institutional 
intellectual Shils has referred to that particular 
intellectual employed in state service, as well as in 
professionalized fields of study and in the academies. 
The institutional intellectual is endowed with a sense of 
political responsibility and thus a tendency to actively 
participate within the authority structure. This tension 
can also be observed in Dick Flacks' study on the 
relation between social theory and the power structures. 
Flacks has referred to the delimitation of the 
"organizationally mobilized intellectual's" interest to 
"maintenance and order.
Dyson has provided a comprehensive account of the 
relation between the state and intellectual and the 
effects of this relation on intellectual work.·^ ® Employing 
a comparative analysis of the intellectual preoccupation 
with the concept of the state with respect to Anglo- 
American and Continental European cases, Dyson has 
attributed the differences among countries to particular 
philosophical and legal traditions as well as to the 
diverse historical experiences with the state as an
On the other side of the spectrum Shils points at the free-lance 
intellectuals which are characterized by an aloofness from society 
and a critical stand towards the existing authority structure coupled 
with an aversion to participate in it. Shils, "Intellectuals and 
responsibility."
Dick Flacks, "Making History and Making Theory: Notes on How 
Intellectuals Seek Relevance," in Intellectuals and Politics: Social 
Theory in a Changing World, ed. Charles C. Lemert (Newbury Park, 
London and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), 9-10.
Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe.
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institution. Throughout the book the core argument is 
that the degree of stateness and/or state tradition is 
determining for the variations among different
intellectual traditions.'’'^
Dyson has searched the rationale behind different 
conceptualizations of the state and variations among 
prior issues that occupied the intellectual work in the 
nature of the state and in its relation with academia. As 
regards the nature of the state, he has exemplified the 
function of the state as providing order in Germany and 
in nineteenth-century France. Comparatively he has taken 
the Anglo-American case whereby the state as an all- 
comprehensive concept -viewed either as an institution or 
as an organism- did not have such weight as did 
preoccupation with specific issues and diverse 
institutions, autonomous within their distinctive spheres 
of action.'’®
As far as the relation between the state and 
academia is concerned, Dyson has traced the extent of 
state interference in academic issues in continental 
Europe in the nineteenth century. He has also added the 
role of the state institutions as potential recruitment 
agencies for the intelligentsia. In this respect, the 
state's hand in university education was most manifest in 
the growth of historiography in France and statistics in 
Germany. More briefly, in France history performed a 
unifying function in a time of social turmoil and
Ibid., 81-93.
■’®. Ibid., 83-95.
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external threat by the injection of the idea of state as 
the provider of order in society. And in the German 
context, the growth of statistics on the initiative of 
the state is linked to the tendency of the state for 
efficient means of information-gathering and control, 
which was perceived as a way to enhance the
centralization process.
Relatedly, Dyson has referred to the difference of 
the Anglo-American intellectual tradition, pointing at 
the lack of experience with the state as a separately 
defined institution, both legally and sociologically. 
Specifically in Britain, the fact that it is the society, 
rather than the state, that has been on the forefront in 
history prevented the emergence of the continental model 
of state with its predominance over all spheres, 
including politics and economy. Not differently, the
American society inherited the British tradition of self- 
government, without the need for a separate centralizing 
institution. The American society did not share the 
continental unease with providing for an integrated 
social identity. Additionally, as in its British
antecedent, political power in the American context has 
been concentrated in the hands of social groups, mainly
Ibid., 83-93. For the same line of argument see, Hans Kastendiek, 
"Political development and political science in Western Europe," in 
The Development of Political Science: A Comparative Survey, eds,
David Easton, John G. Gunnell and Luigi Graziano (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1991), 108-12; Jean Leca, "French political science 
and its 'subfields’: some reflections on the intellectual
organization of the discipline in relation to its historical and 
social situation," in ibid., 147-65.
Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe.
Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, 121-5.
Ibid., 126.
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the businessmen.such a configuration laid the grounds 
for the replacement of continental preoccupation with the 
state as possessing public power, by the prominence of 
elite studies.®^ Thus, it is no surprise that the major 
focus of concern has been the individual -which 
symbolized the identity of British bourgeoisie and 
American businessmen-, the liberty -which primarily 
connoted free-initiative-, and equality -essentially 
meaning that of opportunity. Interest in the state has 
been limited to the delimitation of its sphere of 
function with respect to the individual-as-such.
Last but not least, Dyson has read the differences 
between Anglo-American and continental intellectual 
traditions as regards the concept of state with a view to 
the peculiar experience of liberalism in the British 
political culture -and its cross-fertilization into 
America. Thus the preoccupation has turned out to be with 
the delimitation of authority, rather than with the 
understanding of an all-embracing state -which had 
already been absent in history.®^
Given the above picture - though general in vista - 
it can be concluded along with Dyson that there are 
"national traditions of political theories."®® In other 
words, the issue area with which an intellectual 
tradition engrosses itself, and the means of 
interpretation employed thereof reflect particular
®®. Ibid., 126-30.
®^ . Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 196. 
®®. Ibid., 201.
®®. Ibid., The State Tradition in Western Europe, 155.
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cultural experiences. On the other hand, intellectual 
traditions are prone to transformation - i.e., that no
particular case is unchangeable in itself, since 
throughout history the intellectual tradition within the 
same country retains the potential of changeability due 
to the arising socio-political problems.
STATE TRADITION AND LIBERAL THOUGHT: TOWARDS A TENTATIVE
MATRIX
In his chapter on liberalism Vincent has
distinguished among four approaches in studying liberal 
thought. Roughly, he has cited the nation-state approach, 
the approach to particular liberal traditions, the
approach as co-emergent with a particular type of 
economic structure namely capitalism, and finally
constitutionalist approach. The first and second 
approaches inhere the assumption that flows between the 
lines of this thesis, -i.e., there is no one liberal 
tradition but national traditions of liberal thought.
Liberal literature in the Western context is marked 
basically by its opposition to the unlimited power of the 
state, which was used to be legitimated on the grounds of 
a paternalistic view of acting in the name of the 
subjects for the fulfilment of their happiness.®® The 
tradition that would later be named as "liberal," and
®^ . Vincent, "Liberalism," in Modern Political Ideologies (Cambridge: 
Basil Blackwell, 1992), 24-5.
®®. J.G. Merquior, Liberalism: Old and New (Boston: Twayne
Publishers, 1991), 85-6.
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which found its most salient examples in England from 
seventeenth century onwards, did not emerge out of the 
blue. Rather, it was the outcome of a process extending 
through almost two hundred years of Western history 
characterized by an overall change in the socio-political 
domain. The process also contained intellectual shifts in 
the way of providing appropriate theories as regards the 
evolution of the relationship between the ruler and ruled 
-i.e., from the sovereign - subject to the state-citizen 
formulation within the framework of nation-state.
It is not possible to account for a monolithic 
picture of the liberal tradition, since due to the 
specificities of the countries as well as of the epoch it 
was introduced, the major focus of concern has displayed 
variations. A general background can be framed for the 
rise of liberal literature in different western 
countries, though not necessarily falling into the same 
period. Roughly, the historical process through which a 
reformulation of the political and social theory has come 
about was built on the dissolution of the socio-political 
structures of the Middle Ages. The dissolution also 
contained a radical shift in the understanding of the 
universe whereby science and reason -free from religion- 
began to overwhelm the predominating metaphysical and 
cosmological theology.In other words, the perception of 
knowledge as a way to salvation -which had been the
Contained within the Enlightenment thought, a new scientific 
outlook -discarding all modes of understanding which preclude the 
intelligibility of man- was initiated with reflection on the analysis 
of social and political structures.
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commonly held idea in the preceding period-was replaced 
by a new understanding whereby knowledge was taken as a 
means of power over nature. The epoch also witnessed 
restructurations in the relations of authority parallel 
to the changes in the social, economic and political 
spheres.
Renaissance and Reformation: 'Man' as the Focus
A brief look at the background out of which liberal 
theory emerged, provides a schema of drastic 
transformations. Beginning with the materialization of a 
new formation, the predominantly agricultural economic 
structure of the Middle Ages was gradually replaced by a 
new spirit, introducing the perception of wealth as an 
end for its possessor, which had been denounced for the 
sake of society. Parallel to this shift were geographical 
discoveries, technological innovations and the extension 
of literacy. This overall transformation accompanied and 
carried the signs of the subsequent historical 
developments of Renaissance, Reformation and 
Enlightenment. Firstly, Renaissance and Reformation 
brought in the primacy of the man and the idea of 
toleration to the religious sphere, to find firm grounds 
in the Protestant movement which upheld individual 
examination of Scriptures as the only means of fulfilment 
of faith and worship. Subsequently, Enlightenment
Harold J. Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism: An Essay in
Interpretation (London: George Allen and Unwxn LTD, 1936), 11-86.
Ibid., 11-86.
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thought, providing a scientific outlook, attributed the 
central role to the principle of progress and credibility 
to reason and scepticism in its accomplishment.
It is against this background that what is named as 
liberal tradition arose with a social and political 
theory, based on toleration as an inheritance of the 
Protestant movement, though in an extended n a t u r e T h e  
emerging tradition employed the scientific outlook of the 
Enlightenment in fulfilling its ambition to understand 
the world and society. In its understanding of the 
world and society it proposed a new interpretation of the 
relationship between society and man, and man and state. 
The roots of such an interpretation can be traced back to 
the shift in the outlook as regards the nature of man 
which is most significant in the writings of Thomas 
Hobbes.
2^. Ibid.; Vincent, "Liberalism," 25.
However, here it should be noted that the Protestant opposition 
to the centralized and hierarchical structure of Rome and its attack 
on the medieval institutions was not merely a reflection of faith in 
the individual. It is linked more to a conviction of the incapacity 
and irrelevancy of the then-existing human institutions in matters of 
faith. For the argument about the discrepancies between the 
Protestant premises and liberal thought see Andrzej Rapaczynski, 
Nature and Politics (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1987), 62-3; and Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism, 29-34.
. Jeremy Waldron, "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism," The 
Philosophical Quarterly, 37 (147) (April 1987), 135.
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Liberal Thought in the English Context: The Cradle of a
Tradition
Man, society and the state: Hobbeslan scheme as the
precedent?
Hobbes has been commonly referred to as a breaking 
point in the study of philosophy, politics and society. 
His writings introduced the presumption of an analogy 
between the studies of nature and society.In the study 
of society and polity he adopted nominalism -i.e., the 
studying of institutions with reference to the
individuals as their constitutive units.
Hobbes also introduced separation between the ideal 
and the real to social sciences. This was manifested in 
the reformulation of the concept of the state of nature 
as a category for providing an explanation of the 
formation of the society and the s t a t e . I n  contrast to 
the preceding tradition, Hobbes freed the concept from 
its theological bonds. Instead of the preceding
Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press^ 1953), 166ff. Ian Shapiro, The Evolution 
of Rights in Liberal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986), 23-80.
Strauss, Natural Right and History, 181-202; C.B. Macpherson, The 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1962), especially 30-1. See also 
Rapaczynski, Nature and Politics, especially Part I.
Strauss, Natural Right and History, 183; Rapaczynski, Nature and 
Politics, 63.
In Hobbesian terms the function of the state was one of provision 
of the existence of the natural rights of each individual, rather 
than determining the basis of a virtuous life for the citizenry. 
Strauss, Natural Right and History, 181. See also Rapaczynski, Nature 
and Politics; Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism.
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theological state of grace which foresaw virtue as the 
basis of the ideal order, in Hobbesian society man and 
his desires turned to be determining in the escape from 
the state of nature and in the maintenance of the order 
established thereof.
The reinterpretation of the nature of man by Hobbes 
as basically containing selfish and independent
attributes, also laid the basis of his social and 
political theory. The society and the state were both 
perceived to be post-individual, and formed by the self- 
determined actions of the individual. Such an analysis
turned the preceding theories about man and society
upside down, through a rejection of an organic perception 
of the society and the state, as well as by the
reservation of a sphere for the individual independent of 
social and/or political institutions. On the other 
hand, aside from the private sphere of the individual, 
Hobbes accorded the state with extensive dominion in the 
public domain as a prerequisite for the fulfilment of its 
ultimate task of preserving peace and security.Again 
different from the preceding tradition, whereby the 
concern had prevailed to be with "the best regime," for
Strauss, Natural Right and History, 166-202.
Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, p. 
17; Rapaczynski, Nature and Politics, 7-8; Shapiro, The Evolution of 
Rights in Liberal Theory, 275.
The Hobbesian state, dressed with absolute sovereignty in the 
public sphere, has led to controversial interpretations of Hobbes's 
legacy to the liberal thought. While Rapaczynski rejects an attribute 
of a precedence to liberal thought in Hobbes's writings. Rapaczynski, 
Nature and Politics, 62; Shapiro states that what Hobbes had 
delineated within the context of absolute sovereignty were almost the 
same with the liberal interpretation of the regulative state. 
Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 65-6.
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Hobbes the raison d'être of the state was the main 
question·
It would not be wrong to argue that the writings of 
Hobbes had handed over a thematic and methodological 
legacy for liberal theory. In this sense, the most 
significant point is the perception of individual as the 
basic category, both ontologically and 
methodologically.^^^ The concept of the individual, 
occupying a central place in social and political 
analysis also brought with it the category of contract as 
the basis of social and political formation.
The interpretation of the social and political 
structures on the grounds of a contract, presumed to be 
formulated through individual consent, provided a
Here;, it is also possible to observe the breakthrough initiated 
by Hobbes from the preceding tradition of political philosophy that 
the major concern turned to be with legitimacy to be assessed on the 
basis of consent^ rather than on virtue. Strauss, Natural Rights and 
History, 191. Thus, the link with the liberal tradition is also 
observable which put forth the prerequisite that the workings of the 
socio-political order should be apprehensible for the people, rather 
than being clouded into a web of "mythological” and/or "mystical” 
justifications. James Waldron, "The Theoretical Foundations of 
Liberalism," 146.
Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 59-80; 
Rapaczynski, Nature and Politics, 63.
. The confidence in the capacity of man to understand and control 
the nature also formed one basic feature of liberal thought as the a 
priori that reason is the natural possession of man. It is this a 
priori which leads man to enter into a contract and to form the 
society. However, here it should be noted that the basic feature of 
Hobbes’s individual is passion rather than reason. Shapiro, The 
Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 58, 75; Strauss, Natural Right 
and History, 201. Also for the liberal reservation put on the a 
priori of man’s rationality especially within the context of society 
see Waldron, "Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” 133.
The stress in Hobbesian political philosophy was on consent as 
the basis of sovereignty. Strauss, Natural Right and History, 186-7. 
Not differently, within the context of liberal thought what is 
accounted is the prerequisite that the sovereignty should be based on 
the consent of the individual. Waldron, "Theoretical Foundations of 
Liberalism, ” 128.
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precedence for liberal theory to be reflected in the 
perception of rights as being prior to society. Thus, the 
rights of the individual were accepted to be independent 
of the obligations to which the individual is expected to 
be exposed in social interactions. Rather, the latter 
were held to be a derivation from the voluntary consent 
of the individuals.
On the one hand, the most fundamental legacy of the 
Hobbesian stand for liberal theory was the priority given 
to the individual as one actor other than the s t a t e . O n  
the other hand, the fact that Hobbes took the individual 
and state as the only categories worth analyzing and 
discarded all other social institutions as possessing no 
value is one point of divergence between his studies and 
the following liberal thought.The  case of religion is 
exemplary in this instance. Hobbes regards religious 
affairs as falling either in the individual sphere - 
concerning inner conviction-, or in the public sphere - 
concerning practice and hence the society-, and denies 
any legitimacy to any other institution other than the 
state in the latter.
Additionally, Hobbes's contention with the concept 
of absolute sovereignty, insofar as it is based on the
Strauss, Natural Right and History, 181-3; Shapiro, The 
Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 23-69, 82-122.
Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 48, 60-1.
Here, the distinction between the other regarding activities of 
man and his inward autonomy should be noted. For Hobbes only with 
respect to the other regarding activities the state, and only the 
state, has the authority to take measures. D.J. Manning, Liberalism, 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), 38; Rapaczynski, Nature and 
Politics, 61-2.
Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 48, 60-1;
Rapaczynski, Nature and Politics, 62.
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consent of the individuals, places his political theory 
at a different platform when compared to the liberal 
appraisal of the representative government as the most 
adequate form of political organization for the
preservation of social o r d e r . I n  this respect, it would 
be more proper to conclude that the categories and the 
concepts introduced by Hobbes in the analysis of actual 
social and political structures of his time -i.e., 
explanation of what is and why-, had provided the tools 
for the liberal formulation of what ought to be.
Liberal thought in a "stateless" society
Richard Bellamy has referred to "the gradual nature 
of Britain’s social development" which "allowed British 
liberals to take the existence of a liberal society for 
g r a n t e d . E n g l i s h  liberal tradition flourished in a 
political setting which is characterized by Badie and 
Birnbaum as the "weak state model. such a setting
influenced both the formulation of the basic, categories 
as well as the methodology of the liberal writings. In 
England the prevalence of the Parliament which functioned 
effectively to balance the potentially conflicting areas
In this instance it should be noted that Hobbes wrote in a 
period of civil disorder due to an overall decomposition at both the 
social and economic levels, as a result of the dissolution of the 
feudal structures. What Hobbes proposed for the consolidation of the 
new structuration was absolute sovereignty of the state to have full 
control at all levels. Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal 
Theory, 48-9, 66-9; Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism, 86-161;
Rapaczynski, Nature and Politics, 25-7.
Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society: An Historical 
Argument (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 5.
Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, 123-34.
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of social sphere, and the gradual dominance of 
parliamentary power over potential centres of power - 
i.e., the king, the church, the aristocracy-, coupled 
with relative external security, nullified the need for a 
strong state, both in idea and practice, which had been 
experienced by its continental counterparts.
Such a configuration also delineated the sphere of 
problématique for the English liberal texture. Liberal 
thought which gained its political preeminence from the 
eighteenth century onwards had found its groundwork in 
the writings of John Locke.Basically, the concern was 
not with the concept of the state, but with that of the 
individual, characterized by its natural possession of 
reason. The state was studied around the problem of 
legitimacy and in reference to the ideal limits of its 
sphere of functioning.^’·®
The legacy of the lack of state tradition on English 
liberal texture was also nurtured with the Protestant 
movement. Within the context of Protestant reformism the 
individual was at the centre vis-à-vis the established 
Church -i.e., Rome. The affairs of religion and state 
were thought to belong to separate realms. The individual 
was perceived to be competent enough to interpret the 
Scriptures on his own.’·’·’ The freedom of the individual in
Ibid., 121. 
’•’•^. Ibid., 121-2.
115 For the Lockean precedence to the English liberal tradition see 
Rapaczynski, Nature and Politics, and Ruth W. Grant, John Locke's 
Liberalism, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
116 Grant, John Locke's Liberalism, 6.
’·’·’ Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, trans. R.G. 
Collingwood (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 14-23, 395-9.
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Protestant reformism which was idealized within the 
religious context, was carried to the sphere of the 
relation between the state and individual by the liberal 
t e x t u r e . I n  the early English liberal thought, freedom 
was perceived to contain a negative attribute -i.e., 
freedom from outside intervention in matters concerning 
the private realm of the individual. Freedom,
understood in this sense was based on the premise that 
liberty was a natural right of the individual prior to 
and independent of any social and political formation. 
Such a conception was also linked to the centrality of 
the individual not only in the state of nature, but also 
within the social and political setting which laid the 
basis for the confirmation of the right of resistance for
the ruled. 121
The individual of the English liberal thought found 
its replica in the eighteenth-century nouveaux
11®. Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 128-9.
11®. The term "guarantism" well suits to the conception of individual 
freedom in the English liberal thought -i.e., liberty of the 
individual meaning its freedom from the state. Ruggiero, The History 
of European Liberalism, 60.
12°. The society and state were perceived to be the rational 
construction of the individuals in order to ensure their security. 
Thus, the passage from the state of nature to civil society, and the 
law to regulate the latter is grounded on reason. Ruggiero, The 
History of European Liberalism, 160; Strauss, Natural Right and 
History, 228.
121. In this respect what Locke credited as resistance was a 
spontaneously arrived "majority decision" to end the corrupt 
goverivnent only to replace it with an alternate legitimate one. 
Strauss, Natural Right and History, 232. On the other hand the 
reservation put on the right of resistance can also be found in the 
writings of Locke: "Unless a ruler actively places himself 'into a
State of War with his People, dissolve the Government and leave them 
to that defense, which belongs to everyone in the State of Nature' he 
may not legitimately be resisted." Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights 
in Liberal Theory, 115. See also John Kilcullen, "Locke on Political 
Obligation," Review of Politics, 45, (1983), 323-44.
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bourgeoisie. H a v i n g  been organized within a political 
party, and in constant struggle against the
conservatives, the liberal intellectual had the dual
preoccupation of access to power on the one hand, and of 
providing solutions to the problems of the day on grounds 
of his individualistic heritage, on the other hand.^23 
From the eighteenth century onwards, English liberal 
thought evolved in the midst of party struggle, and its 
basic figure of opposition was the conservative party, 
rather than the state. ^24 jts demands were against the 
traditional privileges of the nobility as represented in 
the Tory programme, and in favor of the merchant, the
banker and the trader.
However, the fact that England served as the 
homeland for liberal thought did not make it immune to 
continental European cross-fertilization. The continental 
European influence was manifest in the late- nineteenth 
century with the diversion of the liberals* interest in 
democracy. On the surface, arising out of party struggle, 
liberals slowly gave up their scepticism about state 
interference. Rather than viewing state activity as of 
mere negativity, the argiaments now began to revolve 
around its necessity.
As regards democracy, John Stuart Mill, while 
acknowledging its advantages for the individual, also
. Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, 124-5.
2^3. Ibid.
2^^ . Ibid., 135.
2^3. Examplary is the advocacy of the abolition of Corn laws and of 
free trade. Ibid., 124ff.
126. Ibid., 142.
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drew out its possible dangers, as contained in the 
"tyranny of the majority" and the "tyranny of the 
society. "^ 27 ^he face of such danger. Mill took on
liberal principles of government as a check against 
democracy. ^2® However, the most important continental 
European influence on Mill's work was the due regard he 
extended to the moral and intellectual development of the 
individuals. Mixed with his individualistic standing, 
this turned into a rejection of government interference 
in matters not necessarily restricting individual 
liberty. As different from the liberty of the individual 
from government interference which was of ultimate 
importance for Mill, especially as regards the other 
regarding acts, ^29 also opposed government interference 
for "not restraining the actions of the individuals, but 
helping them."^®° Thus, an additional aspect was added to 
the denunciation of government interference on the basis 
of the principle of liberty. Regardless of its raison 
d'étre Mill denounced any interference on the basis of 
moral and intellectual development of the individual, 
while at the same time reserving liberal wariness 
concerning the ever-present potential for increase in
state power.^21
^2\ Ibid., 144-6.
2^^ . Ruggiero has posited Mill as representing the transitory stage 
in the "democratization" of English liberalism. Ibid., 143.
2^®. John W. Gray and G. W. Smith eds., J.S. Mill ON LIBERTY in focus 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 90-107.
Ibid., 122.
Ibid., 122ff; See also Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society,
22-4.
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The democratization of English liberalism was 
consolidated in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, in the works of T.H. Green, a prominent figure 
among the Oxford Idealists. while introducing a
reinterpretation of freedom. Green also opposed classical 
liberal premises. In Green's writings it is possible to 
observe a shift from the emphasis on the individual to 
the state and society. Such a shift can be linked to the 
rejection of faith in the principle of spontaneity in 
human relations. Doing away with the negative
conception of liberty. Green asserted that it can only be 
realized insofar as it is recognized by the state. 
Freedom, thus understood, brought forth the necessity of 
state interference for the development of the characters 
of the individuals, and thus for the practice of 
morality.Underlying such a perception was the approach 
to the rights of the individual which can be linked to 
the Benthamite descent. Thus similar to the Benthamite 
disposition, for Green there can be no rights anterior to 
the society, rather they evolve out of the relationship 
between the members of a society, However, the
On the influence of Immanuel Kant on Green see, Bellamy, 
Liberalism and Modern Society; Bellamy "T.H. Green and the morality 
of Victorian liberalism," in Victorian Liberalism: Nineteenth century 
political thoought and practice, ed. Bellamy (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 131-51; Ruggiero, The History of European
Liberalism, 147-9.
Green asserted that the society needs external help -the help of 
the state- for the exercise of progress. Ruggiero, The History of 
European Liberalism, 148.
Ibid., 148-9.
The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought, ed. David 
Miller (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987), 183-5.
Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, 148.
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traditional approach to the state with a view to 
legitimacy remained untouched.
Liberal Thought Outdoors: The Continental Europeaui
Experience
Germany: "state liberalism rr l37
The individual and individual freedom in the context 
of German liberalism, -despite the shared experience with 
Protestant Reformation-, was interpreted from a totally 
diverging perspective when compared to the English case. 
Such a difference can be analyzed on the grounds of the 
argument made by Badie and Birnbaum that Germany stands 
as an example for the model of "government via the 
State. "138
In Germany, the development of the state can be 
traced back to the mid-seventeenth century Prussia.i39 The 
process extended well into the nineteenth century. In the 
meantime the German state had to grapple with the 
military which had dominated the buraucratic apparatus on 
the one hand, and with the Stande which had ensured 
economic power on the other. 1·*° The consolidation of an 
independent bureaucracy was achieved in the nineteenth
13^ . The term is borrowed from Hans Vorländer, "Is there a liberal 
political tradition in Germany?,” in The Liberal Political Tradition: 
Contemporary Reappraisals, ed. James Meadowcroft (UK and USA: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1996), 101-14.
138. Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, 115-20.
139. Ibid.
i·*®. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and 
Germany, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 
1992).
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century after the adoption of a series of reform 
legislations which gradually decreased the autonomy of 
the Stande.'^ ^^  Such a development in the institutional 
sphere was accompanied by a shift in the legal sphere. 
The replacement of the military state -Polizeistaat- with 
the Rechtstaat brought with it the codification of a 
systematic body of law, in accordance with which the 
state was presumed to act.^ ^^  jn fact, the codification 
was well underway from seventeenth century onwards. The 
precedence of a distinct sphere of administrative law can 
be found in the monarchical decrees of the seventeenth 
century through which the "commisserial bureaucracy" had 
ensured its extensive dominion over the society.
In this respect, German liberal thought flourished 
in the midst of an ongoing centralization process. As 
Leonard Krieger has argued, it is not possible to talk 
about one German liberal thought. Instead, liberal 
thought in Germany was dispersed within itself and across 
regions.The variants of German liberal thought had to 
chose between either transcending the existing 
institutional configuration while paying due regard to 
history (the Moderates and the Dualists), or with the 
total replacement of the old with the new through a
Ibid., 57-64.
Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, 117.
Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 55- 
7.
Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom (Chicago and London; 
The University of Chicago Press, 1972).
Krieger has provided a classsification of the strands within 
German liberal thought with respect to thematic differences which 
also correspond to regional peculiarities. In this respect he has 
differentiated roughly between the Moderates (North-West), the 
Dualists (South) and the Radicals. Ibid., 278-398.
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revolution (the Radicals) Thus, the reality of a 
fragmented German society, perceived to be in need of 
unification by all the liberal theoreticians, cut across 
the preoccupation with the individual as the basic 
category of the classical liberal stand.
On the other hand, arising out of an historical 
legacy of state tradition, in German liberal thought the 
concern was not with the individual as a social category, 
but with the "mission"^ '*® of molding that individual-as- 
citizen. This was considered as the sine-qua-non for the 
realization of the ideal liberal society.Additionally, 
instead of putting emphasis on the concept of individual 
as the bearer of rationality, the German liberal thinker 
turned towards society which was perceived to contain a 
"latent" reason. This also led to a distinguished place 
for the programme of education in German liberal thought, 
which was perceived to be the basic intermediary through 
which reason as a social attribute would be realized.
The significance of education in the German liberal 
context had its roots in the tradition of Romanticism and 
the organic theory of the state. Firstly, the Romantic 
tradition provided an asocial understanding of the
Ibid.
Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom.
Woodruff D. Smith, Politics and the Sciences of Culture in 
Germany: 1840-1920 (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 
84.
Ibid., 14.
Ibid., 23-5; Vorländer cites Immanuel Kant's emphasis on "'the 
release of people from their self-incurred immaturity'" in presenting 
the recourse of early nineteenth century German liberalism to the 
state to step in for the education of the individual in the way of 
moulding the German citizen. Vorländer, "Is there a liberal political 
tradition in Germany," 104.
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individual which gave priority to the soul over reason, 
inner uniqueness over oneness, and inwardness over socio­
political engagements. The conviction that the 
perfection of the soul -the self-fulfilment of the 
individual- as the highest achievement of the individual 
could only be accomplished by education, confirmed the 
pivotal role of state as the provider and director of 
such a t a s k .  1 2^ secondly, in the context of the organic 
conception of state, the state was perceived as one part 
of the society and as the highest form of 
individuality. jn this respect, the perfection of the 
individual soul was again held to be achieved only within 
the society, the state being the beholder of this 
perfection.
Upon such an intellectual background, the primacy of 
the state was prevalent in all variants of liberal 
thought in Germany. Thus, ranging from the Moderates to 
the Radicals, the state was viewed as an a priori for the 
guarantee and exercise of freedom, either as the earthly 
reflection of divine order, or as the "common will of 
associated p e r s o n s . T h e  common denominator in all 
these conceptualizations was the priority given to order 
as the sine-qua-non of freedom, and not the vice versa.
Steven Lukes, Individualism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), 17-22.
152. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 88.
1^ .^ Ibid., 165.
1^ .^ Ibid., 103; Vorländer has pointed that this legacy was displayed 
in the liberal perception of the state as an "educational institute.” 
Vorländer, ”Is there a liberal political tradition in Germany,” 104. 
Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, 306.
Ibid., 327.
Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom.
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The professional identity of the proponents of 
liberal thought in Germany are important to understand 
such conceptual differences from the English liberal 
thought. In this respect, the career patterns of the 
theoreticians of German liberalism in the nineteenth 
century holds evidence for the modeling of the German 
state as an example of strong state. Except for the free­
lance journalists and exiles which formed the Radical
wing. 158 the bulk of German liberal intellectuals were
academicians who were also involved in government 
service, with the responsibility of educating the 
bureaucratic elite on law and administration.Thus they 
were a part of the state administration. This 
traditional link between the state and intellectuals 
continued in the late nineteenth-century with neoliberal 
anthropologists. Apart from their responsibility of 
training state officials, they were also subsidized by 
the state for their research facilities. Such a double 
sphere of function laid the grounds for the emergence of 
German liberal thought as an outgrowth of the development 
of social science in Germany. In that period social
^^ 3. Ibid., 295.
The most prominent organ of the nineteenth-century liberal 
thought was Staatslexikon, an encyclopedic publication (1834-1843, 
1845-1848, 1856-1866). Its editors, Karl Rotteck and Karl Theodor
Welcker, were also civil servants. Smith, Politics and the Sciences 
of Culture in Germany, 13-4; Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, 
314-22.
As Vorländer has argued nineteenth century German liberalism was 
a "civil service liberalism." Vorländer, "Is there a liberal 
political tradition in Germany?," 103.
Ibid., 102-11.
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science was perceived to be an instrument for the proper 
functioning of politics.^®^
In this respect, German liberalism grew out of the 
concern to provide a framework for the construction of 
the modern society and the ideal way of its government.
It nourished in a milieu whereby the state needed expert 
knowledge from the universities in order to cope with the 
problems of modernization, in a basically agrarian 
s o c i e t y . I t  was formulated not after industrialization, 
but with the task of preventing the potential maladies of 
the pattern and consequences of English 
industrialization.^®^ Coupled with the reaction to the 
French Revolution and Napolean’s invasion, such a 
disposition led the German liberal thinkers to grapple 
with the problématique of modernity, and thus with the 
problem "of how a modern society ought to be governed."^®®
Thus, instead of coming up with a homogeneous 
radical social and political theory,^ ®"' German liberal 
intellectuals were more preoccupied with the task of 
finding compromising grounds for the German bureaucratic 
and university traditions on the one hand, and the
l®2. Ibid., 13-7.
®^^ . Richard J. Bazillion, "Liberalism, Modernization, and the Social 
Question in the Kingdom of Saxony, 1830-1890," in In Search of a 
Liberal Germany: Studies in the History of German Liberalism from 
1789 to the Present, eds. Konrad H. Jarauch and Larry Eugene Jones 
(USA: Berg Publishers, Inc., 1990), 108-9.
^®^. Smith, Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 14.
®^®. Dieter Langewische, "The Nature of German Liberalism," in Modern 
Germany Reconsidered (1870-1945) (London and New York: Routledge,
1992), 103.
®^®. Bazillion, "Liberalism, Modernization, and the Social Question 
in the Kingdom of Saxony, 1830-1890," 87, 108-9.
®^^ . Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom.
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principles of the Enlightenment thought on the other. 
Such a preoccupation also provided German liberal thought 
with another thematic divergence which can be named as 
particularism. While sharing the same mechanistic premise 
in the study of society with classical liberalism, the 
theme of tradition preserved its pivotal place in liberal 
texture for figuring out social laws, to the detriment of 
a priori, universal principles. Such particularism was 
also manifest in the approach to progress. While giving 
priority to the sustenance of social equilibrium during 
the process of social change over the desirability of 
progress, German liberal intellectuals were more 
interested in the analysis of the diverse ways of 
progress with respect to culture.
Last but not least, accompanying the task of 
centralization, nationalism was another common 
denominator within the context of German liberal thought. 
What Krieger has referred to as the "German idea of 
freedom"i'^2 gains more clarification in this respect. For 
the German liberal, the freedom of the nation, meaning 
the freedom of the one German state, laid at the basis of 
individual freedom. The nationalistic aspiration was
Smith, Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 14.
Ibid., 27-9, 35-8. German Enlightenment was shaped around a
reaction to the universalistic premises of the Enlightenment and 
French Revolution, and thus it bore a particularistic interpretation 
of the concepts imported. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in 
France and Germany, 1.
Smith, Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 29.
Ibid., 109-10.
As Krieger notes the German idea of freedom is well summarized 
in Treitschke's article {Freedom), as the "freedom in the state," 
rather than "freedom from the state." Krieger, The German Idea of 
Freedom, 367-8.
Ibid., 278-398.
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not reserved to any one of liberal strands of thought. 
Though ironically, even the Radical branch had to linger 
between its abstractionist and universalist ideals on the 
one hand, and the ideal of "a common German fatherland"^·^^ 
on the other.
France: liberalism between the individual and citizen
Apart from Germany, French liberal thought also 
contains differing tenets from that of the fatherland of 
the theory. Unlike its German counterpart, French liberal 
texture flourished in a setting whereby centralization of 
the authority had already been underway. It was 
consolidated with the French Revolution, which ensured 
the dissolution of feudalism, clericalism and divine 
monarchy. The basic premises of the French liberal 
thought were documented within the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man (1789), which also provided its 
peculiarity.^’^® Liberal theory in France evolved out of a 
process of transfer of power from the divinely ordained 
absolute monarchy to the secular state. In this respect, 
the theoreticians of liberal outlook saddled themselves 
with the task of providing the framework according to 
which a socio-political restructuration should be 
consolidated, whereby science turned out to be their main
Ibid., 328.
Kingsley Martin, French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth 
Century, ed. J.P. Mayer (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), 
1.
Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, 66-73.
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guide. In pre-Revolutionary France, the liberal
intellectual was more opposed to Church in favor of the 
secular state, than he was to the state in favor of the 
individual, while acknowledging the prerequisite of a 
strong state for the sake of the individual. Thus, as 
different from the English case, French liberal texture 
was originally shaped more around the challenge between 
the "secular" and the "divine", rather than between the 
individual and the institution of political authority. In 
fact, in France the freedom of the individual was a 
matter of struggle for power among the two contending 
institutions of the time.^ ·^ ® In this respect, mid­
nineteenth century Liberal Catholicism exemplifies the 
standpoint in favor of the Church -though originally 
received Papal condemnation- as the protector of the 
individual against the State.Basically, it advocated 
the independence of the Church from the State and the 
"catholicization of l i b e r a l i s m . T h i s  meant the 
interpretation of freedom in consistence with religion.
Apart from that, the Physiocratic standpoint -most 
akin to the premises of classical liberalism as far as 
its economic dimension was concerned-^®^ of pre- 
Revolutionary France also served as another historical 
instance for the diverging feature of French liberal
Martin, French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century.
Ibid,
Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, 399-403.
ISO. Ibid., 175. 
isi. Ibid., 175-6.
S^2. Ibid.
S^3. Martin, French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 228- 
35.
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thought. The liberal economic principles which 
corresponded to the interests of the English nouveaux 
bourgeoisie found their replica in France within the 
agricultural s p h e r e . O n  the one hand, the Physiocratic 
principles can be summed up as the full freedom of trade, 
encouragement of the labor of every member of the 
community so as to increase competition, and the opening 
of all possible markets to the sale of production.Thus 
opposing the traditional network of agricultural 
production. Physiocrats proposed the removal of arbitrary 
taxation, and of legal and commercial barriers to 
t r a d e . O n  the other hand, they were distinguished from 
their English counterparts on the basis of their 
acknowledgment of the necessity of an enlightened 
despot. The Physiocratic adherence to an enlightened 
despot was based on the perception of the ideal social 
order to be spontaneously constituted out of the already 
existing laws of nature, whereby the despot was 
ultimately authorized with its sustenance.
Arising from such background, the evolution of 
French liberal thought throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries displayed a continuous search for 
reconciliation between the individualistic disposition on 
the one hand, and an ever-present theme of strong state 
on the other. In this sense, the preeminence of the
Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, 34ff.
Ibid., 33.
Martin, French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 234. 
Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism, 185.
Martin, French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 233.
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concept of the state in French liberal texture was 
another major difference from its English counterpart.
Firstly, the Revolutionary liberal texture -as 
exemplified in the writings of the Philosophes- put faith 
on the secular state as the ideal form for its abstract 
individual. And the individual of the Revolution was 
not different from that of the classical liberal 
theory. 191 In this respect, the Declaration of 1789 -in 
complete conformity with the principles of the
PhiJosophes-192 contained not only faith in the priority 
of the individual, but also the task of delineating the 
ideal political structure for the individual as such.i^^
Secondly, the decades following the Revolution 
witnessed the emergence of a new rival to the individual, 
other than the state -the society.i®^ The experience with 
the rule of Napoleon which had based the legitimacy of 
its despotism upon the principle of popular sovereignty 
of the Declaration, led "liberals” to speak in the name 
of the individual and find a framework for a new 
reconciliation -that between democracy and liberalism.
This endavour was most manifest in the writings of 
two prominent nineteenth century liberal thinkers.
Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 155-74.
9^°. Martin, French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century.
9^1. Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, 68ff.
9^2, Martin, French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century.
9^3. According to Baiaman the intellectual of the Enlightenment -the 
Philosophes- very well fits into the model of legislator. By giving 
an end to the monopoly of the Church over knowledge the intellectual 
had taken over the claim of the former to possess the wisdom about 
universal values which would provide the basis for the best form of 
order in the society. Zygmunt Bauman, Legislatgrs and Interpreters. 
9^·^. Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, 208.
9^5. For the evolution of French liberal thought throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see ibid., 158-210.
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Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville. While 
attacking democracy. Constant reformulated the concept of 
liberty by a differentiation between its "ancient" and 
"modern" f o r m s . B y  ancient liberty, he referred to that 
'pseudo-liberty' — exercised through the post- 
Revolutionary right of political participation—  which 
had ensured the all-encompassing presence of society to 
the detriment of the individual. On the other hand, 
modern liberty was precisely modeled on the English 
version, which corresponded to "civil liberty" -i.e., the 
complete independence of the individual within its 
private sphere.However, unlike its model it excluded 
any interpretation on the presocial existence of 
liberty.
Deeply fascinated by American democracy, Tocqueville 
re-read Constant's conception of liberty as detrimental 
to the "healthy" individual, which ultimately meant the 
citizen. 200 Thus, what he emphasized most was not the 
freedom of the individual from, but participation in the 
public affairs which he viewed as the only means to 
preempt the domination of the state over individuals. 
Such an approach led him to end up positing the citizen, 
committed to the nation, over and above the individual, 
for the sake of liberty:2°^
Kelly, The Humane Comedy, 56.
Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, 167-8.
Kelly, The Humane Comedy, 57.
135. Ibid., 55.
200. Roger Boesche, The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 51.
201. Ibid., 198.
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It is said, it is repeated; all organs of the 
press, from whatever side, say: local interests are 
becoming, in the mind of the citizens, in the mind 
even of deputies, stronger than the general 
interest.
What is that. Gentlemen, if not the greatest 
political demoralization which can exist in a 
country?
How do you expect that, in this fight between the 
general interest and the particular that will take 
place without cease in their hearts, the particular 
interest will not often be stronger? Is that 
possible? And will they not soon lose the country 
from view in order to see only themselves?^02
Such an approach to the concept of liberty also 
corresponded to the shift from the ontological and 
methodological perspective of classical liberal theory. 
French liberal texture of the nineteenth century 
relinquished the classical assertion of the ontological 
priority of the individual to the state. Instead, while 
asserting the "ideal" of priority in terms of
individual's rights, it introduced an historical insight 
whereby the appearance of the individual and the state 
were perceived to be colateral. This inherently
contained the prerequisite of a close scrutiny of the 
history of the relation between the individual and the
state.
The framework for the historical perspective, 
prevalent in the nineteenth century, had already been 
provided in the writings of Montesquieu, a loyal observer 
of English institutional structure. The basic themes, 
style of approach and formulation of the concept of
Quoted in ibid.
Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, p. 208.
. Thomas L. Pangle, Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A
Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws (Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press, 1973).
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French way to modern society in the liberal texture of 
the period, bear the legacy of Montesquieue's writings, 
which ironically furnished it with conservative colors. 
It is in this respect that one comes across a similarity 
with the particularism of German liberal thought. In the 
last analysis, the Montesquieuan heritage handed over the 
theme of the reconciliation of the universal -reason- 
with the national to the coming generations of liberal 
intellectuals.205 The projection of the national on the 
universal was analyzed with respect to the legislative 
structures of different countries. And the peculiar way 
for the French nation towards the "modern" was searched 
in the adoption of the appropriate legal framework, which 
would not run counter to the peculiar attributes of the 
French nation.206 in other words, "laws are always 
unsteady so long as they are not based for support on 
morals. Mores are the only tough and durable power among 
a people. "20·^
Apart from the Montesquieuan heritage, the
Revolution had also worked in the way of providing the 
historical framework in which the nineteenth-century 
liberal intellectual would frame its sphere of
problématique. In this respect, the Revolution had not 
only ensured the dominance of the secular state vis-à-vis 
the Church, but also redefined the individual with
respect to the nation and state. The state-stripped of
2°^ . Pangle, Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism, 194-7.
2°®. "...the laws 'should be so appropriate to the people for which
they are m a d e , Q u o t e d  in ibid., 43.
2°^ . Quoted in Boesche, The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de 
Tocqueville, 183.
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divine legitimation-was conceptualized on the basis of 
national sovereignty, and thus as a derivative of the
nation. Relatedly, the French individual was (re)defined 
with respect to his membership in the state, which
ascribed it with the identity of the citizen.Rogers 
Brubaker has argued that the legal recognition and
codification of the French individual as such was 
perceived to be a prerequisite for the strengthening of 
the state for the sake of providing internal order and 
external security.Such a development well corresponded 
to the concern of the nineteenth-century liberal
intellectual with the necessity of strengthening the
state for the sustenance of unity and homogenity in 
society.
The variations in liberal theory across countries 
can be re-read with respect to different legal 
traditions.2^  ^ The difference in the legal sphere also
accompany differences with respect to state models. As
stated above, in England one criterion for the experience 
of "government-via-civil society" was the infusion of the 
private and public realms as was manifest in the
prominence of traditions in the codification of laws.^^^ 
England did not have a separate body of administrative 
laws which would ensure the existence of a predominant
208. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 35- 
49.
209, Ibid., 40-9.
2^ 0. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 164.
2^ .^ For the elaboration of the differences inbetween as an outcome 
of the particular experience with the Roman law and the Common law 
see Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism, 56-7.
2^ 2^  Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, 121-5; Dyson, 
The State Tradition in Western Europe, 41-3.
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public law. The supervision and application of laws have 
been run by independent b o d i e s . on the other hand, in 
the case of France and Germany the existence of a 
separate body of administrative laws further ensured 
state power over society.Unlike England, the task of 
the supervision and application of law was carried out by 
officials tied to the state structure.
From the legal perspective, reflections of different 
state traditions can be analyzed in relation to the 
concept of natural rights. At the origins of English 
liberal thinking, rights were originally separated from 
law and attributed prior existence as an inherent feature 
of the human b e i n g . on the other hand, in France and 
Germany the distinction between the "ancient" and 
"modern" liberty, the latter corresponding to the 
perception of liberty basically as a civil right, 
connoted that its realization was to be found within the 
society, and under the guidance of the state.21·^ Such a 
perception also carried hints of concern with the 
strength of the state, both against the external threats 
and for the sustenance of the internal order in a new 
social structure, rising on the instabilities of the
Badie and Birnbauiti, The Sociology of the State, 123.
Ibid., 117, Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 42.
Badie and Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, 111.
2 ®^. Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory, 51-2. In 
this instance it is possible to observe the Hobbesian legacy within 
the context of liberal thought on the grounds that it was first with 
Hobbes that the basis of law was ensured to be the natural rights of 
man. The legacy is manifest in the writings of Locke whereby it is 
proposed that only the natural rights are innate in men, and not the 
duties. Strauss, Natural Right and History, 225-7.
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feudal past. Eventually, the right of resistance, so 
prevalent in English liberal thinking, did not occupy a 
significant place in the continental case.^^® In the 
French case. Declaration of 1791 serves as an example. 
The Declaration acknowledged the prerequisite of the 
right of resistance to oppression, but only to be 
activated by an organized body independent of State; the 
National Guard. The National Guard was held responsible 
"to defend the rights of the individual and avoid 
unnecessary violence in the name of resistance.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Above all, the distinguishing point in English 
liberal thought was its synthetic character.220 in England, 
the practical reflections of liberal premises were 
consolidated through a smooth transition, while the bases 
of traditional life have assumed their place. English 
liberal thought was not formulated against an all- 
embracing state, in any of its phases. Rather, it 
initially grew out of an attempt by the intellectuals who 
were engaged in a political struggle vis-à-vis the
The reservation put on the right of resistance in the 
continental European case is best observable in the writings of Kant, 
whereby alongside with the acknowledgment of the constitutional 
limits on the ruling mechanism to ensure the accountability of those 
elected to public offices, all kinds of resistance are also rejected. 
Manning, Liberalism, 11. Bellamy exemplifies "many of the supposed 
contradictions of German liberal thought..." on "Kant's a priori 
definition and defense of liberal principles, and his practical 
willingness to compromise with tyranny..." Bellamy, Liberalism and 
Modern Society, 161.
Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, 167.
220, Ibid., 135.
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conservatives, and thus in search of alternative policies 
for the problems of the day. The English liberal did not 
have the task of dissolving the existing system. He 
aspired to transcend it, while preserving the tradition. 
This was in total contrast to the French experience, 
whereby the realization of the liberal ideals required 
the Revolution and the radical dissolution of the past.^^^ 
On the other hand, French liberal intellectuals had to 
walk on a conceptual tightrope between the individual of 
classical liberal theory and the concept and practice of a 
strong state. The same was also true for Germany. Such an 
unease which arose from the rather problematic 
adaptability of liberal premises on foreign land has led 
to a particular concern with history. History, especially 
in the German liberal literature, was more than a 
phenomenon which connoted a universally achievable 
unilinear development. 222 instead, it provided an escape 
from hovering between the individual of liberal theory on 
the one hand, and the legacy of the state tradition on the 
other.
The comparison above which was carried out on the 
basis of thematic differences between the English and 
continental European contexts suggests that one cannot 
come up with a monolithic structure of liberal thought 
either on a country, or on a periodic basis. Instead, 
what is observed is an all-out and ongoing process of the 
formation of an intellectual layout, which has
221. Ibid., 81-2.
222. Smith, Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 109.
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experienced shifts due to particular social and 
political problems of the period, and the country in 
question.223 However, within this framework one variable 
stays constant. It is the absence and/or existence of 
state tradition acting behind the scenes, but still with 
considerable influence on intellectual vocation.
223. This is best discernible in the variety of the claimants for 
liberal premises which originated in the clash between the 
aristocracy, bourgeoisie, and the state, to be extended to the 
tension between the working and the middle classes in the eighteenth 
century. Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, 48.
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CHAPTER III
STATE TRADITION AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL MIND 
AND IDENTITY IN THE OTTOMAN CONTEXT
THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE CLASSICAL AGE OF THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
As it has been shown in the preceding chapter, when 
the West was experiencing an intellectual revolution in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman 
Empire was entering into a phase of decline. This phase 
was initially marked with military reverses, and with 
deepening economic backwardness. Thenceforth, the main 
issue in the Ottoman agenda would be the question of "how 
to save the Empire."
The initial remedies proposed for coping with the 
decline were modelled on the institutional framework, 
consolidated during the reign of Suleiman the
Magnificient (1520-1566) . By the end of the sixteenth 
century, the Ottoman state had become a strong state.^ 
This meant both the overwhelming military power of the
See Halil İnalcık, "Turkey Between Europe and the Middle East," 
Foreign Policy, 1 (1980); Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and 
Culture in the Ottoman Empire," Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 12 (June 1969), 258-81; Metin Heper, The State Tradition in 
Turkey (Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985); "Center and
Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the 
Nineteenth Century," International Political Science Review, 1 
(January 1980), 81-105.
State and the development of state autonomy vis-a-vis the 
society.
The state in the Ottoman Empire as consolidated in 
the sixteenth century was symbolized in the person of the 
ruler.2 The ruler carried the double identity of the 
Sultan and the Caliph. As Sultan, he held absolute 
authority over all his subjects, regardless of religious 
and/or ethnic differences, within the territories of the 
Empire; and as the Caliph he was accepted as the 
"protector of Islam.
During the sixteenth century, the Sultan dominated 
the system. The main constituents of the ruling 
institution were referred to as the Askeri ("the 
Military") due to the warrior nature of the empire, that 
is to the commonly acknowledged mission of extending the 
boundaries of Islam.^ The Askeri was composed of the 
members of the bureaucracy, military and Ulema (religious 
dignitaries). The members of the first two groups had
2. Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 
Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, vol. 
1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 164-5; İnalcık,
"Turkey," in Modernization In Japan and Turkey, eds. R.E. Ward and 
D.A. Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 42-61;
Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish
Politics?," Daedalus, 102 (1973), 169-89; Bernard Lewis, The
Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), 371.
İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600 (USA:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), 57. See also Shaw, History of the
Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1, 164-5. Here it is necessary 
to point at the argument by Niyazi Berkes that not the Sultan 
personally in his Muslim identity, but the Caliphate as an 
institution made up one of the two bases of the authority in the 
Ottoman polity. Berkes, The Development of Secularism In Turkey 
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 9, 13-4.
İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 5-9, 57; Shaw, History of the Ottoman 
Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1, 12-22.
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direct attachment and loyalty to the Sultan. They were 
subjected to special education and training from the very 
beginning of their recruitment that stressed service to 
the state. They were stripped of their preceding social 
bonds, educated and made slaves of the Sultan, in the 
real sense of the term.® Their possessions and survival 
depended on his sheer will.®
The third group, the Ulema comprised of the educated 
segment of the Muslim population.·^ The relation between 
the Ulema and Sultan was slightly different when compared 
to that between the military and bureaucracy. The Ulema 
having the claim of monopoly over the interpretation of 
Islam, oversaw whether the practices of the Sultan were 
in line with the Şeriat, the religious law. This placed 
them in a position of potential shareholders of power -if 
not equality with the ruler.®
Here, it is in order to note the predominance of 
Islam in the Ottoman state structure and its functioning. 
In order to serve within the ruling body, conversion into
®. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 12.
®. The fact that the servants of the state other than the Ulema could 
be condemned to death for reasons of state {"siyaseten katl") and 
their property confiscated further illustrates the totally dependent 
status of the latter on the will of the ruler. See, Emre Kongar, 
İmparatorluk'tan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapası (The Societal 
Structure of Turkey from the Empire until Present) (Istanbul: Evrim
Matbaacılık Ltd., 1985), 121-22. For a thorough analysis of the
structure of Ottoman ruling institution, see Shaw, History of the 
Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1, 113-50.
. By the term education what is meant is purely religious education. 
The Ulema were chosen from the most prominent graduates of medreses, 
the religious high schools. For further information on the Ulema see, 
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 13-7.
®. Ibid., 13-7. However while making such an evaluation one should 
bear in mind the fact that the Ulema, as not different from the 
bureaucracy and the military, owed their posts in the state to the 
Sultan and were subject to dismissal at his will.
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İslam constituted one of the basic conditions.^ The 
activities of the Sultan were also checked according to 
their compatibility with the principles of Şeriat. It is 
true that the Sultan had the right to issue laws in those 
spheres falling outside of religion. However, until the 
reign of Mehmed II (1444-1481) this right had not been 
systematically used.^° In this sense, Mehmed II was the 
first to codify the already existing legal practices and 
traditions. However, this did not mean the end of the 
predominance of Islam. From this point onwards, the 
duality in the identity of the ruler was carried to the 
legal s p h e r e . such a duality had already been present in 
the distinction between Şerl and Örfi laws, the latter 
referring to those body of laws "enacted by the Sultan on 
his will and independent of the Şeriat, and in the name 
of the public good."^^ ^he enactment of the Fatih 
Kanunnameleri (Codes), gave permanent status to the Örfi 
laws in those spheres that the religious law fell short 
of regulation. This basically meant state organization.^^
It was not only the Ulema who were Muslims. In the classical age, 
as a prerequisite of the devşirme system, it was obligatory to 
convert into Islam in order to enter into state service. Shaw, 
History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1, 114.
İnalcık, Osmanlr İmparatorluğu; Toplum ve Ekonomi Üzerine Arşiv 
Çalışmaları, İncelemeler (Ottoman Empire; Archive Studies, Analysis 
on Society and Economy), ed. Muhittin Salih Eren (Istanbul: Eren 
Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık Ltd. Şti., 1993), 319-41.
Ibid.; Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 
vol. 1, 62.
2^. İnalcık, Ottoman Empire, 70-5. For the Ottoman legal structure 
and duality therein, also see Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey, vol. 1, 134-38.
İnalcık, OsmanlI İmparatorluğu, 320.
14. Ibid., 322-36.
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Above all, the Sultan came to possess "theoretical" 
superiority vis-à-vis the Ulema, who were state servants 
appointed and subject to dismissal by the Sultan. 
However, the duality in both the legal sphere and power 
structure continued, and it was in the following ages of 
decline that Islam would gain the upper hand and hence 
the Ulema, from then on representing the conservative 
bloc against reformist rulers, would overwhelm the 
dominant standing of the Sultan, and from time to time to 
the extent of dethroning him. Exemplary are the 
abandonment of the throne by Ahmed III to Mahmud II 
(1730), and the destitution of Selim III (1807) at the 
will of the Ulema.
As already noted, the centrality of Islam was also 
manifest in the mission long-attributed to the Ottoman 
state. In this respect, the precedence of ghazi (warrior) 
tradition made the basis of the authority of the ruler to 
depend on military might and the expansion of Islam to 
far territories westward.^’ The warrior identity of the 
Empire was not limited to the ghazi-state tradition but 
also had an economic dimension. In its classical set-up, 
the Ottoman Empire was basically living off victories at 
the battlefield. Each newly occupied territory was always 
a new source of revenue to be taxed. The link between the 
military and the land was further strengthened by the
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1, 
164-5.
Ibid., 169-277. For the conservative opposition as most 
effectively carried out by the Ulema, see Berkes, The Development of 
Secularism In Turkey, (especially) 51-85.
İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 55-9.
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tımar (fief) system, by which the -sipahis- (fief-holder 
in return for military service), appointed by the state, 
had the right of tax collection in return for providing 
military force to the state during times of war. The 
ownership of land belonged to the state while peasants 
only had the right of usufruct.^® The state had double 
control over production. While it assured regular flow of 
taxes through the the fief-holders, the tripartite 
network of checks and balances comprised of heylerheyis 
(officials of the highest administrative unit in the 
Empire), kadis (judges applying both religious and Örfi 
law; highest administrators of kaza) and defterdars 
(officials of provincial treasury) in the provinces 
formed the second dimension of control, this time over 
the fief-holders.^® Production was limited to the supply 
of the means for survival. By restricting the size of the 
production mainly to the local level, the system 
automatically prevented the flow of surplus production to 
the peasant, and of incentive for profit-making on the 
part of the peasantry.
. Here it must be noted that there were also categories of land 
that fell outside the ownership of the state, namely the Uşr land and 
the Haraç land, the owners of which were subject to taxation. But, in 
the classical age, most of these were converted into Mlri status, 
meaning the land of the country (Araziyi Memleket). Taner Timur, 
Osmanir Toplumsal Düzeni (Ottoman Social Order) (Ankara: Turhan 
Kitabevi, 1979), 2nd ed., 160-201. For a thorough analysis of tımar 
system see İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, 
107-18.
1®. Ibid., 117-8.
İnalcık, Studies In Ottoman Social and Economic History (London: 
Variorum Reprints, 1985), 105-26/ Kemal Karpat, "Land Regime, Social 
Structure and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire," in Beginnings of 
Modernization In the Middle East, eds. William R. Polk and Richard L. 
Chambers (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 
especially 69-90.
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Apart from its control over rural production, the 
state also played a determinative role in the urban 
economy. This was particularly manifest in the activities 
and organizations of the craftsmen. Under the guild 
system the craftsmen were subject to dual control of the 
state. The kahya, the executive authority within the 
guild structure, acted as the intermediary between the 
central authority and guild members. On the one hand, 
they fulfilled the role of the representative of the 
guild vis-a-vis the government, and on the other hand 
assumed the basic responsibility of seeing to it that the 
laws were regularly obeyed. The kadis and the muhtesips 
represented state control in executive and economic 
matters.Through these officials, the state ensured its 
authority over the dynamics of the market; the price and 
quality qualifications of the items traded were all 
determined, regulated and maintained by the state itself. 
The kadis also represented the state authority in matters 
concerning the organizational structure of the guilds.22
On the basis of the account given above, one may
conclude that the Ottoman state held a monopoly in the
economic sphere. Moreover, the values and norms governing 
the action in society were formulated on the basis of 
either the Islamic principles or Örfi laws issued by the
Sultan, and their proper practice v/ere ensured by the
21. İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 150-62; Shaw, History of the Ottoman
Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1, 156-8. See also Huricihan
İslamoğlu-lnan, 1991, 35-6. Robert Mantran ed., Osmanli İmparatorluğu 
Tarihi (History of the Ottoman Empire), trans. Server Tanilli, vol. 
1 (İstanbul: Say Dağıtım Ltd. Şti., 1992), 256-73.
22. İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 150-62; Shaw, History of the Ottoman 
Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1, 156-7, 159-61.
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officials responsible to the center. 3^ such an effective 
presence of the state in both the economic and social
spheres, coupled with the fact that it had a distinct
identity and structure from the rest of the society, led 
to the formulation of the legitimacy of state power not 
on its responsiveness to society, but on military might 
and divine will.^^
The rest of the society was commonly named the
reaya.25 The relationship between the askeri and reaya was 
also manifest in the principle of "the circle of 
justice," which was a legacy of the Asia-Front
tradition.The circle of justice meant that the state 
was held to be the provider and protector of justice. 
For the state to survive and also perform its basic
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 13, Mardin, 
"Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective," in State^ Democracy and Military 
in Turkey in the 1980s, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin and 
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 29-30.
Timur, OsmanlI Kimliği (Ottoman Identity) (Istanbul: Hil Yayın,
1986), 59-61.
In this instance we should note the counter argument posed by 
Timur against the tendency to classify all those falling outside 
state ranks as reaya. Making a class analysis of the Ottoman society, 
Timur uses the term only for the peasants, and .refers to the 
moneylenders and merchants as forming one side of the economic basis 
of the state beside the rulers. Timur, Osmanli Toplumsal Düzeni, 
201, 232.
The idea of the circle of justice as the basic formula for the 
duties of the state and the society had its origin in the Kutadgu 
Bilig (1069) of Yusuf Khass Hajib. İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 61-2. 
On the other hand, the emphasis on justice is commonly linked to the 
"Islamic Middle Eastern Civilization" as presented by Nizam ul-Mülk, 
whereby the ruler is belived to have been created by God to provide 
justice to the ruled. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern 
Turkey, vol. 1, 112; Timur, Osmanli Toplumsal Düzeni, 177.
. Justice in the Ottoman system meant simply the "protection of the 
reaya against administrative abuses." İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 
66. In a more comprehensive context when coupled with the 
preponderance of the concern with keeping the order as such it 
connoted the preservation of the status of each and every subject, 
i.e., the maintenance of the hierarchical structure. Berkes, The 
Development of Secularism in Turkey, 11-2.
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function, the military assumed a central role. For the 
military to function effectively, the state needed 
revenues which the reaya was responsible to provide by 
paying regular taxes.^s Thus, the one basic link between 
the ruled and state was through taxation. The ruled had 
no say in the ruling process.
The reaya was divided among itself along economic 
and religious lines. There was almost no horizontal 
mobility in the society. However, the economic and 
religious divisions within the society did not 
necessarily overlap. Outside the workplace the individual 
was identified according to the religious community to 
which he belonged.The division along religious lines 
was structured by the millet system, the grand community 
to which the particular individual belonged through 
religious and ethical lines. Outside the boundaries of 
his religious community, the individual had no identity 
of his own. The link between the individual and state 
could only be established through the leaders of his 
millet. In this respect, the concept of had corresponded 
to the realm of individual action which was delineated by 
its family, status, religion and wealth. Only within that 
particular realm the individual had the right of action 
on his behalf, and insofar as it was also compatible with
2®. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1, 
112.
2®. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 16.
As argued by Berkes the Ottoman system was based on the 
continuity of the separateness of the basic economic functionaries: 
the farmers, merchants and artisans. Ibid., 10-1.
İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 150-1.
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the existing rules and regulations as well as with the 
traditions.
All in all, the main characteristic of the Ottoman 
system was the clear-cut distance between the ruler and 
ruled. Yet, this does not mean that the service in state 
ranks was hereditary and thus closed to other segments of 
society. On the contrary, there was a selective upward 
mobility. However, the servants of the ruler comprised a 
distinct body with an identity totally separate from 
society. The only link between the ruler and the ruled 
was the performance of the responsibilities. The state 
was held responsible to provide justice for the 
preservation of statusquo, and hence social structure. 3^ 
And the people were held responsible for regular payment 
of taxes and allegiance to the ruler.
The Ottoman empire serves as a model for the 
experience of living with a state tradition. The 
criterion used in assessing the state tradition in a 
country, elaborated in the preceding chapter, fit well 
into the Ottoman example. To begin with, the 
determination and supervision by the state of the 
fundamentals of political and social life corresponds to 
the concept of sovereignty as interpreted by Pierre 
Birnbaum.^^ The foundation of the basis of authority
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1,
166.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 10-2.
Pierre Birnbaum, "State, Center and Bureaucracy," Government and 
Opposition, 16 (1981), 58-77. However, here it should be noted that
the norms of action as fixed by the state were confined to the 
relationship between the ruler and the ruled, roughly to fiscal and 
economic concerns. More briefly, the state was determinative in the
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outside the society further confirms that the society was 
a passive recipient of the order imposed by central 
authority.
Additionally, in the Ottoman system, administration 
was located within the structure of the central 
authority. The members of the bureaucracy owed direct 
responsibility and loyalty to the Sultan only, who was 
perceived to be the locus of the state. The activities of 
each and every official were to be appraised directly by 
the Sultan. In this sense the already noted concept of 
had is illustrative. Besides connoting boundaries of 
action of the common individual, had also determined the 
sphere of interest and function of the government 
official. The official serving the state had the 
responsibility and authority only within his office, and 
was not to concern himself with matters falling out of 
his own sphere, which can be viewed as a pre-modern 
replica of what Nettl terms as sectoral autonomy of the 
state.
Last but not least, when the relation between law 
and the state in the Ottoman Empire is analyzed, one 
comes across the predominant status of the latter over 
the former. In the Ottoman system, law had no distinct
one basic sphere of its interaction with the society, i.e., in the 
flow of revenues. In this respect Shaw has pointed at the variety of 
millets practising their own ethical codes and norms of action both 
within their own communities and in their relationship with each 
other. Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the 
Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers," in Beginnings of Modernization 
In the Middle East, 32.
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1,
166.
J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," World Politics, 
20 (4) (July 1968), 320-2.
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realm from the state itself, but was perceived basically 
as a means of control of the ruled by the ruler. Apart 
from the principles of religious law, it was the state, 
deified in the person of the Sultan which had sole 
authority, to issue laws and regulations. Also, the fact 
that the interpreters of the religious law. Ulema, were 
appointed and dismissed at the will of the Sultan further 
confirms such an argument.
The analysis presented thus far backs the argument 
that the Ottoman system serves as a model for the 
experience of state tradition. As far as the basic theme 
of this study is concerned, and drawing upon the argument 
by Nettl that intellectual tradition is one dimension of 
the experience with stateness,^® the role of the 
intellectual in the Ottoman system becomes pertinent.
"INSTITUTIONAL INTELLECTUAL": ^9 FROM ADVISOR TO RULER
In the Ottoman empire, knowledge traditionally meant 
that of Islam, and hence was reserved for the monopoly of 
the Ulema. In this respect, one must differentiate 
between lore and science, which referred to the different
The criteria of the dominantly active presence of the state in 
the legal sphere is also utilized by Kenneth H.F. Dyson in the 
differentiation of "state societies" from "stateless societies." 
Accordingly, Dyson presents the former as those societies with a 
tradition of state acting as a law-giver. Dyson, The State Tradition 
In Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution (Oxford: Martin 
Robertson, 1980), 19, fn. 2.
Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," 566.
Edward Shils, "Intellectuals and responsibility," in The 
Political Responsibility of Intellectuals, eds. Ian Maclean, Alan 
Montefiore and Peter Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 257-307. In the present study the institutional intellectual 
is taken as the intellectual educated and recruited by the state.
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spheres of the act of "knowing." As far as the former is 
concerned, the subject of knowing was limited to 
tradition and belief. In this sense, the classical 
Ottoman men of knowledge were identified with respect to 
their authority over Islamic knowledge. On the other 
hand, science, in order to find its place in the sphere 
of knowledge, had to wait for the detrimental experience 
of military defeat at the hands of the West that brought 
about the beginning of the irreversible decline.
The Ottoman Intellectual of "Advise Literature"^^
The Ottoman state acted as a recruitment mechanism 
for the men of knowledge. Their function had primarily 
been the interpretation of Islamic principles, the 
evaluation of the acts of the Sultan as regards their 
compatibility with religious law, and the depiction of 
the norms of conduct among the Muslim millet. It was from 
the late-classical age onwards that the Ottoman 
intellectual appeared to bear the role of advisor within 
the state mechanism in the search for the ways of "how to 
save the state."
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 98-100.
Shaw cites the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) as the marking point in 
the Ottoman history when the loss of territory was absolutely 
ensured. It is from then on that the classical Ottoman disregard of 
the West was replaced by a concern with the reasons of decline in the 
face of Western superiority. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey, vol. 1, 225.
The term is borrowed from Virginia H. Aksan, "Ottoman Political 
Writing, 1768-1808," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 
25 (1993), 53-69.
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The existence of state as a constant phenomenon is 
observable in the Ottoman intellectual layout, whereby 
the main preoccupation had been with the question of what 
the structure and functions of the state "ought to be." A 
look at the analysis of the writings of the classical age 
suffices to conclude that what was at stake was a 
"paternal s t a t e , w i t h  its all-embracing institutions 
and structures that served to preserve the order of 
society. In this instance, the argument by Dyson is 
relevant. Dyson states that the conception of society as 
an hierarchical organization is substantiated by a 
paternal concept of state, the basic function of which is 
to ensure the durability of the existing societal 
configuration.·^^ As already noted, the Ottoman system was 
based on a dual stratification of society along religious 
and economic dimensions. Since the sustenance of the 
Ottoman state depended at one point on the continuous 
flow of taxes from the ruled, the ruler was assigned with 
the duty of providing for the conditions to keep each and 
every individual in its s t a t u s . I n  this respect, the 
argument by Karl Mannheim, that every individual is born 
into a settled societal pattern which to a great extent 
shapes the predominant configuration of thought and
Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 140.
Ibid., p.l40. Apart from the traditional Ottoman conception of 
justice, the fact that from the late sixteenth century onwards the 
Empire was in a state of flux, led the Ottoman intellectual to 
emphasize the function of the state as providing order in the 
society. A comparative example can be found in the post-Franco- 
Prussian War France whereby external vulnerability and internal 
distress were taken to have led to the centrality of order in the 
formulation of state theories. Ibid., 83ff.
Karpat, "Land Regime, Social Structure and Modernization in the 
Ottoman Empire," 73.
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conduct,^® is illuminative. In the Ottoman context, this 
corresponds to an intellectual totally preoccupied with 
the ideal of the sustenance of order, and who, till as 
late as the twentienth century, would be in almost total 
disregard of society, except insofar as its existing 
structure is in question. As far as the conceptual schema 
common to the Ottoman intellectuals is concerned, the 
state had been the center of intellectual preoccupation. 
The common themes had been justice, on the part of the 
state, and obligation, on the part of society, as the 
bases of order. The means to achieve order were perceived 
to be determined and actualized by the state. The Sultan, 
as the locus of the state, was perceived to possess 
absolute authority and to be the sine-qua-non for the 
prevention of potential conflict and unrest in society 
which would arise in case individual members were left to 
their own devices.
The textual reference for the Ottoman intellectual 
was the Kutadgu Bilig of Yusuf Khass Hajib. The concept 
of circle of justice as formulated in this work provided 
both the framework of the social stratification and the 
role of the state. Exemplary is the Ahlak-i Ala’l of Ali 
Kinalizade, a prominent sixteenth-century Ottoman 
intellectual. In his book Ali Kinalizade, drawing upon 
the concept of circle of justice, justifies the Ottoman 
social stratification, while according each social 
category its set of duties and rights which correspond to
Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. Louis Writh and Edward 
Shils (San Diego^ New York and London: 1985), 3.
İnalcık, OsmanlI. İmparatorluğu : Toplum ve Ekonomi, 340.
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its status in the society.^® Apart from internal dynamics, 
Kutadgu Bilig also had its reflection on the Ottoman 
conception of state by the definition of the external 
function of the state as that of extending the boundaries 
of I s l a m . S u c h  an approach to the function of the state 
can be linked to the Ottoman perception of the West, 
i.e., Christendom, as the inferior-infidel ' o t h e r . I n  
this respect, the absolute authority of the state, 
identified in the person of the Sultan was legitimated on 
two grounds; that of divine will, and derived from it, 
military power.
As stated above, from the late-sixteenth century 
onwards the Ottoman intellectual was to engage in a 
struggle against the ever-deepening problems, in all 
spheres including the economy and society, that the 
Empire faced. The failures at the battlefield which had 
the long-run effect of revenue-loss for the Empire, 
constituted the most conspicious cause of economic 
deterioration. Such a development was also accompanied by 
the decline of the tımar system, which in turn led to the 
weakening of the control of land by the state.®^
Aksan, "Ottoman Political Writing," 53.
4®. Ibid.
For the classical Ottoman perception of the West, see Hüseyin G. 
Yurdaydin, "Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi" (History of Thought and Science) 
in Türkiye Tarihi (History of Turkey), ed. Sina Akşin, vol.3 
(Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1988), 251.
The dissolution of the tımar system was also due to the 
recruitment of the reaya to military service, from late-sixteenth 
century onwards, which further enhanced the curtailment of state 
revenues. İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 47; Karpat, "Land Regime, 
Social Structure and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire," 69-90.
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Military degradation was just the surface cause of 
internal decline. The all-encompassing reason for the 
decline was the inability of the Empire to catch up with 
the already industrializing West. The West had been going 
through an ages-long process of development. While 
geographical discoveries were providing military 
upperhand and trading advantages, social developments 
were bringing about the replacement of the traditional 
agricultural structures with industrial economies which 
had formed the second dimension of Western superiority. 
Another factor further deepening the crisis was the flow 
of American silver into the Empire in large quantities 
which had the final effect of the devaluation of Ottoman 
currency.
At first hand, the remedies were sought in 
restrengthening the state as an all-out solution. What is 
called the advise literature was localized first and 
foremost among the ranks of the Ulema,· and mainly 
comprised the works of the official historiographers. In 
this respect, as argued by Fleischer, Mustafa Ali (1541- 
1600) -a student of Ali Kinalizade- introduced a new 
outlook into the advise literature. To begin with.
Among the many, the primary incident was the loss of the 
prominence of the Silk Road that had been for centuries a major 
source of revenue for the Empire, due to the new routes of trade that 
the West acquired through the Americas and Africa. Shaw, History of 
the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1, 172.
For a multi-dimensional analysis of the reasons of Ottoman 
decline, see Ibid., especially 169-215.
Cornell Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and ' Ibn 
Khaldunism' in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters," in Ibn Khaldun and 
Islamic Ideology, Bruce B. Lawrence ed. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984), 
49-61/ Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: Mustafa All
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although Mustafa All was no exception among the Ottoman 
intellectuals with religious education, in his writings 
it is possible to observe a reservation on the monopoly 
of the divine will as the root of legitimate power, and 
thus a shift to more functional concerns as to increase 
the efficiency of the ruling m e c h a n i s m . Based on his 
analogy between the physician and the state, the latter 
being responsible for curing societal sickness,and 
relating the problems of his time to institutional 
decadence, Mustafa Ali saw the escape from further 
decline in the restoration of the Sultan's authority.^’ He 
was critical of the bureaucratic corruption which he 
linked to the arbitrary staffing of bureaucratic ranks, 
as a natural extension of the increasing need of the 
Empire for state officials. In this respect, he staunchly 
argued for appropriate education and professional 
training as the basic principles for recruitment.
Apart from Mustafa Ali's precedence, Ibn Khaldun's 
Muqaddlmah provided another reference point especially 
for the seventeenth-century Ottoman historiographer.®® His 
explanation of the decay of the state, as a natural 
outcome of being, invoked inquisitiveness among Ottoman
(1541-1600) (Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1986) .
®®. Ibid., 201-13. See also Fleischer "Royal Authority, Dynastic 
Cyclism and 'Ibn Khaldunism' in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters,"
56.
Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual In the Ottoman Empire,
244.
®·^. Ibid., 201-13
®®. For the analytical parallelism between Mustafa Ali and Ibn 
Khaldun, see Fleischer, "Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and ' Ibn 
Khaldvmism' in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters," 46-69.
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intellectuals. The divergence appears to be where Ibn 
Khaldun approached the decline of the states as an 
inevitable phase of history. The Ottoman intellectuals 
were optimistic enough to argue for the possibility of 
stopping the decline of the Empire. They had faith in 
returning to the victorious old days, once the causes of 
the decline were apprehended. Here, it is again possible 
to point at the emphasis on the function of the state to 
ease the pains that the Empire was going through.
In this respect, the writings of the two prominent 
seventeenth-century historiographers. Katip Çelebi and 
Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, are illustrative. It is possible 
to observe in both the influence of Ibn Khaldun, as far 
as the organic view is concerned, and that of Mustafa 
Ali, as far as the remedies, suggested for dealing with 
the problems of the day, were in question. The 
paternalistic connotation common to the Ottoman 
intellectual is also evident here,®^ that both proposed 
reforms regarding state officials in line with what was 
ideal, the criteria of which were honor, justice, and the 
capability of taking timely precautions.
The Ottoman historiographers of the late-sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries are mostly important for the 
piecemeal meeting of the Empire with the West in the 
sphere of knowing. With such a precedence, the following
53. Ibid., 47.
5°. Ibid., 48.
5^ . Illustrative is the analogy provided by Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi 
between parent-child on the one hand, and state-society on the other 
hand- Yurdaydin, "Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi,” 263.
62. Ibid., 255-67.
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decades witnessed the emergence of a new type of 
intellectual stratum primarily within the bureaucratic 
ranks. It was this strata that we now turn as the
protagonists and initiators of a new epoch in Ottoman 
history, the epoch of Westernization, out of which the 
main subject of this study, the liberal intellectual, 
would emerge.
A New Identity For the Ottoman Intellectual: Between
Tradition and Modernity
As stated above, the attempts of the late-sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries for reforming the state 
mechanism were to turn into a project of modernization, 
taken as Westernization in the following centuries.
Justifying the chain effect, the first failure in the
face of the superiority of the West in the battlefield 
would lead to a change in the Ottoman perception of the 
West from the inferior infidel to one that must be taken 
as a model for improvement, first and foremost in the 
technical sphere, and subsequently to an aspiration to 
understand it in all its aspects.
The emulation of the West by the Ottomans basically 
in technical terms began in the eighteenth century. In 
this respect, the most conspicuous development was the 
introduction of printing (1729), which bore the seeds of 
the examination of the Western way of government. The 
leading figure in this era was Ibrahim Müteferrika 
(1670’-1754) who, besides his prominence in the opening 
of the first press house, provided seminal works which
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paved the way for more comprehensive reform attempts of 
the coming decades, Berkes has cited the 'Usui ul-Hlkam 
fl Nizam ul-'Umam (1731) as the most significant work of 
Ibrahim Müteferrika, which he submitted to Mahmud I 
(1730-1754). The book mainly concentrated on the military 
aspects of Western superiority and proposed parallel 
military reforms for the Ottomans to escape from decline. 
Additionally, he provided works in a wide range of fields 
including geography and physics which introduced European 
science.
Following the subsequent conservative reaction, the 
task of Westernization was to be revitalized in the late- 
eighteenth century. During the reign of Selim III, (1788- 
1807) radical military reforms, under the supervision of 
foreign experts, were adopted as the basic project. On 
the other hand, and most importantly, the practise of 
sending Ottoman officials abroad with the duty of 
observing the structure and functioning of the Western 
institutions,®^ was systematized in 1793, by the 
establishment of permanent embassies.®® In spite of the 
failure of the reform attempts in the short term, due to 
the recurrence of stultifying reaction coming from the 
conservative wing, ®® they formed precedence for the more 
far-reaching measures of the following periods.
®®. Berkes, The Development of Secularism In Turkey, 36-47.
®^ . Ibid., 33-41.
®®. Ibid., 77.
®®. For the conservative reaction against the eighteenth century
reform attempts, see Ibid., 51-89.
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The opening of the medical and engineering schools 
basically with military concerns are important in this 
se nse.The introduction of scientific studies in these 
newly established institutions threw the seeds for the 
cultivation of a new type of men of knowledge donned with 
a new outlook. Acquainted with the Western type 
institutions and ideas throughout his education, and 
hence sharply differing from his predecessors, the new 
intellectual was to give precedence to the superiority of 
science to the detriment of lore. It was he who gained 
the upper hand in the bureaucratic ranks, and initiated a 
break away from the antedating traditional reformism.®®
THE NEW ROLE OF THE INTELLECTUAL IN THE POLICY MAKING 
PROCESS: THE CASE OF TANZİMAT
The new intellectual was to reflect his presence on 
the politics of the Empire through a series of reforms 
which made up the essence of his ruling time, known as
. Prior to Tanzimat all the high schools were established within 
the structure of loilitary education. In this respect, the first 
meeting with the Western ideas was experienced in the Schools of 
Engineering and Medicine which were mere branches of military 
education. Ibid., 75, 99-132; Cahid Baltacı, "Osmanli Eğitim Sistemi" 
(Ottoman Education System) in Osmanlj. Ansiklopedisi (Ottoman
Encyclopedia), vol.2. (Istanbul: Ağaç Yayıncılık, 1993), 105.
®®. For the perception of reform attempts, till as late as the second 
half of nineteenth century, within the context of traditional 
reformism, see Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 
vol. 1, 225-11; ilber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılr (The
Longest Century of the Empire) (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1987);
Mardin, Türkiye'de İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi (The Development of 
the Economic Thought in Turkey) (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi
Maliye Enstitüsü, 1962) (12), 10-1; Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims
and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers," 29-9.
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the Tanzimat era (1839-1876) . In this period, the new 
intellectual consolidated his standing not only against 
the traditionalist wing, but also vis-à-vis the Sultan 
through a set of measures. By initiating the codification 
of a criminal code, the Tanzimat Charter (Gülhane Hatt-i 
Hümayunu) (1839), the basic texture initiating the 
Tanzimat era, aimed to provide security for the state 
official from the arbitrary punishment and dismissal by 
the Sultan.·^“ Additionally, the Charter also contained the 
concept of law to be based not merely on the $eri 
principles and arbitrary enactments of the Sultan, but on 
the prerequisite of the proper governance of the people.·^ ! 
The most prominent indicator of such a development was 
the acceptance by the Sultan to abide by the laws which 
were to be enacted by an independent assembly.
Apart from the strengthening of the disposition of 
the bureaucracy vis-à-vis the Sultan, the relation 
between the latter and the people was also redefined. In 
this respect, the fact that both were bound by the same 
rule had significant connotations for the perception of 
the ruled. Such a measure is interpreted by some as a 
sign of a conceptual shift from ruled-as-subject to the
Literally, Tanzimat correponds to ordering. In the Ottoman 
context it meant reorganization. Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Tarih 
Sözlüğü (Dictionary of History from Tanzimat to the Republic), ed. 
Necdet Sakaoğlu (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 125/ Ortaylı,
"Tanzimat," in Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol.6 
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 1545.
İnalcık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri" 
(Implementation of Tanzimat and Its Social Reactions), Belleten 28 
(112) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1964), 620.
■^1. Ibid., 619.
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ruled-as-citizen.'^ 2 ^he arguments in this strain draw upon 
the enactment of the Code on Citizenship {Tabiiyet 
Kanunu-1869), which ensured the legally equal status of 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike which had already been 
acknowledged in the Tanzimat Charter (1839) and
subsequently in the Reform Edict (1856) However, such a 
development should be comprehended more as a reflection 
of the deepening influence of the West on the Empire, and 
relatedly as a way to cope with the increasing uprisings 
by the non-Muslim population with nationalist 
aspirations.·^^ Additionally, the tendency to appeal to the 
ruled-as-citizens rather than as subjects is interpreted 
as one measure by the center to reassure its control over 
the periphery vis-à-vis the increasing strength of the 
local notables as intermediaries between the ruler and 
the ruled.
Apart from that, the granting of legal guarantee for 
life and property was also interpreted as connoting a new 
conception of justice, by incorporating a worldly 
dimension, and thus expanding its context from both the 
tutelage of the will of the Sultan, and the strict
. Zafer Toprak, "İktisat Tarihi" (History of Economics) in Türkiye 
Tarihi, ed. Sina Akşin, vol.3 (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1988), 198; 
and Yardaydın, "Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi," 292.
The principle of equality of Muslims and non-Muslims before the 
law was to be one grounds of agitation of the traditionalist wing 
against the Tanzimat reforms. İnalcık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve 
Sosyal Tepkileri," 623-49; Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı, 
75.
Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1856-1876 (New 
York: Gordion Press, 1973), 234-70.
Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," 169-90. For the relation 
between local notables and center, see Karpat, "Land Regime, Social 
Structure and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire," 69-90.
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application of respective religious laws.’^^ Hence, justice 
came to mean more than preserving societal hierarchy. 
Such a shift in the perception of justice can be seen in 
the establishment of independent courts with the 
authority of supervision over issuance of penalties,and 
in matters which were assessed to be outside the sphere 
of the religious law.’^^
In this respect, the measures taken by the Tanzlmat 
intellectual-as“bureaucrat, who aimed to preserve for 
himself a breathing space from the arbitrary will of the 
Sultan, and to assume authority in the state structure, 
may be considered to contain the glimmerings of the 
concept of the rule-of-law just for themselves, however 
unintentionally.'^^ Indeed, it is possible to interpret the
İnalcık, "Tanzimat* in Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri,” 619. 
Berkes has dated the change in the conception of justice back to the 
rule of Mahmud II, whom he names as the "enlightened monarch." In 
this respect, he has cited the introduction of the concept of 
'"adalet^  ^ (justice) by Mahmud II, as distinct from Şeriat and Kanun, 
and thus its implication of a legal sphere outside the both. Berkes, 
The Development of Secularism In Turkey, 92, 94-5. On the other hand, 
Karpat has linked the significance given to the security of life and 
property to such practical concerns of the center as to gain the 
support of the masses against the local notables. Karpat, "The 
Transformation of the Ottoman State," International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, 3 (1972), 243-81.
Such a measure had significant implications not only for the 
ordinary men, but also for the members of the bureaucracy whose life, 
property and status in the state had long been dependent on the will 
of the Sultan.
For a detailed analysis of the institutional reflections of the 
change in the conception of justice, see Berkes, The Development of 
Secularism In Turkey, 156-9. The contradictions between the enactment 
of codes, based mainly on Western models, and the religious law, can 
be observed especially in the sphere of penal code and trade. 
Exemplary are 1838 Commercial Treaty with England, 1850 Commercial 
Code, 1858 Penal Code, 1858 Land Code. For a thorough analysis in 
this respect, see Ibid., 161-4/ Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun 
Yüzyrir, 141-4.
For a similar assessment see Berkes, The Development of 
Secularism In Turkey, 146; İnalcık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve
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reforms in the legal sphere as the manifestation of the 
attempt to forge a distinct identity for the legislative 
and judicial organs, outside the sphere of both the 
Sultan and the Ulema, that would hold the authority in 
setting out the principles of the relationship between 
the ruled and the ruler. Exemplary here was the
establishment of Meclis-i Ahkam-i Adliye,^^ to devise 
required rules and regulations for the enactment of the 
reform package, as well as to supervise over the disputes 
between the ruled and the ruler. However, here one should 
bear in mind the fact that the officials were still 
appointed by the Sultan and the realization of the laws 
were dependent on their being ratified by the Sultan. 
The final attempt came with the establishment of Divan-i 
Ahkam-i Adliye (1868) which assumed authority over the 
secular courts.®^
Thus, unlike their predecessors, though sharing the 
same unease in the face of external threat coupled with 
internal unrest, the former being due to both military 
degradation and economic backwardness, the latter mainly
Sosyal Tepkileri," especially 620; Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun 
Yüzyılı, especially 21, 180.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 146. Dyson has 
pointed at the concern with the public law as a characteristic of 
"state" societies. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 115. 
The attempt to delineate a sphere of public law distinct from the 
religious law in the Tanzimat era is also significant in this 
respect.
Meclis-i Vala-yi Ahkam-i Adliye (1837) and Meclis-i Ali-i 
Tanzimat (1853) subsequently acted as the legislative organs of the 
Tanzimat era. Meclis-i Ahkam-i Adliye (1853-1861) was formed as a 
branch of Meclis-i Vala-yi Ahkam-i Adliye (1837). In 1861 it rejoined 
the latter. Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Tarih Sözlüğü, 82, 84.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 146.
83. Ibid., 157.
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to the emerging nationalist aspirations again as a result 
of Western impact, the Tanzimat men diverged from the 
conception of state-as-might. Rather, they concentrated 
on the reformation basically in the judicial sphere, 
which led to subsequent codifications®^ beginning with 
commerce and then extending to the public sphere.®®
In this respect, it is possible to observe a shift 
in the role of the bureaucracy from preserving the 
existing order, to a tendency towards creating a new 
one.®*^  In a sense, the Tanzimat intellectual-as-bureaucrat 
displayed a portrait of ”intellectual-as-legislator, ”®®
As different from the conception of state-as-law, the idea of 
state-as-raight takes economic and military power as the basis of the 
legitimacy of sovereignty. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western 
Europe, 102. Thus it can be argued that state-as-might well 
corresponds to the Ottoman idea of the state in the periods 
antedating Tanzimat when reform attempts were carried out extensively 
with the concern of recapturing the military supremacy of the Empire 
in the face of the West. For a supportive assessment, see Berkes, The 
Development of Secularism in Turkey; Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun 
Yüzyılr, 34.
®®. ”The whole assumption of the Tanzimat was that reform meant 
codification, systematization, and control,...” Shaw, "Some Aspects 
of the Aims and Acheivements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman 
Reformers,” 33.
®®. İnalcık, "Tanzimat’ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri.” Ortaylı 
has pointed at the break in the Tanzimat period with the traditional 
reformism Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı, 80. However, such 
a shift did not happen out-of-the blue. Instead, it can be 
interpreted as a natural outcome of the preceding reform attempts. 
See Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 8 9-132, for the 
significance of the rule of Mahmud II in the emergence of the 
Tanzimat intellectual-as-bureaucrat, as well as of the first seeds of 
a new conception of justice outside the sphere of both the Kanuns of 
the Sultan and the religious law.
®"^. Traditionally, bureaucracy was one group of the slaves of the 
Sultan whose authority were confined to administrative sphere and the 
application of the rules and regulations in accordance with the will 
of the latter.
®®. The term is borrowed from Zygmunt Bauman, Legislators and 
Interpreters (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987). In 
his comparative analysis of the role of the intellectuals in the 
modern and post-modern era, Bauman argues that the intellectual of 
the modern epoch bore the role of the legislator with an alternative 
set of principles for the ideal societal order as a reaction to the
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however, still carrying the traditional concern of saving 
the state.
On the other hand, one should bear in mind the fact 
that the Tanzimat period was a period of duality. Such 
duality was most manifest in the judicial sphere, and 
particularly in devising up of a penal code. The old 
bases of law making, the Şeriat and Örf, continued to 
exist side by side with reform attempts which were 
modeled on the West. This led to a schizophrenic practice 
at times leading to a deadlock due to the incompatible 
nature of the religious principles and the modern secular 
ones. Exemplary is the 1858 Penal Code which was modeled 
on the French Penal Code, whereby, despite its 
overwhelmingly secular structure, conformity with the 
religious law was assured.®®
On the other hand, the Tanzimat intellectual has, in 
some instances, been attributed a liberal identity.®® For 
such an assessment, the key has been found within the 
economic sphere. In this respect, as far as the 
agricultural policies were concerned, the 1858 Land Code 
which promulgated the right to private property and the 
freedom in production, has been taken as the most
dominance of the Church. However^ in this chapter the term is used 
symbolically for the Tanzimat intellectual. When compared to the 
intellectual-as-legislator of the West, Tanzimat intellectual lacked 
the cognizance with respect to the society. His ideal world was 
shaped by the criteria of what the state mechanism "ought to be.” On 
the other hand, he inherently carried the seeds of his Western 
counterpart, i.e., the concern with what the society "ought to be,” 
which would be furnished in the coming decades, and ultimately 
consolidated in the Republican era.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 164.
Toprak, "İktisat Tarihi,” 215.
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prominent example.®^ Apart from that, the 1838 trade 
agreement with England formed another basis for this 
argument. The negation of state monopoly over trade, and 
the immunity from internal tariffs for exporting have 
been cited as liberal policies. The 3tudents of Ottoman- 
Turkish politics in this strain have also pointed at the 
1860 Trade Convention with England and France, which gave 
an end to the obstacles arising from tariff regulations, 
as another further step towards liberalization.
These arguments have also been countered. In this 
respect, the main intention underlying the reforms, 
specifically in the agricultural sphere, has been 
interpeted as the aspiration to strengthen the center 
vis-à-vis local notables, rather than as a reflection of 
the liberal mood of the era.®^ In this strand of arguments 
the subsequent privatization of the land has been 
perceived to be a rather unintended outcome.®^ Not 
differently, reforms in the commercial sphere have been 
taken as the outcome of Western influence which 
concentrated on the Empire as the new market for 
manufactured goods and as a supplier of cheap raw 
materials and agricultural products.®® The 1838 trade 
agreement has been analyzed from this perspective as 
providing the starting point of the Western infiltration
For the liberal tendency in the adoption of agricultural policies 
see. Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı, 169-71; Mardin, 
Türkiye'de İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi, 9-10, 24.
Toprak, "İktisat Tarihi," 200-3.
Karpat, "The Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in 
the Ottoman Empire," 69-90.
Ibid.
®®. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 139-41.
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reform package of the Tanzlmat. These measures were not 
advocated on the basis of a compact liberal theory. 
Besides, it is difficult to categorize the reformers in 
terms of a certain theoretical viewpoint; rather they can 
merely be viewed as policy-makers with the common goal of 
restrengthening the Ottoman state in the face of the 
West. The disjunction among the Tanzlmat reformers is 
best exemplified in the conflicting dispositions of the 
two prominent bureaucrats of the period, Ali and Cevdet 
Pashas, with respect to the codification process of the 
civil law. In this respect Ali Pasha, who can be taken 
among the Westernists, proposed the modelling of the 
civil law on the French model. On the other hand, Cevdet 
Pasha, representing the conservative wing, objected to 
such an adoption and proposed that the codification be 
drawn in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence.
Above all, one may easily name the Tanzimat reforms 
as attempts towards Westernization. It is here that the 
dilemma of the Tanzimat intellectual-as-bureaucrat comes 
forth; he fluctuated between tradition and the modern.
Examplary is the testaments of the two prominent Tanzlmat 
figures, Fuad Pasha and Ali Pasha, whereby the acknowledgement of the 
indispensability of the protective measures exists side by side with
the pseudo liberal atmosphere which was limited to the sphere of
foreign trade. Belgelerle Tanzlmat: Osmanlr Sadrazamlarından All ve 
Fuad Paşaların Siyasi Vasiyetnameleri (Tanzlmat İn the Documents:
Political Testaments of Ottoman Grand Viziers All and Fuad Pashas), 
ed. Engin D. Akarli (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 
1978).
Berkes, The Development of Secularism In Turkey, pp. 165-169. 
Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı, 180-90.
Such a dilemma was also present in the Tanzlmat Charter, which 
originally declared loyalty to the religious law. İnalcık, however, 
has interpreted the acknowledgment of the prerequisite of conformity 
with religious law in the enactment of refo2mis as one of formal
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The policy implications of such a disposition can be 
observed in every sphere and especially in the 
codification process, whereby conformity with the 
religious law was repeatedly asserted.
However, the continuous effort to bring the reforms 
in line with tradition should not be viewed as a 
pathology. Rather, the explanation should be sought in 
the fact that the Tanzlmat intellectual-as-bureaucrat was 
the product of a Western type education which existed 
side by side with the traditional institutions of 
learning, still providing a channel for state service. 
Thus, the argument that the Tanzlmat era was an 
experience with dual identity of the state structure 
gains grounds, since the Ulema still existed within the 
state ranks with their own policy alternatives, the 
religious law constituting one of their bases of power.
In this respect, the inherent duel between tradition 
and the project of Westernization of the Tanzimat era was 
to merge in the synthesizing reaction of the Young 
Ottoman movement in the second part of the nineteenth 
century.
traditionalism. İnalcık, "Tanzimat'ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal 
Tepkileri," 518.
For the tensions arising out of the duality in the legal 
structure in the Tanzlmat era, see Berkes, The Development of 
Secularism In Turkey, 160-69.
Dyson has noted that the cross-fertilization of foreign ideas 
into the native intellectual framework does not occur in an isolated 
style. Rather the ideas imported are exposed to interpretations based 
on "...wider cultural attributes." Dyson, The State Tradition In 
Western Europe, 156.
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Intellectuals of Opposition: Press as the New Circle
The Tanzimat period contained the seeds of a new 
type of intellectual, infiltrated by Western, and 
especially by the French Enlightenment thought. In 
contrast to the preceding era, it initiated the
intellectual framework of the search for escape from 
decline not in the past, but in the present. The Tanzimat 
intellectual, unlike his predecessors, was in quest for 
transcending the present, rather than rebuilding the 
past.i°^ Such a preoccupation also corresponded to a new 
conception of history as progress, which formed the 
second dimension of break with the classical Ottoman 
intellectual. Last but not least, the period, however 
slowly, introduced a new attribute to the intellectual, - 
the "critical discourse."^®® It is especially in this 
respect, that the Tanzimat period provided a framework 
for the introduction of the press as an intermediary, 
though rather a weak one, in the articulation and 
dissemination of ideas.
Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Acheivements of the 
Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers," 31-2; liter Turan, 
Westernization and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey, Occasional 
Paper, (Ebenhausen, Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) (May 
1989), 8-12.
Mardin, "Tanzimat ve Aydınlar" {Tanzimat and Intellectuals), in 
Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet 'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol.l, 53-4.
Ibid., 47-9.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 192. Except for 
the first official Turkish newspaper of the Empire, Takvim-i Vekayi 
(1831), Tercuman-j. Ahval (1860), Tasvir-i Efkar (1861), Muhbir 
(18 63), and Mirat (1867) can be cited as the first instances of the 
experience with the relatively independent dissemination of ideas to 
the public. See Orhan Koloğlu, "Osmanli Basını: İçeriği ve Rejimi"
(Ottoman Press: Its Content and Regime), in Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e 
Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol.l, 68-94.
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Thus emerged a new wing of intellectuals, in 
opposition, and with an alternative sphere of function, 
around the press. Such a disposition also contained 
connotations of a switch in the perception of the role of 
intellectual from a mere legislator to one preoccupied 
with educating the people.However, this should not be 
mislead one to conclude with a portrait of independent 
intellectuals. On the contrary, the Ottoman intellectual 
kept his organic links with the state. This was mostly 
due to the fact that he was still educated by and for the 
state. His identity yet lacked any social projection.^i°
Yet, the press as a new circle for the intellectuals 
was not yet firmly established, because the strong hold 
of the state on the press continued. The 1865 Press Code 
made it possible to commit any publication found 
offensive to the state to pay heavy penalties and/or 
imprisonment for owners/editors. State control over the 
press was extended by a provision in the 18 67 Sublime 
Decree. The provision gave the state the right of 
supervision over and stop the publications in case they 
were thought to be detrimental for the Empire.Another
The assessment by Mardin that "Yo\mg Ottomans were the first 
ideologues of the Ottoman Empire. Their medium of action was not the 
sword, but the word” very well illustrates this point. Mardin, The 
Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of
Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1962), 397.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 197-8/ Lewis, 
The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 146.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 207.
The first example would be the closure of Muhbir in May 18 67. 
For further information about the Press Code and its application, see 
Koloğlu, "OsmanlI Basını: İçeriği ve Rejiıai," 68-94; Lewis, The
Emergence of Modern Turkey, 149-50.
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practical reflection of the dependent status of the 
intellectual to the state can be observed in his swinging 
between exiles and returns to state service on state 
pardon. One such figure of the period was Namık Kemal 
(1840-1888). Namık Kemal experienced his first exile in 
1867 by his appointment to provincial service. He 
continued his exile abroad between 1867-1871. Upon the 
pardon of the state, he returned to the country in 1871, 
and in 1873 was imprisoned in Cyprus. In 187 6 he was 
again pardoned and returned to Istanbul.
The Young Ottomans and Freedom in Tradition
The second half of the nineteenth century was marked 
by the Young Ottoman movement, which was formed into a 
society in 1865. The intellectuals that participated in 
this movement were mainly the graduates of the secular 
schools of the Tanzimat era. The origins of the movement 
lied in the opposition towards the policies of the 
Tanzimat bureaucrats. The main target was the higher 
bureaucrats such as Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha and their 
Westernization project, rather than the S u l t a n . Their 
ideas were expressed in the newspapers Tasvir-i 
Efkar[1Q61) , Mirât{IS 63 ), and Muhbir{18 61 ) . The official 
organ of the movement began publication in 1868 under the 
name Hürriyet
. Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, 108-15.
Mardin, "Yeni OsmanlIlar ve Siyasi Fikirleri" (Young Ottomans 
and Their Political Ideas), in Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi, vol.6, 1698-1701.
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These intellectuals were gathered around the ideal 
of a parliamentary system of government and the need for 
a constitution. In this respect, the open letter of 
Mustafa Fazxl Pasha (1867) to Abdülaziz (1861-1876) was 
important, since it represented the gist of the Young 
Ottoman thought. The key term in the letter was 
"freedom." Freedom was perceived to be the basic need of 
the Empire to avoid further decadence and to achieve
progress. The conception of freedom as formulated in the 
letter also contained the idea of a ruling mechanism with 
checks which, in the final analysis, would merge the 
Young Ottomans around the ideal of a parliamentary 
regime. Another important point was that Mustafa Fazıl 
Pasha stressed the necessity of a distinct sphere of laws 
for the state from that of religion.Ironically, this 
point constituted the dilemma for the Young Ottomans. 
They were at a loss concerning the question of how to
reconcile their Western-inspired ideals with tradition, 
that is with Islam.
Among the Young Ottomans, Namık Kemal's writings
were significant, in that he tried to come up with a
synthesis. Mainly influenced by the writings of Rousseau
For the inçıortant role that Mustafa Fazıl Pasha played in the 
Young Ottoman movement, see Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 
153-60. For a brief outline of the letter, see Tevfik Çavdar, 
Türkiye'de Liberalizm (1860-1990) (Liberalism İn Turkey) (Ankara: 
İmge Kitabevi, 1992), 14-5. For more information about the ideas of 
Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, see Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman 
Thought, 276-83.
Mustafa Fazıl Pasha held the idea that religion was purely a 
matter of eternal life, and thus should be kept outside the ruling 
sphere. Ibid., 282.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 206.
106
and Montesquieu, Namık Kemal attempted to find grounds 
to his liberal disposition in Islam. His ’liberal’ side 
was discernible in his advocacy of the consent of the 
people, that is a parliamentary regime. He also 
approached the theme of freedom from a ’liberal’ stance, 
with the presumption that all individuals are born with 
natural rights the boundaries of which are delineated in 
respect to the absolute good. However, in his writings 
the absolute good turned out to mean the good as defined 
by religious law.^ ^^  Namık Kemal applied the determinative 
hand of divine will to the society through the religious 
law which he perceived to be an ideal reflection of the 
former in the formation and survival of societies.
Namık Kemal viewed the state as a moral personality, 
with no existence transcending the p e o p l e . state in 
this respect was equally bound with religious law. Here 
one faces an admixture of traditionalism with
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 142; Kamiran Birand, 
Aydınlanma Devri Devlet Felsefesinin Tanzimat^a Tesirleri (Effects of 
State Philosophy of Enlightenment Period on Tanzimat) (Ankara: Son
Havadis, 1955), 29.
For the conciliation of Islamic principles with the idea of 
freedom and prerequisites of a parliamentary regime see Berkes, The 
Development of Secularism in Turkey, 208-18; Mardin, "Yeni OsmanlIlar 
ve Siyasi Fikirleri," 1700-1.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 211. The 
determinative existence of the absolute will as the conditioner of 
the individual rights is not foreign to the liberal theory. On the 
contrary, in Locke one can observe the prerequisite that laws of 
society be in conformity with the divine law. See David Gauthier, 
"Why Ought One Obey God? Reflections on Hobbes and Locke", in Essays 
on Early Modern Philosophers: From Descartes and Hobbes to Newton and 
Leibniz, ed. Vere Chappel (New York and London: Garland Publishing,
Inc., 1992), 103-25.
Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, 291; Birand, 
Aydınlanma Devri Devlet Felsefesinin Tanzimat*a Tesirleri^ 41.
Ibid., 29-35; for more information about Namık Kemal * s views on 
the state, see Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, 300ff.
107
Montesquieuan influence. Basically equating the state 
with the government, Namık Kemal delinated the boundaries 
of legislation outside and above the sphere of function
of the state. ^22
Namık Kemal's idea of the state was also manifest in 
his writings on the economy, whereby he viewed the state 
as nothing more than an institution in the service of the 
people, of which revenues should correspond to the 
capacity and the needs of the public. More importantly, 
he reversed the traditionally held opinion about the 
economic backwardness of the Ottoman Empire. He explained 
lack of accumulation of national wealth and of private 
initiative on the grounds of non-development in 
industrial, trade and banking facilities. In this sense, 
while opposing protectionist policies as pseudo 
solutions, he proposed the creation of capital 
accumulation as the basic remedy for the economic
maladies of the Empire.^^3
Namık Kemal is important for Ottoman-Turkish 
intellectual history; his stance serves as a model for 
the unease of the intellectual to comply both with the 
existing traditions and with the nature of the ruling 
mechanism. Thus, there emerges an intellectual having 
partially modern values and in a quest to reconcile them 
with tradition.
Ibid.; Birand, Aydınlanma Devri Devlet Felsefesinin Tanzimat'a 
Tesirleri, 33-5.
For the ideas of Namık Kemal on the economy, see Çavdar, 
Türkiye’de Liberalizm, 43-54.
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The Young Ottoman movement failed to present a 
homogeneous schema of thought, as was the case with the 
Tanzimat bureaucrat. ^24 There was a falling out among the 
members concerning political orientations. The means 
proposed by the members to reach the ideal of a 
parliamentary regime, ranged from compliance with the 
Sultan, to finding social support, and to seizing 
authority through a Sultan who would conform with their 
reform projects. ^25 Again, not different from their 
predecessors, the conceptual schema of the Young Ottomans 
was roughly formulated around the question of the decline 
of the Empire and the ways to reverse this process. The 
uniqueness of the group arouse from the fact that it was 
with the Young Ottomans that one sees the tendency to 
reach and educate the public through the press.
THE OTTOMAN INTELLECTUAL AT THE CROSSROADS: THE EMERGENCE 
OF THE PLATFORM OF LIBERAL INTELLECTUAL
Liberalism in its Economic Facet
The liberal tunes in the world of the Ottoman 
intellectual was not absent in the decades following the 
Young Ottoman movement. In this respect, the period of 
Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909) is worthy of attention. It was 
during this period that courses on the economy was 
included in the context of secondary school and
2^4. Mardin, "Yeni OsmanlIlar ve Siyasi Fikirleri," 1700-1. 
2^5. Berkes, The Development of Secularism İn Turkey, 207.
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subsequently in the high school curricula. The leading 
examples are books by Ahmed Midhat, Ekonomi Politik^ 
compiled of the articles published in Tercuman-i Hakikat 
in 1880, and by Sakızlı Ohannes, Mehadi-i îlm-i Servet-i 
Milel {1881) In Ekonomi Politik, one can observe an
explanatory introduction into the basics of classical 
economy; also the view that each country has a peculiar 
way of conducting its economic affairs.^^®
It was particularly in Sakızlı Ohannes*s work that 
the precepts of liberal economy were stressed as 
guidelines for the proper functioning of the economy. The 
significance of the book arises from the fact that it was 
subsequently used as a textbook in the economy classes 
of Sakızlı Ohannes in the Schools of Maliye and 
Mülkiye.
The practice had its precedent in the Kiz Sanayi Mektepleri and 
The Faculty of Law where such a practice had begun in 1870 and 1874 
respectively. During the 1877-1878 period economy was also included 
in the curriculum of Mekteh-i Funun-u Maliye. Mardin, Türkiye^ de 
İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi, 46-9.
Çavdar translates the name of Sakızlı Ohannes* s book into
Turkish as Economy. Çavdar, Türkiye^de Liberalizm, 54.
The reader should not be misled to include Ahmed Midhat into the 
liberal stream. Ahmed Midhat is important with his pioneering work on 
economy. On the other hand, his emphasis on protectionist policies 
puts him at a distance from the liberal thought. Ibid., 117-27.
Mardin cites the emphasis on the idea of labor, and the criticisms
against the state officials on the basis of the criterion of
efficiency as the most important point in the writings of Ahmed 
Midhat. Mardin, Türkiye^de İktisadi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi, 45.
Çavdar cites the Mebadi-i İlm-i Servet-i Milel of Sakızlı
Ohannes as the cornerstone of the Ottoman liberal economic thought. 
Çavdar, Türkiye^de Liberalizm, 55-83. However, one should not be 
misled by the above-stated observations to conclude with a liberal 
era. On the contrary, the reign of Abdülhamid II was merely one of 
formal constitutionalism and par li ament arianism, and one that 
distanced itself from Western institutions and ideas. In a way, it 
was an experience with wiping out the duality that was prevalent in 
the structure of thought of the Ottoman (institutional)
intellectuals, and in this case especially the Young Ottomans who can 
be cited as the cultivators of the era. The duality between the
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The same liberal disposition was also appearent in 
the ilm-l İktisat (1900) of M. Cavid Bey (1875-1926). M. 
Cavid Bey built his arguments on the premise of the 
constant laws of economy, and on the theory of natural 
selection.In this respect, he perceived inequality as 
a natural attribute, which should not be eliminated, and 
as a prerequisite for the progress of the society. 
Eventually, he put emphasis on (economic) individualism, 
and thus denied any right of activity to the state in the 
economic s p h e r e . M .  Cavid Bey is also important as an 
intellectual active in the state ranks. The Second 
Constitutional Period (1908-1920), whereby he served as 
the Finance Minister, was marked with liberal policies 
in the economic sphere.
On the other hand, in the same period the journal 
Ulum-u İktisadiye ve İçtimaiye, founded by M. Cavid Bey 
together with Ahmed Şuayb (1876-1910) and Rıza Tevfik 
(1868-1951) in 1908, the two Ottoman advocates of
adoption of the Western ideas and institutions on the one hand, and 
the search to find them grounds on the traditional platform was 
challenged by the Pan-Islamic rhetoric and despotic policies of 
Abdiilhamid. Such a challenge was also reflected in the intellectual 
layout which paralleled the anti-Western measures of the Sultan, by 
replacing the Western studies by Islamic ones as the main reference 
texts. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 256-71.
Çavdar, Türkiye'de Liberalizm, 86-7.
131. Ibid., 94.
132. M. Cavid Bey was appointed as Finance Minister between 1909- 
1911, in 1914 for short term, and in 1917 and 1918.
13^ . The Second Constitutional period (1908-1920) should not be 
perceived as a breathing space for the actualization of the liberal 
policies in the real sense of the term. On the contrary, liberal 
rhetoric was restricted to the economic sphere, which would also be 
curtailed under the dampening conditions of World War I whereby the 
s\ibsequent rule of the Young Turks turned out to be one of "military 
dictatorship." Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 213-30.
134. pqj. ^ brief analysis of the journal, see Çavdar, Türkiye'de 
Liberalizm, 141-52.
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positivism, provided the sociological and philosophical 
aspects of the liberal stance which was most discernible 
in the economic field. In this respect, the journal 
provided the first examples in social analysis. 
Especially in the writings of Ahmed §uayb (1876-1910) it 
is possible to observe a strong adherence to scientific 
methods in the study of society. His approach was 
grounded on positivistic stance which was most clear in 
his conception of history as an ongoing process of 
progress.Societies and the institutions were viewed in 
this respect not as static bodies, but ones that evolve 
in line with historical contingencies.
Apart from the prevalence of liberalism in the 
economic policies with philosophical and sociological 
grounding, the period between 1908-1918 is worthy of 
attention since it proved to be a determinative phase in 
the clearing of the lines between different and well- 
articulated policy proposals, which were based not only 
on the age-old question of how to save the state, but 
also on specific "schools of thought," namely the 
Islamists, the Turkists and the Westernizers. Thus
oriented, the new intellectuals of the epoch were 
equipped with well-defined conceptual schemes when 
compared to their predecessors.
Ekrem Işın, "Osmanli Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm" (Ottoman 
Modernization and Positivism), in Tanzimat'tan Cumhurlyet'e Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi, vol.2, 359-62.
Işın, "OsmanlI Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm."
Çavdar, Türkiye'de Liberalizm, 147-8.
Işın, "OsmanlI Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm," 361-2.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 337-411.
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The Islamists formulated their conceptual schema in 
reaction to the Westernists, and in a way continued with 
the traditional reformism of the eighteenth century. 
While accepting the superiority of Western science and 
techniques, they sternly opposed the imitation of Western 
morals and mentality. They proposed a return to the 
'glorious old days' when 'Islam had been properly 
practiced. '
On the other hand, the Westernists of the period 
differed from their predecessors in their perception of 
the West and the ideal of Westernization. In fact, 
stripping off the unease of both grappling with the 
duality of adherence to Westernization, and conforming to 
tradition, the new Westernists were not satisfied with 
institutional reforms, rather they stressed the necessity 
of transforming the people through education to match the 
Western standard. This meant creating the Western man on 
Ottoman land.^^^
The Turkist wing was distinguished from the other 
two in its acknowledgement of the necessity of being a 
part of the Western civilization, without giving up 
national identity.The Turkists perceived the critical 
attribute of the West as neither merely a matter of 
science and technique nor of morality and intellect, but 
first and foremost as a matter of national
consciousness 143
14°. Ibid., 340-3.
141. Ibid., 338-40,
142. Ibid., 343-6.
143. Ibid., 355.
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As far as the scope of this study is concerned, the 
important wing is the Westernist one, within which the 
liberal disposition can be located. By the split that 
arouse in the First Congress of the Young Turks in 1902, 
the liberal disposition found itself in the Society of 
Private Initiative and Decentralization (Teşebbüsü Şahsi 
ve Ademi Merkeziyet Cemiyeti), under the leadership of 
Prens Sabahaddin (1878^-1948). Both the name of the 
society and the intellectual identity of its leader 
carried hints of matching the twentienth-century Ottoman 
Westernist with the Ottoman liberal.
Prens Sabahaddin: Portrait of a Liberal Intellectual
The cleavage within the Westernist wing had already 
been solidified in the First Congress of the Young Turks 
(1902), on the surface, around the question of foreign 
interference in the reform process in the Ottoman Empire. 
The liberals approved such an interference.
In this respect. Prens Sabahaddin appears as an 
important figure both due to his leading role in the 
organization and the running of the congress, as well as 
in the delineation of the layout of the liberal 
disposition.^^® Prens Sabahaddin is also significant as an 
intellectual figure in his total opposition to the 
existing power structure in the Ottoman Empire. His
Sina Akşin, "Jön Türkler" (Young Turks), in Tanzimat'tan 
Cumhuriyet e^ Türkiye Ansiklopedisi  ^ vol.3, 835-6. See also All Erkul, 
”Prens Sabahattin,” in Türk Toplumbilimcileri, ed. Emre Kongar ed., 
vol.l, (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1982), 92-6.
Erkul,"Prens Sabahattin,” 92-149.
114
intellectual identity was shaped by an educational 
pattern which can plausibly be called private, and thus 
outside the state-controlled educational process, and 
eventually by the fact that he did not serve in the civil 
service. During the years of his intellectual maturation, 
he happened to be in self-imposed exile abroad.
The conflict which came to surface in 1902 and 
caused the final split within the Young Turk movement in 
1906, resulted in the foundation of the Society of 
Private Initiative and Decentralization under the 
leadership of Prens Sabahaddin. The society was in 
opposition to the Committee of the Union and Progress of 
the Young Turks, which epitomized the faith solely in the 
reconstruction of the parliamentary regime. It is 
possible to find the grounds of difference at this point 
as far as the thought-formation of the two trends were 
concerned. While the Young Turks staunchly argued for the 
reorganization of the state structure, the group of Prens
This was linked to the dispute between Prens Sabahaddin*s 
father, Damat Mahmut Paşa, who once served as the Minister of 
Justice, and Abdülhamid II, that had led to his expulsion from state 
service. Nezahat Nurettin Ege, Prens Sabahattin (Istanbul: Güneş 
Neşriyat, 1977), 19-20. The aloofness of Prens Sabahaddin from active 
engagement in state service was also attributed to his self­
exclusion. In his writings Prens Sabahaddin repeatedly noted his 
disinterest in the power struggle. Ibid., 138.
. The journal which supported the views of the society. Terakki, 
began its publication in 1906. See M. Şükrü Hanioglu, "Osmanlx 
Devleti*nde Meslek-i İçtimai Akımı” (Social Science Trend in Ottoman 
State), in Tanzimat^tan Cumhuriyet e^ Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol.2, 
382-3. The ideas of Prens Sabahaddin provided the groundwork in the 
formation of a number of societies and parties in the coming decades. 
Exemplary are the Society of Revolution (1904), Ottoman Liberal Party 
(1908), Nesli Cedit Kulübü (1908), as the successor of the Society of 
Private Initiative and Decentralization, the Party of Liberty and 
Conciliation (1911), and National Liberal Party (1919). See Tank 
Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye d^e Siyasi Partiler (Political Parties in 
Turkey) (Istanbul, 1952); Erkul, "Prens Sabahattin," 102-3.
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Sabahaddin brought forth the social structure as the 
starting point for transformation,^^®
The grounds of such a disposition should be sought 
in the writings of Frederic Le Play and Edmond Demolins 
which had overwhelming influence in the intellectual 
formation of Prens Sabahaddin. As already noted, 
setting himself apart from the prevailing concerns of the 
period with the state as the main object of reformation, 
Prens Sabahaddin took the society as an object of 
critical analysis, and emphasized the need to adopt 
policies to bring it to maturity for the realization of 
the ideal form of polity which he modeled after the 
Anglo-American parliamentarism.^®^ In this respect, Prens 
Sabahaddin introduced sociological analysis into the 
realm of politics.
Apart from his pioneering studies in the field of 
sociology, Prens Sabahaddin is particularly important in 
his representation of the liberal thought in the Ottoman 
Empire in all its aspects. In his comparative analysis of 
the Western and Ottoman social structures, he adopted the 
Demolins' differentiation between individualistic and
Hanioğlu, "OsmanlI Devleti'nde Meslek-i İçtimai Akımı," 382-6.
Ege, Prens Sabahattin, 36.
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 347. Hanioğlu, 
"Osmanli Devleti'nde Meslek-i İçtimai Akımı," 382-6.
Ege, Prens Sabahattin, 40.
As has also been mentioned above the emphasis on sociological 
analysis can also be found in the writings of the two nineteenth- 
century Ottoman positivists; Ahmed Rıza (1857-1930) and Ahmed Şuayb. 
However, Ahmed Rıza distinguished between the individual of the West 
from the "Ottoman man," on the basis of his contention that the 
individual of the West does not exist in the Ottoman culture. 
Adopting the Comtean perspective he focused on the family and 
bureaucracy as the main constituents of society. On the other hand, 
the contributions of Ahmed Şuayb were mainly in the field of 
literature. Işın, "Osmanli Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm," 356-62.
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communitarian societies, granting the former a higher 
status.Thus, his proposals for an end to the decadence 
that the Empire was going through centered around the 
theme of transforming the Ottoman society from a 
communitarian into an individualistic structure. In this 
respect, education, to be modeled on Western, and 
particularly on Anglo-American style, emerged as the key 
process for the destruction of the Ottoman "individual" 
whose image was, for Prens Sabahaddin, represented in the 
bureaucratic identity as total dependence on the state; 
and the creation of the ideal Western individual about 
whose superiority he was firmly convinced. Here, one 
can observe a critical approach to the Ottoman 
intellectual-as-bureaucrat, which coincides with the
proposed educational reform. Prens Sabahaddin argued for 
an educational process which would bring up productive 
individuals, and not subservient state officials.
In the realm of politics, Prens Sabahaddin proposed 
the delineation of respective spheres of responsibility 
and authority within the power structure. He most 
straightforwardly criticized the overlapping function of 
the military with the executive. More importantly, he
argued for the desirability of decentralization in local
Prens Sabahattin, Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarilabillr? (How Can Turkey 
Be Saved?) (İstanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1950), 30-4, 60; Kge, Prens 
Sabahattin, 241.
Prens Sabahattin, Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarilabilir?, 37-43; Berkes, 
The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 406.
155. Prens Sabahattin, Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarilabilir?, 48; Ege, Prens
Sabahattin, 134-5; Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 
406.
156. pj;ens Sabahattin, Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?, 50. 
ıs’7. Ibid.
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administration as the prerequisite for the efficient 
running of local affairs.^®® Not surprisingly, his 
economic standpoint was grounded on the idealization of 
the Western capitalist economies, an important dimension 
of which was individual initiative.
It can be concluded that the individual as the basic 
category of the Western liberal thought emerged as the 
ideal to be adopted in the context of Ottoman liberal 
thinking. In the Western context, liberal thought had 
found grounds in the nominalist epistomology the object 
of analysis of which is the individual constituents of a 
whole, and for the society the individual-as-such. On the 
contrary, for the Ottoman liberal the theme of the study 
was the society, and particularly the family as its basic 
element; the process of molding out the ideal individual 
was to be activated by the state. In this context, as far 
as Prens Sabahaddin was concerned, bearing in mind his 
ideal of transforming society, one eventually ends up 
with a portrait of a hopeful social engineer, which was 
the common characteristic of the nineteenth-century 
Ottoman intellectual.
Ibid., 51-8. Upon the criticisms directed against the idea of 
decentralization on the grounds of enhancing the separatism of the 
non-Muslim millets, Prens Sabahaddin was forced to assure that the 
idea had mere administrative connotations, and that it had no 
political aspects. Ege, Prens Sabahattin, 163.
Prens Sabahattin, Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarilablllr?, 166-9; Berkes,
The Development of Secularism In Turkey, 393-4.
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In the West, the state was not the sole 
identification reference point for the intellectual. On 
the contrary, following the Renaissance, the intellectual 
was to find his identity in princely courts, in the 
salons of the aristocracy, and the seventeenth-century 
coffee-houses. It was with the rise of the modern state 
that the latter was to systematically act as a 
recruitment channel for the intellectual.
In the Ottoman case, the intellectual was devoid of 
any social circle to present independently formulated 
thought patterns. Instead, he was strikingly a part of 
the state mechanism. Such a situation was to a certain 
extent curbed in the late-nineteenth century, by the 
emergence of a new stratum of intellectuals who gathered 
around the press. However, one should bear in mind the 
strong hold of the state over the press.
In this respect, in the Ottoman classical period 
(1300-1566), the identity of the intellectual was 
delineated within the ranks of the ilmlyye. With the 
modernization attempts, the ideal intellectual was to be 
created by the state itself and placed within 
bureaucratic ranks. In the West, the emergence of the 
secular intellectual accompanied an ages-long historical 
process, beginning with the Renaissance, and stretching
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture, ed. Bryan S. 
Turner (London: Routledge, 1992), 132ff.
Here, the intellectual in question is the secular intellectual 
as against the clerics of the medieval era.
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throughout the Reformation and the Enlightenment. In the 
Ottoman context, the secular intellectual was a product 
of the practical concerns of the state. Consequently, 
such a development had its reflections in the functions 
of the intellectual. While the intellectual-as-legislator 
of modernity in the West was in a struggle to transform 
his society in conformity with the ideal picture in mind 
which was based on reason, the Ottoman intellectual had 
the aim of reorganizing the state on the ideal model of 
the Western state structure.
In this respect, the most exemplary case was 
displayed in the Tanzimat era. The Tanzlmat intellectual- 
as-bureaucrat was the first product of the Western type 
education again conducted by state initiative. The 
intellectual was educated by and for service to the 
state. During the period in question his task was that of 
modernizing the governmental machinery. Such a 
development had its reflections in the self-perception of 
the intellectual.
As far as the identity of the intellectual is
concerned. the situation is far from clear. The
predicament of the Ottoman intellectual from the
eighteenth century onwards had been the necessity of 
reconciling Westernization with tradition. The 
intellectual of the Tanzimat period carried the double 
burden of a relatively positivist educational background 
on the one hand, and the difficulty of deciding whether 
to comply with Islamic principles or to justify 
innovation in terms of the same principles, on the other. 
This dilemmatic mode further distanced the intellectual
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from any possibility of societal ' identification of which 
he had already been devoid. This was most apparent in his 
daily life; the Tanzimat man was one getting accustomed 
to the Western style in his everyday conduct and 
language, and thus was in a somewhat unconscious 
endeavour of transgressing the traditional modes of 
thought and conduct. While actively involved in the 
reorganization of the state structure, he was also 
experiencing a cultural mutation in his private life.^®^
Only as late as the twentieth century, the covert 
tension between the intellectual and society was to be 
taken into consideration with the shift in his concern of 
the social environment as an object of critical analysis. 
Such a shift paved the way for the replacement of the 
ideal of maintaining the traditional social structure by 
a search for models and means for its transformation. For 
the same period Şerif Mardin has pointed to a 
corresponding shift in the double identity of the Ottoman 
intellectual from the "bureaucrat-intellectual" to that 
of "intellectual-bureaucrat.
The Ottoman liberal thinking as most typically 
represented in the writings of Prens Sabahaddin is 
important in this respect. Prens Sabahaddin, both due to 
his educational background and to his aloofness from 
state service, presented more or less an unorthodox 
portrait of the Ottoman intellectual. However, when his 
approach especially to the society was concerned, one 
encounters with a social engineer, not unlike his
^^ 2. In this respect see Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı, 
192-8.
Mardin, "Tanzimat ve Aydınlar," 48.
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contemporaries, since he, too, ended up with a project of 
transformation to be accomplished by education.
The above-stated schema of the Ottoman intellectual, 
however general in vista, shows the impact of the 
experience of living with a strong state tradition on the 
formation of the intellectual mind and identity. Both due 
to its function as a recruitment mechanism for the 
intellectuals, and to the consolidated faith in the 
natural limits of criticism, the state determined the 
context of the intellectual concern to be confined to the 
question of how to save the state. Such a concern led to 
a preoccupation with the state as the central object of 
analysis. On the other hand, the partial internalization 
of the critical mission of the Western intellectual in 
the Ottoman mind, as late as in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and insofar as a natural ingredient 
of the Western style education, should also be viewed in 
this respect.
As far as the concept of state is concerned, it is 
possible to conclude with a shift in the Ottoman 
conception of the state from state-as-might, to state-as- 
law from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries. Dyson 
explains the concept of state-as-might on the grounds of 
internal distress and external threat.^®® Such an
Ibid., 52.
The Ottoman intellectual, still tied to the state both 
financially and identically, would find grounds for his critical 
discourse mainly in literature. Ibid., 46-54/ Işın, "Osmanli 
Modernleşmesi ve Pozitivizm," 359-62.
1^ ®. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 101-7. Dyson cites 
the prevalence of the theories of state-as-might, from sixteenth to 
nineteenth century, in various Continental European states on the 
basis of these factors.
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explanation also fits well into the Ottoman context in 
the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in that it 
is especially during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud 
II that the Ottomans were to turn towards the West as a 
model for military reforms.
The Tanzimat period contained a framework of 
institutional reforms which corresponded to the 
conception of the state-as-law in the Western context. 
However, before concluding with the cross-fertilization 
of the conception of the state-as-law in the Ottoman 
context, one should bear in mind the raison d'etre of the 
reforms, that of saving the state.^®”' In the Ottoman 
Empire, the institutions, whose formation had been 
grounded on a new conception of the state in the West, 
were established with the task of revitalizing and 
sustaining the existence of the Ottoman state. On the 
other hand, the adoption of reforms were a result of both 
the aspiration of the bureaucracy for power vis-à-vis the 
Sultan as well as of an intellectual interest in the West 
because of the belief in Western superiority. The 
problematic posture of the Tanzimat intellectual-as- 
bureaucrat appears at this point. The intellectual lacked 
the precedence of legal positivism which was congenital 
for the theory of the state-as-law especially in 
Continental Europe.^®® Instead, he was in a constant
The interpretation provided by Dyson, that cross-fertilization 
is partly an outcome of the incompetency of the tradition to meet the 
current problems, well fits the Ottoman case of Westernization. 
Ibid., 160.
Ibid., 108. However, the policies adopted by Tanzimat 
intellectuals unconsciously contained the motives of such a 
mentality. Examplary is the constitution of assemblies which would be 
the sole determiner of the laws to which the ruler and the ruled were 
equally bound.
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effort to reconcile reforms with Islamic principles. 
Examplary here is the inept functioning of the secular 
courts which had been formed to be active in the public 
realm independently of religious courts, and thus further 
displayed the inherent contradiction between the raison 
d ’etre of the reform measures in the Western context and 
their proclaimed bases in Islam.
Ottoman liberal thought nourished in such a 
political and intellectual milieu. Not surprisingly, its 
problématique was formulated around the question of how 
to save the state. It tried to provide remedies to the 
problems arising out of an ongoing decline due to the 
dissolution of the classical social and political 
structures of the Empire, and not to those concerning the 
independent running of the market. The Ottoman liberal 
thinker proposed liberal economic policies not in the 
name of the individual, but for the enhancement of the 
Ottoman economy.^®® Apart from that, the individual, as 
the basic category of liberal thought in the West, did 
not occupy a significant place in the Ottoman context. 
Instead, the texts which provided the philosophical and 
sociological groundwork for the Ottoman liberal thought 
focused mainly on the society and family. And the 
individual was attributed an identity that was to develop 
only with the transformation of the society and the 
polity.
Here the refonas in question are not those adopted during the 
Tanzimat period, but those adopted during the second Constitutional 
Period (1909-1918) by M. Cavid Bey, the Minister of Finance of the 
period. The reforms of the Tanzimat period can more plausibly be 
viewed as a result of Western pressure and of the growing unrest of 
the millets. Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi 
(History of Contemporary Thought İn Turkey) (İstanbul: Ülken
Yayınları, 1992), 36-7.
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CHAPTER rV
THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL OF THE REPUBLIC: CONTINUITY
WITHIN CHANGE
EARLY REPUBLICAN ERA: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND NATION 
BUILDING AS THE TWIN PROCESSES OF BREAK WITH THE PAST
Following the National Independence War (1919-1922), 
the commanding cadre of the Turkish Revolution provided a 
reform framework which theoretically proposed a total 
break with the Ottoman past. From the proclamation of the 
Republic onwards (1923) the Ottoman heritage was 
officially perceived to be the totality of all the 
negative features which had led to the breakdown of the 
Empire, and thus it had to be destructed.
Such a mentality of sweeping all that was accepted 
to belong to the Ottoman past was compiled within the 
project of modernization. However paradoxically, as in 
the Ottoman case in the early Republican era, too, the 
leitmotive of the project was again taken to be the 
state, this time with a different institutional 
structure.^ What differentiated the Republican state from 
its Ottoman antecedent was not the role attributed to it.
h Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 362-400. Ali Kazancigil, "The 
Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism," in Atatürk: Founder of a Modern 
State, eds. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst and 
Company, 1981), 37-56.
but the mentality that shaped the process of its 
institutionalization.2
Continuity within Change: A New Identity for the State
with the Old Mission of Modernization
Long before the proclamation of the Republic the 
counter-government of the National Independence War had 
already reflected the ruling cadre of the coming decade, 
which was to a great extent comprised of governmental 
officials ( 4 3 % ) By the 1923 popular elections the same 
group was gathered in the Republican People's Party 
(RPP) , the only organized political force,'* which 
naturally achieved majority, leading to an increase in 
the ratio of bureaucrats and army officers in the 
assembly.^ Thus, the leading cadre of the National 
Independence War also took responsibility in the 
consolidation of the new regime, under the continuing 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal.
liter Turan, "Continuity and Change in Turkish Bureaucracy: The 
Kemalist Period and After," in Atatürk and the Modernization of 
Turkey, ed. Jacob M. Landau ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Wetview Press,
1984), 99-121.
Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats 
and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978), 15.
Ibid., 23.
In the first Turkish Grand National Assembly, out of 43% of 
governmental officers 23% were civil bureaucrats and 15% were 
military officers. Ibid., 15-8. On this issue see also Richard L. 
Chambers, "The Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey," in Political Modernization 
in Japan and Turkey, eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow eds. 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), 301-27;
Ergim Özbudun, "The nature of the Kemalist political regime," in 
Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, eds. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun
Özbudun (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981), 79-102.
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Following the proclamation of the Republic, the 
relatively conciliatory stand of the leading cadre 
towards different tendencies within the first Assembly 
(1921) during the National Independence War, left its 
place to the enaction of radical laws in the way of 
restructuring the Turkish state and subsequently society 
in line with the prerequisites of modernization.^
Such a task necessitated extensive control over the 
government and society which was ensured by the dominance 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), whereby 
the RPP, civil and military bureaucrats had the ultimate 
power of decision-making and enforcing,·^ not only in 
political life, but also in the administration of the 
state.* Thus, the new Turkish state was built by a merge 
of politics and administration.
One can thus talk about a kind of continuity with 
the Ottoman past. Social engineering that was so 
prevalent especially in the last decades of the Ottoman 
Empire was also carried to the Republican era, again 
holding the bureaucracy as an instrument in the 
achievement of the task of modernization.^ The 
institutionalization of the bureaucracy was pursued in 
such a manner. First, during the National Independence 
War the aim was to erase the Ottoman identity from the 
ranks of the bureaucracy by putting it under the
Dankwart A. Rustow, "Atatürk as an institution-builder," in 
Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, eds. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun 
Özbudun (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981), 57-77.
Trimberger, Revolution from Above, 109.
*. Ibid., 20-1.
Ibid., 112; Chambers, "The Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey," 301.
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dominance of the militaryJO Second, during the Republican 
era the aim was to ensure its adherence to the 
modernization task." The Turkish Revolution was thus 
realized from the top down." Although prominent in this 
process was literally the TGNA, in practice it was 
Mustafa Kemal who, as the head of state, held the ropes. 
During the National Independence War, the status of the 
TGNA as the representative of the sovereignty of the 
nation and its doubling as the executive had already been 
accepted ( 1 9 2 1 ) The status of the TGNA was further 
enhanced by the Constitution of 1924 which accorded it 
executive, legislative and judicial powers.i'* However, by 
the proclamation of the Republic, it had also been 
ensured that the office of the head of the state would be 
over and above the TGNA."
Underlying such a shift was the loss of faith in the 
competency of the TGNA to keep itself aloof from the 
interests of different social segments, which was 
perceived to be deviating from the raison d'être of the
". Metin Heper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi" in Çağdaş Düşüncenin 
Işığında Atatürk (Atatürk İn the Light of Modern Thought) (İstanbul: 
Eczacıbaşı Vakfı Yayınları, 1986) , 234; Turan, "Continuity and Change 
in Turkish Bureaucracy: The Kemalist Period and After."
". Heper, Türk Кати Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme: 
Siyaset Sosyolojisi Açısından Bir İnceleme (Traditionalism and 
Modernization İn Turkish Public Bureaucracy: An Analysis from the
Prespectlve of Political Sociology) (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi 
Yayınları, 1977), 99; Chambers, "Civil Bureaucracy: Turkey," 325.
". Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The MIT Press, 1965), 303-4; Trimberger, Revolution From Above.
". Trimberger, Revolution From Above, 20-1.
". Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party 
System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 137.
". Heper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi," 238.
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S t a t e . Mustafa Kemal perceived the state as exceeding 
the will of the individual.''^ State, in his words, found 
its being not in individual consent. Instead, the power 
of the state over its nation was something internal to 
the very concept of the state.'* The concept of the state 
inherently transcended the political and social system.'5* 
Thus, the state should stand over and above any conflict 
that may arise in the society and be reflected in the 
TGNA.^" Underlying such a stand was the delegatory 
conception of national sovereignty, which was taken as 
the sine qua non of the Republican regime, and of the 
"general interest" of the people, which would be 
determined not by the people itself, but by those who 
have the competence of acting beyond their individual 
interests.2' The state, conceived as such, was eventually 
held responsible for upgrading the Turkish society so as 
not to let the preceding decadence recur.“
'^ . Bülent Daver, "Atatürk ve Sosyo-Politik Sistem Görüşü" (Atatürk 
and his View of Socio-Political System) , in Çağdaş Düşüncenin 
Işığında Atatürk, 2 65. As stated in the "Declaration of Populism" 
(Halkçılık Beyannamesi) , published by the TGNA on October 21, 1920
:". . . TGNA presumes as its main task to eliminate all the underlying 
causes of people's misery via new means a!nd institutions and replace 
it with welfare. In this respect, it will aspire to install social 
brotherhood and cooperation in all spheres, including land, 
education, justice, finance, economy and pious foundations, and to 
enact reforms and install institutions in accordance with the needs 
of the people." Quoted in ibid.
A. Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemaldin El Yazıları 
(Civil Instructions and Mustafa Remains Handwritings), 2nd ed. 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 27.
'*. Ibid.
'^ . Keper, "State, Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey," in The State 
and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective, (New York,
Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1987), 132-4;
Heper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi," 223.
Heper, "Atatürk'te Devlet Düşüncesi," 238.
Ibid., 239.
Kazancıgil, "The Ottoman Turkish State and Kemalism," 52.
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Such a mentality inhered in the policy of imposing 
social change for the good of the society itself, rather 
than waiting for its occurrence. The society was 
conceived as possessing a latent tendency towards the 
good. However, it needed the vanguardism of the state for 
the realization of this good (emphasis added). The 
project of modernization, built upon faith in science, 
complied with this perception by enabling state control 
in all spheres extending from education to economy.
The goal of modernization laid a positivist stand on 
the cadre of the revolution. The good of the society was 
not awaited to arise spontaneously from within society. 
Instead, related means and measures were determined and 
implemented from outside. In this respect, the early 
Republican era was a period of intense search and 
realization of the ways to transcend the social, 
political and cultural orders of the Ottoman past and 
their symbolic and structural basis.It was a period of 
search which contained a twin process. First, uprooting 
all that "tradition" both from the institutions and from 
the society. Second, constructing the 'genuine tradition' 
for society.
Heper, "State, Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey," 132.
S.N. Eisenstadt, "Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity 
and Reconstruction of Tradition," Daedalus (Winter 1973), 102 (1), 6. 
25. Ibid., 1-27.
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The Double Identity of the early Republican Intellectual: 
Legislator and Transmitter^^
The positivistic stand that was so prevalent in the 
early Republican era connotes some continuity in the role 
of the intellectual when compared to his Ottoman 
antecedents. In this period, the mentality of social 
engineering, that is faith in science in reshaping 
society was very well established to the detriment of 
religion. The merger of the bureaucratic and 
intellectual identity was also a matter of continuation.^» 
The difference lay in the competence of the state to 
provide for homogeneity with respect to the good of the 
society.
The intellectual of the Republican era took on a 
double identity. First he would act as legislator, in the 
way of ensuring institutional and social modernization. 
He would comply with and carry out the measures, 
predetermined by the state, "...to shape and administer
The term "legislator" is borrowed from Zygmunt Bauman, 
Legislators and Interpreters: On Modernity, Post-Modernity and
Intellectuals, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, ,1987).
The term is also used in the previous chapter. However, while it is 
employed symbolically for the institutional intellectual of the 
Ottoman era, legislator was the ideal model for the Repviblican 
intellectual which was determined by the state. In this respect, the 
ideal Republican intellectual well fits into the categorization of 
the intellectual of modernity by Bauman. Bauman typifies the 
intellectual of the modern epoch with the role of introducing and 
iıtçlamenting an alternative set of principles for the ideal societal 
order as a reaction to the dominance of the Church.
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 401-42; Niyazi Berkes, The 
Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University,
1964), 479-500.
Murat Beige, "Tarihi Gelişme Süreci İçinde Aydınlar" 
(Intellectuals in Historical Development Process), in Cumhuriyet 
Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, vol.l (İstarüjul: İletişim Yayınları,
1983) 124-6.
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the social system according to a preconceived model of 
order... Second he would act as the transmitter of the 
logic of the subsequent reconstruction of the 'genuine 
tradition' to the society.
The conceptual schema for the intellectual had 
already been drawn by the state. As far as the task of 
building the 'genuine tradition' of the Turkish society 
was concerned, the basic themes were the nation and the 
individual-as-citizen, which ultimately meant the citizen 
of the Turkish Republic.
For the Republican leaders nation was of utmost 
importance for the task of constructing the modern state, 
which was based on a tripod of secularism, nationalism 
and citizenshipIn fact, as Kemal H. Karpat has argued, 
nationalism had long been the dominant motivating factor, 
both during the National Independence War and following 
the proclamation of the Republic. Similarly, Niyazi 
Berkes has stated that the intellectual background to the 
Turkish Republic had been provided by one of the 
forerunners of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Gokalp.^^
For the ruling cadre Turkish nation was identified 
in terms of language, history, ethics, and political 
territory.The intellectual was left with the task of 
reconstructing and revitalizing the authenticity of
Bauman, Legislators and Interpreters, 2.
Kazancigil, "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism, " 38.
Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 49; Trimberger, Revolution from Above,
13.
Niyazi Berkes, "Ziya Gökalp: His Contribution to Turkish
Nationalism," The Middle Eastern Journal, (Autumn 1954).
İnan, Medeni Bilgiler, 18-25.
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Turkish language and the consciousness of history.This 
mentality was reflected at the institutional level by the 
establishment of the Turkish Language Institution (1932) 
and Turkish History Institution (1935),35 as well as by 
the reorganization of the curriculum of Faculty of 
Humanities in Istanbul Dariilfunur?^ (literally House of 
Sciences, the predecessor of Istanbul University) with 
overwhelming emphasis on all that was related to Turkish 
and Turkey, extending from history and language to 
g e o g r a p h y A  large number of the intellectuals worked in 
these institutions, and they were saddled with the task 
of exploring the fundamentals of the history and language 
of the Turkish Republic, and conveying them to the 
public.
. Such a mission of the Turkish intellectual fits well into the 
argument by that in those societies which took the path to 
Westernization, the nationalistic stand among the intellectuals 
presumably represents the yet-to-be rejunevated national 
consciousness of the people. Edward Shils, ”The Intellectuals in the 
Political Development of the New States," in Political Change in 
Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism, ed. Jonh H.
Kautsky (New York, London and Sydney: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1967), 209.
First established under the name of Turkish History Research 
Commission in 1930, which was transformed into Turkish History 
Research Society in 1931, and ultimately institutionalized under the 
name of Turkish History Institution in 1935.
For more detailed information about Darülfünun see İstanbul 
Üniversitesi: Kuruluş, Tarihçe, Teşkilat ve Öğretim Üyeleri 1453-1981 
(The Establishment, History, Organization and Staff of Istanbul 
University) (Istanbul, 1983) .
Ayşe Öncü, "Academics: The West in the Discourse of University
Reform," in Turkey and The West: Changing Political and Cultural
Identities, eds. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer eds. 
(London, New York: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd., 1993), 51.
The official view about the role of the university and the 
intellectual is well illustrated by Falih Rifki (Atay) : "...Even if 
Darülfünun is solely a scientific institution, it should sacrifice 
such a standing during the times of revolution, and hold itself 
responsible for the prime task of serving the revolution, and 
ingraining it in the minds and souls of the people." Atay, 
"Darülfünun," Cumhuriyet, July 23, 1932.
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Emphasis upon the nation was a manifestation of the 
intense efforts to cut ties with the Ottoman past. The 
proclamation of the Republic, based on the sovereignty of 
the nation, signified the dislocation of religion as the 
basis of legitimacy. Relatedly the relationship between 
the ruler and the ruled was redefined. As a corollary of 
the "modern” state (read as nation-state), the Ottoman 
subject was replaced by the Turkish citizen. Both the 
citizen of the Republic and the state were defined in 
terms of the nation.
The historical significance of the emergence of the 
nation-state for the conceptualization of the citizen is 
not peculiar to the Turkish context. As Moris Janowitz 
has argued, nationalist revolutions in the West have to a 
great extent provided the framework for the definition of 
the status of citizenship by the nation-state as a tool 
of carrying out the required transformation.'“^ In other 
words, the "modern" has been associated with the process 
of the "citizenization"'^^ of the subject. This process of 
citizenization has been analyzed by Rogers Brubaker.'·^  In 
his study, Brubaker has delineated the transformation of 
the subject into a "member of the s t a t e a s  a product of
inan, Medeni Bllgller, 17.
Moris Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for 
Civic Consciousness (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1983), 8.
. Robert Nisbet, The Making of Modern Society (Great Britain: 
Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1986), 132.
Rogers Brxibaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1992).
Brubaker defines the modern state as a membership organization. 
Ibid., 21.
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the development of the modern state.'*^  In his words, the 
practice of citizenship, conceptually identified in terms 
of nationhood, provided the bureaucratic, centralized
(modern) state with the new basis of legitimation for its 
rule, i.e., rule "..,'of’ and 'for' a particular, 
distinctive, bounded nation. The Republican
individual was perceived in terms of his/her relation to 
the state.'^  ^ The link of the individual-as-such to the
state was symbolized in the term "social man, " which
referred to the duties of each to the other.Besides its
responsibility of carrying out foreign policy and 
providing for external and internal security, as well as 
justice, one of the most significant duties of the state 
was the definition and sustenance of the freedom of 
individuals The state was to fulfill this
responsibility with a view to the rule of law.“*’ In this 
instance it is possible to observe a sense of lack of 
faith in the individual. It is true that individual 
rights and liberties occupied an extensive place in the 
1924 Constitution. However, as Karpat has argued, this 
had only a symbolic significance since the individual 
vis-à-vis the state had no autonomous means of their 
enforcement.
44. Ibid., 49.
45. Ibid., 28.
4^ . İnan, Medeni Bilgiler, 53.
47. Ibid., 48.
48. Ibid., 44.
49. Ibid.
5^ . Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 137.
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The Republican cadres put special emphasis on 
education as a way of shaping the individual into the 
ideal Republican citizen. The making of the individual- 
as-citizen, which was perceived to be a task of utmost 
importance, was going to be the climax of the break with 
the past.^i In this respect, the ideal individual of the 
Republic was defined as "...rationalist, anti­
traditionalist, anti-clerical person approaching all
problems intellectually and obj actively.
The emphasis on the process of education in the 
early Republican Turkey was not a deviation when compared 
to the emergence of citizenship in the Western context. 
Reinhard Bendix presents citizenship as "...a core 
element of nation-building...," whereby the state organs 
of education are perceived to be indispensable elements 
of the nation-state.^^ The status of citizenship in the 
Western context has been the denominator of a two-sided 
process, which contained the ruled demanding equality in 
the political and social arena on the one hand, and the 
state trying to provide for social cohesion and 
integration by constructing the grounds for the consensus 
around shared norms, values and consciousness, on the 
o t h e r . I n  the Turkish case the balance was more to the 
side of the state. The introduction of the concept and
. Macit Gökberk, "Aydınlanma Felsefesi, Devrimler ve Atatürk" 
(Philosophy of Enlightenment, Reforms and Atatürk), in Çağdaş 
Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk, 303.
Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 53-4.
Reinhard Bendix, Nation Building and Citizenship (New York, 
London, Sydney: John Wiley and Sons., Inc., 1964), 94.
5'*. Ibid., 74-101.
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status of citizenship was a deliberate step within the 
grand project of modernization. Not only the duties, but 
also the rights of the citizen were determined, and in 
the latter case, were not demanded by the ruled but 
granted, by the state.^^ The three subsequent phases of 
the process, namely legal, political and social, through 
which the status of citizenship in the West has 
developed, were simultaneously introduced by the state.·^ ^
In such a configuration the intellectual of the 
Republic was expected to occupy himself with the 
transmission of the already defined prerequisites for the 
sustenance of the regime. His identity differed from the 
Ottoman precedent; he was to be not just a bureaucrat but 
an educator. On the other hand, in the Ottoman-Turkish 
context, it was not the free preoccupations of the 
intellectuals with the universe, man, society and the 
legitimation of authority and social order, which have 
played an important part in the public life as was the 
case in the West.^’^ Instead, the Turkish intellectual was 
held responsible for the transmission of the already set 
patterns of authority, its symbols and basis of
legitimation to the society.
The acquiescence of the intellectual to the
legitimacy of the Republican state and its policies to 
transform the society was related to his/her
inan. Medeni Bilgiler, 42-9.
This classification belongs to T.H. Marshall, cited in Bendix, 
Nation-Building and Citizenship, 76.
Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New 
States," 196.
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"ideological" perception of modernization.^® As Edward 
Shils has argued, in a political structure "...where 
authorities have tended on the whole to be more unitary 
and where alternative authorities ... have not yet 
emerged . . . the modern intellectual can find an 
authoritative collectivity in 'nation’ and that organized 
body which represents the 'nation' -namely, the party of 
national independence."^^ In his political orientation the 
early Republican intellectual was nationalist; largely 
identified with the state, and the party of the state, 
RPP, and was held responsible to transform the society in 
order to substantiate its inherent "collective 
personality."^® The collective personality of the society 
was conceptualized in the term "nation."
LIBERAL IDENTITY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE ATTEMPTS AT 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF OPPOSITION
It is possible to argue that the intellectual-as- 
bureaucrat of the early Republican era had more 
competence to reorganize the society as compared to his 
precedents in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. On 
the other hand, it is not possible to refer to the 
Republican regime as a total break with the past, as far 
as the state-intellectual relationship was concerned. The
Karpat, "The Mass Media: Turkey," in Political Modernization in
Japan and Turkey, eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 277.
Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New 
States," 206-207.
60. Ibid., 210.
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intellectual of the early Republican era was also 
employed at the institutions of the state either as an 
educator, or as a member of the ruling party.
As far as the "liberal" stance is concerned, in the 
early Republican era those who called themselves liberals 
began to emerge within the context of active political 
struggle. The inheritors of the writings of Prens 
Sabahaddin, a forerunner of the liberal intellectual in 
the Ottoman period, happened to stand aloof from the 
liberal orientation. The legacy of the writings of Prens 
Sabahaddin had left its imprints mainly in the sphere of 
sociology. In this respect, M.Ali Şevki, the founder of 
the Meslek-i İçtimai Cemiyeti (Association of
Sociologists) (1918)^ 1 evinced a continuity of the 
conceptual and methodological framework developed by 
Prens Sabahaddin.Again, the emphasis was on society, 
rather than on the individual and the tendency was to 
create an individualistic society via education, starting 
with training in the family.
Thus, M.Ali Şevki, too, had shared the faith in 
education, as the leitmotive of social transformation 
which would be achieved by the replacement of the 
congregationist family by the individualist family.^ '* His
Meslek-l İçtimai Cemiyeti founded on the influence of the
Science Sociale. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "Osmanli Devleti'nde Meslek-i 
içtimai Akımı," Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 
VOİ.2 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), 382-3.
Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Türkiye'de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi (History of 
Contemporary Thought in Turkey), 3rd ed. (Istanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 
1992), 443-7. First published in 1966.
3^. Ibid.
Ibid.; Muzaffer Sencer, "Mehmet Ali Şevki," in Türk 
Toplumbilimcileri, ed. Emre Kongar (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi A.Ş.,
1988), 55.
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studies mainly dwelled on education and social science. 
Following the establishment of the Republic, perceiving 
science as the means of finding out general laws through 
induction, M. Ali Şevki was interested in experimental 
sociology and initiated monographic surveys.He held the 
view that a prerequisite for the realization of the task 
of modernization was first and foremost the understanding 
of the Turkish society and its requirements, which would 
facilitate the drawing up of appropriate policies. In his 
analyses of the evolution of the educational policies in 
different western countries, M.Ali Şevki concluded that 
the policies in this area should be in congruence with 
the level of economic and technological development in 
society.^® He opposed the implementation of radical 
reforms, especially in the sphere of education, by the 
state from top down, and proposed a more evolutionary 
stance, whereby the reference point of the state policies 
would be the existing society, rather than the ideal 
model conceptualized by the state itself.M.Ali Şevki's
M. All Şevki, "Tecrübi Sosyoloji" (Experimental Sociology), 
Mülkiye, (August 1933) (29), 4-8/ "M. Paul Descamps'in Yeni Eseri: La
Sociologie Experimentale (1)" (New Work of M. Paul Descamps: La
Sociologie Experimentale (1)), Mülkiye (30) (September 1933), 4-10;
"Tecrübi Sosyoloji," Mülkiye (32) (November 1933), 5-8.
M. Ali Şevki, "Ümmilik ve İlk Tahsil Meselesi İlmi Usul ile Nasıl 
Tetkik Olıınuyor?" (How Is the Issue of Collectivity and Primary 
Education Analyzed by Scientific Method?), Mülkiye (36) (March 1934), 
10-5; "Mesele Nasıl Vaz'edilmeli: Tahsil Mükellefiyeti mi? Tahsil
İhtiyacı mı?" (How Should the Issue be Spelled: Obligation of
Education or Need for Education?), Mülkiye (37) (April 1934), 7-14;
"Niçin Her Memleket Mektep İşini Aynı Yoldan Yürütemez?" (Why 
Education cannot be Handled in the Same Manner in Every Country?) , 
Mülkiye (38) (May 1934), 4-9; "Bizde Bir Asırlık Maarif İşi" (Our
Centennial Issue of Education), Mülkiye (39) (June 1934), 20-9.
M. Ali Şevki, "Mesele Nasıl Vaz'edilmeli: Tahsil Mükellefiyeti
mi? Tahsil İhtiyacı mı?"; "Niçin Her Memleket Mektep İşini Aynı 
Yoldan Yürütemez?"; "Bizde Bir Asırlık Maarif İşi."
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conception of state is not unambiguous, and can be 
gleaned only by reading between the lines of his work, 
whereby he acknowledged state interference in the social 
sphere in times when other social institutions lack the 
competence to provide the people with required services.^* 
However, the writings of M.Ali Şevki remained within the 
newly consolidating sociological circle, and proved to 
have no significant political ramifications. Above all, 
it would also be a rather forced conclusion to label him 
as liberal.
State and Opposition in the Early Republican Era
The Republican state, as the expression of political 
power in society, had all the means to prevent the 
emergence of any ' serious opposition as well as to avoid 
any congruence of interests among the opposition.^^ First, 
the civil-military bureaucracy was relatively autonomous, 
since it was composed of the cadres which had led the 
National Independence War, and which were independent of 
social groups, especially those with economic power.™ 
Second, the same bureaucracy ensured its dominance in the 
Assembly, since it also comprised the majority in the
M. All Şevki, "Mesele Nasıl Vaz'edilmeli: Tahsil Mükellefiyeti 
mi? Tahsil İhtiyacı mı?," 7.
Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, 
Interruptions and Reequilibrations," in Perspectives on Democracy in 
Turkey, ed. Ergun Özbudun {Ankara: Turkish Political Science 
Association, 1988), 12-3.
™. Trimberger attributes the success of the Republican state, in 
initiating radical reforms while taming the opposition without much 
difficulty, to such an autonomy of the bureaucracy. Trimberger, 
Revolution from Above.
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RPP, the only organized political force, which 
consequentially acquired the majority in the TGNA after 
the 1923 national elections, thereby depriving the 
possible opposition centers within its own structure, 
namely the religious representatives and local notables, 
of having political efficacy.’^’ Third, the "tactical 
timing"'^  ^ of the reforms, starting first at the
institutional level without direct influence on the 
socio-economic basis of the different opposing groups, 
prevented the formation of immediate and unitary reaction 
to the changes in the political sphere.Additionally, 
the Republican state had the opportunity to incorporate 
its policy against the potential economic power centers 
into the grand task of modernization. The positivist 
mentality of the revolutionaries which evicted religion 
from the political sphere,'^ '· has also served in the way of 
curbing the potential threat to the regime from the 
economically powerful groups, since it was especially the 
religious people who owned most of the vineyards and 
farms, as a legacy of the Ottoman past.·^ ^
As far as the intellectuals were concerned, the 
state either incorporated them into its structure, or 
tried to curb their opposition by proclaiming them as
. Local notables were incorporated into the new political system by 
the recognition of their local economic and social supremacy. Ibid., 
23.
Trimberger, Revolution from Above, 22.
■^3. Ibid.
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 401-42.
Trimberger points at the confiscation of economic assets of the 
religious foundations. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, 29.
142
traitors.The comprehensive process of sweeping away all 
that seemed to embody the seeds of potential opposition 
to the state was carried out and legitimated in the name 
of the spirit of the Republican regime. Following the 
disabling of the Second Group in the First Assembly 
(1920-1923)'^ '^  and the successive ensurance of its
ineffectiveness in the political system, by total control 
in the 1923 national elections, the state continuously 
stepped up its hostility to any voice which it perceived 
to be threatening to its ascendancy in the enactment of 
reforms.'^ * The state's control over the intellectual 
activity can easily be observed in the state policies 
with respect to the press, one of the most available 
channels to reach the people. The first legal restriction 
on the press was introduced on March 4, 1925, within the 
framework of the Law for the Maintenance of Order 
(Takrir-1 Sükun- Kanunu). The main aim behind the 
restriction was to curb the increasing opposition coming 
mainly from the Istanbul press against Kemalist reforms.'^  ^
The overall state control over the press was firmly 
established by the enactment of the Press Code in 1931,
According to the Law on Treason (April 15, 1923) "...Those who 
engage in oral, written or active opposition or provocation and 
pxiblication against the legitimacy of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly are treated as treasoners." Quoted in Ahmet Demirel, Birinci 
Mecliste Muhalefet: İkinci Grup (Opposition İn the First Asseiably:
The Second Group) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 529.
'77. Ibid., 483-569.
7^ . Nurşen Mazıcı, Belgelerle Atatürk Döneminde Muhalefet (1919-1926) 
(İstanbul: Dilmen Yayınevi, 1984).
7^ . Among the main oppositionary newspapers of the Istanbul press 
were, Tanln, Tevhld-i Efkar, Vatan (closed down by the state due to 
the enactment of the Law for the Maintenance of Order), İkdam (closed 
due to the insufficient number of readers). Ali Gevgilili, "Türkiye 
Basını" (Turkish Press), in Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 
vol. 1, 224.
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enabling the executive to ban those publications which 
were accused of propogandizing in favor of the Caliphate, 
Sultanate, and fostering anarchism.* ® The restrictions 
became more extensive paralleling the radicalization of 
the reforms and consolidation of the state-centered 
polity.*^ Such hostility towards the opposition reached 
its climax in the aftermath of the unsuccesful Izmir Plot 
to assassinate Mustafa Kemal (1926), which resulted in 
the execution of a number of the members of the former 
Union and Progress Party.
As for the opposition of the intellectuals who 
worked for the state, especially in the universities, the 
case of firing of many members of Darülfünun (1933), 
because of their "unwillingness and/or incompetency to 
support the new regime"*^ is a manifestation of the 
unyielding stand of the state towards any deviation from 
the role ascribed to intellectuals. Following a change in 
its structure and curricula. Darülfünun was accorded
*®. Ibid., 225.
*h In 1933, General Directorate of the Press was put under the 
authority of the Interior Ministry; and in 1938, by the amendment in 
the Press Code, stricter prerequisites for the publication of 
newspapers and journals were enacted. Ibid., 214-6.
Due to their rather oppositionary stance against the state and 
the RPP, the members of the ex-Union and Progress Party was under 
suspicion throughout the early Republican era. Examplary is M. Cavid 
Bey, the liberal Minister of Finance of the Second Constitutional 
Period, who openly accused the state, including Mustafa Kemal, and 
the RPP of deviating from the raison d'etre of the Republican regime 
in their actions, and exercising a military dictatorship under the 
mask of "pseudo democracy.” M. Cavid Bey was executed in 1926, on the 
charges of planning the İzmir Plot. Cavid Bey, Şiardın Defteri 
(Şlar^s Diary), ed. Şiar Yalçın (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995), 
28-30, 33, 73-4, 86, 89-90, 96, 126, 268. On the trial of M. Cavid
Bey, see, Cavit Bey: İdama Beş Kala (5 Minutes before the Execution) 
(İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1993), 195-224.
Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Darülfünun."
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financial and administrative autonomy ( 1 9 2 4 - 1 9 2 5 ) The 
institution had come to have an historical significance, 
due to its representation of an intellectual tradition, 
inspired by the liberal and humanistic orientations of 
Europe.* ^ For the Republican state, Darülfünun's 
significance was also due to its having a Faculty of 
Humanities, which made it instrumental for the state.*^ In 
this respect, Darülfünun was perceived to be the 
institution to provide intellectual support for the 
Republican mentality, as prescribed by the state itself.
However, as early as the 1930s, there appeared to be 
a decline in what used to be a harmonious relationship 
between the state and the institution,*·^ The period was 
marked by accusations towards Darülfünun, coming both 
from the state and from the Ankara press, of lagging 
behind the process of modernization and deviating from 
the regime's ideals.** One field to search for such a 
shift in the disposition of the state with respect to the 
institution is the issue of the Turkish History Thesis 
{Türk Tarih Tezi) . Darülfünün criticized the Thesis, to
*·^. öncü, "Academics: The West in the Discourse of University 
Reform," 150-1.
*5. Ibid., 147.
*6. Ibid., 151.
*^ . Ibid.
**. Ibid., 142-3; Falih Rifki (Atay) criticized the institution as 
follows: "We know that TL 5000 worth award is still awaiting for its 
winner who would provide the best text for the Turkish Revolution. 
The fact that this award has not been given to anybody yet, can 
reveal the judgement of a rather static intellectual engagement.
...How can one conceive such a disposition towards Turkish Revolution 
which created a totally new material and moral order. . . We can 
tolerate neither indifference nor incompetence." Atay, "Darülfunım." 
For the same line of criticism see also Burhan Asaf (Beige), "Arkada 
kalan Darülfünun" (Darülfünvın which Lagged behind) Kadro (August 
1932) (9), 47-8/ "Fırka Mektebi" (Party School) in ibid., 30-33,
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which it referred as unscientific and attracted the wrath 
of the Republican leaders.*^ Upon the inclusion of the 
issue of institutional reform into the agenda of the 1931 
Party Program, and subsequent to the report prepared by 
Albert Malche,^® a professor of pedagogy in Geneva 
University,(May 29, 1932) Darülfünun was restructured
under the name of Istanbul University, by the University 
Act of July 31, 1933. The report mentioned the lack of
scientific contribution, involvement of the academicians 
in extra-academic activities due to financial exigencies, 
the institution not having adapted the universal 
standards in teaching methods, insufficent comprehension 
of foreign languages among the students, and the 
necessity of training the academicians of the next 
generation abroad. Ayşe Öncü pointedly argues that 
Darülfünun did not present an active opposition to 
political power. Its closure was more because it fell 
short of providing that unified body of intellectual 
support which was desired by the Republican state, a 
point already made.^^
Turkish History Thesis was originally based on the assumption 
that various Turkish tribes immigrated throughout the world, due to 
an enormous drought in Central Asia, and created surpassing 
civilizations. Mete Tunçay and Haldun Özen, "1933 Darülfünun 
Tasfiyesi veya Bir Tek-Parti Politikacrsının Önlenemez Yükselişi ve 
Düşüşü" (The Darülfünun Purge of 1933 or Unavoidable Rise and Fall of 
a Single Party Politician), Tarih ve Toplum (October 1984), 6-20.
For the details about the report, see Ibid., 12-3.
1^. Ibid., 12.
Öncü, "Academics: The West in the Discourse of the University
Reform," 151-2. Here, the remark by Burhan Asaf (Beige) is also 
explanatory: "Darülfünun was established on the basis of the 
nineteenth-century concept of science. And this must have been the 
main reason of its remaining as a replica of darülfünun, rather than 
ensuring itself a standing of a darülfünun in its real sense. The 
rather indifferent scientific standings of the darülfünuna are both a 
result and a cause of the liberal thought. ...However, if liberal
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The early Republican state was able to control, 
incorporate and suppress the opposition. Having the 
monopoly of political power and thus privileged access to 
the people, it was also successful to avoid the emergence 
and/or sustenance of any organized opposition, "till the 
time was ripe."^^
Emergence of the Liberal Opposition
The first organized opposition which proclaimed 
itself as liberal, came from within the state, and from 
the very ranks of the RPP. Subsequent to resignations 
from the RPP, mainly due to opposition to the centralized 
rule of the party and the monopolization of political 
power in the office of the head of the s t a t e , a  new 
party was formed on November 17, 1924, under the name of 
Progressive Republican Party (PRP) {Terakkiperver
thought had lost its credit in the real life and challenged by new 
perspectives; basing scientific approaches of the darülfünuns on 
liberal thought is nothing, but mere reactionism." Burhan Asaf 
(Beige) "Üniversite *nin Manası" (The Meaning of University) Kadro 
(August 1933) (20), 25-6.
" ..., the republic is still in its preparatory stages ... And
we should not be asked for the same kind of political experience in 
one leap forward that ...England had been exposed throughout 
centuries. Mustafa Kemal, "Interview with Times," Cited in Erik Jan 
Zürcher, Political Opposition In the Early Turkish Republic: The
Progressive Republican Party 1924 - 1925 (Leiden, New York, Kobenhavn 
and Köln: E.J. Brill, 1991), 137.
Tank Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952 
(Political Parties In Turkey 1859-1952) (Istanbul, 1952), 606-8. For
the details of the daily developments in the formation of the party 
and thenceforth see Nevin Yurdsever Ateş, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nln 
Kuruluşu ve Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Foundation of Turkish 
Republic and Progressive Republican Party) (Istanbul: Sarmal
Yayınevi, 1994), 105-73.
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Cumhuriyet Fırkası) In the declaration of the party the 
motive behind its formation was stated as the inefficient 
functioning of the TGNA due to the lack of control 
mechanisms within the Assembly. Moreover, the
centralization of political power in the RPP and the 
delegation of executive function to a commission was 
heavily criticized as constituting a potential threat to 
the full realization of national sovereignty. The party 
from its very foundation onwards displayed a portrait of 
an independently organized opposition. Such a stance led 
to intense conflict in the assembly between the PRP and 
the RPP. The conflict between the two parties also had 
its reflections on the press. Especially the Istanbul 
press gave support to the PRP, at times even acting as
its spokesman, while the Ankara press continued in its 
stance as a branch of the state and directed sharp 
criticisms to the opposition.
In its program, the PRP proclaimed itself to be
liberal (Article 2).^ Its liberal stance was mainly 
displayed with respect to the principles it adopted in
the administrative, political and economic spheres. In
One columnist referred to the PRP as "...the child of misery and 
lack of freeedom." Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu, Son Telgraf, October 
12-13, 1924; quoted in Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, SOI.
For the details of the PRP Declaration, see Tunaya, Türkiye'de 
Siyasi Partiler, 615-6; and Ateş, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nln Kuruluşu ve 
Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, 113, 188-90.
Ibid.
Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 611-3; Ateş, Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti 'nln Kuruluşu ve Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, 
appendix 10, 205-6; appendix 11, 207-8; appendix 13, 211-2; appendix 
14, 213-4; appendix 20, pp. 232-5; appendix 21, 236-7; appendix 22, 
238-40; appendix 38, 280-2; appendix 43, 302-5.
According to Zürcher, the declaration and the program of the 
party (1924) contained nineteenth-century classical liberal premises. 
Zürcher, Political Opposition In the Early Turkish Republic, 97 ff.
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this respect, the main policy goals were stated as 
decentralization in local administration (Articles 
14,15,16); encouragement of private enterprise, the 
limitation of the state hand in public works only to 
those spheres where private initiative was insufficient, 
and nullifying all restrictions on domestic and foreign 
trade (Articles 29-39).
The significance of the PRP for the early Republican 
political life lies in its being the first organized, 
relatively independent and liberal opposition. It was 
basically such a disposition that caused the party to 
have a rather short-term existence in Turkish political 
life. In this respect, while the continuous attacks 
coming from the RPP and its press wing, as well as the 
disapproval of the party by Mustafa Kemal, worked against 
the firm establishment of the party since its foundation, 
and the political milieu of the era functioned as a 
catalyst in the process of its downfall.
The intensification of hostility towards the party 
coincided with the Şeyh Said rebellion, a Kurdish 
uprising, in the eastern provinces (February 13 - May 31 
1925). Relatedly, Article 6 of the party program, which 
stated that the party shows respect to public opinion, 
faith and religious belief, was interpreted by the state 
to the disadvantage of the party, as it could be a shield 
for reactionary propaganda. It was under such
100. Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 616-20.
. See "Terakkiperver Ciimhuriyet Firkasi'nin şeddine dair vekiller 
heyeti kararı (Decision of the Council of Ministers on the closure of 
the Progressive Republican Party)," in ibid., 621-2.
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circumstances that arrests and executions of the party 
members, accused of collaboration with the uprising and 
reactionary propaganda took place. The PRP was closed on 
June 5, 1925.
Among other things, the PRP experience has been one 
of the most conspicuous manifestations of the omnipotence 
of the state. With such a precedence, the state in the 
following decade coped with potential opposition by 
actually launching its formation and organization itself. 
In this respect, while exemplifying the practice of 
tutelary opposition, the nature of the formation of the 
Free Republican Party (FRP) {Serbest Cumhuriyet 
Fırkası) (August 12, 1930) and its experience in the
political sphere further indicated the power of the 
state.
Liberal identity in the form of tutelary opposition
The formation of the FRP signifies the second trial 
of transition to multi-party politics, this time 
initiated by the state itself, but not against it, as was 
the case with the PRP experience. The state's tutelage 
over the party was manifest in the colloquies and
correspondence between Mustafa Kemal and Ali Fethi 
(Okyar), the founder and chairman of the FRP, on the
formation of the party; in the state financing of the
party's formation, as well as in the selection of the
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founder of the party and party members by Mustafa Kemal
himself
Such a framework fits well into the mentality 
underlying the formation of political party in the early 
Republican era. In general terms the party was conceived 
as "... an organization for securing the necessary 
government and societal integration. and in
particular as the executor of the reforms from top down.**^ '’ 
Such a conception denoted a function for the party that 
deviated from the logic of opposition, namely to have a 
political sphere with multiplicity of views. On the 
contrary, the Republican state drew up an ideal picture 
for the political party, the basic function of which was 
to provide for social cohesion, which it would secure by 
acting as "...a mechanism for social control
Thus, in its very foundation the place and role of 
the FRP in the political sphere was delineated by the 
state, as a test case for the transition to democracy. 
Underlying such an experience in the Turkish political 
life was the rational conception of democracy, whereby 
democracy was perceived as an end, rather than a means of 
reconciling opposing views and interests.’®^ Democracy,
Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka Hatıraları (Memoirs of Free Party) 
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), 21-35, First Published in 1950. 
103 _ Trimberger, Revolution from Above, 23/ Frey, The Turkish 
Political Elite, 304.
104_ Trimberger, Ibid., 23.
105_ Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, 304.
Heper, "Introduction," in Political Parties and Democracy in 
Turkey, eds. Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (London: I.B. Tauris,
1991), 2-3; "Bureaucrats: Persistent Elitists," in Turkey and the
West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities, eds. Metin Heper,
Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer eds. (London, New York: I.B. Tauris and Co 
Ltd., 1993), 39.
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understood as such, required "enlightened debate" to 
attain what was best for T u r k e y I n  this respect, the 
FRP would act as the second party in this "enlightened 
debate."
Emerging in the midst of such a political framework, 
the FRP represented the second liberal party of the early 
Republican era. Apart from the acknowledgment of the 
liberties and right of immunity, as guaranteed in the 
constitution (Article 1), the liberal stance of the party 
was most conspicuous with respect to the opposition it 
raised against the statist policies of the RPP in the 
economic sphere. The party program advocated the 
abolition of all state restrictions on private 
initiative, and restricted state involvement in the 
economy only to those spheres where private initiative 
lacked competence (Article 5) . In principle, such an 
orientation on the part of the FRP did not contrast with 
the declarations by the state in the way of legitimizing 
the economic measures of the era. In fact, Bilsay Kurug 
has pointed at 1927 as the year when state incentive to 
private initiative reached its climax. On the other 
hand, as asserted both by Mustafa Kemal and by the 
members of the RPP such an incentive did not carry the 
signs of laissez fairs laissez passer mentality.
Ibid.
Bilsay Kuruç, Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi (Economy In Mustafa 
Kemal's Period) (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), 128.
The extent of the tolerance towards private initiative can be 
observed in 1927 RPP Program: "Our main goal is to see to it that the 
laws and the measures, that will be introduced by the state for 
economic development, will be based on the common good. We give 
utmost importance to avoid the state from taking any measure to 
provide and maintain a private benefit, as well as to ensure that it
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However, as far as the economy was concerned, the nuance 
between the state and the FRP, would become more overt 
throughout the decade, as the state-initiated capitalist 
development proceeded.
In fact, the economic policies adopted during the 
early Republican era conform with the economic 
contingencies of the time. As Karpat has argued, the 
Republican era inherited the "...paradoxical, piecemeal 
combination of statism, liberalism and nationalism..." 
that dated back to the Young Turk period.*” The statement 
by Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt) (Minister of Economy of the 
period) in the 1923 Turkish Economic Congress fits well 
into this combination :
The new Turkish economy cannot be the same as any 
of the existing economic systems and policies. We 
have to pursue a genuine political economic policy 
which is in conformity with the economic 
requirements of our country and with the spirit of 
our economic history. ...We do not belong to any 
known economic school. We are neither laissez falre 
lalssez passer, nor socialist, communist, statist 
nor protectionist. We have a new school of 
economy...which I call the (New Turkey Economic 
School). The new Turkey should follow the system of
is impossible and inappropriate to expect any direct and/or indirect 
advantage from the treasury for private benefits of the individuals.” 
Quoted in Ibid. As Mustafa Kemal stated: "...the Repiiblic is yet too 
young. . . .As is the case in political and intellectual life, it is 
not expedient to wait for the fruits of private initiative. The 
principle of "etatism," that we find proper to adopt, is not the same 
as the systems of collectivism, communism which depend on the 
principle of socialism, that take over the means of production and 
distribution from the individuals, ..., and preclude any possibility 
of private and individual economic initiative and action. ...Thus, 
the principle of "etatism" that we employ in order to provide 
national welfare and development, while perceiving individual action 
as essential, locates the state in a pivotal position in such issues 
which are of ultimate concern for the general interest of the 
nation," Quoted in İnan, Medeni Bilgiler, 48-9.
110. Trimberger, Revolution from Above, 115.
***. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 84.
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mixed economy. ...Thus, in certain instances 
etatism will be adopted, and in some others the 
state will transfer its economic ventures to 
private initiative. ... As we are entering the 
economic war of our age, we have to ensure 
solidarity to the detriment of individuality. 
...Individual initiatives are destined to step back 
and be rendered inconsequential in the face of the 
unified foreign economic world.
As Erdoğan Alkin has stated, one of the aspirations 
in the economic sphere was to create the "national 
merchant. However, in a milieu where private capital 
was almost non-existent and where the state entitled 
itself to its creation, such an aspiration brought with 
it the implementation of high tariffs on imports, 
reluctance in foreign borrowing and high taxation.”  ^ As 
also delineated by Karpat, despite the acknowledgment of 
private capital and enterprise, throughout the early 
Republican era, the state's economic activities led to 
ever-widening limitations on private initiative, and even 
to its elimination.
Above all by the late 1920s, and throughout the 
1930s, the primary task for the Republican cadre in the 
economic agenda turned out to be industrialization, which 
was perceived as a natural part of the grand project of 
modernization, and as the only way to maintain the 
aspired goals of self-sufficiency and self-reliance vls-
Quoted in Türkiye İktisat Kongresi 1923-îzmlr: Haberler-Belgeler- 
Yorumlar (Turkish Economic Congress 1923-tzmlr: News-Documents-
Comments), ed. A. Gündüz Ökçün (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal 
Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1981), 257-66.
Erdoğan Alkin, "Atatürk Döneminde Devletçilik" (Etatism in 
Atatürk's Period), in Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye Ekonomisi Semineri 
(Seminar on Turkish Economy İn Atatürk's Period) (İstanbul: Yapı ve
Kredi Bankası, 1981), 116.
Trimberger, Revolution from Above, 117-8.
Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 86-7.
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à-vls the West With such a task at hand and especially 
in the midst of the 1929 World Depression, the state 
further enhanced its control and preeminence in the 
economy, which led to the intensification of
protectionist measures. The shift from the emphasis on
the creation of the national merchant, to national 
industry also led to a parallel shift from the 
combinatory stance of the state, in the economic policy 
in 1923 İzmir Economic Congress towards etatism."* On 
August 30, 1930, İsmet İnönü (Chairman of the RPP; Prime
Minister) identified the RPP as "Moderate Etatist" 
against the liberal stance of the FRP.”  ^And in May 1931, 
etatism was included into the Party Program as the 
fundamental policy in economic sphere.
The fact that the FRP emerged, with liberal 
proclamations, in a period of intensified protectionism, 
eventually put the party into a position of potential 
opposition to the state. This potential was perceived by 
the state to come to surface by the participation of the 
FRP in the municipal elections (1930), despite the 
reluctance of Mustafa Kemal to approve such a decision.
The state, in turn, toughened its stand vis-à-vis the 
party, especially in the face of the popularity the 
latter acquired from the public during its propoganda
Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 85.
11·^. Ibid.
Kuruç, Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi, 105-24; Alkin, "Atatürk 
Döneminde Devletçilik,” 116-21.
Alkin, ”Atatürk Döneminde Devletçilik,” 120.
Kuruç, Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi, 105.
. Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka Hatıraları, 48.
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tours.’“ The municipal elections can be taken as a turning 
point in the relationship between the FRP and the state. 
Following the elections, the party was no longer 
perceived as the "loyal opposition" in its idealized 
model, namely drawing the institutional schema of control 
within the assembly while staying under the general 
supervision of the state. This conviction on the part of 
the state was further enhanced by the submission of an 
interpellation by the FRP on the validity of the election 
results, mainly questioning the compatibility of the 
elections with democratic principles.’“
Such a political configuration was met with the 
traditional action of the state in the face of any threat 
towards the maintenance of political power. Thus, the 
fate of the FRP was no different from that of the PRP. In 
fact, from its very foundation, the party was constantly 
subject to accusations of provoking "reaction" and 
anarchy, and of discrediting Mustafa Kemal both within 
the assembly and through the press. The party brought its 
own dissolution (November 17, 1930).’“
The tutelary nature of the FRP, as has been 
presented above, was evident not only in its equivocal
Ibid., 53-69.
Ibid., 105-22.
Ibid., 69-123, 171-6, 216-7. Subsequently, the dissolution of the 
FRP was justified on the grounds of its exploitation by reactionary 
and anti-revolutionary forces as well as of the incompatibility of 
liberalism with the conditions in Turkey. Ahmet Hamdi Başar, 
Atatürk ^ le Üç Ay ve 1930^dan Sonra Türkiye (Three Months with Atatürk 
and Turkey after 1930) (Ankara: A.İ.T.İ.A Basımevi, 1981), 27-36. At 
the time Mustafa Kemal had argued that "...liberalism is a system 
which has been practised in the colonies!. ...However, we are not a 
colony, and we will never be. Thinking of liberalism is denying the 
revolution,” Quoted in ibid., 30.
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standing in the political spectrum at the time it was 
founded, but also in its rather facile self-dissolution 
at the time of its engagement in active opposition. Yet, 
the party ensured itself a specific place in Turkish 
political life, basically as a result of its intellectual 
orientation which was provided by Ahmet Agaoglu, the 
renowned liberal of the Republican era.
THE INTELLECTUAL BETWEEN STATE AND OPPOSITION: THE CASE
OF AHMET AGAOGLU
Apart from his active participation in the
foundation of the FRP and thenceforth, which ensured him 
an important place for the students of Turkish political 
life, Agaoglu is also significant for understanding the 
identity of the Republican intellectual, hovering between 
the state and opposition. Agaoglu served within the state 
structure both before and after the proclamation of the 
Republic. In this respect, he represents the
Responding a question of Ahmet Agaoglu, the leading liberal of 
the time, about the program of the party, Fethi Okyar replied as
follows: ” ...(The party) will not be different from the RPP in
essence... (Mustafa Kemal) will have control over both parties. While 
holding (his) links with the RPP (he) will not be indifferent to my 
party, and will in fact determine the candidates of both parties in 
the elections. It seems that (he) is fed up with lack of control... 
(He) wants, on the one hand, the presence of two parties in the
parliament which would control each other, on the other hand, an
atmosphere of freedom throughout the country. However, in order to
avoid anarchy and unrest, (he) wants to ensure that there be no 
radical difference between the two parties and that both parties be 
directed by one higher authority. Thus, my party will be on one side 
of the RPP. The circumstances will determine whether it will be on 
the right or on the left. Agaoglu, Serbest Fırka Hatıraları, 28.
126. From 1921 onwards Agaoglu took position in various state posts
including the General Directorate of the Press and Information
(General Director), the pro-state Hakimlyet-i Milliye (editorial
writer), and parliament after 1922, Turkish History Institution and
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intellectual of the Republic preoccupied with the
consolidation of the Kemalist principles and reforms into
an intellectual framework and transmitting them to
society. A thematic analysis of his writings may help to
depict such a preoccupation. Ağaoğlu mainly dwelled upon
delineating the mentality of the Turkish Revolution, the
necessity of further change in line with Kemalist
principles, and the role of the Turkish intellectual in
this process. The common denominator throughout his
writings appeared to be the spontaneous interlinkage
between the West on the one hand, the concepts of nation
and nationalism, on the other. His conformity with the
Kemalist reforms was manifested first in his acceptance
of the West as the reference point in the grand task of
modernization.He justified such a standing on the basis
of national sovereignty, which constituted one of the
basic themes throughout his writings. Ağaoğlu stated that
the concept and practice of national sovereignty was
peculiar to Western thought and history, and constituted
an antithesis of Eastern mentality. Second, in line with
the preoccupation of defining the "Turkish nation," that
was so characteristic of the early Republican era, the
nation was another basic theme in his writings. Ağaoğlu
defined the nation in terms of shared language, religion,
literature and common history, which for him comprised
the Ankara and Istanbul Law Faculties. Ülken, Türkiye'de Çağdaş 
Düşünce Tarihi, 409.
Ağaoğlu, "Şark ve Garp" (The East and West), Vatan, September 5, 
1923, no. 158, Cited in Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı I (Intellectual 
Life İn Atatürk's Period I) (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları,
1992), 83-7.
‘2*. Ibid.
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the basis of national consciousness. He held that the 
role the intellectual would play was of utmost importance 
for the development of national consciousness, inherent 
within the society, and accorded the state the 
responsibility in the realization of such a taskJ^° Such a 
conception of the nation provided another legitimation 
ground for Kemalist reforms, as harmonizing and unifying 
the different thoughts and feelings of the individuals 
for the sustenance of the Republican order, which 
basically meant the realization of national sovereignty.* ^’ 
As far as the role of the intellectual in this 
nation-building process is concerned, Agaoglu again took 
the West as the reference point. In his comparisons 
between the East and West, he criticized Eastern literary 
works on the basis of their isolation from the society in 
terms of both terminology and c o n t e n t . o n  the other 
hand, he praised the nineteenth-century positivist 
intellectual, who had entrusted himself the task of 
reconstructing the good and the bad for society, and of 
reorganizing society on the precepts of reason vis-à-vis 
the church.*33 For him this new society ultimately evolved 
into nation. *3'· Mirroring on such a model he held the
*39. Ağaoğlu, "Milli Şuur" (National Conscious), Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 
August 8, 1924, no. 1189, Cited in Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı I, 97. 
*3®. Ağaoğlu, Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde (In the Land of Free Men) 
(Istanbul: Sanayii Nefise Matbaası, 1930), 69.
*3*. Ağaoğlu, "Milli Şuur," 97-101; "Milliyetçilik Cereyanının 
Esasları" (Principles of Nationalist Trend), Türk Yurdu, August 1925, 
vol.II, no.11, 389-95, Cited in Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı I, 115-22. 
*33. Ağaoğlu, Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde, 70.
*33. Ağaoğlu, "Türk Bntellektüellerinin Zaafları" (The Weaknesses of 
Turkish Intellectuals) Akın, June 7, 1933.
*34. Ibid.
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Republican intellectual responsible for reading, 
interpreting and, in the final analysis, framing the 
latent consciousness among the Turkish p e o p l e . Ağaoğlu 
thought that the institutional aspect of the Turkish 
Revolution well exceeded the social ethos, and emphasized 
that it is the responsibility of the intellectual to find 
the matching point between them.^ ^^  In fact, in the latter 
part of his works, he employed the term National Movement 
{Harekatı Milliye) instead of Revolution, which according 
to Ağaoğlu, was a display of unconsciousness among the 
p e o p l e . H e  underlined the function of literature to act 
as a transmission belt between society and state. 
Literature should present the ideal model, as set by the 
Movement, for the construction of Republican society. 
Underlying such a faith in the intellectual was his 
peculiar perception of the intellectual as representing 
the nation and reflecting the national consciousness.'^^ It 
is in this respect that Ağaoğlu displayed the portrait of 
an intellectual who has internalized the state-given role 
of the "bearer of culture"''*·' with the mission of educating 
and training people in conformity with the mentality of
'35. Ibid.
'36. Ağaoğlu, Devlet ve Fert (The State and Individual) (İstanbul: 
Sanayiinefİse Matbaası^ 1933) 122.
Ağaoğlu, İhtilal mi tnkllab mı? (Revolution or Reform) (Ankara: 
1941-1942) 18-22.
Ağaoğlu, Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde, 69ff.
3^^ . Ibid., 68.
The term is borrowed from Dyson. Dyson employs the term "bearers 
of culture” for the late nineteenth century theoreticians of 
Kulturstaat, who took on the "interpretative role of the philosopher 
as the discoverer of norms and values.” Dyson, The State Tradition in 
Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution (Oxford: Martin 
Robertson, 1980), 151.
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the regime. Ironically, his professional history
exemplified the intellectual of the Republican era, 
walking on a tightrope, by his appointment to the 
membership of Turkish History Institution (1932), and 
subsequent dismissal from the Darülfünun (1933)
Ağaoğlu as the Intellectual in Opposition
Ağaoğlu can also be taken as a model for the 
intellectual in opposition, coming from within the state, 
in the name of those very principles that the state 
determined and proclaimed. He was appointed member of the 
FRP; however he turned out to be a genuine opponent of 
the RPP.i'*^  Although the party had quite a short life which 
prevented it from extending beyond the status of 
opposition under tutelage, the peculiar standing of 
Ağaoğlu within the party, as its theoretician, continued 
after its dissolution. In contrast to the other ex-party 
members who later rejoined the RPP, Ağaoğlu chose to stay 
in opposition.’'·^
Ağaoğlu perceived the formation of the FRP as the 
corollary of a natural necessity inherent in the raison 
d ’être of the Republican regime.·'·'· For him, the FRP 
constituted the mechanism of constructive opposition 
within the parliament that would refresh political life 
and deter the potential of indifference and passivity
·'·’. İstanbul Üniversitesi, 18.
•'•^. For the colloquies between Ağaoğlu and Mustafa Kemal in this 
respect, see Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka Hatıraları, 35-40.
•'•3. Ibid., 10.
·'·'·. Ibid., 147.
161
among the people, which he thought, was an inevitable 
outcome of one-party rule,^ '·^  Underlying his scepticism 
towards the one-party rule of the RPP, with whose 
principles he totally agreed, was his conviction on the 
corruptive effect of power on human beings, leading to 
oppression. In this respect, he found much more in the 
second party of the regime than mere formal practice of 
opposition, namely the activation of public consciousness 
with respect to the political system. And, upon the 
dissolution of the FRP, it was again this perception that 
led Agaoglu to conclude that Turkey was still not mature 
enough to provide a suitable atmosphere for the 
nourishment of opposition parties .
The Intellectual in Search of Liberal Identity
The conceptual framework that Ahmet Agaoglu used in 
his writings is of utmost importance. It shows the 
contextual impasse that the liberal intellectual 
experienced throughout the early Republican era.
The liberal stance of Agaoglu was colored with his 
identification with the Republican state. In fact, the 
identity crisis of the early Republican era, which arose 
out of the uneasiness of matching changes at the 
institutional level with those at the cultural level, was
’'*5. Ibid., 147, 198-9.
Agaoglu, Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde, 35.
"It is confirmed by experience that opposition parties cannot be 
founded and/or sustained (in Turkey)." Agaoglu, "Müstakil 
Meb'usluklar" (Independent Memberships of Parliament), Akin, June 15, 
1933.
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well symbolized in his writings: "I entered the FRP as a
revolutionary democrat, liberal, statist and Kemalist. 
...Till the foundation of the FRP, I sincerely believed 
that the RPP was a liberal, democratic party, and even as 
statist as I am."''**
In this respect, it is necessary to read between the 
lines in order to understand the underlying factors of
his peculiar standing as an intellectual of the state, 
which in the meantime led to his dismissal from the state 
circle. Throughout the writings of Agaoglu, it is 
possible to observe a co-existence of the acknowledgement 
of the faith in the principles of the Republican state 
and a distinctive interpretation of the raison d'être of 
those very principles based on a structured conceptual 
framework.
The matrix of the conceptual framework of Agaoglu
can be found in his conception of history. Agaoglu 
perceived history as a process of a continuous search for 
harmony among the organic contradictions within each and 
every society.''*^  For him history was composed of 
subsequent stages of "becoming, signifying a further 
level of progress, which arose out of the ongoing
contradictions.'^' More briefly, he viewed history as a 
scene of "creative evolution, each stage of which
contains a phase of order producing its own tensions.
''**. Ağaoğlu, Devlet ve Feet, 101-2.
''*9. Ibid., 35-7.
'50. Ibid.
'5'. Ibid., 40.
'52. Agaoglu, "Yaratıcı Tekamül" (Creative Evolution), Kültür latası, January 29, 
1936, no. 3.
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According to Agaoglu each stage of progress delivers a 
more structured order, which in turn, bares more complex 
contradictions.
Agaoglu placed the state and individual as the main 
actors on this scene of struggle between order and 
tension.For him, individual action, which he viewed as 
the womb of the contradictions, is the main leitmotive 
behind further progress.The state, on the other hand, 
is the manifestation of the antidote, namely order. 
Throughout the historical stages, this tense interaction 
between the individual and state is shaped by the 
specific exigencies of different historical stages.
It is such a framework that provided Agaoglu with a 
breathing space to pursue his proclaimed liberal stance 
on the one hand, and to justify such a stance on the 
grounds of the Kemalist principles, on the other. In his 
writings, the nation constituted the common denominator 
between the individual and state. According to Agaoglu, 
the early Republican era was a period of nation-building 
as an eventual outcome of the "attraction"*^ '^  among those, 
with shared anthropological origins, language, and 
culture to u n i t e . H e  held the state responsible for the 
pursuit of the consolidation of the ethical bases of 
national consciousness whose material foundations had
Agaoglu, Devlet ve Fert, 40.
154. Ibid., 98-9.
155. Ibid., 34-5, 40-2.
156. Agaoglu, Devlet ve Fert.
157. Ibid., 93.
158. Ağaoğlu, "Milliyetçilik Cereyanxnin Esasları," 115-22; Devlet ve 
Fert, 92.
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already been laid down by histor y . O n  the other hand, 
Agaoglu perceived the individual not as an absolute 
category, but as the individual of the nation, namely the 
individual-as-citizen of the Republic, For him, the 
individual could not be considered in solitude, but as a 
constitute part of society and the nation.It is in this 
respect that he accorded the state with the task of 
consciousness-raising of the mutual responsibility 
between the individual and society, and thus of providing 
the groundwork for the solidification of the already- 
existing sense of belonging.
Perceiving freedom as the essence of life for both 
the society and individual, Agaoglu argued that freedom 
was crucial for the inculcation of such a consciousness in 
the individual. He contended the views which held that 
freedom contained the risk of leading to anarchy. 
Instead, he based the sustenance of social order, harmony 
and unity on the appropriate practice of freedom.For 
Agaoglu, the appropriate exercise of freedom would ensure 
sweeping away the remnants of the Ottoman past which had 
circumscribed the individual will.^ "^^  He invested the state
Ağaoğlu, Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde, 69; "Milliyetçilik" 
(Nationalism), Акт, July 10, 1933.
Ağaoğlu, Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde; Ben Neyim (Who am I?) 
(istaxibul, 1939), 10.
Ağaoğlu, Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde, 105.
Ibid.; "Maarifimizin Islahı" (Reform of our Educational System), 
Акт, June 21, 1933.
Ağaoğlu, Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde, 121.
. Ibid.; Devlet ve Fert, 22, 106.
Ibid., 22, 87; "Nizamlı Hürriyet" (Ordered Freedom), Акт, June
5, 1933.
Ibid.
Ağaoğlu, Devlet ve Fert, 29ff.
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with the task of training people in freedom, and thus 
carrying the achievement of national freedom at the 
institutional level, which was legally structured in the 
TGNA, to the cultural level. In other words, in his 
writings a universal conception of freedom, based on his 
homocentric stance, was remolded into freedom-in-society. 
Freedom was praised not only from a homocentric 
perspective, (read as freedom as right), but also from a 
societal perspective (read as freedom as duty).^^^ The 
freedom-in-society required delineation by and compliance 
with the principles of the state.^ "^ ®
The individual in Agaoglu's conceptual matrix
Agaoglu's individual corresponds to the personalist 
conception of man of the twentieth century continental 
European intellectual reaction against the
"...subjectivism of liberal individualism.In Agaoglu's 
work, the individual was described in terms of two 
opposing dimensions, namely "the outer self" and "the 
inner self."’’^^ The outer self is analogous to the identity 
of the ego-centered, interest-seeking individual with no 
commitment to any entity other than himself, which for 
the classical liberal is the individual-as-such. On the
Ibid., 80; Ağaoğlu, Devlet ve Fert, 74-5, 122.
Ibid., p. 35. Freedom, conceived as such, was taken to have 
formulated the ethical aspect of discipline in the society. Ağaoğlu, 
"Nizamlı Hürriyet."
Ibid.
Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 72.
Ağaoğlu, Ben Neyim.
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other hand, the inner self inherently embodies 
"solidarity, '”'^3 "virtue, and "cognizance, and thus 
the essence of the ideal altruistic individual for 
AgaogluJ·^^ He puts the inner self, that is the will of the 
individual, over and above the outer self, that is 
reason In his reading, freed from the bonds of the 
rationalism of classical liberal standing, the actions of 
the individual arise out of his will which is always in a 
state of "becoming," as a projection of the past over the 
present.'"^ ® In congruence with his interpretation of the 
Turkish Revolution as the surfacing of the 
unconsciousness among the people, for Agaoglu the inner 
self is the bedrock of that unconsciousness which lies 
under the individual action, leading to "creative 
evolution.
The reflection of such a portrayal of individual, in 
the image of a bifurcated self, on the conception of the 
state, can be located within the framework of the 
nineteenth-century continental European theories of state, 
associated with a communitarian model of spciety.’*® The 
organic metaphor, the common denominator of these 
theories, which perceives "...the individual as an 
integral part of the society... "^** who can realize his
Ağaoğlu, Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde, 30-4.
Ibid., 61.
Ibid., 112-3; Ağaoğlu, "Maarifimizin Islahı;" Ben Neyim, 40. 
Ağaoğlu, Ben Neyim.
Ağaoğlu, "Yaratıcı Tekamül."
Ibid.
Ibid.
Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 143-50.
Ibid., 165.
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"...value and dignity...'” »2 only through integration with 
the society, can also be observed in the writings of 
Agaoglu. Derivatively, this perception not only accorded 
the state sovereignty, but also invested it with molding 
the ideal individual of the Republic, which would 
eventually lead to the surfacing of the inner self to the 
detriment of the outer self. Above all, in the writings of 
Agaoglu, the state has never been an outcast in the name 
of the individual. This is well manifested in his credence 
to the task of disciplining the individual for freedom, 
which, for him, was already established in the state 
structure by the state itself.**“*
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The early Republican era was a period of 
crystallization of the legacy of the state tradition into 
a strong state within the process of nation-state 
building. In this process, the intellectual was saddled 
with double responsibility. He was endowed with the task 
of formulating the intellectual grounds for the Turkish 
Revolution, and of inculcating the logic of the new regime 
in society. Such a disposition can be taken as a corollary 
of social structure high-in-stateness in the intellectual
•*2. Ibid.
**^ "...that all those communities which have been successful in 
establishing Republics, have also determined and organized the means 
and manners of the practise of (these) freedom(s) . Individuals can 
possess freedom if and only if they coitply with these prerequisites." 
Agaoglu, "Nizamlı Hürriyet."
**“*. Ağaoğlu, "Ana kanunlar ve Nazım Kanunlar" (Main Laws and By­
laws), Akın, June 27, 1933.
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sphere.’*^ To employ Kenneth H.F. Dyson's 
conceptualization, the Republican state was "...a 
generalizing^ Integrating and legitimating..." oneJ^^ 
Throughout the early Republican era it was the state that
determined the leading values of the political 
community with reference to which authority (was) 
to be exercised; ...found its embodiment in one or 
more institutions and one or more public purposes 
which thereby acquired a special social ethos and 
prestige and an association with the public 
interest or general welfare; and produced a socio­
cultural awareness of the unique and superior 
nature of the state itself,!®'^
and thus installed itself over and above the society. The 
Republican state, constructed as such, readily undertook 
unto itself the mission of setting up the conditions for 
upsurging the norms and values of Turkish society which 
awaited vitalization.
Such a configuration provided the early Republican 
intellectual with a conceptual framework which had 
already been determined by the state itself. As was the 
case in the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire, the 
intellectual continued to preoccupy himself with 
analyzing the West, in order to highlight why the East 
has failed in the face of the West. Again not differently 
from his precedents he found his safety belt within the
1*5. Such a conclusion is based on the work of two students of Turkish 
politics. "Experience in statecraft, respect for the state, the 
importance of the state in the history of the Turkish republic, 
endowing it with a political gravitas, absent from most new 
countries..." Andrew Mango, "The State of Turkey," Middle Eastern 
Studies, 13 (1977), 265; Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey 
(Walkington, England: The Eothen Press, 1985).
Kenneth H.F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 206. 
l*"^. Ibid.
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State structure. This time he based his arguments on the 
logic of the Turkish Revolution, which at times resulted 
in mutually opposing interpretations among the 
intellectuals.
It may be argued that Ahmet Ağaoğlu represents an 
isolated figure in the early Republican intellectual 
circles,His isolation may be linked to the absence of a 
liberal circle. He was typical in that he constructed his 
liberal stance on the raison d'être of the Turkish 
Revolution, which ensured his loyalty to the state and 
its principles. In his In the Land of the Free Men 
(Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesi ’nde) Ağaoğlu painted the utopia 
of that novel system, which for him underlied the 
cardinal aspiration of the Turkish Revolution.’^® In the 
land of the free men of Ağaoğlu, the system is founded on 
the principle of individual freedom. He argued that the 
Turkish Revolution was in fact a struggle of the will 
against memory,’^’ for liberating the individual, "...and 
thus the community constituted by the individuals...," 
from the shackles of Eastern d o g m a t i s m . Ağaoğlu 
substantiated his argument by referring to the structure 
of the Republican state and the Constitution. He 
specifically emphasized that the "...foundations of the 
new Turkish state were built upon..." the principle of 
the right of participation in the political system, basic 
channel for the disclosure of the free will of the
In this respect see the Kadro circle which provided a leftist 
interpretation of the Turkish Revolution and Kemalist reforms in the 
early 1930s, as opposed to Ağaoğlu's reading. Kadro, ed. Cem Alpar, 
vols. I,II (Ankara: A.İ.T.İ.A. Yayxnlari, 1978/1979).
Ironically, Ağaoğlu has been studied as among the "tradionalist- 
conservative" circle, however standing on the edge. In this respect 
see C. Nazim İrem, "Kemalist Modernism and the Genesis of Modern 
Turkish Conservatism" (Ph.D. Dissertation. Bilkent University. 1996).
Ağaoğlu, Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde.
Ibid., 98.
Ağaoğlu, Devlet ve Fert, 30.
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individuals. However, such an emphasis on the 
individual should not mislead one to analogize his 
conceptual framework with the classical liberal stance, 
which accords the individual a pivotal place in the 
public sphere, over and above any other social entity. 
Instead, Agaoglu's arguments were derived from the 
concept of individual freedom in the name of sustaining a 
stable and dynamic society, which was modelled on the 
Western nation-state.'^'* Here, it should be noted that 
faith in the individual was not in the individual-as- 
such, but in the ideal individual-as-citizen of the 
Republic, which he perceived to be the prerequisite for 
the sustenance of the order.
What pushed Agaoglu to opposition was not his views 
about the basis of the Republican regime, but those about 
the particular policies which the state pursued in the 
name of the regime. His conception of freedom, delineated 
above, led to his active participation in the FRP and his 
identification with the party even after its dissolution. 
For him the FRP experience represented the practise of 
control and criticism, prerequisites of the realization 
of freedom.His conception of history was reflected in 
his challenge to the etatist policies of the state, which 
had gained momentum in the 1930s.HoWever, one should 
not misinterpret such a standing as a manifestation of a 
refusal of statism. In fact, while acknowledging "the 
statism of the (Turkish) state"'^ '^  as sui generis, Agaoglu 
rejected state intervention in the economy, because it
'^ 3. Ibid., 29.
'94. Ibid., 74.
'95. Agaoglu, Serbest Fırka Hatıraları. 
'9^ . Ağaoğlu, Devlet ve Fert, 62-76.
'97. Ibid., 61, 98.
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was too e a r l y . H e  believed that the imperative 
contradictions in the economy, which occasionally lead 
the state to step in to reinstate social harmony and 
order, had not emerged yet. Instead, he stated that the 
requirements of the period asked for a role of the state 
as an organizer in the economic sphere, rather than as an 
active partner.
The peculiarity of Agaoglu's liberal stance was 
mainly shaped by his perception of historical 
contingencies. Examplary is his interpretation of the 
Turkish Revolution, not as an exceptional parenthesis in 
history, but as a contextual eventuality in the universal 
process of progress, as the climax of that "creative 
evolution." However, this perception of history was not 
steered by a portrait of a liberal intellectual acting 
with the universal and abstract principles of classical 
liberalism. He employed the universally authentic concept 
of individual freedom in order to provide an indigenous 
conceptualization, which would conform with the 
particular political configuration of his period in 
Turkey. It is in this respect that Agaoglu represented 
the intellectual of the early Republican era who was in 
search of a liberal identity for his s o c i e t y (emphasis 
added)
Ibid., 62-76.
For Agaoglu, the economic exigencies pushed the state to maintain 
technological improvement in agriculture, providing markets for 
agricultural products, upholding industrial development, and seeing 
to it that the national products are circulated within the country. 
Agaoglu, "Ziraat mi Sanayi mi?" (Agriculture or Industry?), Akin, 
June 3, 1933.
200. "Reflecting upon our past we can conclude that we -as a 
community- have not yet fulfilled the process of becoming. We do not 
have a definite form. We do not have divergent and opposing interests 
and intellectual formations. Now the ultimate task for us is to 
acquaint this country with freedom." Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka 
Hatıraları, 122.
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CHAPTER V
THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL IN AN ERA OF 'LIBERALIZATION'
(1946-1960)
THE STATE AND DEMOCRACY
Ahmet Agaoglu died in 1939. The year was also marked 
by the beginning of a significant period in world 
history: the Second World War (1939-1945). The war
affected not only the foreign but also domestic politics 
of the Turkish Republic. This effect was most conspicious 
with respect to the economic sphere. The war brought with 
it the closing down of the borders, and the reinforcement 
of protectionist policies in the economic sphere. The 
period was distinguished by the ascendancy of Keynesian 
policies in the West. Beginning with the 1929 Depression, 
the West was going through a denial of the classical 
liberal idealization of the market economy. The focus of 
attention shifted from faith in the interest-seeking 
individual in the economy to the aspiration of providing 
full-employment. In this respect, John Maynard Keynes 
became a key figure by his rather moderating propositions 
between the efficiency of the autonomously working market 
and planning. The autonomy of the market was perceived to 
be essential for the quality of production, while 
planning was re-considered for the determination of the 
quantity of production beforehand.
Living in the midst of such an international milieu, 
the Turkish state adopted stricter measures in the 
running of the economy. In fact, this was no exception 
with respect to the preceding period of absolute etatism. 
The 1930s had witnessed the evolutionary consolidation of 
etatism. The state ensured itself the role of principal 
investor and producer in the sphere of railways, 
navigation, municipal services, energy, industry and 
mining. By the introduction of the First Five Year Plan 
in 1934, this role had been consolidated.’ However, the 
rationale behind etatism was stated not as hostility 
towards private initiative, but as the conviction of its 
inadequacy at the time. Nevertheless, the Law on the 
Encouragement of Industry (Te$vlk-i Sanayi Kanunu) was 
still in force. As argued by Korkut Boratav, in this 
period private capital was not perceived as a competitor 
against the state. Rather, it was provided with the 
opportunity of free initiative in small industrial 
spheres.2 A statement of Celal Bayar in 1937, the 
incumbent Minister of Economy, confirms this argument:
We will support individual initiative for those 
spheres where it is competent. ... However, the 
state will assume the pivotal role for sustaining 
national security and common interest and for the
h Bilsay Kuruç, Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi (Ankara: Bilgi
Yayınevi 1987) . On the etatist period, see Çağlar Keyder, Turkey: A 
Study in Capitalist Development (London: Verso Publications, 1987), 
98ff.; Faruk Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey, 1932- 
1950: The Uncertain Road in the Restructuring of a Semi-Peripheral
Economy," Review, VII (3) (Winter 1985), 407-38.
Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi (1908-1990)" (History of 
Economics), in Türkiye Tarihi: Çağdaş Türkiye (1908-1980) (History of 
Turkey: Modern Turkey (1908-1980), ed. Sina Akşin, vol. 4 (Istanbul: 
Cem Yayınevi, 1995), 304-11.
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development of individual initiative in those 
spheres where the latter lacks competence or under 
conditions of national protectionism.^
Such a standing would have led to a gradual shift to 
liberal policies when the time was ripe. However, the 
proviso of the period between 1939-1945 engendered a 
reverse development. Apart from the yet-to-be achieved 
goal of industrialization, and the lack of an effective 
national bourgeoisie, the requisite of getting prepared 
for the risk of entering into the war led to the 
tightening of state control over the economy. Thus, 
contacts with England and France in the late 1930s, which 
had also speeded up the actualization of proclaimed 
intention of the government to adopt liberal policies, 
lost their significance by the overwhelming emphasis on 
military expenditures.** The imposition of Capital Levy 
(Varlık Vergisi) (1942) was a further move in this 
direction.^
The most significant display of state intervention 
in the economic sphere was exercised by the enactment of 
the Law on National Protection (Milli Korunma 
Kanunu) (1940). The law provided the RPP government with 
the authority to determine the quality and quantity of 
production, plan production, fix price limits in imports 
and exports, temporarily confiscate private enterprises, 
and to the seize of land where it was deemed necessary 
for national security. In this respect, the government
Quoted in Kuruç, Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi, 84-5.
Z.Y. Hershlag, Turkey: The Challenge of Growth (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1968), 131-2.
Ibid., 133; Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi (1908-1990)," 306-7.
175
was unaccountable, since it was the ultimate decision 
maker about the conditions requiring the implementation 
of the law, and it was obliged only to inform the Grand 
National Assembly about its deeds.^ Not differently, in 
the implementation of the Capital Levy, owners of 
property had no right of appeal and were subject to 
severe punishment in case of disobedience.'^
The social and political significance of the war 
time economic policies lay in the post-war panorama of 
political scene. The above-mentioned measures led to 
discontent among property-owners both in the agricultural 
sector and in the urban sites, which also corresponded to 
the rise of opposition within the RPP.* The opposition was 
first voiced against the Draft Law on Land in 1945, which 
proposed the nationalization and redistribution of landed 
property to the landless peasantry.^
Hershlag, Turkey: The Challenge of Growth, 133; Boratav "İktisat
Tarihi (1908-1990)," 306-7.
Hershlag, Turkey: The Challenge of Growth, 133.
*. Keyder, Turkey: A Study In Capitalist Development, 40.
The name of the law was changed into Law on Providing Peasantry 
with Land {Çiftçiyi Topraklandrrma Kanunu) and passed on June 11, 
1945. Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi: 1839-1950
(Turkey's History of Democracy: 1839-1950) (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi,
1995), 384-8.
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The Rise of Opposition: A Replay of the Claims for 
"Rational Debate
The indignation against the Draft Law later proved 
to be more than a voice against one particular issue. The 
opposing figures, namely Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, 
Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü clarified their stance by 
a proposal, known as the Proposal of the Four {Dörtlü 
Takrir) submitted to the TGNA in June 1945. Acccording to 
its propaganists the proposal was in the form of a reform 
report. It basically contained "...setting up of a 
substantive control mechanism in the TGNA, certain 
constitutional amendments which blockade the emergence 
and survival of democratic institutions..." as the 
prerequisites for the "...fulfillment of democratic 
conscious and realization of democracy.
Subsequent to the expulsion of Menderes, Koraltan 
and Köprülü from the RPP and the resignation of Celal 
Bayar from both his office at the Parliament and the RPP, 
a new opposition party was formed on January 7, 1946. The 
party was named the Democratic Party (DP).!^  similar to 
the preceding attempts to initiate a multi-party regime, 
the party was formed by the former members of the RPP and
Metin Heper, "Bureaucrats: Persistent Elitists," in Turkey and
the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities, eds. Metin
Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer (London and New York: I.B. Tauris 
& Co Ltd Publishers, 1993), 39.
’h Refik Koraltan, Vatan, October 2, 1945.
'2. Ibid.
Tank Z. Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler: 1859-1952 (Political 
Parties In Turkey: 1859-1952) (Istanbul, 1952), 648-9.
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proclaimed itself to be liberaU'* Again, not different 
from previous experiences, emergence of the DP was 
simultaneous with the shift in the RPP towards more 
liberal policies. The subsequent statements of İsmet 
İnönü, beginning by his speech in May 1945, pointed at 
the need for accelerating the move towards democracy.^^ in 
his opening speech of the TGNA (November 1, 1945) İnönü
explained the means for the realization of such a task:
The democratic character of the Republic has been 
taken to be principal. ...In principle, 
dictatorship has never been accepted... Our only 
deficiency is the absence of a party opposing the 
party in power. ...by the motivation of the 
exigencies of the country and the eventual 
functioning of free and democratic life, the 
foundation of another political party will also be 
possible. ...There is no doubt that freedom of 
expression is the shared basis of each and every 
people's rule... We believe that instead of 
functioning as a faction, the ensurance of an overt 
disposition by a programme, by those who do not 
share the same views on principle and execution 
with their partners within a political institution, 
is both more appropriate for the development of our 
political life and more constructive for the 
interest and political maturity of the nation.·^
On the other hand, as far as the economy was 
concerned, by the end of the Second World War the RPP
Ibid., 647-9.
In his speech İnönü mentioned the "...training of the nation for 
free thoughts and life of freedom by the people *s rule...” He further 
stated that "...each nation is in a search of precautions against 
oppression on thought and morality. ...By the removal of the war-time 
conditions which necessitated precautionary measures, the principles 
of democracy will ensure their dominance in the political and 
intellectual life of the country. ...the national will which is 
placed in the National Assembly, will continue to develop in the path 
towards democracy.” İsmet İnönü, May 19, 1945, quoted in Forum, 9
(102) (June 15, 1958), 10.
İsmet İnönü, Opening Speech of the Parliament, November 1, 1945,
quoted in Forum, 10 (103) (July 1, 1958), 9-10.
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government had already begun to search for ways to
reconcile its etatist standing with the need to boil down 
the increasing opposition urging liberalization. Although 
in the 194 6 Five Year Development Plan the party 
continued in its traditional requisite of state
initiative for development and industrialization and of 
economic independence in the international sphere, in the 
1947 Turkey Development Plan the role of the private 
sector was emphasized.''^ More significant was the 1947 RPP 
Congress, whereby the party acknowledged most of the
demands coming from the private sector. In the same 
Congress, etatism was reinterpreted as a substitute
principle for the enhancement of private initiative.'® In 
this respect, while Article 8 '^ of the new party program 
delineated the spheres of state initiative. Articles 9'^ 
and 1 0 '^ accepted a wider scope for the private
initiative, at least in principle.
'^ . Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi," 314. See also Hershlag, Turkey: The
Challenge of Growth, 133-7.
'®. Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi," 314.
"State is responsible to pursue economic activities in those 
spheres concerning pviblic interest and public services in national 
economy and national security via its own institutions. These are the 
construction of large mining enterprises, energy plants and heavy 
industry, large-scale investments such as defence industry and public 
works, and initiatives which are related to piiblic services such as 
transportation and communication." Quoted in Tunaya, Türkiye'de 
Siyasi Partiler, 585.
"The RPP acknowledges the necessity of private initiative in all 
economic spheres except those mentioned in Article 8. The state 
should support, encourage and protect private initiative. ...On the 
other hand, the state might come into the picture where the private 
initiative lacks incompetence and/or is unwilling to act due to 
absence of future profiteering." Quoted in ibid., 585-6.
'^. "The RPP acknowledges the requisite of the legal enactments on 
the operation of private initiative and state initiative under equal 
conditions." Quoted in ibid., 586.
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However, this tendency to soften the practice of 
absolute etatism did not help much in curtailing the 
opposition. On the contrary, the indifference of the RPP 
towards independent attempts at the reinterpretation of 
etatism and/or its incapacity to follow up with the 
related proposals led to an increase in the popularity of 
the DP. In this respect, the 1948 National Economic 
Congress, which was organized by the Istanbul Trade 
Chamber, is exemplary. The main theme of the Congress was 
the clarification of the role of the state and limits to 
its role in the economy.The criticisms were mainly 
related to the issue of inconsistency in state policies 
as well as ambiguity in the relative dispositions of 
state and private initiatives. Another target of
criticism was centralization and the inefficiency of 
bureaucratic mentality.^^ Such a standing provided the DP 
with a potential support base, at least in the initial 
stages of its opposition, following the failure of the 
subsequent RPP governments to pursue a consistent path 
towards liberalization.^'*
As noted above, the third attempt at the transition 
to multi-party regime had resemblance to its precedents. 
On the eve of the formation of the DP, İnönü promised to 
play a neutral role as a mediator between the two 
parties, which resembled the role that Mustafa Kemal had
For an outline of the principles determined in the Congress see 
Hershlag, Turkey: The Challenge of Growth, 137.
Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey, 1932-1950: The 
Uncertain Road in the Restructuring of a Semiperipheral Economy," 
423-9.
2'*. Ibid., 432.
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assumed himself during the formation of the Free 
Republican Party (FRP) .25 Again, not different from the 
FRP experience, the standing of the DP on the political 
spectrum with respect to the RPP was rather ambiguous:
Since our party program refers both to the 
political and economic, as well as social spheres, 
it is difficult to prefigure whether we stand on 
the right or left with respect to the RPP in each 
of these spheres. These issues are stated in our 
program more clearly. We believe that Turkey is on 
a stage of democracy that it has to transcend. We 
reject the theory which perceives class struggle as 
imperative. We are determined to protect national 
interest as a whole. 2^
However, the authenticity of the DP opposition was that 
it disclosed a split within the RPP. While the incumbent 
prime minister, Recep Peker, attacked the opposition as 
"...provoking rebellion. .. "2^ , İnönü displayed a totally 
contrasting approach in his July 12 Declaration (1948) 
which ended up with the curtailment of the tough-liners 
within the RPP. 28 In fact, the Declaration may be 
interpreted as the genuine illustration of the 
reconciling role that İnönü took on himself, between the 
government and opposition:
The opposition party which operates not as an 
institution provoking rebellion, but on the basis
25. Examplary is a series of Celal Bayar-İsmet İnönü meetings that 
began on Juine 7, 1947, which were initiated on the occasion of the
deadlock reached between the DP opposition and the government. 
Throughout the meetings İnönü ensured his proclaimed arbiter role. 
Cem Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi (Democratic Party:
Its History and Ideology) (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası: 1970), 33-4.
2^ . Celal Bayar, Press Declaration as the President of the DP, 
January 7, 1946, quoted in Celal Bayar Diyor kl: 1920-1950 (Celal
Bayar Says: 1920-1950), ed. Nazmi Sevgen (İstanbul, 1951), 102.
2^ . Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, 34.
28. Ibid., 31-8.
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of the methods of legitimate political party should 
be provided with the same means the party in power 
has. Thus, I regard myself neutral with respect to 
both parties. ...It is beyond doubt that a 
responsible government is obliged to provide 
security and order. On the other hand, the basic 
prerequisite of the security of political life is 
the imperative of neutrality towards and equal 
treatment of legitimate and legal political 
parties. ...I would like to see to it that security 
among the two parties be consolidated. This 
security also corresponds to the security of the 
country. Opposition should exist in complete 
security and be sure of the fact that the 
government has no intention to destroy it. The 
government should be content that the opposition is 
merely concerned with its legal rights.^^
An Organized Liberal Movement as the New Claimant to 
Democracy
By the time of its foundation and in the following 
years, the opposition of the DP was mainly based on the 
principle of democracy. In his first declaration, Celal 
Bayar, the head of the party, explained the DP’s 
conception of democracy as "...a move from bottom up..."30 
In line with this view the party was proclaimed to be 
"...the first party founded and created by the Turkish 
nation itself..."^' to control state apparatus, the lack
2^ . Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 688-9.
Celal Bayar Diyor ki, 101.
In the first congress of the DP, Bayar stated that "It is a fact 
that a mono-party regime which by definition is not accountable leads 
to the emergence some deficiencies in the national structure. ...Our 
people . . . were aware that a new development could only be achieved 
by the realization of control over the whole state administration by 
the nation. It is in this respect that "Democratic Party" movement 
triggered sympathy throughout the country and readily accepted by the 
nation. Thus, it can be said that "Democratic Party" came to be the 
first party founded and created by the Turkish nation itself..." 
Celal Bayar Diyor ki, 141; see also Bayar's Speech in Edirne Mass 
Meeting, December 5, 1948, quoted in ibid., 314.
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of which was perceived as the foremost drawback of the 
existing regime. Starting from this baseline, the DP 
demanded the revision of the electoral system and those 
laws which were perceived to be against the Constitution 
and the separation of the office of presidency from 
partisan politics. As noted, these points were initially 
made in the Proposal of the Four which can be taken as 
the cradle for the formation of the party. In the Oath of 
Freedom (Hürriyet Misaki) , and the Oath of National 
Enmity (Milli Husumet Andı), the official documents 
compiling the decisions taken in the first and second 
congresses of the party, the same demands were
articulated.
On the other hand, the liberal identity of the DP 
was mainly manifested in its program. Apart from the re­
acknowledgement of the adherence to the principle of 
democracy (Article 1)^  ^ in Article 43 of the DP program 
private initiative and capital were viewed as the 
principal actors in the economic sphere. The state was 
held responsible for providing grounds for free and 
secure functioning of private sector as well as opening 
up new opportunities for this sector.In this respect. 
Article 44 pointed at the requisite of planning in the 
economic activities of the state for drawing the 
boundaries within which the state would act. The state 
was not to intervene in the functioning of the markets
Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 673-6, 683-4. 
33. Ibid., 662.
3-*. Ibid., 667.
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except for sustaining competitive conditions (Article 
53).35 The program also proposed principles according to 
which the state would take on economic initiative. These 
were not different from what the new program of the RPP 
had introduced. The state action in the economy was 
perceived to be acceptable only in those spheres where 
private initiative lacked competency as in the case of 
big infrastructural investments, and when national
interest was the issue (Article 4 5 ) .36 on the other hand, 
the DP went one step further in the liberal spirit by 
proposing the transfer of state enterprises into the 
private sector under appropriate conditions (Article 
48) .37 Apart from that, in line with the common tendency 
of the era, the party program also contained a new 
interpretation of etatism (Article 17).3» The DP perceived 
etatism as arising out of exigency. In the party program, 
etatism was viewed as a transitory policy which would 
provide harmonization between the activities of the state 
and private initiative, and protection of the latter vis- 
à-vis the former.39
The liberal disposition of the DP was also apparent 
with respect to the political sphere and bureaucracy. 
Article 19 of the party program construed the government 
as an administrative mechanism, formed by the people and 
one saddled with the task of performing public service.
35^ Ibid., 6 6 1,
36^ Ibid., 668.
37^ Ibid.
38^ Ibid./ 664.
39^ Ibid.
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Here it is possible to observe a nuance from the 
dominating early-Republican disposition of determining 
what is best for the people, in the name of, but despite 
the people. However, whether this nuance would turn into 
a distinct identity or have no significance rested on the 
actual practise of power by the DP. In the same Article, 
the DP also made clear its rejection of centralization of 
authority and proposed delimitation on the authority, and 
responsibility of the bureaucracy. Lastly, the granting 
of authority and responsibility to local administrations, 
as stated in Articles 20 and 21, derived from the party's 
consistency in the proclaimed adherence to the principle 
of decentralization.
The factors that gave the DP its liberal feature 
also matched with the criticisms directed against etatist 
policies and the proposals for its re-interpretation in 
the National Economic Congress of Istanbul Trade Chamber 
(1948) . Faruk Birtek has attributed a neo-liberal 
character to the reports prepared for and the proposals 
brought up in the Congress. According to .Birtek, what 
made the participants in the Congress neo-liberal was 
that they did not adhere to a strictly classical liberal 
standing which would require the elimination of state 
from the economy.'*’ Instead, like the other attempts at 
the re-formulation of etatism coming from the RPP and the 
DP,'*2 they were asking for a re-definition of the role of
Ibid.
. Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey," 423ff.
In fact, if the statements by the party members are examined one 
may observe a shift from the allegedly liberal identity. Exaitplary is
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state in the economy. The main points of criticism which 
were articulated during the Congress, matched with those 
of the DP. In this respect, the criticisms were focused
on the expansionist and monopolistic nature of the state
enterprises, leaving no room for private initiative even 
in those spheres which it could prove to be competent.“*^ 
As far as the proposals are concerned, the final report
of the Congress specifically focused on the delimitation
of the role of the state to the extent of acting as a 
support base for the emergence and consolidation of urban 
private sector.'*'* The Congress specifically represented 
the dispositions of urban industry and commerce with 
respect to the role of state in the economic sphere.'*^  At 
this point, divergence between the representational 
identity of the DP and the Congress emerged. They had 
represented the two blocs of criticism towards the party 
in power, in post-war Turkey. As Birtek has pointed out, 
the Congress expressed the interests of urban private
an excerpt from Celal Bayar's speech in İzmir, on April 6, 1947: " 
Drawing the boundaries of etatism is not within the sphere of power 
of anybody. If this boundary is wide it extends towards liberalism. 
If it is pushed further it even reaches to communism. It is 
imperative to practise moderate etatism; that is what this country 
needs. Since we accept proprietorship we should detennine our 
policies accordingly. It is true that liberalism contains 
advantageous aspects. ...However, for us to pursue a totally open 
economic policy means falling short of providing for national 
welfare. ...We believe that a middle of the road protectionism is the 
best alternative for our country." Quoted in Celal Bayar Diyor ki, 
162.
'*^. Robert W. Kerwin, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik: 1933-1950," trans. 
Nevin Coşar, in Türkiye'de Devletçilik (Etatism in Turkey), ed. Nevin 
Coşar (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1995), 107-8.
'*'*. Birtek, "The Rise and Fail of Etatism in Turkey," 429; Hershlag, 
Turkey: The Challenge of Growth, 137.
'*^. Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party 
System (Princeton and New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1959), 
295ff; Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey," 429-34.
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sector, outside the agricultural sphere. On the other 
hand, apart from the liberal features of this program 
with respect to the urban capital, a significant social 
basis which led the DP to power were found in the big 
landowners.'*'^  This disposition was also supported by the 
initial opposition of the founders of the party 
specifically to the Draft Law on Land which proposed the 
redistribution of state-owned land and land cultivated 
through share-cropping to the poor peasants.'** By this 
opposition, which may be considered as the first step 
towards the formation of the party, the tendency to act 
in line with the interests of landowners had already been 
displayed.'*^ On the other hand, the DP was more inclined 
to actively oppose the party in power for the sake of 
opposing, which for Karpat was the common tenet of the 
Turkish political system.^® Publications of the party 
clearly showed this tendency on its part, and fell short 
of providing clear viewpoints on different issues 
sufficient to associate the party with a distinctive 
political identity, neither liberal nor some other
'*^. Birtek, "The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey," 429-34; Keyder, 
"The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," in Turkey in 
Transition, eds. Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 40-1.
Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," 40; Birtek, 
"The Rise and Fall of Etatism in Turkey," 435; Karpat, "Structural 
Change, Historical Stages of Modernization, and the Role of Social 
Groups in Turkish Politics," in Social Change and Politics in Turkey: 
A Structural-Historical Analysis, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1973), 58; Leslie L. Roos, Jr. and Noralou P. Roos, Managers
of Modernization: Organizations and Elites in Turkey (1950-1969)
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 45.
'**. Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," 38.
Ibid., Çavdar, Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi, 385-8.
Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 391-2, 410-1.
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ideological stance.^^ This ambiguity was further 
reinforced by the rejection of class differences by the 
DP and its "resolve" to act in the name of the Turkish 
nation as a whole.
THE DP ON THE EDGE OF A NEW INTELLECTUAL CROSS­
FERTILIZATION
Karpat has argued that"...the Republican regime was 
theoretically (emphasis added) inspired by the liberal 
and individualistic ideas of the French Revolution. 
However, such an inspiration was more salient with 
respect to intellectuals rather than politicians.^'* In 
fact, the state tradition in Turkey matched more the 
dominant Continental European conception of the state - 
i.e., the idea of the omnipotence of the state in
political life. This was most observable in reform 
measures.
The DP experience is also significant in this 
respect. Apart from the success of the party at the 
opposition with respect to the transition to a two-party 
regime, the era which is marked by its active opposition 
witnessed the beginning of a shift in political and 
intellectual cross-fertilization from Continental Europe 
to the Anglo-American world. First, this was manifest in 
the conception of democracy. The founders of the party 
solemnly announced their view about communism as the
5*. Ibid., 410.
52. Ibid., 414.
53. Ibid., 137.
54. Ibid.
188
antithesis of democracy. They acknowledged the imperative 
of alliance with Western, particularly with the Anglo- 
American world, which for them formed the best model for 
the practise of real (emphasis added) democracy and as 
the only escape gate from the communist threat : "Policy
which is presented as 'national' or 'independent,'
...means distancing (the country) from the democratic 
world. However, this would only ensure our country's 
placement in the midst of the Communist bloc."^^ The party 
explained such a disposition on the basis of 
international conditions following the Second World War: 
"Fascist governments had disappeared... Germany lost its 
status as a military power, ... and the boundaries of the 
Iron Curtain expanded through Europe. In this respect, it 
is no longer possible to talk about a European balance 
around which diplomatic activities with their positive 
and negative aspects are established."^^ On the other 
hand, adherence to the Anglo-American model at times 
reached to the unrealistic extent of trying to bring 
about a similarity between the Turkish case and the 
Anglo-American model and ignoring the actual political 
characteristics of the countries concerned : "It is not
Adnan Menderes, Speech in İzmir, on August 27, 1948, quoted in
Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, Makaleleri, Demeçleri (Aralık 1933- 
Mart 1950) (Speeches, Articles, Statements of Adnan Menderes 
[December 1933-March 1950]), ed. Haluk Kılçık (Ankara: Demokratlar
Kulübü Yayınları, 1991), vol.l, 316. The same line of thought was 
also expressed by Celal Bayar in the Second Congress of the party: 
"After the last world war the world was divided into two blocs. One 
is the democratic bloc, the other is Soviet bloc. The DP, taking the 
Constitution of the United Nations as essential, has considered the 
Anglo-Saxon bloc and hence the democratic world and fomad it to be 
advantegous to ally with it." Quoted in Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi 
Partiler, 682.
Ibid., 315.
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possible for the class issue to occur in our country. We 
resemble Anglo-Americans,... I sincerely believe that 
democracy in this country will also resemble democracy in 
the Anglo-American world... There are no such things as 
capital or capitalist in Turkey. ...The only problem is 
that we are at the lowest level with respect to living 
standards.
The new conception of democracy also contained a 
different approach towards the relationship between the 
state and people. The DP acknowledged its faith in the 
consciousness of the people, thus reversing the early- 
Republican tradition of perceiving the people as not 
mature enough to make sound decisions about what was best 
for the nation.-5* As a matter of fact, what the members of 
the party termed as the distrust of the state to its 
people formed one of the major points of criticisms 
directed against the RPP:
We face serious problems. What is the source of 
these problems? The mono-party mentality which has 
not been eliminated till now. Either overtly or 
covertly, this mentality argues that (our) nation 
is not mature enough. There has been emphasis on 
order and security as if the citizens, having their 
basic rights and freedoms would lead to disorder 
and chaos. They think that in this country there is 
nobody other than themselves who is mature enough, 
who can comprehend the reality, and who is
Fuad Köprülü, Cumhuriyet, October 9, 1946, quoted in Erogul,
Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, 60.
"...They (the Repiiblicans) say that citizens and Turkish nation 
will be educated by the intellectuals and only by this way they will 
practise freedom. ...It is of no doubt that this mentality is based 
on the aim to institutionalize tutelage over the country and nation." 
Adnan Menderes, Speech in Kütahya Democratic Party Provincial 
Congress, December 25, 1949, quoted in Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, 
Demeçleri, Makaleleri, vol. 1, 396.
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competent to use his/her rights... and (they) 
perceive themselves as authorized by faith to rule 
the nation.
The pro-Anglo-American disposition of the DP was 
• also displayed by the daily, Vatan, which was closely 
associated with the party from its foundation onwards.^® 
The daily had already been infamous with its opposition 
to the mono-party rule of the RPP. It began its 
publication on March 26, 1923, and experienced subsequent 
bans throughout the mono-party period.The significance 
of the daily was due to its owner and editorial writer, 
Ahmet Emin Yalman, (1888-1973) who had been a well-known 
adherent of the Anglo-American world. He also actively 
took part in the formation of the DP.^  ^ Yalman identified 
himself as a liberal.He participated in the Union of 
World Liberals and was active in the formation of the 
Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas {Hür
Celal Bayar, Speech in İzmir (July 15, 1946), qouted in Celal
Bay ar Diyor Kl, 122.
During the years of opposition prominent members of the DP 
published articles in Vatan. In this respect see, Statement by Adnan 
Menderes on the occasion of his and Fuad Köprülü*s being dispelled 
from the RPP due to the Proposal of the Four: Vatan, September 22,
1945; Statement by Menderes, Vatan, April 1, 1946; "Teessür Verici
Bir Manzara” (A Regretful Panorama) , Vatan, May 19, 1946; "Demokrat
Partinin En Bariz Vasfı” (The Most Obvious Quality of Democratic 
Party) Vatan, May 23, 1946; "Ulus Gazetesi *ndeki Bir Cevap
Münasebetiyle” (On the Occasion of a Response in Ulus Daily) Vatan, 
June 22, 1946; "İdareciler Kongresi Dolayısıyla” (On Account of
Administrators* Congress) Vatan, January 25, 1947; Menderes, "Açık
Konuşma Zarureti” (Obligation to Speak Clearly) Vatan, January 28, 
1947; Vatan, November 2, 1949.
The longest ban was experienced beginning by August 28, 1925, due 
to the support the daily gave to the Progressive Republican Party. 
This ban was applied for an indefinite period of time, and the daily 
started its publication only as late as 1935. It was banned on 
September 30, 1940 again for an indefinite period of time.
63. Ibid., 109-11.
Yalman, Yakj.n Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim: (1944-1971)
My Recent Observations and Experiences: (1944-1971), IV, 32ff.
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Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti), which was planned to be the 
branch of the Union in Turkey.
Evolution from Hesitant Opposition to a Political 
Identity
A chronological categorization of Yalman's articles 
can help one to observe the evolution of the main themes 
of the political agenda between 1923 and 1950. In this 
respect, one can clarify three periods of significance: 
1923-1939, 1939-1945, and 1945-1950. This periodization 
also connotes the path of evolution in the life-span of 
Vatan.
The period between 1923-1939 proved to be the years 
when the basic themes around which the daily formulated 
its opposing stance were solidified. The arguments in the 
articles by Yalman in this period matched the political 
spirit of the era. Not different from the initial motive 
in the formation of the opposition parties to realize 
democracy — the articles published in Vatan had faith in 
the Turkish revolution and Republican regime and, at the 
same time, noted the obstacles in the pursuit of this 
i d e a l . F o r  Yalman the most serious threat to the 
realization of democracy laid in the mono-party regime. 
Yalman continuously pointed at the potential for 
absolutism, which for him was inherent in the nature of
Ibid., 109-12. On the Association for the Dissemination of Free 
Ideas see Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 294-5.
Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, vol. III, 81-
4.
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the mono-party rule.^^ He emphasized the high propensity 
of such a potential in the RPP due to the political 
identity of the head of the state as also the party 
leader.He perceived the centralized and "tutelary" rule 
in the party as the main barrier in the path towards the 
ideal of democracy.^* He further accused the party of 
being no more than a collection of numbers, thus 
incapacitated to lead the path of progress initiated by 
the Turkish Revolution.^^
A little after the death of Atatürk (1938) İsmet 
İnönü was given the titles of National Leader (Milli Şef) 
and Permanent Chairman of the Party (Partinin Değişmez 
Başkanı), simultaneously, by the RPP. Thus, between 1939- 
1945, the domestic political scene continued to provide 
appropriate ground for the same points of critisms. 
However, in this period an additional theme began to 
dominate the writings of Yalman. Especially, throughout 
the early-1940s, articles were published subsequently in 
Vatan, which mainly dwelled upon the concepts of the 
nation and history and the practise of tradition. This 
does not stand out as an exception when the war time 
conjuncture is taken into account. The period was marked 
by the rise of extreme nationalistic trends in 
Continental Europe. In the domestic site the fluctuating
Yalman, "Gazi Paşa Hazretlerine Maruzat" (Appeal to Gazhi Pasha), 
Vatan, October 5, 1923.
Yalman, "Bazı Esaslı Noktalar" (Some Essential Points), Vatan, 
September 27, 1923.
Yalman, "En Esaslı Mesele" (The Most Essential Issue) , Vatan, 
January 8, 1925.
Yalman, "Gazi Paşa Hazretlerine Maruzat"; Yakın Tarihte 
Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, vol. III, 90.
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policy of the RPP government towards Germany was also an 
issue. Coupled with the demands of the extreme 
nationalists for forming an alliance with Nazi Germany,™ 
such a rather ambiguous milieu led to intensification on 
the part of the intellectuals to address the themes of 
nation, nationalism, history, and tradition,·^ * Thus, the 
concern with these themes was not reserved to the 
articles of Yalman. The period was also remarkable 
because of intensifying search to provide an ideological 
basis of the Turkish Revolution. It witnessed the 
formation of intellectual circles which provided the 
exegesis of the Revolution and the basis of Turkish 
nation.'^  ^ In this respect, the emphasis on nation and 
nationalism can also be interpreted as a means to point 
out the distinctiveness of the Turkish nation and 
nationalism from the extreme nationalistic trends in 
Continental Europe.
Yalman emphasized the significance of history for 
the nation:
™. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 262ff; Mete Tunçay, "Türkiye
Cumhuriyeti'nde Siyasal Düşünce Akımları" (Trends of Political 
Thought in Turkish Republic), Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye
Ansiklopedisi, vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1982-1985),
1927; Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, "The Ultranationalist Right," in Turkey 
İn Transition: New Perspectives, Irvin Cemil Schick and E. Ahmet
Tonak eds., 2nd ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987), 177-217.
. For an analysis of the intellectual climate of the Turkish 
republic in the concerned period see Celal Nazim İrem, "Kemalist 
Modernism and the Genesis of Modern Turkish Conservatism" (Ph.D. 
Dissertation. Bilkent University. 1996).
İrem notes the formation of an intellectual circle by Mustafa 
Şekip Tunç, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Peyami Safa, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, 
gathered around a number of journals, focusing mainly on revealing 
the Turkish man and traits of the Turkish nation. Ahmet Ağaoğlu also 
happened to stand on the edge of this circle.
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Nation, which is a social entity cannot be 
something that has come into existence in five or 
ten years. What mold a nation are the memories, 
shared sentiments and thoughts accumulated in 
political and geographical unity throughout the 
ages. Nation arises out of traditions ...which have 
been rooted in history. By tradition we mean the 
whole cultural life including custom and usage.
Thus pointing at the impossibility for a nation to cut
its ties with the past, Yalman noted the total rejection
of the Ottoman past as a shortcoming resulting in social
gaps, especially between the ruled and the r u l e r . H e
basically criticized the perception of the past as
"...the embodiment of the Eastern culture and a barrier
against Western culture. Instead, he proposed the
utilization of Western methods of analysis in
comprehending and internalizing the authentic elements of
the past.·^  ^ For Yalman everything belonging to the past
should be scrutinized by Western spectacles in order to
reach a proper understanding of Turkish nation. He stood
against attempts which aimed at a radical Turkification
of language in use, which for him was one of the
fundamental constituents of a nation. He opposed the
exclusion of words of Arabic or Persian origin which have
daily u s a g e . H e  stressed the capacity of a society
"...to represent and absorb foreign substance in its
"^5. Yalman, "Bizi Maziye Bağlayan Köprüler" (Links that Tie Us to the 
Past), Vatan, October 9, 1940.
Ibid.; "Kendi Kendimize Kavuşmak İhtiyacı" (The Need to Turn to 
Ourselves), Vatan, November 19, 1941.
Yalman, "Bizi Maziye Bağlayan Köprüler."
"^6. Ibid.
"Dilde İstikrar ve Birlik" (Stability and Unity in Language), 
Vatan, August 10, 1942.
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structure,." as "...an indicator of awareness...""^* The 
basis of such a disposition can be found in Gokalp's 
conceptualization of language, which he perceived as the 
main obstacle against the extremist potential of 
nationalistic trends:
Each and every word to which we are accustomed and 
which we use belongs to us, We do not consider the 
claim of the right of any foreign language on these 
words. However we cannot tolerate the capitulation 
of rules of foreign languages in our language. We 
act in accordance with the rules of our own 
language
Such a standing can be interpreted as a 
manifestation of the importance given to tradition. 
Yalman valued upholding of tradition as a display of the 
culture of nation. For him religion was part of one's 
tradition. Islam should not be perceived as a remnant of 
the past, but rather as a requisite for the preservation 
of order. He opposed "...the replacement of social 
gaps..." that have developed out of arbitrary 
westernization "...by dogmatized modernization."*' More 
briefly, Yalman's criticism was basically directed 
against the total rejection of religion, not only as a 
means of avoiding its usurpation for political aims, but 
also to the extent of excluding it from the social life.*^ 
In fact, Yalman's approach to the role of religion in the 
life of individual and in society contained the hints of
"Yarım ve Tam Vatandaşlık" (Half and Full Citizenship), Vatan,
November 20, 1941.
"Dilde İstikrar ve Birlik.”
”Din ve İnkılap” (Religion and Revolution) , Vatan, November 22, 
1941.
. "Kendi Kendimize Kavuşmak İhtiyacı.”
"Bir Tecrübenin Neticeleri” (The Consequences of an Experience), 
Vatan, November 25, 1941.
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the political identity with which he accorded himself, 
especially after 1945. Yalman referred to reason as the 
sine qua non for the preservation of moral bonds in 
society.On the other hand, he also stressed faith as an 
exigency for the preservation of moral values and "...the 
order which depends on these moral values."*'* In this 
respect, he perceived Islam as the ideal religion which 
"does not accept any medium between the individual and 
God. It denounces any kind of priesthood and presents 
full trust on the conscience of individual. "*3 in the 
period of transition to multi-party regime he would find 
the DP supportive of his ideas, since the the party had 
the same perception towards religion.*^
The significance of the post-1945 period lay in the 
evolution of the hesitant opposition of Yalman, which had 
been shaped in his articles in Vatan, into a political 
stance which he named liberal.*'^  At the time DP was 
founded, the consistency in the themes of criticisms 
against the RPP which he based on the aspiration for 
democracy were integrated with an institutionalized 
political standing. As mentioned above Yalman took an 
active role during the formation of the DP. He noted:
83. "Din Bahsinde Vardığımız Neticeler" (Results Concerning the Issue 
of Religion), Vatan, December 4, 1941.
84. Ibid.
8^ . Yalman, "ideal Din Sistemi: Diğerlerine Üstünlüğün Esaslı
Sebepleri" (Ideal System of Religion: The Fundamental Reasons of
Superiority), Vatan (November 27, 1941); See also Vatan, August 7, 8, 
1948.
8^ . "Din, milliyetçilik bahsinde Bayar'ın konuşması" (Bayar's Speech 
on Nationalism), Vatan, January 9, 1945; "Celal Bayar Ankara'da
konuştu" (Bayar Speaks in Ankara), Vatan, April 25, 1949.
8’^. Yalman, Yakın Tarihte, Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim (1945-1971),
vol.IV, 112-3.
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"Vatan has eventually become a unified bloc of struggle 
with those who submitted the Proposal of the Four. Thus I 
have become the fifth to the four and remained as such 
for years.
Yalman's faith in the DP can be found in his
perception of opposition as an exigency in the path
towards the realization of democracy. This can be
observed in his articles published during the initial 
stages of the rise of an opposing group from within the 
RPP: "When the Second World War ended with the victory of
democracy, such an initiative stemming out from within 
the party in power acts as a saviour for the party
itself.
As far as the raison d ’être of opposition was
concerned, Yalman's approach did not present a radical 
deviation from the traditional conception of opposition 
in the early Republican era. The continuity can be found 
in Yalman's rejection of the existence of classes in
Turkey. He criticized the tendency to model the
formation of a party in opposition on a class basis. 
Distinguishing between Western and Eastern type of 
democracy, Yalman classified the Turkish political system
In his memoirs, Yalman talks of himself as the godfather of the 
DP; Ibid., 38,43.
Yalman, "Politikada Tesanüt İmtihanı" (Trial of Solidarity in 
Politics), Vatan, October 4, 1945.
Yalman, "Tam ve Hakiki Demokrasiye Giden Yol" (The Road to Full 
and True Democracy), Vatan, December 24, 1940.
Yalman, "Parti Sistemi Demokrasinin Temeli Değil Hatalı 
Tarafıdır" (Party System is not the Base of Democracy, but its 
Misdemeanour), Vatan, December 31, 1941.
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in the most developed category of the f o r m e r . For him 
Turkey originally ensured itself an advantegous position 
in the path towards the ideal type of democracy due to 
"...the rootlessness of class and group interests in our 
country. Thus, he emphasized that the party in 
opposition should represent the interest of the nation as 
a whole and act in a constructive manner by providing a 
control mechanism against the party in power on behalf of 
the nation.In this respect, it is possible to observe 
the same perception of democracy as in the early 
Republican era, as a debating ground for the good of 
nation. However, the nuance that provided Yalman with an 
opposing standing to the RPP and confirmed his
identification with the DP, lies in his perception of the 
people as mature enough to decide about what is best for 
the country.In fact, for Yalman the basis of the 
mentality of the rule of the RPP was founded on a total 
distrust in the people.In this respect, he referred to
Yalman, "Sağlam Bünyenin Manası ve Kıymeti” (The Meaning and 
Value of Healthy Structure), Vatan, November 1, 1945.
Yalman, ”Tam ve Hakiki Demokrasiye Giden Yol.”
Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, vol.IV, pp. 
32-33; ”Yeni Parti Kurulurken” (While the New Party is Founded) 
Vatan, December 3, 1945; "Demokrat Partinin Mesuliyetleri” (The
Responsibilities of Democratic Party), Vatan, December 10, 1945.
. Yalman, "İkinci Parti Herşeye Deva mı?” (Is the Second Party the 
Remedy to all Troubles?), Vatan, July 24, 1945; "İdare Edenler ve
Edilenler” (The Governors and Governed), Vatan, August 2, 1945.
Yalman, "Тек Partili Sistemin Neticeleri” (The Consequences of 
Single Party System), Vatan, July 20, 1945. Yalman interpreted the
mentality of the RPP as follows : "There are basically two groups in 
the world: Rulers and the ruled. If the ruled ...do not comprehend 
what they want, cannot find the truth and if they are left free, they 
might fall into an error of ... not electing us. In order to avoid 
this they need to be kept under strict discipline by intelligent men. 
Those are us. The rest is nonsense ...we need a disciplined order. 
...a second right of election should only be initated by the party 
and not on the demand of the people...” "Geniş Ufuklara Doğru” 
(Towards Wide Horizons), Vatan, September 19, 1945.
199
the political parties as mere mechanisms for the practise 
of democracy: "It is imperative that (we) should get rid 
of mono-party mentality and practise freedom of thought 
and discussion. However, a second or third party is only 
an instrument in this respect, and not an aim."^ ·^
For Yalman the DP represented the nation's 
aspirations. He viewed the new party as the appropriate 
actor which "...will represent the criticisms and 
opposition in the country which were ignored, and direct 
them to the legal sphere."^* Apart from the shared 
perception of democracy and criticism against the mono­
party rule, articles by Yalman on particular policies 
concerning especially the administrative and economic 
spheres also echoed the declarations made by the party 
members. To begin with, both opposed the extreme 
centralization at the governmental and local level. 
Yalman admitted the requisite of centralization for 
determining basic principles However, he pointed at the 
deficiency of extreme centralization in government which 
resulted in "tutelage which prevents checks and balances 
to go beyond formality, " and "the mechanism to free 
itself from the position of inefficient bureaucratic 
mechanism. He expressed the same view concerning the 
local government, too:
Yalman, "İkinci Parti Herşeye Deva mı?"
Yalman, "Huzur ve Ferahlık Yolu" (The Road of Peace and Relief), 
Vatan, November 22, 1945.
. Yalman, "On Ana Prensip" (Ten Fıondamental Principles), Vatan, 
August 1, 1942.
Yalman, "Fiili Halk Murakabesi" (Active Check by the People) , 
Vatan, October 28, 1941. Yalman pointed at the potential of abuse of
power in tutelary rule. According to him "...the mono-party rule.
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The greatest hindrance to local development in the 
country is neither insufficient finance nor lack of 
means; it is solely the tutelary claim of the 
center....One cannot criticize this tutelage if it 
serves to prevent wrong doings and to provide 
technical specialization which the local 
administrations cannot fulfil....Local
administrations should be set free, and provided 
with the opportunity of consulting with technical 
committees in certain ministries.
Apart from the political and administrative spheres, 
Yalman also noted his opposition to centralized rule with 
respect to economic policies. Like the declarations of 
the DP members both before the formation of the party and 
during the time the party was in opposition, Yalman 
pointed at the inadequacy of etatism to meet the 
requirements of the country: "An experiment was made with 
etatism during the war....The results of the experience 
in common confirms that (etatism) works against common 
interest and the principle of economic efficieny. 
Yalman based his criticisms against etatism also on the 
incompatibility of this principle with the principle of 
populism. In line with the attempts from different
circles, including the RPP itself, in an endeavor to 
reinterpret etatism, he argued that etatism could only be
despite all the goodwill, could not fulfil its responsibility of 
acting as the safeguard of common interest. Due to inefficient 
functioning of the mechanism of checks and balances, private 
interests found the grounds of surpassing common and shared 
interest." "Тек Partili Sistemin Neticeleri." On this issue see also 
"Devlet Otoritesi" (State Authority), Vatan, December 8, 1945;
"Nazari Mantığın Fendleri" ( Vatan, July 23, 1945.
"Demokrasi Müphem Bir Mefh\jm mu?" (Is Democracy an Ambiguous 
Concept?), Vatan, August 29, 1945.
Yalman, "Devletçilik ve Halk" (Etatism and People), Vatan, 
September 4, 1945.
Ibid.
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accepted "...as a means if and only if it is required by 
general interest, and not as an aim."i®'* In this respect,
The state is the guardian of the common interest.
If this interest requires, the state engages in 
certain tasks. But, its principal responsibility is 
to avoid falling into idee fixe....the opportunity 
to private initiative is entrusted to the citizens 
on the condition of acting within the limits 
determined by the common interest. The state takes 
action against the usurpers of this trust....Apart 
from this, the state acts as an institution of 
control at times when citizens who engage in 
initiative in a certain sphere fall short of 
forming an institution which would provide 
regulation, ...(The state) functions as a guide, 
gives support in order to achieve efficiency, and 
fulfil common interest.
Yalman construed etatist policies under the rule of the 
RPP as "...an arbitrary practise putting the people in 
the condition of a means, and taking the state and 
bureaucracy as the principal beneficiaries..." which 
resulted in "a state which does not serve, but 
dominates. Not differently from what the DP had
proposed, he argued that the state and private initiative 
should cooperate in a milieu whereby the ideal sphere of 
function for the former is determined by the competency 
of the latter.
’04. Ibid.
’05. Ibid.
’06. Ibid.
’07. Yalman, "On Ana Prensip.'
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Shortcomings of a Liberal Circle: Immaturity or Past
Legacy?
As mentioned above, the political identity of Yalman 
was not reserved to his articles and to the support he 
gave to the DP both in its formation and when the party 
was in opposition. Yalman also participated in 
international initiatives, such as the reappraisal of 
liberalism in the aftermath of the Second World War. In 
fact his self-proclaimed liberal identity was manifested 
more clearly in such cases. He took part in the first 
meeting of the Union of World Liberals (April 9-14, 
1945). The meeting was basically an attempt to reinforce 
liberal standing vis-a-vis communism. The first step 
here was the preparation of a liberal manifesto. Besides 
its anti-leftist standing which matched the dominant 
spirit in Turkey, the significance of the meeting with 
respect to Turkey was the foundation of Association for 
the Dissemination of Free Ideas, which was planned to 
function as the National Committee of the union in 
Turkey.^'® Thus, the Association based its liberal standing 
on the grounds of an adherence to Western liberal 
democracies and a condemnation of "rightist and leftist 
totalitarianism."*” Its liberal disposition was expressed
108. Yalman, Yakın Tarihte^ Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, vol. IV,
111.
>05. Ibid.
>*0. Ibid., 112.
>>>. "Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti Beyannamesi" (The Declaration of 
the Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas), in Hür 
Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti'nln Beyanname ve Esas Nizamnamesi
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in its emphasis on the individual in relation to the 
state. In Article 1 of the bylaws of the Association, the 
individual was conceptualized as "...possessing reason 
and the power of will, capable to distinguish between the 
good and evil and thus to take on the responsibility for 
his own acts..."”2 Furthermore the Association grounded 
the legitimacy of the state on the consent of the 
individual, the basic function of which was defined as 
service to the individual. (Article The boundaries of 
the state were set with respect to the basic rights and 
liberties of the individual. Accordingly, the 
Association put special emphasis on economic freedom as a 
prerequisite for political freedom.
Karpat has argued that this rhetoric fit well into 
the classical theory of natural rights."^ However, this 
inspiration from the classical theory of natural rights""^  
was built into the wider framework of nation whereby the 
priority of the individual was substituted by the 
citizen, and of freedom by duty:
(Declaration and Regulation of he Association for the Dissemination 
of Free Ideas) (Istanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1949), 2.
"2. Ibid. 5.
Ibid.
In Article 8 the rights and liberties were defined as: 
"individual liberty guaranteed by the legal independence of 
administrative and judicial organs; freedom of conscience; freedom of 
expression; freedom of association; freedom of occupation; right to 
get education; right of individual initiative; ... " Ibid., 5-6.
"Absence of economic freedom or arbitrary deterrence of freedom 
of initiative not only obscures political freedom but is also among 
the main resons behind economic poverty." (Article 10). Ibid., 6.
Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 294.
The prevalance of classical theory of natural rights is also 
observable in the publications of the Association. In this respect, 
see Ali Fuad Başgil, Cihan Sulhu ve İnsan Hakları (World Peace and 
Human Rights) (Istanbul: Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti Neşriyatı No.6, 
Tan Matbaası, 1948).
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The inevitable cost of freedom is service. To each 
right correspons a duty. For obtaining the expected 
results from individual freedom and free 
institutions each citizen should bear a sense of 
moral responsibility for the other human beings, 
respect the honor and dignity of humanity in the 
person of the citizen and be closely involved in 
social affairs and actively engage in social 
activities.
Above all, the attempt to initiate a liberal circle 
in Turkey proved to be insignificant. This can be 
attributed to ambiguity as far as the conceptual 
framework is concerned. The best example can be found in 
the writings of Yalman. Pointing at the difficulty of 
defining liberalism, Yalman stated the main aim in 
liberalism as "...avoiding serfdom under anyone and 
anything, standing up against fear, fanaticism and 
extremism,... expressing the truth f r e e l y . such a 
literal characterization gained more clarification in his 
recourse to the liberal ideology as "...aiming to defend 
the rights and liberties of the individual vis-a-vis the 
totalitarian regimes which conceive the state as 
fundamental and the citizens as its subjects... "*^0 
However, Yalman's conceptual matrix fell short of 
providing sufficient ground for a solid liberal 
theoretical framework.
To begin with, in his writings the fundamental 
category was the citizen rather than the individual. His 
excessive emphasis on common interest, rather than on the
"Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti Beyannamesi," 6.
Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, vol.IV, 110. 
120. Ibid., 113.
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interest of the individual further deepened the mentioned 
ambiguity. In fact, as noted above Yalman's faith was not 
specifically on the individual, but on the nation which 
for him had reached the sufficient level of maturity to 
freely participate in the ruling process.Furthermore, 
his approach to freedom was not formulated around the 
general conception of liberty as a natural possession of 
the individual, but as a means for the attainment of 
order: "at a time when external threat and the struggle
to make a living exist simultaneously, both the
governments and citizens should be careful in practising 
freedom of expression.... The natural imperative of 
freedom is to practise it virtually and for the right 
purpose. Additionally, the main concern in his writings 
revolved around the mechanism of control. First, he 
directed his criticisms against the mono-party rule of 
the RPP on the basis of lack of checks and balances in 
the political system. Second, he proposed alternative 
control mechanisms in the society in the form of 
associations which would take over the function of the 
state.
The emphasis on the associations was more prevalent 
with respect to the economic sphere.According to 
Yalman, the extent of state control in the society and *
'^ ’.Yalman, "İkinci Parti Herşeye Deva mı?"
*22. Yalman, "Söz Hürriyetine Dair" (On the Issue of Freedom of 
Expression), Vatan, April 14, 1942.
Yalman, "Fiili Halk Murakabesi."
’24. Yalman, "Yılanlar Kımıldarken" (While the Snakes are Moving), 
Vatan, August 12, 1942.
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economy was a reflection of distrust in the people 
Yalman's standing in this respect may be summarized as 
the restriction of state's dominance in the political and 
economic spheres to the extent possible. He opposed the 
"unrestricted" perception of "freedom which depends on 
the 'laissez faire' mentality. Instead he proposed;
that flow of freedom which provides specialization, 
control and cooperation in the name of common 
interest, and aims at achieving minimum level of 
employment, health, and knowledge for each and every 
citizen, delivers various kinds of social insurance, 
and tries to find solutions to social problems via 
scrutiny and discussion.
In the economic sphere this meant that the boundaries of 
state action would be determined not by the autonomous 
working of the market, but by the competency of the 
associations formed on the basis of occupation. In the 
political sphere, it turned out to be adherence both to 
the participation of people in the ruling process through 
elections under a multi-party regime, and afterwards as 
the main holders of control to-be-represented in the 
national assembly by the opposition parties.
In fact, in the approach to the role of state which 
accorded the state responsibility rather than authority 
in sustaining the welfare of the citizens, a somewhat
In one of his articles Yalman interpreted the mentality of the 
RPP as follows : "...association in this respect is detrimental... In 
the country there should be no political, economic, social 
associations other than that of the RPP. The citizen should stand 
individually vis-à-vis the associations and powers which belong to 
the rulers. "İdare Edenler ve Edilenler" (The Governors and Governed) 
Vatan, August 3, 1945.
Yalman, "İktisadi Siyasetin Temelleri" (The Foundations of 
Political Economy), Vatan, December 21, 1945.
'27. Ibid.
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rough resemblance to the nineteenth century neo­
liberalism can be ob served . 2^8 ^ 3  ^3 emphasis on common 
interest rather than on individual interest and the 
admission of the intervention of the state in the economy 
are concerned, this resemblance gains credit. However, 
the point may be challenged when the by-laws of the 
Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas on 
classical theory of natural rights are taken into 
account. All in all, this panorama supports the argument 
about the ambiguity of what liberal disposition basically 
stood for and its inadequacy to provide a solid liberal 
theoretical pattern. Despite the risk of falling into 
cynicism; since the period was one when the classical 
liberal conceptualizations had already been re-evaluated 
in the homeland of the theory, such a shortcoming may be
Here, the term neo-liberalism refers to a combination of the 
conceptualizations provided by nineteenth century British Idealists 
and subsequently by the British Pluralists which were synthesized 
within the welfare state package of Keynesian policies. Levent Köker 
has summarized the basic features of this disposition as the 
transposition from the atomistic conception of society, the Lockean 
theory of natural rights, the negative conception of freedom into an 
appraisal of common interest, rejection of attributing an a priori 
existence to the individual vis-à-vis the society and the positive 
conception of freedom which gave priority to the concept of "freedom 
to..." over that of "freedom from..." Levent Köker, Demokrasi Üzerine 
Yazılar (Essays on Democracy) (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 
1992), 44-9. In his analysis of the late nineteenth and early
twentienth century British thought Kenneth H.F. Dyson has also 
pointed at this transposition. Interpreting the diversities and 
connections between the British Idealists and Pluralists, Dyson has 
provided a schema of Continental European cross-fertilization into 
the Anglo-American world which swept away the excessive emphasis on 
the "individual" of the classical liberal theory. Kenneth H.F. Dyson, 
The State Tradition In Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and
Institution (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), 191-6.
Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 294-5.
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linked to the traditional unease that the Ottoman-Turkish 
intellectual has been grappling withJ^®
THE DP RULE (1950-1960): DISSOLUTION OF THE LIBERAL
RHETORIC
It was such a conceptual framework that constituted 
the base of Yalman's faith in the DP. While the DP was in 
opposition this was strengtehened by the overlap of the 
points which were emphasized in party declarations and 
the main themes in Yalman's articles. In the aftermath of 
the 1950 elections, when the party came to power, such an 
empathy seemed to promise a long-lasting character. 
Participation of the DP delegates in the Congress of 
Union of World Liberals in Stuttgart (1950) led Yalman to 
interpret such an initiative as the self-identification 
of the party as liberal. The enactment of a liberal 
press law in July 1950 further supported Yalman's 
assumption.Apart from that, the relative success of the 
DP government in the betterment of the economy in the 
early 1950si^  ^seemed to represent the transmission of the 
liberal rhetoric of the opposition years to actual 
political, social and economic policies.
yalman's enthusiastic applause of 1960 military intervention, 
which does not comply with a liberal standing is a manifestation of 
such an unease. Yalman, Yakın Tarihte, Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, 
vol.IV, 361.
Ibid., 112.
•32. Eroğul, "The Establishment of Multi-Party Rule," 108.
•33. Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy," 42. Boratav 
has argued that the basis of this positive panorama had in fact been 
laid by the attempts towards liberalization which were initiated in 
1946. Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi," 311-9.
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However, what actually took place moved in the 
opposite direction. Through time the DP rule resorted to 
policies which were in total contrast to its liberal 
acclamations of the prerequisites of democracy. Beginning 
with 1954, the liberal identity of the DP in the economic 
sphere was replaced by restrictive policies in foreign 
trade and an arbitrary decision making in domestic 
economy, which in the end resulted in regression towards 
dependence on the s t a t e . I n  the political sphere, this 
reversion from the original disposition of the party was 
manifested by intolerance towards the opposition, which 
gradually evolved into hostility. This reversion was at 
times reflected in the perception of opposition as 
"enemy. Not differently, the relations between the 
party and Yalman, which displayed a fluctuating path 
during the 1950-1954 period, deteriorated after 1954.^^6
Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy,” 44-5; 
Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi," 319-25.
Such a hostile and suscpicious perception of the opposition was 
manifest in various speeches of the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. 
” We see that . . . all those whose enmity to us is beyond suspicion 
are attacking us.” Menderes, Speech in DP Parliamentary Group, July 
16, 1953, quoted in Kılçık, Adnan Menderessin Konuşmalara^ Demeçleri^ 
Makaleleri (Temmuz 1953-Nlsan 1954) (Speeches ^ Statements ^ Articles 
of Adnan Menderes (July 1953-Aprll 1954), vol. IV, 34. On the other 
hand, as far as the RPP was concerned the government was content that 
it showed tolerance to the extent possible : "As a party which held 
the 1946 elections under such a restraint . . . which utilized the 
bureaucracy as a whole in order to prevent the foundation of our 
party, they should expect nothing but survival and parliamentary 
function .... Even their existence is a result of tolerance.” Ibid., 
40.
Yalman has remarked that during the first four years of the DP 
rule Menderes maintained cooperation with a group of selected 
journalists. He has linked the fluctuations to the hostility of some 
DP members against the opposition. Yalman, Yakın Tarihte,· Gördüklerim 
ve Geçirdiklerim, vol. IV, 225-301. The deterioration was first 
manifested in the words of Menderes: "Elections displayed the support 
of the citiziens to (the DP government) . Till now, I have considered 
to consult to the journalists. Now, the enthusiastic trust of the
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The roots of such a shift lies in the proclamation 
of the DP to be representing the national will. This 
formulation contained an authoritarian conception of 
power, which was gradually resorted to after the party 
came to power. The mentality of deciding and acting on 
behalf of the nation as a right thought to be accrued by 
the victory in the general elections, led to a severing 
in both the discourse of the party with the opposition 
and the policies it adopted in social, economic and 
political spheres. This was in total contrast to its 
preceding 'liberal' opposition. In this respect, 1954 can 
be taken as the year when the DP government totally broke 
its ties with liberalism and began to enact laws to curb 
the opposition.These laws first aimed at putting the 
bureaucracy under the control of the party, and thus 
curtailing any potential for opposition from within the 
government. The second target was opposition from the 
society. In this respect, the most affected circles were 
the press, and the universities. In fact, university
people implies that I do not need such a consultation (any more) . I 
will make the final decision on my own." Quoted in ibid., 317.
Examplary are the amendments to the Press Law (1954), Kırşehir 
Law (June 30, 1954), "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Emekli Sandığı Kanununun
Bazı Maddelerinin Değiştirilmesine Dair Kanun" (Law Concerning the 
Amendment of Some Articles of the Retirement Fund Law) (June 21, 
1954) and "Bağlı Bulundukları Teşkilat Emrine Alınmak Suretiyle 
Vazifeden Uzaklaştırılacaklar Hakkında Kanun (Law Concerning Removal 
from Active Duty) (July 5, 1954). Quoted in Eroğul, Demokrat Parti:
Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, 114-6.
In 1953 Menderes, was accusing an opposing newspaper of 
provocation as follows : "Yeni Sabah .. . would publish articles to
our detriment to which we would reply by passivity....Although not 
each one of us is a journalist we will find the opportunity to ensure 
that we are the real defenders and safeguards of the rights of this 
nation..." Menderes, July 16, 1953, Speech in DP Paliamentary Group,
quoted in Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları, Demeçleri, Makaleleri, vol. 
IV, 34-5; in a press declaration Menderes accused the newspapers 
which criticized the economic policies of the government of
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members were subjected to double restriction because of 
their dual identity —  working in the university which 
had traditionally been perceived as an organ of the state 
on the one hand, ^ 9^ their self-identification to be the
enlighteners of society, on the other.
Intellectual, University and Press: Forum as the
'Missionary' Triangle for Democracy
At the time when DP rule shifted towards
authoritarian measures in the name of the national will, 
a fortnightly journal was founded (April 4, 1954), By its 
core group it was named Forum to symbolize their 
intention of scientific neutrality. The core group 
consisted mainly of university professors. In the 
article introducing the fortnightly, the raison d'étre of 
the journal was stated as follows:
Today in most of the Western countries FORUM has 
become a symbolic term referring to any place 
whereby thoughts are expressed and discussed 
freely. In fact, today in those countries where
subverting the economic facts for political passions. Menderes, 
October 23, 1953, quoted in ibid., 143-5.
It is in this respect that Prime Minister Menderes pointed at the 
possibility of the state control over the universities as well as the 
requisite of their depoliticization: "An institution which receives
its finance from the state should be accorded only scientific 
autonomy. As far as the administrative aspect is concerned the state 
which provides finance should have and practise the right to control. 
It is required that regulations, which will ban the engagement of the 
university in politics, be enacted, Menderes, July 16, 1953, quoted
in ibid., 59.
140_ "Forum'un Davası" {Forum’s Cause), Forum (editorial), 1 (1)
(April 1, 1954), 1.
Among the founders who were university professors. Aydın Yalçın 
(professor of economy), Bahri Savcı (professor of law) , Turhan 
Feyzioğlu (professor of law), Osman Okyar (professor of economy), 
Turan Güneş (professor of law), and Muammer Aksoy (professor of law) 
can be cited. Such intellectuals as Metin And and Bülent Ecevit also 
wrote regularly in the journal.
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democracy is successfully realized there are some 
organs of thought that mold, direct, and inspire 
public opinion, functions reminiscent of the FORUM 
of the Classical Ages.
Gathering around the journal, we believe that 
Turkish democracy is in urgent need of centers of 
thought similar to the FORUM of the Classical Ages. 
Gathering of such an extensive intellectual group 
which is aware of its ideals in the history of 
thought of our country should be the evidence of an 
intense need. This need arises from the longing of 
the Republican generation and Turkish intellectual 
for free and sophisticated discussion of the 
problems the country faces.^ '’^
This statement contained hints for the identity and 
responsibility of the intellectual. Throughout its 
publication years, excessive emphasis was put on the 
social and political responsibility of the intellectual 
as a natural derivative of his scientific identity. This 
emphasis was based on a particular approach to science 
and the scientist. The Forum group severely opposed the 
tendency to isolate science from "everyday events and 
social facts. Instead, they perceived "scientific 
activity.." by definition as "containing an overt or 
covert acceptance of an ethical system." Thus the 
scientist was to be inescapably "engaged in the 
controversial issues of his time."'“^
Based on such an approach the interpretation of the 
role of the intellectual in social and political spheres 
contained faith in enlightened debate for "reaching an
•^•2. "Forxom'un Davası," 1.
. Cemal Yıldırım, "Bilimin Sosyal İlgileri" (Social Concerns of 
Science), Forum, 4 (37), (October 1, 1955), 19.
Roger Apery, "Tarafsizlili Meselesi" (The Issue of Neutrality), 
trans. Cemal Yıldırım, Forum, 5 (52) (May 15, 1956), 17.
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organic unity within a pluralist milieu. As far as the 
society was concerned, the intellectual was held 
responsible to eliminate the traditional gap between 
himself and the p e o p le.In the pursuit of this task the 
scientist would "...upgrade the society intellectually 
and aesthetically. "147 The intellectual was perceived as 
the carrier of the Turkish Revolution to its logical ends 
which "was initiated by the claim to create a great 
social and cultural transformation" in the way of 
consolidating the "secular worldview ... as in the case 
of the intellectuals of Renaissance and Enlightenment. "i^s 
Thus, "in the midst of the process of cultural 
transformation" the intellectual should be aware of his 
mission in society "as a representative of high culture, 
and step to the forefront of society" in defense of "his 
thoughts, values and ideals. "i49 The emphasis of the group 
on the mission of the intellectual was due to their 
following perception of Turkey: "a country which is going
through cultural transformation ... (where) everything is 
in a state of flux.... Those thoughts, personalities, 
institutions to be trusted . . . are still not known. In
’45. Metin And, "Türkiye'de Aydınlar" (Intellectuals in Turkey), 
Forum, 4 (44) (January 1, 1956), 25.
’46. The circle pointed at the fact that "In our country impact of 
Western culture increased the gap between the people and the 
intellectual and weakened the give and take between the people and 
the intellectual which is the most crucial factor of stability." 
"Türkiye'de Yıkıcı Cereyanlar Meselesi" (Issue of Destructive Trends 
in Turkey), Forum (editorial), 3 (30), (June 15, 1955), 3.
’47. And, "Türkiye'de Aydınlar III" 25.
’4”. "İlme Verdiğimiz Kıymet" (The Value We Attach to Science), Forum 
(editorial), 4 (48) (March 15, 1956), 1-2.
’4^ . "Demokratik Bir Düzende İlim Adamlarının Yeri" (The Place of 
Scientists in a Democratic Order), Forum (editorial), 3 (35)
(September 1, 1955), 3.
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such a milieu, the leadership of the scientist is of 
utmost importance. "150 it is in this respect that the 
intellectual was attributed political responsibility. The 
intellectual was to act as an enlightener with respect to 
not only the society but also the political actors. 
Besides the function of "gathering of knowledge and its 
preservation; dissemination and... amplification, "i5i for 
Forum the intellectuals were to be "guides for the 
statespersons by explaining to them various policy 
alternatives, with a view to existing conditions and 
available resources. "152 The existing conditions meant a 
state of instability and confusion, and available 
resources meant the scientific works of intellectuals.
If the intellectual was the laborer of scientific 
work and thus the protagonist of democracy, the
university was the cradle of science which accumulates 
and disseminates "functional" knowledge. i55 The group 
stressed the need for an intellectual framework in proper 
conduct of politics, the center of which was viewed to be 
the university. As mentioned above, the faith in the 
intellectuals was grounded on the belief in enlightened 
debate for the consolidation of democracy. In this 
respect, providing an analogy between democracy and 
scientific method in the discussion of social, political
>50. Ibid.
>5>. Aydın Yalçın, "Üniversitelerimizde Bilimsel Çalışmalar" 
(Scientific Works in Our Universities) , Forum, 3 (34) (August 15,
1955), 19-20.
>52. "İlme Verdiğimiz Kıymet," 2.
>53. Yalçın, "Üniversitelerimizde Bilimsel Çalışmalar," 19.
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and economic issues, the group pointed at the university 
as the most significant institution which would help to 
tailor the nation to the task of "organizing its life
freely.
The third edge of the triangle which, for Forum, was
the apostle of democracy, was the press. In a way the
group which founded Forum perceived the press as an 
instrument that would disseminate the truth to the 
public, reached by scientific work at the university. For 
them, the press formed both a transmission belt between 
the intellectuals and public, and an alternative center 
for independent criticism and control. In fact, the
first function was stated repeatedly in the anniversary 
issues of Forum. The second function of the press was 
linked to the circle's perception of opposition "in a 
democratic state" as an "institution of public
activity. As stated in an editorial article of the
j ournal:
Democracy is a regime whereby government is 
conducted under the continuous surveillance of the 
citizens, by those who acquired power via elections 
and where issues are pursued by free 
discussions.... The difference of direct democracy 
from democracy adopted in today's states is that 
today the number of citizens makes it impossible
"In a way democracy is ... dissemination of scientific method ... 
in discussing the issues, to the whole country and nation." "Rektör 
Seçimi" (The Election of Rector), Forum (editorial), 3 (31) (July 1,
1955), 5.
Muammer Aksoy, "Üniversite Hadisesi ve Başbakan" (The Case of 
University and Prime Ministry), Forum, 6 (70) (January 15, 1957), 12.
Turan Güneş, "İç Tüzükteki Değişikliğin Manası," Forum, 8 (90)
(December 15, 1957), 11.
"Son Parti Çalışmaları ve Gelişme İstikametleri" (The Last Party 
Activities and Development Routes), Forum (editorial), 3 (27) (May 1, 
1955), 3.
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for them to gather in a 'forum' to discuss public 
affairs. In today's democracies, the press has 
replaced this 'forum'.^ *^
Democracy on the Cutting Edge: Forum versus the DP
It was the above-stated framework which led to an 
intense conflict between the DP rule and the Forum group. 
Basing its disposition on adherence to democracy modelled 
on western liberal democracies, the journal directed its 
criticisms against the government throughout the late 
1950s. The conflict between DP rule and Forum was 
materialized on two grounds: ethical and institutional
aspects of democracy. The university-intellectual-press 
triangle provided a consistency in the articles 
containing the interlinkage between the two aspects. The 
ethical content was structured by the ideal of open 
society, which basically meant freedom of the individual 
from oppression and to decide on his own and to criticize 
the society in which he is living. The group viewed 
democracy as consisting of stages and pointed that in the 
1950s, Turkish society was going through the first stage, 
that is the struggle to free the individual from 
oppressio n.Not surprisingly, the individual was 
referred to as citizen: "if one pole of democracy is the 
use of political power by the people, the other is 
protecting the citizen's liberties vis-à-vis state
"Kırılan Basin Hürriyeti" (Restricted Freedom of Press), Forum 
(editorial), 5 (54) (June 15, 1956), 1.
"Kıymetlerimizi Savunma Karan" (Decision to Defend Our Values), 
Forum (editorial), 3 (36) (September 15, 1955), 3 ; "Çarşaf" (Veil), 
Forum (editorial), 5 (51), 5.
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authority. In this respect, the journal mainly dwelled 
upon the increasingly restrictive measures the government 
took with respect to opposition, and defended freedom of 
thought and expression.
However, the main opposition stance of the journal 
was reflected more in relation to the institutional 
requisites of democracy. This basically meant 
"...delimitation of the practice of political power.. 
by providing authority to the parliament to hold
political power accountable,and to control government 
in the name of national sovereignty, autonomy to the 
members of parliament so that they participate more 
effectively in the decision-making process, and to 
certain institutions such as the judiciary, press and 
university. These measures were viewed essential for the 
realization of "immunity of legality and legitimacy.
Due to the professional identity of its writers, 
criticisms were directed to specific issues and through 
several aspects, including legal, social, economic and 
political. The serial of the enactments of government 
which gained intensity especially after 1954 were the 
focus of concern for the journal. To begin with, adhering 
to the rule of law as the ground for the realization of
160. "Vekaletin Sınırları" (The Limits of Representation), Forma 
(editorial), 5, 54 (June 15, 1956), 4.
161. "Hizip Günah mı?" (Is Faction a Sin?), Forum (editorial), 4 (37) 
(October 1, 1955), 6.
162. Bahri Savcı, "Demokratik Bir Düzende Meclisin Gerçek Yeri" (The 
Real Place of Assembly in a Democratic Order), Forum, 4 (45) 
(February 1, 1956), 9-10.
162. "Dört Mesele Bir Arada" (Four Issues at Once), Forum (editorial), 
4 (45) (February 1, 1956), 5.
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political democracy, the group gave priority to the 
autonomy of the judiciary Basically opposing the 
enactment of subsequent laws, in 1954, on the duration of 
office and retirement of government officials, which 
provided the government with extensive authority vis-à- 
vis the judiciary, Forum emphasized the impossibility of 
disseminating justice "by a judge deciding under the 
strain of any authority, pointed at the
contrariety between the law and "democratic regimes which 
conceive an autonomous judicial organ within the state 
structure as a safeguard of individual rights and
Aksoy, "Hukukçuların Manevi Mes*uliyeti ve İki Hukuk Derneğine 
Dair" (About the Spiritual Responsibility of Legal Professionals and 
Two Law Associations), Forum, 5 (56) (July 15, 1956), 12; 
"Uyanmalıyız Artık!" (We Should Wake Up!), Forum (editorial), 7 (80) 
(July 15, 1957), 1-2; Aksoy, "Demokrat Parti Milletvekillerine Açık 
Mektup: Rejim Buhranı Halledilmelidir" (Open Letter to Democratic 
Party Deputies: Regime Crisis Should be Handled), Forum, 8 (88) 
(November 15, 1957), 10; Aksoy, "Muhalafetin Birleşmesi Zaruridir" 
(Opposition Should Unify), Forum, 10 (110) (October 15, 1958), 7-10. 
Aksoy has restated the requisites of rule of law as providing free, 
equal, and honest elections, autonomy of the judiciary, neutral 
administration, neutrality of state media, freedom of press, freedom 
of meeting and freedom of science and university. Aksoy, "Muhalafetin 
Birleşmesi Zaruridir," 9.
Aksoy, "Fikir, İlim ve Öğretim Hürriyeti: Üniversite Muhtariyeti" 
(Freedom of Thought, Science and Education: The Autonomy of 
University), Forum, 4 (37) (October 1, 1955), 9; Aksoy, "Hukukçuların 
Manevi Mes*uliyeti ve İki Hukuk Derneğine Dair," 11; Savcı, "Seçim 
İklimi Yoktur" (There is No Room for Elections), Forum, 3 (33) 
(August 1, 1955), 10-11; "Bir 'Müjde* ve Bir Unutkanlık" (A Good News 
and a Forgetfulness), Forum (editorial), 3 (30) (June 15, 1955), 4-5.
By a law enacted on June 21, 1954 all government officals, 
without exception, were subjected to the regulation which proposed 
retirement after the completion of 25 years in office; and on July 5, 
1954, a new law was enacted which contained the dismissal of 
government officals directly by the government. (Bağlı Bulundukları 
Teşkilat Emrine Alınmak Suretiyle Vazifeden Uzaklaştırılacaklar 
Hakkında Kanun) Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, 116.
Münci Kapani, "İcra Organı Karşısında Hakimlerin İstiklali" (The 
Autonomy of Judges vis-à-vis The Executive), Forum, 6 (70) (February 
15, 1957), 9.
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liberties” and ” (which) provides for the autonomy of the 
judiciary and judges.
As far as the political aspect was concerned, the 
main focus was on the structure and functioning of the 
parliament. The group viewed the parliament as the 
platform for discussion to reach a gentlemen's agreement 
on national interest. Additionally, it accorded it utmost 
importance for the prevention of abuse of political power 
by exercising effective control. In this respect, it 
proposed such institutional reforms as a bicameral 
legislature, the autonomy for the members of parliament, 
and the neutrality of the President and Speaker of the 
Parliament. For the group, these institutional
Ibid., 10; For an analysis of the DP government * s disposition 
with respect to the judiciary see Aylin Özman, ”The State and Bar 
Associations in Turkey: A Study in Interest Group Politics," (Ph.D. 
Dissertation. Bilkent University. 1995), 125.
Savcı, "Murakabe Müessesesinin Korunması" (Protection of the 
Institution of Checks), Forum, 3 (29) (June 1, 1955), 9-10; İlhan
Arsel, "Hükümet Sistemimiz Hakkında" (About our Government System) , 
Forum, 3 (34) (August 15, 1955), 9-10; "Dört Mesele Bir Arada";
Savcı, "Demokratik Bir Düzende Meclisin Gerçek Yeri"; "Karanlıkta 
Vuruşanlar" (Those Who Fight in the Dark), Forum (editorial), 10
(114) (December 15, 1958), 2.
On bicameralism see Arsel, "Hükümet Sistemimiz Hakkında"; Feridun 
Canıtez, "Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanununun Tadili" (Reform of the 
Constitution), Forum, 5 (54) (May 15, 1956), 11; Arsel, "Çift Meclis 
Sistemi" (Bicameralism), Forum, 8 (96) (March 15, 1958), 6-8; Kapani,
"Yarınki Anayasamız Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler" (Some Reflections on 
Our Future Constitution), Forum, 11 (127) (July 1, 1959), 8-10. On
the parliamentarians see Savcı, "Murakabe Müessesesinin Korunması"; 
Savcı, "Buhran İstidatları ve Önleme Yolları" (Buhran İstidatları and 
the Ways to Prevent Them), Forum, 3 (35) (September 1, 1955), 11-2;
"Yol Ayrımındayız" (We Are on the Crossroads), Forum (editorial), 4 
(39) (November 1, 1955), 1-3; Aksoy, "Partiden Ayrılma Mebusluk
Sıfatını Kaybettirir mi?" (Does Quitting from Party Cause Liquidation 
of The Title of Member of Parliament?), Forum, 4 (41) (December 1,
1955) , 7-9. On the neutrality of the President and the Speaker of the
Parliament see "Tarafsız Organlar Üzerine" (On Neutral Organs), Forum 
(editorial), 4 (40) (November 15, 1955), 4ff; Savcı, "Buhran
İstidatları ve Önleme Yolları"; Savcı, "Murakabe Müessesesinin 
Korunması"; Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Demokrasi Davamıza Genel Bir Bakış" (A 
General Look at Our Democracy Issue), Forum, 4 (46) (February 15,
1956) , 12-4.
220
iTGcjuisit6S l©ci to th© int©irnalization of d©niociratic mil© 
by th© inassGs; and th© consolidation of d©inocratic ml© 
could only b© achi©v©d by activ© participation of th© 
public in th© political proc©ss. On this issu© th© 
opposition was h©ld to b© significantly r©sponsibl© for 
providing alt©rnativ© mediums of participation Thus, 
while attacking th© restrictive measures of th©
government both in and out of th© parliament, th© group 
also accused th© opposition of passivity and inertia 
For th© group, both th© opposition and government in 
Turkey, dwelled heavily on politics as "a dynamic 
activity of an organization and cadre for th© pursuit and 
preservation of power, and thus lacked the wider
comprehension of politics as "an activity of research, 
interpretation, comparison in searching for alternative 
solutions to the problems...."’'^'
Apart from its institutional references such an 
interpretation also contained a social aspect. For the 
group the roots of the social problems of the period were 
to be found in the drawbacks of development. In this 
respect, the state was held responsible for both 
respecting the absolute sovereignty of person "in 
determining his own faith" and "providing those who are
171 _ "Türkiye'de Siyasi Buhran ve Muhalefet" (Political Crisis and 
Opposition in Turkey), Forum (editorial), 3 (30) (June 15, 1955), 4; 
”Yapmak Hürriyeti, İstemek Yasağı!” (Freedom to Do, Prohibition to 
Demand!), Forum (editorial), 3 (30) (June 15, 1955), 5.
”Meclis Tatile Girerken” (While the Assembly Closes down for 
Vacation), Forum (editorial), 3 (29) (June 1, 1955), 2; Savcı, ”Seçim 
İklimi Yoktur,” 10; '’Rejimimizde Kararlı Muvazene” (Resolute Balance 
in Our Regime), Forum (editorial), 5 (56) (July 15, 1956), 1-3.
Savcı, "İktidar Savaşı Yapmadan Siyaset” (Politics without Power 
Struggle), Forum, 3 (32) (July 15, 1955), 8-9.
174. Ibid., 9.
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relatively disadvantaged in the system...with support 
which does not disrupt their absolute freedom, but which 
does help its development. ^he assignment of such 
duties on the state was based on a conception of freedom 
with a "social content. "Today, the requisites of 
social progress . . . have filled the concept of freedom 
with a social content. ... freedom requires that a 
person, in all social categories should not be left 
economically and socially deprived. Accordingly, the 
group repeatedly accused the government of falling short 
of devising a social program which would promote social 
equality.
If one point of criticism was the failure of the DP 
to provide social equality, the other one was obstruction 
of the unions.The significance given to the unions laid 
in that they were perceived to be alternative means of 
attachment to the system, in a time of social 
transformation where traditional mediums had been 
dislocated, by preparing the grounds for the individual
>■^5. Ibid.
Savcı, "Batılı Demokrasinin Bazı Temel Kavramları Üzerine" (On 
Some of the Fundamental Concepts of Western Democracy), Forum, 4 (47)
(March 1, 1956), 10.
Ibid.
"Gene Grev Hakkına Dair" (On the Freedom to Strike), Forum 
(editorial), 3 (33) (August 1, 1955), 6; Cahit Talas, "Müessir Bir
Sosyal Politika Zarureti” (The Imperative of an Effective Social 
Policy), Forum, 4 (39) (November 1, 1955), 14-5; "İktisadi
İstikbalimizin Görünüşü” (The Panoroma of Our Economic Future), Forum 
(editorial), 4 (40) (November 15, 1955), 1-3; "Meselelerimiz ve 
Manevi Hazırlık Zarureti” (Our Problems and the Imperative of 
Spiritual Readiness), Forum (editorial), 4 (42) (December 15, 1955)
1-3; "İktisadi Tedbirler ve İçtimai Sonuçlar” (Economic Measures and 
Social Consequences), Forum (editorial), 5 (58) (August 15, 1956), 3.
Feyzioglu, "Demokrasi Davamıza Genel Bir Bakış,” 14; "Birlikler 
Kapanırken” (While the Unions Are Closed Down), Forum (editorial), 7 
(75) (May 1, 1957), 1-2; "Biz Ne İstiyoruz?” (What Do We Want?), 
Forum (editorial), 5 (60) (September 15, 1956), 1-2.
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for active participation.It is in this respect that the 
government was criticized for both pushing the individual 
to passivity and inertia in political life and preempting 
any potential of opposition for political power; both 
were viewed to be irreconcilable with the raison d'être 
of democracy.!*'
The group's criticisms on social issues were 
reflections of its standpoint regarding the economy. As 
far as the economy was concerned, the group declared its 
adherence to a well-functioning free market system.'*2 This 
adherence was based on the faith in the spontaneity of 
economic development and capital accumulation under 
competitive conditions.'*^ However, the group also put 
reservation on this spontaneity by a remark on the 
distinction between developed and undeveloped countries. 
Thus, it admitted the need for a passive state in a well 
functioning economy which is based on the principle of 
free competition. On the other hand, taking Turkey as a 
developing country, it pointed at the indispensability of 
planning in the economic sphere to preempt disorder and 
inequality in the social structure and thus to achieve
'*". Şerif Mardin, "Yeni Bir Ütopya" (A New Utopia), Forum, 5 (51)
(May 1, 1956), 10-1.
'*'. "Evet, Hür ve Bağımsız Sendika" (Yes, Free and Independent 
Union), Forum (editorial), 4 (41) (December 1, 1955), 4; "Başlayan
Bir Hareketin Düşündürdükleri" (Reflections on a Movement in Start), 
Forum (editorial), 4 (47) (March 1, 1946), 5/ "İktisadi Tedbirler ve 
İçtimai Sonuçlar," 3-4.
'*^ . Yalçın, "Sosyalizmin Bugünkü Meseleleri" (Contenç)orary Issues of 
Socialism), Forum, 4 (40) (November 15, 1955), 11-3; "Biz Ne 
İstiyoruz?," 2; "Plan Kelimesinden Maksat" (What Is Meant by the Term 
Planning), Forum (editorial), 7 (73) (April 1, 1957), 7.
'*^ . Osman Okyar, "Planlama Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar VI: İktisaden 
Geri Kalmış Memleketlerde Planlama Meseleleri" (Notes on the History 
of Planning VI: Issues of Planning in Economically Backward
Countries), Forum, 8 (89) (December 1, 1957), 15.
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economic and social development spontaneously. However, 
such a standing should not be misinterpreted as support 
of etatism. The group overtly put forth its perception of 
planning as a complementary pursuit in developing 
countries for the consolidation of competitive market 
economy. Listing the problems of Turkish economy as the 
scarcity of resources and insufficiency of private 
capital, it idealized a regulative state which would 
devise rational plans to provide harmony among 
production, investment, and savings, without disrupting 
market mechanisms. It is in this respect that the DP 
government was accused of arbitrariness in its pursuit of 
economic policies, which according to the group, was a 
result of dominating political aspirations in the
economy 187 To further differentiate itself from the
Okyar, "İktisadi Plancılığımızın Şekil ve Muhteva Meselesi" (The 
Issue of the Form and Content of Our Economic Planning) , Forum, 3 
(31), July 1, 1955, 9-10; "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı" (The Need for
Economic Planning), Forum, 3 (34) (August 15, 1955), 6-7; Yalçın,
"Gelişme Gayretlerimizde Aksayan Nedir?" (What is the Trouble with 
Our Attempts at Development), Forum, 4 (45) (February 1, 1956), 11-2; 
Yalçın, "Az Gelişmiş Memleketlerde Para ve Maliye Politikası" (Fiscal 
and Financial Policy in the Less Developed Countries), Forum, 1 (82) 
(August 15, 1957), 16-8, (Review of Karl iversen, İktisadi Kalkınma
Konferansları [Conferences on Economic Development]); Okyar, 
"Planlama Tarihine Müteallik Notlar VI: İktisaden Geri Kalmış
Memleketlerde Planlama Meseleleri," 15-7; Z.Y. Hershlag, "Türkiye: 
İntikal Halinde Bir Ekonomi" (Turkey: An Economy in Transition),
Forum, 12, (134) (October 15, 1959), 8-10.
Okyar, "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı"; "Biz Ne İstiyoruz?"; iversen,
"Az Gelişmiş Memleketlerde Para ve Maliye Politikası"; Hershlag, 
"Türkiye: İntikal Halinde Bir Ekonomi."
Okyar, "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı"; Yalçın, "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde 
Aksayan Nedir?"; "İktisadi Gerçekleri Kavrama Derecemiz" (Our Limits 
of Comprehending Economic Facts), Forum (editorial), 4 (47) (March 1, 
1946), 1-3; "Plan Kelimesinden Maksat"; Yalçın, "Plan ve Program
Meselesi" (Issue of Planning and Program), Forum, 1 (75) (May 1,
1957), 8-9; Okyar, "Planlama Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar VI."
"...The contradictions with which the party, that had come to 
power by the motto of private initiative, faces due to the
incompetency to foresee the reflections of its policies in the long 
and middle-terms..." "D.P.*nin Liberalizmi" (DP*s Liberalism), Forum
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etatist trend, the group named its standpoint "democratic 
planning, which was modelled on the practice of state 
activity in the economy in the Anglo-American world. 
Democratic planning called for a depoliticized and 
debureaucratized economic program by a developed public 
administration which would provide rationality in the 
economy. This "was possible only in a free, competitive 
market dominant economic milieu whereby price stability 
was achieved.
From Intellectual Neutrality to Organized Political 
Identity
While making all the criticisms stated above. Forum 
was not immune to restrictions. The law which subjected
(editorial), 5 (60) (September 15, 1956), 6; Okyar, "İktisadi
Plancılığımızın Şekil ve Muhteva Meselesi”; "Kendimize Güvenme 
Zamanı" (The Time to Trust Ourselves) , Forum (editorial), 3 (31) 
(July 1, 1955), 1-2; "İktisadi İstikbalimizin Görünüşü," 1-3; Mümtaz
Soysal, "Bütünlük" (Totality), Forum, 6 (63) (November 1, 1956), 11-
2; Ömer Sakıp, "Demokratik Devrim Üzerine Düşünceler" (Reflections on 
Democratic Revolution), Forum, 1 (83) (September 1, 1957), 7-9;
"Program ve Plan Tartışmaları" (Discussions on Program and Planning), 
Forum, 10 (114) (December 15, 1958), 7-9.
Yalçın, "Plan ve Program Meselesi," 8-9.
Yalçın, "Sosyalizmin Bugünkü Meseleleri," 11-3; Okyar "Planlama 
Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar (1939*dan bu yana)" (Notes on the 
History of Planning [from 1930 until today]). Forum, 1 (82) (August
15, 1957), 14-6.
For the circle the ideal model was the running of the state
economic enterprises with economic rationality and with the aim of 
founding the grounds for the efficient functioning of private 
initiative. Soysal, "İktisadi Devlet Teşekküllerinin Bünyesi" (The
Structure of State Economic Enterprises), Forum, 3 (27) (May 1,
1955), 12-3; "İktisadi Devlet Teşekküllerinin Murakabesi" (The
Control over State Economic Enterprises), Forum, 3 (28) (May 15,
1955), 11-3; Yalçın, "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde Aksayan Nedir?," 11-2;
H.C. Richard, "İktisadi Gelişmede Devletin Rolü" (State*s Role in 
Economic Development), trans. M.E., Forum, 6 (72) (March 15, 1957),
16-7.
Okyar, "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı," 7.
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the judiciary to political power was also a matter of 
criticism as far as the university was concerned, since 
it also exposed the deeds of university members under 
arbitrary evaluation of the government. Due to its 
attribution of a dual identity to the university both as 
the cradle of scientific research and derivatively the 
center for intellectual contribution to democracy, Forum 
criticized the government for misinterpreting 
intellectuals’ political responsibility as
p o l i t i c i z a t i o n . fact, it is in this respect that the 
most conspicuous clash between the journal and DP came to 
the surface. The government’s response was the 
application of the law to Osman Okyar in 1955 and Turhan 
Feyzioglu in 1956. On the other hand, the group was 
subject to restrictions not only with respect to the 
university law, but also the press law. The new press law 
which was enacted in 1956, further severed relations
Upon the removal by the Ministry of Education of Turhan Feyzioglu 
from active duty in the university, the government declared that: 
"Apart from his articles in Forum which are clearly in opposition to 
the government (Feyzioglu) had displayed an aggressive persistence 
and renitence in taking part in daily politics and its controversies 
in Thought Club (Fikir Klühü) . . Zafer, November 26, 1956.
"Osman Okyar Hadisesi" (The Case of Osman Okyar), Forum 
(editorial), 3 (35) (September 1, 1955), 3-4; On the reaction of the 
group against the law in question see Aksoy, "6435 Sayılı Kanun 
Karşısında Üniversite Muhtariyeti" (University Autonomy in the Face 
of Law 6435), Forum, 4 (46) (February 15, 1956), 14-6; "Vekalet 
Emrine Alınmanın Hakiki Sebebi," Forum, 6 (69) (February 1, 1957),
12-3. The objection towards the decision of the government were not 
reserved to articles; Munci Kapani, one of the members of the group, 
resigned from his post in the university as a display of protest: 
"The interpretation of writings and statements of some of my 
colleagues, which comply with scientific and objective standards as a 
display of opposition... is of utmost importance since it presents 
the predominant mentality (of the government)." Kapani, Cunhuriyet, 
December 8, 1956.
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between the circle and DPJ^4 one significant example was 
the rejection of an appeal from Forum to the Ankara Radio 
Directorate for a declaration on the occasion of its 
sixth anniversary due to its "degrading" publications 
about the policies of the state.
In fact, one factor which intensified the hostility 
of the government towards Forum was the active support 
the journal gave to the Freedom Party (FP) (November 19, 
1955), which was a splinter party from the DP, The 
significance of the party laid in the fact that it was 
formed by nineteen DP parliamentarians, nine of whom had 
been expelled from the party due to their submission of a 
proposal demanding the right to substantiate claims made 
by the press (ispat hakkı) Initially, Forum assumed an 
advisory standing. Pointing at the lack of an 
intellectual basis behind the existing political parties 
as the major deficiency of the Turkish political system, 
the journal subsequently published articles concerning
Laws 6732 and 6733 (June 7, 1956) placed the media under
arbitrary judgement of political power. Cem Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: 
Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, 136. On the reaction of Forum against this law 
in particular and the DP's policies vis-à-vis the media in general 
see "Kırılan Basin Hürriyeti," 1-2; "Siyasi Rejimimizin Temelleri" 
(Foundations of Our Political Regime), Forum, 5 (55) (July 1, 1956),
1-2; Feyzioğlu, "Radyo Meselesi-II" (The Radio Issue-II), Forum, 6 
(70) (February 15, 1957), 15-7; Feyzioğlu, "Basin Hürriyeti
Tartışmasına Dair" (About the Discussion on the Freedom of Press), 
Forum, 1 (73) (April 1, 1957), 11-3; Yalçın Tuna, "Basin
Mevzuatımızın Antidemokratik Hükümleri" (Anti-democratic Sentences of 
Our Press Law), Forum, 1 (78) (June 15, 1957), 9-12; Feyzioğlu, 
"Basin Hürriyetine Darbeler" (New Blows to the Freedom of Press), 
Forum, 7 (80) (July 15, 1957), 7-8; Aksoy, "Bizde Basının Kontrol
Vazifesini İmkansızlaştıran Sebepler" Forum, 1 (84) (September 15,
1957), 9-11; "Yeni Tedbirlere Doğru" (Towards New Measures), Forum
(editorial), 12 (142) (February 15, 1960), 1-2.
195. "Arena ve Forum" (Arena and Forum), Forum (editorial), 10 (121)
(April 1, 1959), 2.
Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, 126-9.
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the ought“tO“be disposition of the new party with respect 
to the social, political and economic issues of the 
p e r i o d jn the meantime, it also provided support by its 
appraisal of the party as presenting a fresh identity due 
to its immunity from "the attributes, mental tendencies 
and patriarchical traditions of the RPP and by its 
criticisms against government policies. Through time, 
relations between the journal and FP proved to be more 
than a shared critical standing with respect to the 
policies of DP. This was first manifested in the remark 
about the propensity of Forum readers and subscribers 
among the party delegates The identification was
further ensured when Aydın Yalçın who was among the core 
group of the journal, and Muammer Aksoy and Münci Kapani, 
two prominent columnists, joined the p a r t y . T h e  group 
justified its support for FP, which was perceived by the 
DP as the politicization of intellectuals and thus the
”Yeni Bir Parti Kurulması" (Foundation of a New Party) , Forum 
(editorial), 4 (40) (November 15, 1955), 3-4; "Değişen Türkiye*de 
Yeni Adımlar" (New Steps in Changing Turkey), Forum (editorial), 4 
(41) (December 1, 1955), 1-3/ "Uzağı Düşünme Zamanı" (Time to Think 
Future), Forum (editorial), 5 (51) (May 1, 1956), 1-3; "Hürriyet 
Partisinin Yıldönümü" (The Anniversary of Freedom Party), Forum 
(editorial), 8 (91) (December 31, 1957), 6.
"Uzağı Düşünme Zamanı," 2.
"Yol Ayrımındayız," 1-3. The journal had criticized the decision 
of the DP to removal of those who had quitted from the party on the 
grounds of its incompatibility with democracy, from active duty in 
the parliament. "Sira Milletvekillerinde mi?"; "Ezme Politikası: 
Mebusluktan Iskat" (Policy of Oppression: Removal From Membership of 
Parliament), Forum (editorial), 4 (39) (November 1, 1955), 3-6;
Aksoy, "Partiden Ayrılma Mebusluk Sıfatını Kaybettirir mi?," 7-9;
Savcı, "Seçmenin Yaptığı Iskat," Forum, 4 (40) (November 15, 1955),
15-6.
200^  "Hürriyet Partisi Kongresinden Notlar" (Notes from the Congress 
of Freedom Party), Forum (editorial), 8 (85) (October 1, 1957), 5.
"Siyasi Mücadeleye Katılan Forumcular" (Forum Members in 
Political Struggle), Forum (editorial), 8 (85) (October 1, 1957), 6; 
M. Arif Demirer, "Siyaset Adamı Aydın Yalçın" (Aydın Yalçın as a 
Politician), Yeni Forum, 15 (306) (November 1994), 13.
228
university, because of the party's devotion to the 
political responsibility of the intellectual and to the 
shared task of "protesting the divergence of the party in 
power from democratic imperatives.
However, the relation of Forum to the FP may be re­
interpreted. Rather than viewing the support of the group 
on the grounds of shared criticisms and the emergence of 
a new party with an intellectual formation, one can well 
argue that the group provided the party with an 
intellectual framework. In other words, the group found 
an opportunity for the realization of their long-aspired 
intellectually-framed game of politics.
The Identity of Forum: A "Liberal-Socialist State of
Being"?203
An analysis of the regular columnists of Forum notes 
the difficulty with stamping an absolute label to the 
journal.In fact, this fits the claim that laid at its
”...As a journal of thought Forum has always defended neutral 
analysis and observation. ... the decision of our columnists to take 
part in the political struggle has also shown that this (neutrality) 
does not mean having no opinion and indecisiveness, a fact which we 
have stated on various occasions.” "Siyasi Mücadeleye Katılan 
Forumcular”; see also Cemal Aygen, "Önümüzdeki Seçimlerin Muhtemel 
Neticeleri” (Possible Results of Next Elections), Forum, 8 (85) 
(October 1, 1957), 11-3.
In one of the issues, the group announced its compliance with 
"the approaches which find not a conflictual, but a complementary 
relationship among market mechanism, social control and etatism, ” and 
admitted its faith in "this current of thought, which is labeled as 
’liberal-socialist state of being,* ... for the future world order." 
"Biz Ne İstiyoruz?,” 2.
. In the following decade a number of columnists happened to join 
in rival parties. Two examples are Aydın Yalçın who joined the 
Justice Party which was perceived to be the eventual inheritor of the 
Democratic Party; and Bülent Ecevit who joined and eventually headed 
the Republican People’s Party.
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origin -being an intellectual debating ground for issues 
concerning politics, society and economy. However, there 
were still some common factors other than the faith in 
intellectual debate and neutrality which constituted a 
common ground especially in the criticisms directed 
towards the DP rule, and which eventually led to the 
identification of the journal with the FP.
From its foundation onwards, the outstanding feature 
of Forum had been its opposition mentality based on the 
values and institutions of western liberal democracies, 
particularly the Anglo-American one.“  ^Their understanding 
of Anglo-American democracy was reflected in the 
theoretical standpoint of the group and eventually on 
their perceptions of politics, society and economy.
To begin with, the group viewed the Lockean and 
Humean empricism and nominalism, against Cartesian 
rationality.^®^ Taking England as the ideal model for the 
realization of democracy, they emphasized the requisite 
for experimentalism in social science against 
speculation.^®"^ In fact, the analogy they made between the 
practice of democracy and the methodology of social
®^^ . However, the Anglo-American influence should not be perceived as 
a surprising feature. Its roots can be found in the core group of the 
journal, who had been familiar to Anglo-American experience. In fact, 
Metin And, one of the regular columnists of the journal on culture 
and art, has stated that the idea of forming an intellectually-framed 
journal had been a matter of concern among the core group who 
occasionally met during their stay in England. (Author's) Informal 
interview with Metin And, December 10, 1995.
®^^ . Yalçın, "Aydınların Ferdiyetçiliği" (Individualism of 
Intellectuals), Forum, 3 (29) (June 1, 1955), 16-7; "İktisadi 
Gerçekleri Kavrama Derecemiz," 1.
®^^ . "İktisadi Gerçekleri Kavrama Derecemiz," 1; Kapani, "İngiliz 
Demokrasisine Bakışlar" (A Look at British Democracy) , Forum, 12, 
(143) (March 1, 1960), 12-3.
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science was a reflection of this viewpoint. The group 
held the view that democracy could be achieved only when 
politics is conducted through scientific debates on the 
issues of the day, rather than by mere spéculât ion.
This methodological approach was also reflected in 
the conceptual matrix of the group. The group emphasized 
the decisive role of the individual in the "regulation of 
society through his social, ethical and political 
functions" and the indispensability of individualism for 
democracy .2°^ It is in this respect that the group 
repeteadly stated the requisite of the limitation of 
state power and the delineation of its sphere of activity 
by the rights and liberties of the individuals. However, 
this did not mean a classical liberal outlook. Instead, 
the group criticized the abstract/ahistorical individual 
of classical liberalism as the basic unit both 
methodologically and ontologically; they worked with the 
concept of person in mass society {"kütle adamr").2" The 
concept referred to the modern person grappling with the 
problem of identity in a society which was in a state of
Yalçın, "Aydınların Ferdiyetçiliği," 16; "İşte Forum Budur!" 
(Here is Forum!), Forum (editorial), 4 (46) (February 15, 1956), 1-2; 
Moris Ginsberg, "Bilim ve Günümüzün Meseleleri" (Science and Today's 
Issues), trans. Cemal Yıldırım, Forum, 6 (62) (October 15, 1956), 7- 
9; "İlmi Metod ve Hadiselerin Mantığı" (Scientific Method and the 
Logic of Events), Forum (editorial), 7 (76) (May 15, 1957), 5.
209. "ileri Toplimi ve Şahsi Sorumluluk" (Advanced Society and Personal 
Responsibility), Forum (editorial), 6 (68) (January 15, 1957), 1-3.
"İşte Foriam Budur!," 1-3; John Bowie, "Totaliterlik" 
(Totalitarianism), trans. Cemal Yıldırım, Forum, 6 (61) (October 1,
1956), 11-2; Kapani, "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi" (Limitation of
State's Power), Forum, 1 (76) (May 15, 1957), 8-9; Norman Marsh,
"Fert Hürriyeti ve Teşrii Kuvvet" (Liberty of Individual and Legal 
Power), trans. Cemal Yıldırım, 11 (130) (August 15, 1959), 15-6.
Mardin, "Devrimizde Amme Felsefesi" (Pıablic Philosophy in Our 
Age), Forum, 3 (36) (September 15, 1956), 12-3.
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transformation from traditional to modern culture. 212 
Person was perceived to be in urgent need of mediums 
which would provide him with new attachments to society 
and thus a new personality congruent with modern 
conditions .213 These mediums were sought in the educational 
system which would ensure the education of the individual 
in the faculty of thinking as regards to his place in 
society.214 And, by independent associations which would 
make it possible for the individual to engage in 
political, social, and economic life actively.21^  The state 
was held responsible for both framing the appropriate 
educational system and guaranteeing the independent 
functioning of the associations.
One step beyond this stance was the perception of 
pluralism.216 The group emphasized the significance "in 
particular of professional associations, which in
developed countries perform conspicuous functions to 
protect individual rights and liberties vis-à-vis the 
state... "21'^ Underlying this disposition was the
interpretation of the raison d'être of the state as the 
well-being of the ruled, rather than being a goal in
212. Ibid.
213. Ibid.
214. Yalçın, "Aydınların Ferdiyetçiliği," 16-7; Zinde Kip, "Türk 
Maarifinde Reform Nasıl Olmalıdır?" (How Should Turkish Educational 
System be Reformed?), Forum, 8 (87) (October 1, 1957), 11-3;
"Maarifimizdeki Buhranın Sebepleri Nelerdir?" (What are the Reasons 
of Crisis in Our Educational System?), Forum, 9 (107) (September 1, 
1958), 6-7.
213. Kapani, "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi," 8-9; "Devlet Kudretinin 
Tahdidi II" (Limitation of State's Power II), Forum, 1 (77) (June 1,
1957), 10-2; Karl Mannheim "Çağımızın Teşhisi" (Diagnosis of Our
Age), trans. Cemal Yıldırım, Forum, 8 (86) (October 15, 1957), 10-2. 
216. Mardin, "Devrimizde Amme Felsefesi," 12-3.
21^ . Kapani, "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi II," 11.
232
itself.The Anglo-American cross-fertilization was most 
manifest in this respect. There was a discernible shift 
from the traditional preoccupation of the Ottoman-Turkish 
intellectual with the state being important in itself, to 
one where its existence was viewed to be derivative -not 
ontologically but functionally- and secondary to the 
individual. Thus, the focus of attention was directed 
towards the ought-to-be nature of the state for the sake 
of the individual.
The Anglo-American cross fertilization was also 
reflected in the manner the group considered issues 
concerning the society, politics and economy. Thus, 
"leaving away speculation and theorization for itself, ”219 
it mainly focused on micro issues, found to be 
indispensable for the realization of democracy Not 
surprisingly, the arguments were derived from the Anglo- 
American models based on experimentalism.^^^
Bowie, "Totaliterlik,” 11.
"İktisadi Gerçekleri Kavrama Derecemiz," 1-3.
In fact, the issues were organized with such a mentality. The 
editorial section echoed the common standing of the writers. The 
writers dwelled upon specific subjects as the parliament, judiciary, 
parliamentarians, party structure and inter-party relations, detailed 
analysis of the economic structure and the proposals on the 
appropriate measures. The division of the themes can roughly be 
stated as follows: Aydın Yalçın and Osman Okyar wrote articles
concerning economy. Muammer Aksoy, Turhan Feyzioglu, Turan Güneş, 
Bahri Savcı and Mümtaz Soysal, on law, government and parliament, and 
Metin And and Ömer Sakıp on the intellectuals.
. England was taken as the model first for the functioning of the 
parliament as a debating society on the issues, which was interpreted 
to be the reflection of the compliance with the principle of "honest 
pursuit of the line of argument." "Tarafsızlık Meselesi" (The Issue 
of Neutrality), Forum (editorial), 7 (79) (July 1, 1957), 4. The
group also drew upon the English experience in distinguishing 
themselves from etatist identity, due to their proposal for social 
and economic planning. Kapani, "İngiliz Demokrasisine Bakışlar: 
Milli Karakterin Işığında Siyasi Müesseseler" (A Look at British 
Democracy: Political Institutions in the Light of National
Character), Forum, 12 (143) (March 1, 1960), 12-3: "Dertlerimizin
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In general, it is possible to observe parallels 
between the said intellectual preoccupation with post~war 
conditions in the West and developments in the western 
intellectual layout, which displayed a continuity in the 
liberal tradition thereon. That, in turn, confirmed the 
ultimate demise of classical liberalism and the rise of 
social democracy. When read within the frames of this 
schema, the seemingly inconsistent emphasis on
individualism on the one hand, and planning on the other 
ensures a comprehensive understanding. The group referred 
to its approach as "a liberal-socialist state of being, "“2 
which basically corresponded to a liberal standing with 
respect to the society and a democratic one with respect 
to the state.^ ^^
All in all, the Anglo-American predisposition was a
projection of the task of taking Westernization intact
that the group held fast to. If one major sphere of
manifestation of this task was the emphasis on the
transformation from the rural structure to urban way of
living, the second one was the issue of religion. The
responsibility which the group put on the intellectual as
the enlightener of the public in a stage of cultural
transformation,224 had a structural counterpart. This was
Asıl Kaynağı" (The True Reason of Our Problems), Forum (editorial), 3 
(32) (July 15, 1955), 1-2. Yalçın, "Sosyalizmin Bugünkü Meseleleri," 
11-3; Okyar "Planlama Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar (1939'dan bu 
yana)," 14-6.
222. "Biz Ne İstiyoruz?" 2.
223. Yalçın, "Kültür Değiştirmemizin Temel Şartı" (The Main Imperative 
of Changing Our Culture), Forum, 3 (27) (May 1, 1955), 20-1.
224. Yalçın, "Aydınların Ferdiyetçiliği," 16; "Demokratik Bir Düzende
İlim Adamlarının Yeri," 1-3; "Aydınların Sorumluluğu" (The 
Responsibility of Intellectuals), Forum (editorial), 4 (37) (October 
1, 1955), 1-3; Aksoy, "Profesörlerin Siyasi Yayınları Memnu mudur?"
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substantiated in the call for rapid urbanization due to 
the nourishment of "...liberal society and democratic 
state...” in urbanized societies which preempt the threat 
of closed rural structure to the development of 
individual consciousness.
Second, the uncompromising westernist standing was 
reflected in the approach to the issue of religion. Again 
modelling on the Anglo-American experience with
secularism, the group rigorously put forth the imperative 
of a total separation between state and religion. This 
meant not only the elimination of religion from matters 
concerning the state, but also the withdrawal of state 
from matters concerning religion.Holding the view that 
religion is a concern of individual conscience, and thus 
no medium should be accepted inbetween, the group
severely attacked the trends calling for a selective 
synthesizing process among western values and
(Are the Political Publications of Professors Illegal?), Forum, 4 
(39) (Noveinber 1, 1955), 11-3. And "Türkiye’de Aydınlar I”
(Intellectuals in Turkey I), Forum, 4 (42) (Deceinber 15, 1955), 18-9; 
"Türkiye’de Aydınlar III," 24-5; "C.H.P.nin Meseleleri" (RPP’s 
Problems), Forum (editorial), 5 (53) (June 1, 1956), 3; "Siyaset
Çamuru" (The Dirt of Politics), Forum (editorial), 6 (67) (January 1, 
1957), 4; "Siyaset Eğitimi" (Political Education), Forum (editorial),
7 (74) (April 15, 1957), 1-2; "Fikir Partisi İmkanları"
(Opportunities for an Intellectual Party), Forum (editorial), 7 (83)
(September 1, 1957), 1-3; "Kubali Hadisesi mi. Üniversite Meselesi
mi. Yoksa Hukuk Devleti Davası mı?" (Kübalı Event, or University 
Issues, or the Issue of Rule of Law?), Forum (editorial), 8 (94)
(February 15, 1958), 1-3; Sakıp, "Asıl Eksiğimiz Aydınlarımızdaki
Gerçek Duygusu" (Our Main Deficiency is the Lack of Sense of Reality 
in Our Intellectuals), Forum, 10, (122) (April 15, 1959), 8-10.
Yalçın, "Kültür Değiştirmemizin Temel Şartı," 20-1.
"Laikliği Noksan Anlama" (Deficient Comprehension of Laicism) , 
Forum (editorial), 4 (44) (January 15, 1956), 3; İlhan Arsel,
"Amerikan Demokrasisinde Din ve Devlet Ayrılığı" (The Separation of 
Religion and State in American Democracy), Forum, 5 (50) (April 15,
1956), 15-6; Necat Erder, "Din Meselesi" (The Issue of Religion), 
Forum, 5 (52) (May 15, 1956), 10; "Nursuzlar" (Sinisters), Forum 
(editorial), 9 (100) (May 15, 1958), 5-6.
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institutions on the one hand, and the traditional 
features which were supposed to represent the authencity 
of a nation, on the other. 2^?
It may well be argued that Forum represented a 
crucial stage in Turkish intellectual life. First, it 
symbolized the logical end of the Anglo-American cross­
fertilization, which Turkey had been experiencing from 
the transition to multi-party period onwards. It also 
provided a groundwork for the solution to the uneasy co­
existence of the faith in the individual on the one hand, 
and a society which had been marked by the prevalence of 
a state tradition, on the other. Second, the group also 
represented the beginning of a shift in the relation 
between the state and intellectual. In this respect, they 
provided a re-definition of the identity of the 
intellectual, which subordinated his link with the state 
to his function as an enlightener of the public, due to 
employment in state institutions. Last but not least, it 
also exemplified a beginning point in the preoccupation 
of the intellectual with "specific issues, discrete 
institutions and the detailed analysis of functions and 
powers," reminiscent of the Anglo-American intellectual 
tradition of state.However, it should be noted that the
" ...There is nothing more absurd than expecting an Hegelian
synthesis between the East and the West. ...If we aim at 
Westernization, we should pursue a hundred percent westernization and 
as quick as possible." Soysal, "Bütünlük," p. 12. On the faith in 
absolute westernization see also. Soysal, "Türkiye'nin Son Ortadoğu 
Siyaseti ve Batılılaşma Temposunda Yavaşlama" (The Last Middle 
Eastern Policy of Turkey and Retardation in Westernization), Forum, 
9 (107) (September 1, 1958), 10-2/ "Atatürk'ü Anlamak" (Understanding 
Atatürk), Forum (editorial), 10 (112) (November 15, 1958), 1-2.
Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 199.
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group was not immune to engaging in framing the relation 
of the concerned themes to "an overarching rule like 
state" which, according to Dyson, is absent in the Anglo- 
American tradition. 229 Instead, this particular
intellectual group was trying to substantiate their 
theoretical disposition within a system where the state 
had long been the focal point in their political and 
intellectual preoccupation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The 1946-1960 period was significant for the Turkish 
political system for several reasons. First, it proved to 
be an era of definitive transition to multi-party 
politics, rather than a mere rehearsal which had been the 
case in the preceding period (1923-1946). Second, the 
acquisition of power by the DP also started a transition 
from state-centered polity to party-centered polity, 
which basically meant the handover of political power 
from state elites to political elites.2^0 Last but not 
least, the period was also marked by a shift in the 
intellectual sphere from Continental European cross­
fertilization to the Anglo-Saxon one.
It is in order to categorize the shifts in the 
intellectual sphere on a periodical basis. The first 
stage may be stated as 194 6-1950, which began when an 
opposition in the RPP first surfaced and ended with DP
229. Ibid., 201.
2^ ®. Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington, England: 
Eathon Press, 1985), 100.
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coming to power. This opposition overlapped with the 
writings of Ahmet Emin Yalman — the self-proclaimed 
liberal journalist. The main themes of the opposition 
gathered around the discussion on the actual meaning of 
the term democracy. The main reference point was the 
Anglo-American democracies which had proved their 
supremacy by victory in the Second World War.^ ^^  The period 
in question differed from the early Republican era, in 
that the influence of international developments on the 
domestic political scene began to increase. Thus, as far 
as the nouevauK opposition was concerned, the aura of 
nationalism which had been shaped by national 
independence, and nation-state building were gradually 
merged with the tendency towards an overall alliance with 
the Anglo-American world.
The intellectual framework, in a period where 
tentative initiatives for democracy were replaced by an 
alternative interpretation of democracy - claimed to be 
genuine by the opposition - integrated the concern with 
the requisites of democracy into preoccupation with 
providing the intellectual groundwork of the Turkish 
nation-state. However, one should not misread this shift 
as a total abandonment of the theme of "nation." Instead, 
excessive preoccupation with the construction of nation 
and its constituents continued during this period. 
However, in the rhetoric of the opposition, this concern 
was also related to the international milieu. Yalman's
In fact, for the nouevaux opposition the Anglo-American victory 
in the Second World War symbolized the victory of democracy against 
the totalitarian regimes.
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articles had the tendency to differentiate the basis of 
Turkish nation and nationalism from the extreme 
nationalism of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This 
tendency was nurtured by his engagement in international 
liberal platforms and the foundation of the Association 
for the Dissemination of Free Ideas, which connoted 
adherence to the Anglo-American model. The influence of 
the Anglo-American model on Turkey was also reflected in 
the DP's rhetoric during its opposition period. It may be 
argued that the liberal identity of the opposition was 
shaped more by this rhetoric than a consistent liberal 
theoretical scheme.
The second stage of the period (1950-1960) was 
marked by the consolidation of Anglo-American cross­
fertilization in the Forum group. The significance of the 
group was that they formed an opposing bloc in defense of 
democracy against the rule of the DP — the party which 
came to power in the name of democracy. Despite the shift 
from a state-centered polity to a party-centered one, the 
experience with DP rule proved the continuity of the 
absolutist conception of power, which had traditionally 
been based on the will of the nation. Coupled with the 
politicization of bureaucracy by the DP, such disposition 
ensured a party-dominant state. In a country with a 
strong state tradition, this meant only representational 
change in the functioning of the system. Thus, the uneasy 
disposition of the 'liberal' intellectual with a dual 
identity, which had in fact become a tradition, persisted 
throughout the multi-party era. The liberal intellectual
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once again found himself within a split identity between 
the state and opposition. As exemplified in the case of 
the Forum group, the intellectual was entrusted with a 
double responsibility as being part of the state, on the 
one hand, and being a neutral enlightener on the other.
The group constituted a consistent matrix as regards 
the Anglo-American influence, especially when compared 
with Yalman. Not differently, they grounded their 
opposition to the party in power on democracy, as 
practised in the Anglo-American world. However, the group 
provided an organized flow of thoughts which had 
theoretical and methodological bases. Theoretically, they 
represented social democratic claims, the culminating 
point in the relation between the individual and the 
state, and that between liberty and equality, following 
the neo-liberal and Keynesian chain in the West. The 
Anglo-American cross-fertilization was more manifest in 
the methodology applied. Thus, the articles published in 
Forum focused analytically on specific issues, 
institutions and ought-to-be (s), however, not, arising out 
of abstract theorizing but with reference to the existing 
models.
The group was also significant since it totally 
dispensed with the ages-long ambivalence of the 'liberal' 
intellectual between tradition and modernity, which in 
the early-Republican era was transferred into a tendency 
to construct the national within the project of 
modernization. Thus, a second point which gave the group 
the identity of a breaking point in the intellectual
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sphere, was their rejection of the synthesis between the 
East and West due to its implausibility. This was most 
manifest in the arguments proposing absolute Westernism 
at the expense of tradition. In this respect, it is 
possible to argue that the group represented the climax 
of the tendency towards identification with the West.
However ironically, in the late fifties the 
oppositional stance of the group against the DP rule on 
the basis of political responsibility, terminated when it 
came close to the RPP, the party which had long been 
accused of a tutelary mentality. This disposition was 
first presented in the articles legitimizing the mono­
party rule of the RPP;^ ^^  and second in the call for the 
unification of the opposition to overthrow the DP.233
Apart from the argument that such a shift was merely 
based on practical concerns, it can also be interpreted 
as containing the signs of past legacy. Despite his faith 
in the individual, citizen, and/or people, the Ottoman- 
Turkish 'liberal' intellectual had always lived with a 
concern for the state. In the Forum group this was 
reflected in its scienticism and consequently in the
Aksoy, "Son Demokrasi Hamlemiz Kimin Eseridir?" (Whose Work is 
Our Last Democratic Leap?), Forum, 9 (102) (June 15, 1958), 9-11/ 
Aksoy, "Son Demokrasi Hamlemiz Kimin Eseridir! -II- Tarihi Nutuk 
(İnönü'nün 1 Kasım 1945 Meclisi Açış Nutku)" (Whose Work is Our Last 
Democratic Leap! -II- Historical Speech [Openning Speech of İnönü on 
November 1, 1945]), Forum, 9 (103) (July 1, 1958), 9-11.
This shift, while blurring the identification of the group with 
the FP, as well as the distinct identity of the party itself, 
substantiates the argument by Karpat that there was no significant 
ideological disposition among the political parties of the said 
period. Instead, while all aspired for the construction of democracy 
when in opposition they could well be claimed to fall short of any 
"...viewpoint on the socio-economic aspects of democracy and freedom 
with which to supplement their political goal." Karpat, Turkey's 
Politics, 390.
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CHAPTER VI
THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL IN POST-1960 TURKEY: THE 
ULTIMATE RUPTURE - REPUBLIC OR DEMOCRACY?
THE STATE AND INTELLECTUAL IN A JOINT TASK: THE 1961
CONSTITUTION
As is known, the view that the DP government is 
trying to expand is as follows: Freedom of press 
is practised in full in our country, everyone is 
free to express his thoughts. The only issue that 
is legally banned is to insult the individuals, 
and to offend their to honor and dignity.
However, free and fearless expression of thought 
especially in a country is possible only within an 
appropriate milieu. Is it possible to expect free 
expression of thought from
intellectuals who are in one way or other linked 
to the Government, from the University staff 
members who are subject to the threat of removal 
from active duty in university by the Ministry of 
Education when they recognize that the practise of 
the freedom of thought results in prosecution or 
removal from active duty? This permanent and 
obscure repression by the government has been the 
basic reason for the stale and uneasy nature of 
intellectual work.^
In almost two months time after these statements 
were published in Forum, Turkish politics experienced a 
military intervention (May 27, 1960). The intervention
was crucial since it opened the way for a new era as 
regards the evolution of liberal identity.
h "iktidarın Basin Hürriyeti Anlayışı" (Government's Conception of 
Freedom of Press), Forum (editorial), 12 (144)(March 15, 1960), 2.
As far as Turkish politics is concerned, the 1960 
military intervention may be interpreted as a move to 
reinforce the position of the state elite vis-à-vis the 
political elite which had been impaired to the advantage 
of the latter under DP rule. However, the basis of 
legitimacy for intervention was provided more directly by 
the increasing political turmoil coupled with the failure 
of DP's economic policies. Beginning from the late 1950s 
onwards the Turkish political scene had turned into a 
show of hostile struggle between the government and 
opposition. The opposition included not only political 
parties, but also the press, judiciary, civil bureaucracy 
and university.^ In contrast to the liberal rhetoric in 
the stages of its formation, the DP increasingly resorted 
to repressive policies which reached its climax with the 
establishment of the Assembly Committee of Investigation 
{Tahkikat Komisyonu) with both legislative and judicial 
powers to inquire about and take measures against the 
activities of the opposition (April 18, 1 9 6 0 ) The first
target of the Assembly Committee was the university 
professors who criticized its establishment on the 
grounds that it was in violation of the Constitution.“*
The 1960 Military Intervention
Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment In Democracy, 1950-1975 
(London: C. Hurst and Cortpany, 1977), 44-56.
Cem Erogul, "The Establishment of Multi-Party Rule: 1945-71," in
Turkey In Transition: New Perspectives, eds. Irvin C. Schick and
Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1987), 118.
“*. Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London and New York: 
I.B. Tauris, 1993).
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This was followed by the May 1960 incidents in the 
universities in Ankara and İstanbul^ which symbolized the 
threshold of the decade (1950-1960). Apart from DP's 
falling short of implementing the policies in regard to 
upgrading the Turkish military, which proved to be to its 
disadvantage, such a situation served as a call to duty 
for the military. The "duty" was taken over by the 
National Unity Committee (NUC) which was formed as an 
interim government to protect and re-institute democracy.·^ 
This self-entitlement may be explained in the 
identification of the military with the state and thus as 
the "guardian" of Turkish democracy.* In fact, the 
Military's declaration which was broadcasted on May 27, 
1960 confirmed such a role:
Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has 
fallen and to recent, sad incidents and in order to 
prevent fratricide, the Turkish armed forces have 
taken over the administration of the country.
Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the 
purpose of extricating the (political) parties from 
the irreconciliable situation into which they have 
fallen and for the purpose of having just and free 
elections, to be held as soon as possible under the 
supervision and arbitration of an above-party and 
impartial administration, and for the purpose of
Ali Fuad Başgil, 27 Mayıs İhtilali ve Sebepleri (The May 27 
Revolution and Its Causes), trans. M. Ali Sebük and İ. Hakkı Akın 
(İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaacılık, 1966), 141-4.
Ahmad remarks that DP's policies in the sphere of military proved 
as inconclusive as in the economic sphere, which resulted in the 
military's decreasing self-esteem and purchasing power. On the 
relationship between the DP and the Armed Forces see Ahmad, The 
Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 147-159.
Eroğul, "The Establishment of Multi-Party Rule: 1945-71," 118-24.
*. Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics and the 
Military in Turkey," Comparative Politics, 16 (1) (1983), 21.
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handing over the administration to whichever party 
wins the elections.^
In line with this announced eagerness to restore 
democracy the NUC called for designing a new constitution 
by university professors.'®
The 1961 Constitution: The Realization of the 'Utopia'?
Drafting the constitution took one year." The 
significance of the process for this study lays in the 
fact that such figures as Muammer Aksoy, Turhan Feyzioğlu 
and Bahri Savcı who were among the founders of Forum, as 
well as İlhan Arsel whose articles also appeared in the 
journal, happened to be among the members of the three 
different commissions formed subsequently. This was not 
a casual involvement. It was rather because these figures 
were university professors who had been in opposition to 
the DP rule both intellectually and in active politics 
with their already formulated reform proposals.'^ The
Quoted in Kemal Karpat, "Political and Social Thought in Turkey," 
in Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, ed. 
Kemal Karpat, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1982), 378.
'®. Immediately after the intervention some professors from Istanbul 
University's Law Faculty arrived in Ankara for preliminary studies 
for laying out the new constitution. Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish 
Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military Politics (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1980 reprint), 66.
". For a detailed analysis of the constitution making process, see 
ibid., 64-72.
Turhan Feyzioğlu participated in the commission referred to as 
the Ankara Group, while Bahri Savcı and Muammer Aksoy took part in 
all the three commissions, ibid., 70-1. For the full list of the 
members of commissions see A. Aylin Özman, "The State and Bar 
Associations in Turkey: A Study in Interest Group Politics" (Ph.D. 
Dissertation. Bilkent University, Ankara, 1995), 144.
Muammer Aksoy had participated in the FP which had been formed by
a split from the DP in 1955, while Turhan Feyzioğlu had joined the
RPP.
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proposals in question were made since Forum had started 
its publication in 1954. An analysis of the articles 
published in the journal substantiates the argument that 
the 1961 Constitution provided the institutional 
framework which the intellectuals built around the 
journal, and had idealized as most appropriate for the 
practice of democracy.
To begin with, the independence of the judiciary 
which occupied a substantial place in the columns of 
Forum^ "* was ensured by Articles 132, 133 and 134 of the 
1961 Constitution.*^ As against the experience of the 
previous decade, these articles stipulated the principle 
of the total autonomy of courts from the executive in the 
practice of both judicial authority and profession.
Secondly, by the establishment of the Senate of 
Republic*^ the 1961 Constitution also fulfilled one of the 
most repeatedly discussed institutional requisites by the 
Forum group against the abuse of political power: a 
bicameral Grand National Assembly.*'^
*'*. Muammer Aksoy, "Fikir, İlim ve Öğretim Hürriyeti: Üniversite 
Muhtariyeti" (Freedom of Thought, Science and Primary Education: 
Autonomy University) Forum, 4 (37) (October 1, 1955), 9; Muammer 
Aksoy, "Hukukçuların Manevi Mes'uliyeti ve İki Hukuk Derneğine Dair" 
(About the Ethical Responsibility of Legal Professionals and Two Law 
Associations), Forum, 5 (56) (July 15, 1956), 11; Bahri Savcı, 
"Seçim İklimi Yoktur" (There is No Room for Elections), Forum, 3 (33) 
(August 1, 1955), 10-1; "Bir 'Müjde' ve Bir Unutkanlık" (A Good News 
and a Forgetfulness), Forum (editorial), 3 (30) (Jvine 15, 1955), 4-5; 
Münci Kapani, "İcra Organı Karşısında Hakimlerin İstiklali" (The 
Autonomy of Judges vis-à-vis The Executive), Forum, 6, (70) 
(February 15, 1957), 9-10.
For the full text of the 1961 Constitution, see Suna Kili, Türk 
Anayasaları (Turkish Constitutions), 2nd ed. (Ankara: Tekin 
Yayınevi, 1982), 67-159.
Article 70 of the 1961 Constitution.
Among numerous articles appeared in the columns of Forum on the 
issue of parliamentary control and bicameral legislature the 
following are exemplary: Bahri Savcı, "Murakabe Müessesesinin
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Thirdly, the 1961 Constitution embodied a separate 
section on "Social and Economic Rights and Duties" which 
fit into the standing of the Forum group with respect to 
the social aspect of democracy, Article 41 of the 
Constitution which stated that "Economic and social life 
are organized according to justice, principle of full 
employment and the aim of providing everyone with the 
level of living appropriate for the honor of humanity," 
fulfilled the group's demand that the state should be 
responsible for helping the disadvantaged in the pursuit 
of a respectable life.’^ In line with this view, the 
Constitution also introduced planning by the state for 
"realizing economic, social and cultural development by 
democratic means;... devising development plans with this
aim... »»20
Korunması,” (Protection of the Institution of Checks), Forum,3 (29)
(June 1, 1955), 9-10; İlhan Arsel, "Hükümet Sistemimiz Hakkında,”
(About our Government System), Forum, 3 (34) (August 15, 1955), 9-11; 
"Dört Mesele Bir Arada” (Four Issues at Once), Forum (editorial), 4 
(45) (February 1, 1956), 5; Bahri Savcı, "Demokratik Bir Düzende
Meclisin Gerçek Yeri” (The Real Place of Assembly in a Democratic 
Order), Forum, 4 (45) (February 1, 1956), 9-10; Feridun Canitez,
"Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanununun Tadili” (Reform of the Constitution), 
Forum, 5 (54) (May 15, 1956), 11; Arsel, "Çift Meclis Sistemi” 
(Bic^eralism) , Forum, 8 (96) (March 15, 1958), 6-8; "Karanlıkta
Vuruşanlar” (Those that Fight in the Dark), Forum (editorial), 10
(114) (December 15, 1958), 2; Munci Kapani, "Yarınki Anayasamız 
Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler” (Some Reflections on Our Future 
Constitution), Forum, 11, (127)(July 1, 1959), 8-10.
Savcı, "Batılı Demokrasinin Bazı Temel Kavramları Üzerine” (On 
Some of the Fundamental Concepts of Western Democracy), Forum, 4 (47) 
(March 1, 1956), 10-1.
Ibid.; Savcı "İktidar Savaşı Yapmadan Siyaset” Politics without 
Power Struggle), Forum, 3 (32) (July 15, 1955), 8-10.
Article 41 of the 1961 Constitution. Forum group had repeatedly 
pointed at the need for planning in social and economic spheres. See 
for example, Cahit Talas, "Müessir Bir Sosyal Politika Zarureti” (The 
Imperative of an Effective Social Policy), Forum, 4 (39) (November 1, 
1955), 14-5; "İktisadi İstikbalimizin Görünüşü” (The Panoroma of Our 
Economic Future), Forum (editorial), 4 (40) (November 15, 1955), 1-3; 
"İktisadi Tedbirler ve İçtimai Sonuçlar” (Economic Measures and 
Social Outcomes), Forum (editorial), 5 (58) (August 15, 1956), 3;
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The institutional extension of such a responsibility 
with which the state was saddled in the economic sphere 
was the establishment of the State Planning Organization 
(SPO) (September 30, 1960) its initiation as a 
constitutional organ (Article 129), the SPO seemed to 
echo the demand of the Forum group for "democratic 
planning" which connoted depoliticization in the making 
of economic decisions. Parallel to the group*s 
criticisms against the DP*s economic policies that they 
were arbitrarily made,^^ the SPO was held responsible for 
conducting economic and social research and devising
”Biz Ne istiyoruz?" (What Do We Want?), Forum (editorial), 5 (60) 
(September 15, 1956), 1-2; "Plan Kelimesinden Maksat" (What We Mean 
by Planning), Forum (editorial), 7 (73) (April 1, 1957), 7; Osman 
Okyar, "Planlama Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar VI: İktisaden Geri 
Kalmış Memleketlerde Planlama Meseleleri" (Notes on the History of 
Planning VI: Issues of Planning in Economically Backward Countries), 
Forum, 8 (89) (December 1, 1957), 15; Osman Okyar, "İktisadi 
Planciliguaizin Şekil ve Muhteva Meselesi" (The Issue of the Form and 
Content of Our Economic Planning), Forum, 3 (31) (July 1, 1955), 9- 
10; "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı" (The Need for Economic Planning), Forum, 
3 (34) (August 15, 1955), 6-7; Aydın Yalçın, "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde 
Aksayan Nedir?" (What is the Trouble with Our Attempts at 
Development), Forum, 4 (45) (February 1, 1956), 11-2.
O.N. Torun, "The Establishment and the Structure of the State 
Planning Organization," in Planning in Turkey, eds. S. İlkin and E. 
İlkin (Ankara: METU, 1967), 44-70.
Soysal, "İktisadi Devlet Teşekküllerinin Bünyesi" (The Structure 
of State Economic Enterprises), Forum, 3 (27) (May 1, 1955), 12-3; 
Soysal, "İktisadi Devlet Teşekküllerinin Murakabesi" (The Control of 
State Economic Enterprises), Forum, 3 (28) (May 15, 1955), 11-3; 
Yalçın, "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde Aksayan Nedir?," 11-2; Yalçın, "Plan 
ve Program Meselesi" (Issue of Planning and Program), Forum, 1 (75) 
(May 1, 1957), 8-9; H.C. Richard, "İktisadi Gelişmede Devletin Rolü" 
(State*s Role in Economic Development), trans. M.E-, Forum, 6 (72) 
(March 15, 1957), 16-7.
"D.P.*nin Liberalizmi, (The Liberalism of DP), Forum (editorial),
5 (60) (September 15, 1956), 6; Okyar, "İktisadi Plancılığımızın 
Şekil ve Muhteva Meselesi"; "Kendimize Güvenme Zamanı" (The Time to 
Trust Ourselves), Forum (editorial), 3 (31) (July 1, 1955), 1-2; 
"İktisadi İstikbalimizin Görünüşü" 1-3; Soysal, "Bütünlük" Forum, 6 
(63) (November 1, 1956), 11-2; Ömer Sakıp, "Demokratik Devrim Üzerine 
Düşünceler" (Reflections on Democratic Revolution), Forum, 1 (83) 
(September 1, 1957), 7-9; Ömer Sakıp, "Program ve Plan Tartışmaları" 
(Discussions on Program and Planning), Forum, 10 (114) (December 15, 
1958), 7-9.
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development programs which would form the framework for 
the governments' economic policies.
One other related issue that had occupied an 
extensive place in Forum columns in relation to the 
social aspect of democracy, was also met by Articles 4 6 
and 47 of the Constitution. Article 4 6 recognized the 
right to unionize for all employees and employers, and 
Article 47 established the right to strike for the 
workers; both of which had been perceived as basic 
elements of democracy by the Forum group. 5^
Last and for the purposes of this study, the most 
important parallelism between the 1961 Constitution and 
standing of Forum group had to do with the universities. 
Article 120 of the Constitution secured scientific and 
administrative autonomy for the universities. This was 
crucial since the group had repeatedly emphasized the two 
dimensional significance of the universities for the 
realization of democracy: for them the universities,
while providing the intellectual with the opportunity to 
conduct scientific work, also functioned as the bedrock 
of enlightened debate for the accomplishment of
william Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modem 
Turkey (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp.
^^."Gene Grev Ha)ckina Dair" (On the Freedom to Strike), Forum
(editorial), 3 (33) (August 1, 1955), 6; "Evet, Hür ve Bağımsız
Sendika" (Yes, Free and Independent Union), Forum (editorial), 4 (41) 
(December 1, 1955), 4; Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Demokrasi Davamıza Genel
Bir Bakış" (A General Look at Our Democracy Issue), Forum, 4 (46)
(February 15, 1956), 12-4; "Birlikler Kapanırken" (While the Unions
are Closed down). Forum (editorial), 7 (75) (May 1, 1957), 1-2; "Biz 
Ne İstiyoruz?" (What Do We Want?), Forum (editorial), 5 (60) 
(September 15, 1956), 1-2; Şerif Mardin, "Yeni Bir Ütopya" (A New
Utopia), Forum, 5 (51) (May 1, 1956), 10-1.
249
democratic order. 6^ The same article also recognized the 
right of university members to engage in active politics, 
and thus opened the way for the intellectual to fulfill 
his political responsibility
Since most of the topics of reform that had been 
embodied in the columns of Forum were given official 
recognition by the 1961 Constitution, one may conclude 
with the victory of liberal standing against the 
authoritarian conception of power which had found its 
lattermost example in DP's rule. On the other hand, it is 
possible to argue that such a conclusion would be one­
dimensional and short-sighted. The 1961 Constitution 
symbolized the beginning of an open-ended era, and its 
significance lied more in its illustration of the 
continuity in the relationship between the state and 
'liberal' intellectual, and thus the limits of 'liberal' 
intellectual in the Turkish context.
"ilme Verdiğimiz Kıymet" (The Value Attributed to Science), Forum 
(editorial), 4 (48) (March 15, 1956), 1-2; "Rektör Seçimi" (The
Election of Rector), Forum (editorial), 3 (31) (July 1, 1955), 5;
Aydın Yalçın, "Üniversitelerimizde Bilimsel Çalışmalar" (Scientific 
Works in Our Universities), Forum, 3 (34) (August 15, 1955), 19-20/
"Demokratik Bir Düzende İlim Adamlarının Yeri" (The Place of 
Scientists in a Democratic Order), Forum (editorial), 3 (35)
(September 1, 1955), 3.
Cemal Yıldırım, "Bilimin Sosyal İlgileri" (Social Reflections of 
Science), Forum, 4 (37) (October 1, 1955), 19-20; Roger Apery, 
"Tarafsızlık Meselesi" (The Issue of Neutrality), trans. Cemal 
Yıldırım, Forum, 5, (52) (May 15, 1956), 17; "Demokratik Bir Düzende
İlim Adamlarının Yeri"; "İlme Verdiğimiz Kıymet."
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The State and Intellectual as the Apostles of Democracy
The 1961 Constitution bore the seeds of a new era 
for Turkish political life. However, one should be
cautious in claiming the same for the Turkish
intellectual, and particularly for the 'liberal'
intellectual. The identity of Turkish intellectual as 
legislator was once more enhanced by the 1960 military 
intervention. This was substantiated in the resort of 
military to university members for drawing up the new 
constitution.The most conspicious manifestation of such 
a responsibility imposed on the intellectual may be 
observed in General Cemal Gürsel's statement, who chaired 
the NUC:
We believe in the university. ... The reason why we 
appeal to you is as follows: Prepare a new 
constitution immediately. I urge you to accomplish 
this in the shortest time possible. Because we are 
determined to hold elections in three months time 
and to hand over the power to civilian government
However, this 'respect' for the university was not 
one-sided. The intellectual's self-identification 
contributed to a bilateral positioning. From the very 
start of the period, the intellectual happened to 
cooperate with the state. The inceptive example of this 
cooperation was displayed in the declaration prepared by
LIBERAL IDENTITY IN SHADES
Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961, 66.
Quoted in Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi (1950-1995) 
(Turkey's History of Democracy [1950-1995]) (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi
Yayınları, 1996), 89.
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university members to legitimize the intervention 
"scientifically":
It would be wrong to view the situation (i.e., in 
which we find ourselves today) as an ordinary 
political coup. It is regrettable that, for many 
months and even years now, the political power that 
should have been the guardian of civil rights and 
that symbolized the principles of state, law, 
justice, ethics, public interest, and public
service has lost this quality; it has become, 
instead, a materialistic force representative of 
personal influence, and ambition and class 
privilege.
We look upon the actions of the Committee of 
National Unity (i.e., the military government) in 
arranging for the administration to be taken over 
by state forces and institutions as a measure 
dictated by the imperative need to re-establish a 
legitimate rule so as to redress a situation in 
which social institutions had been rendered 
virtually inoperative, in which the people were led 
to anarchy by being set at each other’s throats, 
and in which there was being exerted a conscious 
effort to destroy all the ethical and moral 
foundations that support such institutions
As far as the liberal intellectual is concerned, one
comes up with a rather debilitating picture. As
constituting an irony with the 1961 Constitution, which
contained their long-aspired reform proposals, it is not
possible to trace a continuity in the identity of the
liberal-minded intellectuals in the post-1960 period.
Forum: The Victory of Social Democracy over Liberal Ethos
The case of Forum exemplifies the limits of liberal 
identity in the Turkish context. These limits may be
Quoted in Karpat, "Political and Social Thought in Turkey," 379- 
80. Zürcher interprets this declaration as a "modern fetva." Zürcher, 
Turkey: A Modern History, 254.
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observed in the uneasiness in upholding a cohesive and 
durable liberal identity in the face of identification 
with the state. The Turkish intellectual's liberal 
identity was squeezed first and foremost with his 
commitment to the sustenance of the state. In fact, for 
the Forum group, such an unequivocal stance had already 
been manifest at its very inception in its self- 
identification as "liberal-socialist. "3' In the late 
1950s, this dual-identity evolved to the disadvantage of 
the former and ended with the solidification of "via 
media" {orta yol) standing in the early 1960s.
This transformation as reflected in the political 
scene by the merging of FP with RPP continued in the 
constitution-making process, which reconstructed the 
state-intellectual fusion, that had been impaired in the 
past decade. This reconstruction was reflected in Forum's 
applause for the 1960 military intervention:
It would not be apt to accept and interpret the 
May 27 Revolution as merely a military movement, an 
incident initiated in the name of the Turkish Armed 
Forces to overthrow a deviated political system. 
...especially after 1954, departure from natural 
principles of the democratic system, trying to 
cover difficulties and resentment by methods and 
means that do not conform with the nature of a 
democratic system motivated those forces of society 
which happen to perform the role of guidance.
For Forum group the phrase "socialist" corresponded to a 
democratic standing with respect to the state. "Biz Ne İstiyoruz," 2. 
^^."Orta Yolun Kaderi" (The Fate of Mid-Way), Forum (editorial) 
(194) (May 1, 1962), 3-5.
"27 Mayıs" (May 27), Forum (editorial) (196) (June 1, 1962), 3. 
See also "Ordu ve PolitDca" (Army and Politics), Forum (editorial) 
(209) (December 15, 1962), 3; "27 Mayıs ve İktisadi Hayatımız" (May 
27 and Our Economic Life), Forum (editorial) (220) (June 1, 1963), 3- 
4.
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Such a statist approach continued throughout the 
early 1960s.The positioning of the journal as 'Via 
media", which ultimately meant social democracy,^^ did not 
represent a radical abandoning of the themes around which 
the Forum group had gathered in the past decade. 
Instead, the difference from the past decade should be 
searched in the points of opposition in terms of which 
the post-1960 Forum tried to form its distinctive 
identity. To begin with the journal defined the phrase, 
"via media'" vis-à-vis "extremist trends, " which meant 
extreme nationalists and conservatives on the one hand, 
and "...extreme statist and socialist group..." on the 
other .^'7
"Sıkı Yönetim" (Martial Law), Forum (editorial) (221) (June 15, 
1963), 3-4; Bülent Daver, "Demokraside Sıkı Yönetim" (Martial Law in 
Democracy), Forum (editorial) (230) (November 1, 1963), 8-9.
. "Plan ve Sonrası" (Plan and Its Aftermath), Forum (editorial) 
(207) (November 15, 1962), 5.
In parallel to the past decade the journal continued in its 
appraisal of parliamentary regime, the role of intellectuals as well 
as the responsibility of political parties in full accomplishment of 
democracy, and of democratic planning. See for example, "Şekli 
Demokrasiden Öz Demokrasiye" (From Formal Democracy to Genuine 
Democracy), Forum (editorial) (199) (July 15, 1962), 3-5/ "Plan ve
Sonrası," 4-6/ Cahit Talas, "Kalkınma ve İktisadi Sistemler"
(Development and Economic Systems), Forum (209) (December 15, 1962),
15-7/ A. Kerimoglu, "Türk ve Fransız Plancılığı: Demokratik
Plancılığın Doğuşu" (Planning in Turkey and France: The Birth of
Democratic Planning), Forum (216) (April 1, 1963), 20-1/
"Parlamentonun Sorumluluğu" (The Responsibility of Parliament), Forum 
(editorial) (218) (May 1, 1963), 3-4/ Adnan Güriz, "Modern
Demokrasinin Temel İlkeleri: I-Hürriyet" (Basic Principles of Modern
Democracy: I-Freedom) , Forum (219) (May 15, 1963), 11-4; Güriz, 
"Modern Demokrasinin Temel İlkeleri: II-Eşitlik" (Basic Principles of 
Modern Democracy: II-Equality), Forum (224) (August 1, 1963), 9-11;
"Buhranın Asıl Kaynağı" (The Real Reason of Crisis) , Forum 
(editorial) (229) (October 15, 1963), 3-4/ "Siyasi Buhranların 
Gerçekleri" (Facts about Political Crises), Forum (editorial) (234) 
(January 1, 1964), 4/ "Onbir Yil" (Eleven Years), Forum
(editorial)(240) (April 1, 1964), 3-4.
"Orta Yolun Kaderi," 3; "Onbir Yıl," 4.
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The political extension of this self-identification 
was affiliation to the RPP. This affiliation was also 
reflected in the group's perception of the Justice Party 
(JP), which was among the claimants to the DP's legacy 
and the major rival of the RPP, as representing an 
extreme nationalistic and conservative trend.^* Secondly, 
the group opposed liberalism on the grounds that it did 
not fit the Turkish context. Viewing liberals as "extreme 
optimists," the journal rejected the possibility of 
direct adoption of Western democracies. Instead, it 
proposed "levelled freedom, democracy in conformity with 
the conditions. Thirdly, the symbolic split of the 
post-1960 Forum from its past identity appeared in its 
severe attack against Aydın Yalçın, one of the prominent 
founders of the journal and self-proclaimed liberal. The 
criticism was directed against Yalçın's reference to the 
past decade as the "Golden Age," and once more 
represented the journal's faith in the close relationship 
between the state and intellectual as apostles for the 
sustenance of democracy
"Onbir Yil," 3-4. For the strict opposition of Forum against the 
J.P., see also "A.P. Kongreleri ve Milli İdare" {Congresses of JP 
and National Will), Forum (editorial) (200) (August 1, 1962), 6-7;
"Türk Demokrasisinin Kaderi" (The Fate of Turkish Democracy) , Forum 
(editorial) (204) (October 1, 1962), 3-4; "A.P. Genel Kongresi"
(General Congress of JP) , Forum (editorial) (209) (December 15,
1962) , 7; "Huzur Çıkmazı" (The Impasse of Peace), Forum (editorial)
(214) (March 1, 1963); "Bundan Sonrası" (From Now on). Forum 
(editorial) (217) (April 15, 1963), 3-4; "Başkanlık Seçimleri"
(Presidential Elections), Forum (editorial) (231) (November 15,
1963) , 5; "Mahalli Seçimlerden Hükümet Buhranına" (From Municipal
Elections to Governmental Crisis), Forum (editorial) (233) (December 
15, 1963), 3-4.
"iki Alanda da Orta Yol" (Mid-Way in Both Spheres), Forum 
(editorial) (211) (January 15, 1963), 3-5.
"Aydın Yalçın Meselesi ve Aydınlar" (The Issue of Aydın Yalçın 
and Intellectuals), Forum (editorial) (179) (September 15, 1961). For
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In the final analysis, this evolution of Forum in 
almost a decade, which may be interpreted as the victory 
of democracy over liberal identity, once more represented 
the limits of liberal intellectual disposition in the 
Turkish context.'*^  The period that was initiated by the 
1961 Constitution bore the seeds of new political 
dynamics. As interpreted by some students of Turkish 
politics, in the latter half of the 1960s the liberal 
aura initiated by the Constitution resulted in the 
ideologization of politics and adoption of extremist 
identities in both the left and right of the political 
spectrum.In such a milieu, the liberal intellectual 
searched either for identification with the state, which 
eased his claim to stand above-parties or for a definite 
political standing, which led him to hover between 
center-right parties.
1961-1979: The Demise of Liberal Identity
In the period between January 1961-January 1980, 
Turkey had nineteen different governments.'*^ As mentioned 
above, the period was marked first with ideologization of
the response of Yalçın see "Aydın Yalçın'in Cevabı" (Aydın Yalçın's 
Response), Forum (181) (October 15, 1961).
. In the latter half of 1960s Forum assumed a leftist standing.
Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: 
Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," in Perspectives on 
Democracy In Turkey, ed. Ergxm Özbudım (Ankara: Turkish Political
Science Association, 1988), 19-25; Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment In
Democracy, 1950-1975, 185-91; Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics In
Modern Turkey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 1-44; Eroğul, "The
Establishment of Multi-Party Rule: 1945-71," 129-39.
Karpat, "Political and Social Thought in Turkey," 375.
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politics, followed by polarization and hence 
fragmentation of the political system.
Although the Turkish political system seemed to have 
achieved a stable standing following the rather conflict- 
ridden coalitions between 1961-1965, the late 1960s 
witnessed political turbulence initiated mainly by the 
extreme left. The incapacity of the government to 
overcome the ideological strife was coupled with the 
irritating emergence of such extremist parties on the 
right as the National Order Party (NOP), and the 
Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP) This led to
stepping in of the military by memorandum for the second 
time on March 12, 1971.^  ^ However, two years of indirect
rule by the military could not eliminate the instability 
which became the major feature of Turkish political life. 
Thus, between 1973-1979, except for the short interval of 
the RPP government in 1977, Turkish politics was 
characterized by subsequent coalition governments.'’^ The 
ideological strife which started in the late 1960s, 
further increased due to the intensification.of political 
violence between the extreme left and right. Such a scene 
was nothing but a 'call to duty for the military' for the 
third time (September 12, 1980).
Renamed as Nationalist Action Party in 1966.
Ozbudun has referred the March 12 coup by memorandum as a "half- 
coup," since the military exercised its rule trough a civilian 
government. Ozbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: 
Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," 21.
For a detailed analysis of the party system in the period 
concerned see Sabri Sayari, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," 
Government and Opposition, 13 (1978), 39-57.
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This rather disruptive evolution of politics had its 
effects on the liberal-minded intellectual. As is clear 
by now, the liberal-minded intellectual has traditionally 
found himself in a dilemma arising from two contrasting 
claims on his commitment: universaListic commitments on
the one hand, and the peculiarities of the Turkish 
context which required responsibility first to the state 
and secondly to the people, on the other. 2\n escape from 
this predicament was found in Atatürkism; that is a re­
interpretation of Kemalist principles. For the liberal 
intellectual Atatürkism symbolized "...a philosophy of 
enlightenment, a liberal trend of thought and a pure 
attempt of Westernization."'*'^  However, such an
interpretation was common to the rhetoric of almost all 
political parties and intellectuals, except for the 
extreme left and pro-Islamists. Thus, during the period 
in question the liberal intellectual who was already 
facing problems in forming a consistent identity, also 
experienced dilemmas in expressing his disposition in the 
political spectrum. This uneasiness was due more to his 
faith in modernization-as-project, than radicalization of 
politics.
The case of Aydın Yalçın is exemplary in this 
respect. Upon his split from the Forum group. Yalçın 
began to publish a daily under the name Öncü (1960-1962) 
and subsequently a fortnightly. Yarın (1963-1968), and 
acted as editorial columnist. Both initiatives may be
47. Yalçın, "Gerçek Atatürkçülük" (True Atatürkism) , Öncü (November 
10, 1961).
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interpreted as attempts to fill the gap that had emerged 
by the elimination of the liberal dimension from Forum. 
Such an interpretation is substantiated when one analyzes 
the basic topics of interest in Yalçın’s articles.
Similar to the first issue of Forum, in the first 
issue of Öncü, Yalçın stated the main aim of the daily as 
"to assist the public by publication with eloquent 
intellectual concern on urgent and basic issues of" 
Turkey.·^ ® This disposition entrusted the intellectual with 
a leadership mission for the realization of democracy.“*^ 
According to Yalçın, the mission contained not only the 
imperative to "think and express but also to act... in 
such countries as Turkey which experience rapid social 
change.
Secondly, Yalçın insisted on the requisite of an 
intellectual basis in the formation of political parties. 
Such a concern was attributed to the lack of an 
intellectual tradition in Turkey for the realization of 
democracy. In fact, this interpretation reconciled 
Yalçın's pro-interventionist standing with his commitment 
to democracy.Putting the blame on the political leaders
Yalçın, "Yol Kavşağında Bir Öncü" (A Protagonist at the 
Crossroads), Öncü (August 26, 1960).
'•9. Yalçın, "İhtiyaç Sistem ve İdeolojiye midir?" (Do We Need System 
and Ideology?), Öncü (August 31, 1960).
Yalçın, "Siyasette Aydınlar" (Intellectuals in Politics), Öncü 
(December 17, 1960).
Yalçın, "Esasta Anlaşalım" (We Shall Agree on the Principles), 
Öncü (September 16, 1960); "Yeni Partinin Keşfi" (The Discovery of
the New Party) Öncü (November 28, 1960).
Although Öncü was subjected to subsequent suspensions between 
December 1960 and September 1961, the daily was not in opposition to 
the military in the actual sense of term. Weiker, The Turkish 
Revolution, 1960-1961, 101-2. This was apparent in Yalçın's articles 
praising the 1960 intervention and military as the saviours of 
Turkish democracy. For exanple, see Yalçın, "Yol Kavşağında Bir
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of the previous decade for constituting "monopoly of 
political professionals”^  ^ and thus impeding democracy, he 
referred to the intervention as an act "not against the 
multi-party regime, but against the disposition and 
cadres of some parties which degenerated democracy."^'*
Thirdly, Yalçın emphasized the necessity for debate 
for the realization of democracy. He posited the need for 
free expression of every thought in order to reach the 
best judgement for the whole.In a way, this emphasis on 
debate formed the basis of his understanding of 
democracy: "Democracy is nothing but the method of
organized debate in order to find the most appropriate 
system as regards the society. Not unlike the Forum 
group of the past decade, he employed the term "open 
society" to denote the social aspect of such a 
definition.
Öncü;" "Milli Birlik Komitesi" (National Unity Committee), Öncü 
(September 10, 1960); "Hürriyet İnancı" (Faith in Freedom), Öncü 
(September 29, 1960); "Devleti Korumak Hakkı" (The Right to Save the
State), Öncü (May 5, 1962).
Yalçın, "Profesyonel Politikacı ve Demokrasi" (Professional 
Politician and Democracy), Öncü (September 26, 1960). Distinguishing
between the DP as an organization with historical significance and 
its leaders. Yalçın directed severe criticisms to the DP leaders. 
"Demokrat Partinin Akıbeti" (The End of Democratic Party) Öncü
(September 3, 1960); Yalçın, "Teşhisi İyi Koymalıyız" Öncü
(September 4, 1960); Yalçın, "Milli Birlik Komitesi"; Yalçın,
"Demokrasi ve Lider" (Democracy and Leader), Öncü (September 14, 
1960); Yalçın, "Hürriyet İnancı".
Yalçın, "Esasta Anlaşalım."
Yalçın, "İlim ve Demokrasi" (Science and Democracy), Öncü
(October 1, 1960); Yalçın, "Farklı Düşünceye Saygı" (Respect for
Different Thoughts), Öncü (November 25, 1961); Yalçın, "Sosyalizm, 
Komünizm" (Socialism, Communism), Öncü (December 1, 1961).
Yalçın, "Zihniyet ve Tutum Meselesi" (The Issue of Mentality and 
Attitude), Öncü (February 22, 1961).
, Yalçın, "Partiler ve Demokrasi" (Parties and Democracy), Öncü
(November 17, 1960); Yalçın, "Siyasi İşbirliği" (Political
Cooperation), Öncü (January 31, 1961).
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In his arguments. Yalçın drew upon the English 
model, which in the final analysis led him to conclude 
with the need for an opposition party which would be 
competent to act as an alternative to government 
Criticizing the JP as a blind follower of the DP,^  ^ he 
personally engaged in the formation of a new party, under 
the name of New Turkey Party (NTP) (February 13, 1961),
which was reminiscent of the FP experienceAccording to 
Yalçın, the NTP fulfilled all the prerequisites of sound 
opposition: It had an intellectual framework which was
grounded on faith in Western democracy. Relatedly, the 
party assumed a rational standing and thus in politics it 
was willing to cooperate rather than to struggle for 
personal ambitions. Lastly, it was determined not only to 
satisfy the demands of its social basis but also to guide 
them.®*
Yalçın's experience with the NTP was important since 
it was through this process that one observes his 
distancing from the Forum group of the past decade with
Yalçın, "Partiler ve Demokrasi"; Yalçın, "Ders Aldık mı?" (Did We 
Learn a Lesson?)^ Öncü (February 2, 1961); Yalçın, ”Yeni Parti”.
Yalçın, "Demokratik Parti Hasreti" (Longing for Democratic 
Party), Öncü (January 9, 1961); Yalçın, "Yeni Türkiye Partisi" (New
Turkey Party), Öncü (February 14, 1962).
The leader of the party had participated in the FP. Before the 
official foundation of the NTP Yalçın pointed that the party would be 
established on the legacy of the FP. Yalçın, "Bir Yıldönümü" (An 
Anniversary) , Öncü (December 23, 1960) . Above all chief members of
the party were cautious to distinguish themselves from the JP which 
declared itself to be the heir of the DP. In this respect see Yalçın, 
"Siyasi Ortam" (Political Milieu), Öncü (October 25, 1960); Yalçın, 
"Yeni Partiden Maksat" (The Aim of the New Party), Öncü (November 24,
1960) . For the self-identification of JP as the outgrowth of the DP 
see Avner Levi, "The Justice Party, 1961-1980," in Political Parties 
and Democracy in Turkey, eds. Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 136.
. Yalçın, "Dikkatli Olalım" (We Shall Be Careful), Öncü (August 6,
1961) ; Yalçın, "Yeni Türkiye Partisi"; Yalçın, "Siyasi Ortam."
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respect to both topics of interest in his intellectual 
preoccupation and his engagement in active politics. The 
break can be observed in his approach to "freedom" and 
"issue of regime." Arguing that the NUC and the 
Constitutional Assembly settled such constitutional 
issues. Yalçın emphasized the need for constructing sound 
particular policies for economic development and social 
reforms.This reflected his satisfaction with the 
liberal nature of the 1961 Constitution in providing and 
guaranteeing the institutional framework for a free 
order, which had formed the major basis of Forum's 
opposition to DP rule in the past decade. Now that the 
institutions of the regime fulfilled the 'prerequisites 
of democracy,' interest should shift to the means to 
sustain it.^ ^
In this respect. Yalçın pointed at two aspects of 
the open-ended process of democracy: the society and
political parties. As far as the society was concerned, 
he pointed to the need for "a revolution in mentality."^'* 
Stating that Turkish society has not yet fully
internalized social elements necessary for the 
realization of democracy, he stressed the need for 
education for the development of the citizen who would 
himself be capable of deciding how to act, rather than 
being directed by tradition, or by others. Here, his main
2^. Yalçın, "Yeni Türkiye Partisi."
Yalçın pointed at the need of taking care of the future of 
democracy. Yalçın, "Partizan İdare" (Partisan Administration), Öncü 
(July 28, 1961).
Yalçın, "Usul Hakkında" (On Procedure) , Öncü (February 5, 1961) .
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reference points were personal responsibility and freedom 
of thought.However, the creation of free order was not 
to be only through education. Viewing politics as a 
training ground in itself, Yalçın thought that first and 
foremost political leaders themselves had responsibility 
for shaping and directing the society.^ In Yalçın's 
articles, the view of democracy as an open-ended process 
was not limited to a one-way flow of demands from the 
people to the parties. Instead, he emphasized the pursuit 
of active political leadership to form a mutual 
interaction between the two.^ "^  Political leaders were 
required not only for the immediate realization of 
demands arising from their social basis, but also to 
articulate this social basis in accordance with 
scientific mentality, i.e., "real Western mentality which 
found its expression through freedom of thought."^® Thus, 
for Yalçın political leaders should arise among 
intellectuals, be revolutionary and act as statesperson.^’ 
Yalçın also criticized the major political parties 
of the period. First, he accused the JP of ignoring the 
imperative of intellectual basis in political activity
Yalçın, "Eğitim ve Demokrasi" (Education and Democracy), Öncü 
(September 16, 1960); Yalçın, "Politikada İnsan Faktörü" (Human
Element in Politics), Öncü (January 8, 1961) .
Yalçın, "Teşhisi İyi Koymalıyız".
Yalçın, "Demokrasi ve Lider"; Yalçın, "Siyasi Liderlik" 
(Political Leadership), Öncü (July 3, 1961); Yalçın, "Karşılıklı 
Etki" (Mutual Influence), Öncü (July 14, 1961).
Yalçın, "Gerçek Atatürkçülük"; Yalçın, "Liderleri Yakından 
Tanımalıyız" (We Should Know Leaders Well), Öncü (July 25, 1961);
Yalçın, "Yeni Partinin Keşfi"; "Demokrasi ve Lider"; Yalçın, 
"Demokrasimizde Aksamalar" (Breakdowns in Our Democracy), Öncü 
(September 15, 1960) .
Yalçın, "Din ve Dil" (Religion and Language) , Öncü (October 1, 
1960).
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and acting merely on populism.'^“ Secondly, he attacked the 
RPP for displaying an incoherent, ambiguous and 
inconsistent approach in both political and economic 
matters.For him, by making concessions to the extremist 
groups, specifically to the leftists, the RPP endangered 
the future of democracy jje also accused the RPP for 
adopting a totalitarian mentality, which for him was 
evident by its statist approach to the economy.
The most conspicious manifestation of Yalçın's 
liberal disposition as well as that of the NTP, may be 
observed in the approach to economy, specifically to the 
SPO in the period concerned. It was in this respect that 
perhaps for the first time faith in the individual, and 
not in citizen, was expressed.In parallel to the 
concept of "democratic planning" of the past decade, 
Yalçın approved the establishment of the SPO only as a 
practice of "Planning in Free Society. For him, the 
ideal model would be an organization with only 
harmonizing functions in the running of the economy. 
Thus, Yalçın strictly opposed the extension of the 
state's sphere in the economy through the SPO for the 
sake of development. He ardently supported private 
enterprise as a stimulative force in economic
Yalçın, "Yeni Türkiye Partisi".
. Yalçın, "Bu Tutum Güven Verir mi?" (Is this Attitude 
Trustworthy?), Öncü (December 13, 1961).
Yalçın, Yarın (October 27, 1965).
Yalçın, "İktisadi Gelişme ve Planlama" (Economic Development and 
Planning), Öncü (February 24, 1961); Yalçın, "Yanlış Teşhis-Yanlış
Çözüm" (Wrong Diagnosis-Wrong Solution), Yarın (April 16, 1964). .
Yalçın, "Hür Cemiyet Planlaması" (Planning in Free Society), Öncü 
(September 3, 1960).
Ibid.
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development/ and proposed state initiative to step in at 
times only when the former proved to te insufficient.^^
However, both Yalçın's publications and the NTP had 
rather short life-spans. In fact, it was Yalçın who first 
left the NTP and joined the JP ranks (1964). Reminiscent 
of the FP, the NTP subsequently dissolved itself and 
merged with the JP.'^'^ The following decade of fierce 
political turbulence was to lead the liberal-minded 
intellectual into an intensive combat against communism.
Drawing upon the framework stated above it might not 
be wrong to conclude that similar to the Republican 
intellectuals of the previous decades who had assumed a 
liberal disposition. Yalçın's liberal identity was based 
first and foremost on modernization, which ultimately 
meant Westernization. In the period under scrutiny, he 
believed that the institutional structure that was 
required for this project was set up by the 1961 
Constitution. Thus, for him the time had come to lay the 
basis for the flow of Western thinking, which would have 
enabled the institutions to operate efficiently. 
According to Yalçın, the most appropriate tradition of 
thought for Turkey was liberalism. It was in this respect 
that he opposed conservative disposibion and deemed it 
subject to failure. For him the time was not yet ripe for
Yalçın, "İktisadi Gelişme ve Planlama"; Yalçın, "Sosyalistleri 
Yanıltan" (Fallacy of Socialists), Öncü (February 4, 1962).
. it is possible to interpret that merge as somehow ironic since 
the NTP and particularly Yalçın repeatedly criticized the JP as 
displaying both "opportunistic" and "conservative" tendencies.
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such conservatism either as a disposition or a tradition 
of thought.'^ *
THE 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION AND BEYOND: THE LEGACY
CONTINUES
As mentioned above, the late 1970s were marked by 
ideological polarization which was reflected as 
fragmentation at the party level and as street fights at 
the social level. The fragmentation at the political 
level resulted in the incapacity of any party to achieve 
majority in the parliament. The solution was sought in 
the Nationalist Front governments (March 1975 - December 
1977). Still, the inability of the Nationalist Front 
governments to reach consensus on basic policies, coupled 
with the politicization of bureaucracy deepened the 
political turmoil.Further, with the intensification of 
economic problems the crisis reached a turning point by 
the inability of the parliament to elect a president in 
1980. The last ditch effort on the part of the government 
was initiated with respect to the economic structure. The 
JP government of the period tried to escape at least from 
the economic crisis Turkey faced at the time by January 
24 (1980) Decisions, which introduced a free-market
Yalçın, "ilericilik. Gericilik" (Progressivism, Reactionism), 
Öncü (July 9, 1961).
In his critical evaluation of the period especially after 1975, 
Metin Heper notes that the basic feature that characterized the 
concerned coalitions was "immobilism, " which he attributes to 
political participation without normative content. See Metin Heper, 
"Recent Instability in Turkish Politics: End of a Monocentrist
Policy?" International Journal of Turkish Studies, 1 (1979-1980),
102-13.
266
economy. This was a reaction to the failure of the SPO's 
policies. The reform package was also against the State 
Economic Enterprises (SEE) that were perceived to be 
burdens on the economy.
However, this last minute effort to at least 
stabilize the economy did not prevent the military from 
stepping in.*^  Above all, the military intervention has 
been interpreted as the culminating point of the failure 
of the 1961 Constitution. The Constitution was criticized 
by one group of the intellectuals to fall short of 
achieving its original task: strengthening the state,
that is the bureaucracy, the military and the president, 
vis-a-vis the short-sightedness of the politicians. 
Another criticism came from the political sphere. 
Süleyman Demirel (Chairman of the JP) was repeatedly 
stating his disapproval for the Constitution by claiming 
that it gave way to "too much freedom" as to endanger the 
regime.®^ In parallel, one prominent student of Turkish 
politics has attributed the problems of the period not to 
"...repression, but [to] excess of expression."*^
From one theoretical perspective, the 1961 
Constitution which had been prepared with the aim of 
preventing the re-occurrence of the misdeeds of the DP
Çağlar Keyder, "Economic Development and Crisis: 1950-1980," in
Turkey In Transition: New Perspectives, eds. Irvin C. Schick and
Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987), 298-305.
. In fact, the discomfort of the military had already been 
expressed by a memorandum on January 2, 1980 which fell short of
producing the effect expected to be similar to the 1971 memorandum. 
Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History.
Quoted in Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, p.
Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey's Travails," Foreign Affairs, 58 
(1979), 1-29.
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government, by reinforcing the state elite against the 
political elite did not stop the politicization of the 
bureaucracy in the igVOs.*** When considered from this 
perspective, one may argue that the 1980 military coup 
had another significant dimension besides its being 
another example of the military's function as the saviour 
of democracy.*^ On the one hand, the intervention
displayed the continuity of the tension between the state 
and political elites as claimants to be the sole 
authority for democracy. On the other hand, through the 
1982 Constitution it opened a new era for the relation 
between the two through the restructuration of the sphere 
of state.This restructuration was to have its effects 
also on the state-intellectual relationship.
Metin Heper, "The State, Democracy and Bureaucracy in Turkey," in 
The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective, ed.
Metin Heper (New York: Greenwood Press^ 1987), 131-45.
Heper and Tachau, "The State, Politics and Military in Turkey,” 
2 6; George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 
1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers?,” in State, Democracy and the
Military: Turkey in the 1980s, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin 
(Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 193.
For an analysis of the restructuration brought about by 1982 
Constitution see Ozbudun, "The Status of the President of the 
Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982: Presidentialism or
Parliamentarism?” in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 
1980s, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin and New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1988), 37-45; Ahmet Evin, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages 
Before and After 1980,” in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey 
in the 1980s, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin and New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 201-13; Metin Heper, "The state and
debureaucratization: the case of Turkey,” International Social
Science Journal (126) (1990), 605-15; Ersin Kalaycioglu "The 1983
Parliament in Turkey: Changes and Continuities,” in State, Democracy 
and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet
Evin, (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 47-62.
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On the eve of the 1980 military intervention a 
fortnightly journal began publication, under the name of 
Yeni Forum (September 15, 1979) . The name of the journal
was deliberately chosen by its founders with the aim of 
differentiating it from the Forum of the past decade. The 
core group was headed by a familiar figure. Aydın Yalçın. 
Yalçın who had quit active politics upon his clash with 
Demirel and the latter's initiative for his removal from 
the JP, had returned to the university. Alongside with 
Yalçın some columnists, mainly from the liberal flank of 
the Forum of 1950s also participated in the journal. 
Almost all of the contributors occupied posts in the 
university, and especially as students of Yalçın. 
However, the distinction from the Forum of the past 
decade was not reserved to the name of the journal.
Yeni Forum began its publication by declaring its 
affinity to the Forum of the 1950s, and underlining its 
difference from the Forum of the 1960s. This, was due to 
the latter's shift towards the left in the second half of 
the past decade. At its inception, the journal declared a 
liberal democratic stance with an all out faith in 
freedom:
Forum, by definition, is a symbol, a concept, 
closely connected with democracy. The name of our 
journal is linked with such concepts as regime of 
freedom, pluralist order, freedom of discussion and 
human rights.
Yeni Forum: Disorder versus Freedom
87. Exemplary are Osman Okyar and Kazım Berzeg.
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We will repeat the phrase from a liberal 
philosopher: "In order to eliminate the
difficulties caused by freedom, we need more 
freedom.” It means that freedom as a regime has a 
mechanism of self-correction and in this sense it 
is unprecedented.^^
However, at a time of intense political strife, this 
rhetoric of freedom soon left its place to efforts to 
counter the perceived threats from Marxist ideology and 
preventing it from damaging the foundations of the 
Republic, not only by informing the public, but also by 
trying to convince the Turkish intellectuals about the 
"pseudo-scientific” mentality of Marxism.In fact, this 
was the most often made argument in the columns of the 
journal in the next decade.
Yalçın, "Niçin Çıkıyoruz?" (Why Do We Publish?) Yenl Forum, 1 (1)
(September 15, 1979), 2.
Yalçın, "Giriş: Savaşmadan Teslim Alma Çabaları" (Introduction;
Efforts to Surrender without Struggle), in Vatan Hıyanetinin 
Anatomisi (The Anatomy of Treason) ed. Aydın Yalçın (Ankara: Daily
News Web. Ofset Tesisleri, 1986), 5-12. This book comprises Yalçın*s 
articles that appeared in Yenl Forum between 1979-1984 and which were 
basically against Marxist theory and the extreme leftists.
See for example, "Gençliği Hedef Alan İdeolojik Saldırılar" 
(Ideological Attacks that Target the Youth), Yenl Forum (editorial), 
6 (129) (January 15, 1985), 8-9; "Psikolojik Savaşta Karşı Önlemler
Nelerdir?" (What Are the Counter-Measures in Psychological War), Yenl 
Forum (editorial), 6 (131) (February 15, 1985), 3-5; "Üniversiteler
ve Çağdaş Softalar" (Universities and Modern Softalar), Yenl Forum 
(editorial), 6 (136) (May 1, 1985), 11-2; "Komünistler, Yalan ve
Aydınlar" (Communists, Lies and Intellectuals) , Yenl Forum 
(editorial), 6 (137) (May 15, 1985), 11-2; "Orduya Komünist Sızması" 
(Intrusion of Communists into the Army), Yenl Forum (editorial), 6, 
(138) (June 1, 1985), 9; "Solun Fikri Perişanlığı" (The Intellectual 
Disarray of Left), Yenl Forum (editorial), 6 (141) (July 15, 1985),
10-1; "Aydınların Görevi" (The Duty of Intellectuals), Yenl Forum 
(editorial), 6 (144) (September 1, 1985), 3-5; "Hayal Kırıklığı ve 
Pişmanlık" (Disappointment and Regret), Yenl Forum (editorial), 6
(147) (October 15, 1985), 3-4; "Öğrenci Derneklerine Dikkat"
(Attention to Students* Associations), Yenl Forum (editorial), 6
(148) (November 1, 1985), 6-7; "DİSK*in Kapatılması Üzerine" (On the
Closure of DİSK), Yenl Forum (editorial), 8 (176) (January 1, 1987),
13-5; Zafer Dağhan, "Bir Konferansın Düşündürdükleri" (Reflections 
on a Conference), Yenl Forum, 8 (176) (January 1, 1987), 46-9; "DİSK, 
Marksizm ve Sosyal Demokratlık" (DİSK, Marxism and Social Democrats), 
Yenl Forum (editorial), 8 (177) (January 15, 1987), 12-5; "Radikal
Sol Dergi Furyası" (Overflow of Leftist Journals), Yenl Forum 
(editorial), 8 (177) (January 15, 1987), 15-8; "Radikal Sol
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Third Constitution of the Turkish Republic: Establishment 
of a Tradition?
What makes Yen! Forum peculiar for the purposes of 
this study is the reform package it proposed for the 
Turkish political system and constitution. The 
publication of the proposal in the form of a
comprehensive program, which also differentiated it from 
the reform proposals of the Forum of the 1950s, may be 
interpreted as another manifestation of the 
internalization of political responsibility by the 
intellectuals. On the other hand, the timing of its 
publication (May 15, 1980) inhered the continuity in the
identification of the intellectuals with the state in 
preventing the extension of the crisis of the past decade 
into the 1980s. This was true at least of this specific 
group of intellectuals in the era under consideration, 
which witnessed polarization and fragmentation not only 
at the party level but also as far as the intellectuals 
themselves were concerned.
The closing part of the proposal summarized the
perspective of the Yenl Forum group:
The Turkish State, its indivisible unity with 
its nation and free democractic regime, the
Dergilerin Fonksiyonları" (The Functions of Radical Leftist 
Journals), Yenl Forum (editorial), 8 (180) (March 1, 1987), 7-8/ 
"Birleşik Sosyalistler Birleşiniz" (United Socialists, Unite), Yenl 
Forum (editorial), 8 (187) (June 15, 1987), 8-10; "Y. Foriam 12.
Yaşına Girdi" (Yenl Forum Celebrates Its 12th Year), Yenl Forum 
(editorial), 11 (257) (October 1990), 13; "Bntellektüel Kirlenmenin
İzleri" (The Traces of Intellectual Corruption), Yenl Forum
(editorial), 12 (264) (May 1991), 13.
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foundations of which were laid by Atatürk, 
are presently facing a detrimental threat.
This threat can only be eliminated by the 
strengthening of our State.
Strong state does not mean irresponsibility 
on the part of those who are in public 
office. On the contrary, in a strong state 
the organs of the state balance each other.
This reciprocal balancing does not mean 
intrusion of the state organs into each 
other's sphere of authority and thus 
hampering the performance of the functions of 
the other state organs.
...Reform in our Constitution, statutes of 
the National Assembly and some other 
regulations should set up a democratic 
political system. It is possible to 
accomplish such reform of the political 
system which will strengthen the national, 
secular and democratic state by democratic 
means. ... YENİ FORUM has the confidence that
saving the state, indivisible integrity of 
the country and national unity on the one 
hand, and the free democratic regime on the 
other simultaneously is possible. We do not 
propose the separation of legal principles 
which determine the practise of basic rights 
and liberties from those principles employed 
in Western democracies. It is certainly 
necessary to protect rights and liberties of 
those political and social trends and 
individuals that comply with the principle of 
loyalty to the state and regime; and for this 
the first and foremost requisite is dealing 
with the threats that arise against the state 
and the territorial integrity of the country 
and national unity.^’
Thus, not unlike the intellectuals of the pre-1960 
period the group specified its disposition in relation to 
the state. Pure faith in freedom with a self-corrective 
capacity against its maladies was overwhelmed by 
political responsibility to provide intellectual support 
for the sustenance of the State, which ultimately meant
. "Rejim ve Anayasamızda Reform Önerisi" (Reform Proposal in Our
Regime and Constitution), Yeni Forum (May 15, 1980), 32.
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the endurance of d e m o c r a c y This involved responsibility 
in the name of the "Turkish citizen" who longed for "not 
the shaping of his own structure according to the 
existing dysfunctional institutions, but correcting the 
latter in conformity with its values and s t r u c t u r e . 
fact, if the prevailing object of criticism of the Yen! 
Forum group was Marxism, the 1961 Constitution was 
perceived to be the bedrock of "the most depressive 
period that Turkey has been experiencing since the 
foundation of the Republic," since for them it fell short 
of providing the mechanisms to eliminate trends 
detrimental to the regime.^ '·
The group's assessment of the 1961 Constitution as 
being inappropriate to the Turkish polity derived from 
three basic observations they made. First, according to 
Yen! Forum^ the Constitution did not create a strong 
presidency which would function with benevolence for the 
sake of democracy in times of crisis. Second, while 
providing excessive autonomy for the judiciary, the 
Constitution did not install security mechanisms which 
would stand in the way of this autonomy, and thus turned 
the regime into a "government by judges. Third, the 
election system was criticized on the grounds that it 
eventually resulted in the fragmentation of political 
parties and hence in the impossibility of proper
Ib id .,  1. 
Ib id . ,  2. 
Ib id .,  1. 
95. Ib id .,  4.
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functioning of the parliament And finally, the group 
drew attention to the incapacity of the Senate of the 
Republic to function effectively with an above-politics 
view to "the supreme interests of the country.
It was this body of criticisms which led the group 
to devise an institutional reform package. As noted 
above, this initiation coincided with the 1980 military 
intervention. However, the significance of Yeni Forum was 
more due to the parallelisms between the package and the 
1982 Constitution than its timing. To begin with, the 
1982 Constitution furnished the office of Presidency with 
extensive powers both vis-à-vis the political elites and 
the judiciary. Secondly, the new electoral law was 
designed to prevent fragmentation in représentâtion.®® 
Lastly, rather than revising the Senate of the Republic 
in line with the reform proposal of Yeni Forum, that is 
as the Council of the Republic, with legislative and 
executive powers, the 1982 Constitution created a 
stronger state with a narrower locus.
®^ . Ibid.
®^ . Ibid., 7.
®*^. Özbudun, "Development of Democractic Government in Turkey: 
Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations," 27. For a thorough 
analysis of the re-institutionalization of the office of presidency, 
see Heper, "The state and debureaucratization: the case of Turkey."
®®. Üstün Ergüder, "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey," in 
Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey, ed. Ergian Özbudun (Ankara: 
Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), 124. However, it should 
be noted that the electoral system enacted immediately after the 
intervention was more limited than the one proposed by Yeni Forum.
Metin Heper, "The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982- 
1989," Governance, 3 (3) (1990), 299-319; Metin Heper, "Transitions
to Democracy in Turkey: Toward a New Pattern," in Politics In the
Third Turkish Republic, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder, San 
Fransisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 20.
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similar to the mentality behind the 1960 military
intervention and the 1961 Constitution, the post-1980 
restructuration, too, was conducted also for re-balancing 
the disposition of the state elite against political
elite. However, the 1982 Constitution was different from 
its predecessor in the sense that it displaced the
bureaucracy from its traditional place in the state 
structure. Instead, the state was reshaped to comprise of 
the office of presidency and the National Security
Council. Besides, while providing the president extensive 
powers in the political sphere, the new structuration 
also provided a framework for a synthesis between the 
state and political elites.Noting that locus of the 
state was the military immediately after the 
intervention, students of Turkish politics have
attributed this novelty to the growing tiredness on the 
part of the military to interfere with politics which 
began to develop into a regularity.
Yenl Forum group welcomed the new political
structuration. First, the group readily approved the 1980
Heper, "Executive in the Third Turkish Reptiblic."
Chief of General Staff, General Kenan Evren who also headed the 
National Security Council assumed the post of presidency by the 
approval of the 1982 Constitution in referendum.
William Hale pinpoints this unwillingness by a quotation from 
Kenan Evren's statement in War Academy immediately after the 1980 
military intervention: "Whenever the army entered into politics it 
began to lose its discipline and, gradually, it was led into 
corruption. ... Therefore I demand from you not to take our present 
operation as an exaitple and never to get involved in politics. We had 
to implement this operation within a chain of commands and orders to 
save the army from politics and to cleanse it from political dirt." 
Quoted in Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The 
Military Perspective," State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in 
the 1980s, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, (Berlin and New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 163.
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military intervention, and did not withdraw its support 
from the military throughout the decade.Second, if read 
between the lines, the reform proposal of the group had 
argued for a synthesis between the presidential regime 
and parliamentary regime. While repeatedly stating faith 
in a well-functioning parliamentary regime, the group 
reserved modelling on the presidential regime to 
emergency conditions. Last but not least, Yenl Forum ^ s 
rejection of taking Atatiirkism as an ideology and in its 
stead, interpreting it as a moderate, democratic 
mentality and thus as the bedrock for liberal 
disposition,^®^ corresponded to the loosening of the strict 
Kemalist positivism of the state which had been prevalent 
in preceding periods.
Two of the writers of the journal, Aydın Yalçın and Osman Okyar 
were appointed by the National Security Council (NSC) to give 
information to the American Senate about terrorism in Turkey. 
"Amerikan Senatosu*nda Terörizm Araştırması” (Investigation of 
Terrorism in US Senate), Yenl Forum (editorial), 3, (45) (July 15,
1981), 3-4. See also "Vatanseverlik ve Sağduyunun Gür Sesi” (The Deep 
Voice of Patriotism and Common Sense) Yenl Forum (editorial), 2 (9)
(January 15, 1980), 3-4 ; "Senaryonun İç ve Dış Tezahhürleri”
(Internal and External Appearances of the Scenario) Yenl Forum 
(editorial), 3 (35) (February 15, 1981), 3-4; "Aysbergin Ucu ve
Gövdesi” (The Apex and Body of Iceberg) Yenl Forum (editorial) , 3
(36) (March 1, 1981), 3-4; "Teşhis Hatasının Sakıncaları” (The
Drawbacks of Wrong Diagnosis) Yenl Forum (editorial), 5 (121)
(September 15, 1984); Osman Okyar, ”Türkiye*de Aydınlar Bunalımı”
(Intellectuals* Crisis in Turkey), Yenl Forum, 6 (134), 20; "Yeni
Yılda Milli Gündem” (National Agenda in New Year) , Yenl Forum 
(editorial), 6 (139) (January 1, 1985), 3-4; ”12 Eylül*ün Beşinci
Yıldönümü” (The Fifth Anniversary of September 12), Yenl Forum 
(editorial), 6 (145) (September 15, 1985), 3-5; "Kış Başında
Bulutlanan Ufuklar” (Cloudy Horizons in the Beginning of Winter), 
Yenl Forum (editorial), 6 (148) (November 1, 1985), 3-4.
105. ”j^ ejim ve Anayasamızda Reform Önerisi,” 25-32.
106. »»Niçin Çıkıyoruz?” 2; "Atatürkçülüğün Çetin Yolları” (Hard Routes 
of Atatürkism) , Yenl Forum (editorial), 6 (146) (October 1, 1985), 3.
Here I draw on Metin Heper * s argument that the inclusion of the 
emphasis on "Turkish historical and moral values” in the Preamble of 
the 1982 Constitution was a withdrawal of the state from the 
positivistic project of constructing the history and normative ethics 
of the nation. Metin Heper, "A Weltanschauung-turned-Partial Ideology
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By and large Yen! Forum presented a continuity in 
the identity of 'liberal' intellectual in the Turkish 
context. In other words, the intellectual persisted in 
his self-entitlement to "the expansion of democratic 
c u l t u r e a n d  thus "interpreting and explaining (to the 
public) the political philosophy of modern society and 
Western life style" for proper accomplishment of
democracy. This shared ideal also provided the mission 
for the group to function as the guide of society in 
periods of hardship.”*^ This self-entitlement again put 
them into a position of eventual identification with the 
state. On the other hand, throughout the 1980s liberal 
discourse represented by the group included a new, 
however related dimension alongside its state-oriented 
feature. As has already been noted, issues of the journal 
were overwhelmingly filled with anti-Marxist articles 
both from a theoretical aspect and as far as active 
politics was concerned. This placed the liberal identity 
on the verge of turning into a negative ideology. This
The Emergence of a Negative Discourse
and Normative Ethics; 'Atatürkism' in Turkey," Orient, 1 (1984), 83- 
94. See also Metin Heper, "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The 
Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective," British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 18 (1) (1991), 38-51; Ahmet Evin, "Changing Patterns 
of Cleavages Before and After 1980," 211-2.
Atilla Yayla, "Teröristlerin Islahının Kültürel ve İdeolojik 
Boyutları" (The Cultural and Ideological Dimensions of the 
Disciplining of Terrorists), Yeni Forum, 6 (131) (February 15, 1985), 
15-7.
"Başarılı Bir Demokrasi İçin" (For a Successful Democracy) , Yeni 
Forum (editorial), 6 (141) (July 15, 1985), 3-4; "Aydınların Görevi" 
(The Duty of Intellectuals), Yeni Forum (editorial), 6 (144) 
(September 1, 1985), 3-5.
110. "Aydınların Görevi."
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negative positioning was also a manifestation of the 
group's self-perception as an intellectual extension of 
the state: "If Turkish statespersons, the military, and 
political parties represent the official and organized 
force of resistance of the Turkish people and the nation 
against the real external enemy, such publications as 
(Yeni) FORUM . . . represent the force of resistance of 
unorganized, voluntarist and silent Turkish people.
Not unlike its predecessor, Anglo-American influence 
was also present in the case of Yenl Forum. However, what 
distinguished the latter was that this influence did not 
amount to absolute Westernism. Instead, the journal 
searched for a synthesis between "the national essence" 
with "universal patterns in the light of critical 
reasoning."*’^ Thus the intellectual was held responsible 
for a double task: On the one hand, he was to bring about 
the social framework that would enable the functioning of 
democratic life style which connoted a dynamic process.”  ^
On the other hand, he was to revitalize "Turkish history 
and national culture, religious and moral values and 
strengthen national unity, to get into close contact with 
the countries and societies which share the same
111. "Yeni Forum'un Cevabı" {Yeni Forum's Response), Yeni Forum, 5 
(111) (April 15, 1984), 3.
Sevim Kantarcıoğlu, "Atatürk'ün Kültür Anlayışı" (Atatürk's 
Conception of Culture), Yeni Forum, 6 (149) (November 15, 1985), 15- 
20. See also. Aydın Doğaner, "'Aydın' Kavramı Üzerine" (On the 
Concept of 'Intellectual'), Yeni Forum, 6 (147) (October 15, 1985),
33-5.
"Başarılı Bir Demokrasi İçin," 3-4; Yayla, "Hür Basın ve 
Demokratik Sistem" (Free Press and Democratic Order), Yeni Forum, 6 
(143) (August 15, 1985), 32-4;
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historical heritage... This double responsibility may 
be read within the parameters of the group^s appraisal of 
a new political standing as "right of center, a compound 
of liberal-conservative, nationalist, against the left 
and communism...” that was perceived to be the only 
security belt for the existence and stability of Turkish 
democracy.
Consequently, there was a double track preoccupation 
in the journal, especially in the wake of the 1990s. The 
first was the increased interest in the Turkic Republics 
of the former Soviet Union.This may be attributed to 
the light of the mission that Yenl Forum had undertaken, 
that is "the creation and internalization of Turkish- 
Islamic-Western civilization" by the Turkish
Yalçın, "Yeni Bir Dönemin Başında” (In the Beginning of a New 
Era), Yenl Forum, 11 (248) (January 1990), 4-5.
"Demokrasimizin Sıkıntılı Dönemleri” (Difficult Periods of Our 
Democracy), Yenl Forum (editorial), 6 (133) (March 15, 1985), 3-4.
The group explained its interest in the Turkic Republics with 
respect to its wish to assist them in their escape from Marxism and 
in the adoption of liberal democracy. "Dergimiz 15. Yılında” (Our 
Journal Celebrates Its 15th Anniversary), Yeni Forum (editorial), 14 
(292) (September 1993), 6. With this aim in mind Yenl Forum organized 
a number of seminars. Examplary are "Türkiye ve Sovyetler
Birliği*ndeki Değişmeler” (Changes in Turkey and Soviet Union), 
colloquium, organized between September 16-19, 1991 in Azerbaijan.
The September and October 1991 issues of the journal contained the 
articles presented in the colloquium. Another one was "Türkiye- 
Azerbeycan ve Orta Asya Cumhuriyetlerinde Demokrasi ve Piyasa 
Ekonomisine Geçiş Sürecinde Bazı Pratik Sorunlar” (Some Practical 
Problems in the Transition to Market Economy in Turkey-Azerbaijan and 
Central Asian Republics), organized on November 16-23, 1992 in 
Azerbaijan. Again the articles presented in the seminar occupied a 
significant place in November and December 1992 issues of the 
journal. In relation to the Turkic Republics, see also Yalçın, 
"Atayurt'ta Arayışlar” (Searches in Atayurt) , Yenl Forum, 13 (278)
(July 1992), 20-7; Nesip Nesipzade, "Bağımsızlık Sorunu-I” (The
Problem of Iridependence-I) , Yenl Forum, 13 (278) (July 1992), 34-8;
Nesipzade, "Bağımsızlık Sorunu-II” (The Problem of Independence-II), 
Yenl Forum, 13 (279) (August 1992), 21-7; Yalçın, "Washington * da
Dağlık Karabağ Toplantısı” (Dağlık Karabağ Meeting in Washington), 
Yenl Forum, 13 (280) (September 1992), 34-9.
279
intellectuals. As far as its liberal identity was
concerned the group limited it to translations concerning 
liberal theory. For the purposes of this study the 
theoretical framework which was provided by these 
translations is more important since it led to the 
emergence of a new group from within the core of Yenl 
Forum, with a claim to lay the foundations of liberal 
tradition in the Turkish context.
FROM YENİ FORUM TO LIBERAL DÜŞÜNCE: A "SPONTANEOUS”
FORMATION?
Nilüfer Göle has mentioned "liberal appearance” as 
one important development in Turkish politics in the 
1 9 9 0 s . Göle, drew her argument mainly from the changes 
that has occurred in the state-society relationship, from
Yalçın, "Yeni Bir Dönemin Başında," 6.
Examplary are Isaiah Berlin "Bir İdeal Olarak Eşitlik" (Equality 
as an ideal), trans. Mustafa Erdoğan, Yeni Forum, 11 (248) (January
1990), 29-37; Peter L. Berger, "Ahlak Yargısı ve Siyasal Faaliyet"
(Moral Judgement and Political Activity), trans. Mustafa Erdoğan, 
Yeni Forum, 11 (250) (March 1990), 36-41; Ayn Rand, "İnsanın Hakları" 
(Human Rights), Yeni Forum, trans. Atilla Yayla, 11 (250) (March
1990) , 68-71; Ayn Rand, "Kapitalizm Nedir?" (What is Capitalism?),
trans. Atilla Yayla, Yeni Forum, 11 (252) (May 1990), 38-48; Maurice 
Cranston, "İnsan Hakları Nelerdir?" (What are the Hıoman Rights?) 
trans. Atilla Yayla, Yeni Forum, 11 (253) (June 1990), 41-3;
Elizabeth Teague, "Açık Toplum mu?" (Open Society?), trans. Mustafa 
Erdoğan, Yeni Forum, 12 (261) (February 1991), 45-6; Friedrich A.
Hayek, "Liberal Bir Sosyal Düzenin İlkeleri" (Principles of a Liberal 
Social Order), trans. Atilla Yayla, Yeni Forum, 12 (263) (April
1991) , 25-34; Otfried Höffe, "Adalet Bir Değiştokuş mudur?" (Is
Justice a Barter?), trans. Ahmet Arslan, Yeni Forum, 12 (264) (May
1991), 27-34; Ayn Rand, "Kollektif Haklar" (Collective Rights),
trans. Mustafa Erdoğan, Yeni Forum, 12 (265) (June 1991), 29-31;
George Urban, "Şimdiye Kadar Elde Edebildiğimiz Dünyaların En İyisi" 
(The Best World We Could Ever Achieved) , interview with Sir Karl 
Popper, trans. Murat Aygen, 12 (267) (August 1991), 47-9.
Nilüfer Göle, "Liberal Yanılgı" (Liberal Fallacy), Türkiye 
Günlüğü, 24 (Fall 1993), 12.
280
1983 onwards; that is the development of civil society. 
However, she warned that this liberal appearance did not 
at all total to a liberalism with a theoretical 
framework, since it was basically limited to economic 
policies pursued in line with the market economy.Metin 
Heper has read this development within the broader 
framework of institutional restructuration in the post- 
1980 period, which brought a new relationship between the 
state and political elite. Heper has pointed out that 
liberalism in question was employed by the political 
elite to enhance their standing in the political sphere 
vis-à-vis the state elite.
The Association for Liberal Thinking {Liberal 
Düşünce Topluluğu) was born into this period where 
numerous liberal identities were prevalent. The rise of 
this new group from within the Yeni Forum took almost a 
decade. The foundation of the Association for Liberal
Thinking in 1992, which gained formal status in 1994, may 
be interpreted as the consolidation of one side of the
synthesis Yeni Forum was after, that is . the liberal
flank:
The aim [of the Association] is to introduce
liberalism in Turkey, deepen liberalism in Turkey, 
educate those who form public policy about the 
basic principles of liberalism, provide solutions 
to the problems of Turkey in line with the basic 
tenets of liberalism.
Göle, "Toward cin Autonomization of Civil Society," in Politics In 
the Third Turkish Republic, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Boulder, 
San Fransisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 218.
Heper, "Trials and Tribulations of Democracy in the Third Turkish 
Republic," in ibid., 238.
As similar to Forum and Yenl Forum, the bulk of the group is 
composed of academicians.
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The Association pursues its activities with the 
long-term aim of constituting an intellectual 
formation. Thus, it takes onto itself the 
responsibility of a protagonist and educator for 
other liberal formations.
This should not be read as a controversy between the 
Association and the Yenl Forum group. In its stead, the 
attempt was complementary to the task of forming a 
liberal tradition in the Turkish context. Two of the 
founders, Atilla Yayla and Mustafa Erdoğan, were among 
the students and disciples of Aydın Yalçın.Yayla and 
Erdoğan wrote in Yeni Forum; their contribution to the 
journal, however, was more through translations. Such 
figures as Kazım Berzeg, Osman Okyar who were affiliated 
to Forum and Yeni Forum and Ahmet Arslan who also wrote 
in Yeni Forum are also among the members of the 
Association.
The Universal Shaping the National : Intellectual of the
Liberal International
At its inception, the Association limited its sphere 
of activity to theoretical issues, with the aim of 
providing an intellectual infrastructure that would 
prepare the ground for the realization of liberal
Murat Yılmaz, "Mustafa Erdoğan ve Atilla Yayla ile Mülakat" 
(Interview with Mustafa Erdoğan and Atilla Yayla), Polemik, 12 
(March-April 1994), 35.
•24 Melih Yürüşen, "Liberal Düşünce Kendine Bakıyor" {Liberal Düşünce 
Looks at Itself), Interview by Muhammed Nur Anbarli, Liberal Düşünce, 
1 (4) (Fall 1996), 112-5.
Atilla Yayla, "Hocam, Arkadaşım, Meslektaşım Aydın Yalçın" (Aydın 
Yalçın: My Teacher, Friend, Colleague), Yeni Forum, 15 (306) 
(November 1994), 20-3; Mustafa Erdoğan, "'Arkadaşım' Aydın Yalçın" 
(Aydın Yalçın: My Friend), Yeni Forum, 15 (306) (November 1994), 24- 
5.
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solutions for Turkey's problems. ^ 6^ with this aim in mind, 
it organized a series of symposiums and seminars, in 
addition to its publications, including translated 
works. The seminars were organized as educational 
programs for different groups, including the political 
parties. It was by the publication of a quarterly under
1 2 6_ Yılmaz, "Mustafa Erdoğan ve Atilla Yayla ile Mülakat,” 37.
International Hayek Symposium, March 31, 1993, İstanbul; April 3, 
1993, Ankara; First International Liberal Thought Symposium of 
Turkey, May 7, 1994, Ankara; Second International Liberal Thought
Symposium of Turkey, May 18-19, 1996, Ankara; Seminar on Introduction 
to Liberalism (together with Friedrich Naumann Foundation), March-May
1995, Ankara; Seminar on Great Traditions of Thought (for Turkish 
Democracy Foundation), March-May 1995, Ankara; Seminar on New World 
Order: 50th Anniversary of the End of Second World War, May 26, 1995, 
Ankara; Seminar on The Historical and Philosophical Grounds of 
Liberalism (together with Friedrich Naumann Foundation), November- 
December 1995, Ankara and İstanbul; Seminar on Liberalism, 
Conservatism and Socialism (for Turkish Democracy Foundation), 
November-December 1995, Ankara; Seminar on The Relation between 
Liberalism and Democracy (for New Democracy Movement), March-May
1996, Ankara; Seminar on Historical and Philosophical Background of
Liberalism (for Liberal Democratic Party), April-June 1996, Ankara 
and İstanbul. The Association also hosted Atlas Economic Research 
Foundation for its 28th International "Workshop” Program between 
September 15-17, 1996, İstanbul; Seminar on Liberalism: Concepts and
Turkey, December 6-8, 1996, Kayseri. Among the books published by the 
Association we can cite the following: John Locke, Hoşgörü Üzerine
Bir Mektup (A Letter Concerning Toleration), trans. Melih Yürüşen 
(Ankara, 1995); Firedrich A. Hayek, Kölelik Yolu (The Road to 
Serfodm), trans. Turhan Feyzioğlu-Yıldıray Arsan (Ankara, 1995) 
Mustafa Erdoğan, Demokrasi, Laiklik, Resmi İdeoloji (Democracy, 
Lalcism, Official Ideology) (Ankara, 1995); Ahmet Arslan, İslam, 
Demokrasi, Türkiye (İslam, Democracy, Turkey), (Ankara, 1995); James 
Gwartney-Richrad L. Stroup, Temel Ekonomi (Basic Economics), trans. 
Yıldıray Arsan (Ankara, 1996); Kazım Berzeg, Liberalizm ve Türkiye 
(Liberalism and Turkey), (Ankara, 1996); Cüneyt Ülsever, Pratik 
Teoriyi Dalma Aşıyor (Practise Always Transcends Theory), (Ankara, 
1996); Terry L. Anderson - Donald R. Leal, Serbest Piyasa ve 
Çevrecilik (Free Market and , trans. Vural F. Savaş (Ankara, 1996); 
Eamonn Butler, Hayek, trans. Yusuf Ziya Çelikkaya (Ankara, 1996).
Exemplary are the Seminar on The Relation between Liberalism and 
Democracy, March-May 1996, Ankara, which was organized for New 
Democracy Movement; April-June 1996, Ankara and İstanbul, the Seminar 
on Historical and Philosophical Background of Liberalism which was 
organized for Liberal Democratic Party, and the training seminar for 
Ata group from Bilkent University. The Association denies any direct 
links or the willingness to form such links. It has confined its 
relations with the political parties to training programs. Apart from 
that, some members of the Association provided assistance to the 
publication of books by political parties. In this respect see, 
Walter Wittmann, Piyasa Ekonomisi Neden Sosyaldir? (Why İs Market
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the name of Liberal Düşünce that the Association seemed 
to open the way for its delayed task: that of providing 
substantial solutions for Turkey's problems. However, 
this did not mean that the theoretical content would 
experience a demise. On the contrary, overwhelming 
importance has been given to explicating the theoretical 
framework that shaped the Association's identity.
The said theoretical framework was to a large extent 
shaped with recourse to such twentieth century liberal 
thinkers as Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin and finally by 
Friedrich A. Hayek, and thus inhered the re-introduction 
of classical liberal ideals.’^9 This is not something new. 
Especially the "open society" of Popper and "spontaneous 
order" of Hayek had already been underlined by the Forum 
and Yeni Forum g r o u p s . T h e  contribution of the 
Association is the full employment of the theoretical 
matrice of these thinkers, without concern for the 
problématique of harmonizing the universal with the 
national. Instead, the underlying argument throughout the
Economy Social), trans. Doğan Nadi Leblebici, eds. Atilla Yayla and 
Mustafa Erdoğan (Ankara: Anavatan Partisi Bilimsel Yayınlar Serisi: 
1; 1993); John Gray, Sınırla Devlet, Pozitif Gündem (Limited State,
Positive Agenda), trans. Doğan Nadi Leblebici, eds. Atilla Yayla and 
Mustafa Erdoğan (Ankara: Anavatan Partisi Biliıasel Yayınlar Serisi: 
2; 1993), Hayek’te Serbest Piyasa Ekonomisi ve Özgür Toplum (Hayek’s 
Free Market Economy and Free Society), ed. Atilla Yayla (Ankara: 
Anavatan Partisi Bilimsel Yayınlar Serisi: 3; 1993).
This should not be misunderstood as to mean that the 
intellectuals in question have limited their preoccupation with 
liberal theory to these thinkers. However, throughout their works 
categories, conceptualizations and methodology of these thinkers 
happen to occupy a dominant place.
An analysis of the former Yenl Forum writers' articles in 
Liberal Düşünce presents a continuity in their approaches. As far as 
the then younger writers of Yenl Forum were concerned one may also 
conclude with the consolidation of the said theoretical framework, 
which has proceeded through their translations in the 1980s.
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articles has been for the universal applicability of 
liberal premises regardless of national contexts. This 
universalism is also declared in their self- 
identification with the Liberal International.
Popper's assessment of Marxist theory of knowledge 
as "pseudo-science" is one legacy that the journal 
inherited from Yeni F o r u m . Furthermore, his reference to 
scientific activity as an "evolutionary passage" by the 
development of new theories for "deeper problems" and his 
related denial of the possibility of "achieving Utopian 
aspiration to control and reconstruct s o c i e t y f o r m s  
one theoretical basis for the journal's criticisms 
against the constructivist approach. Liberal Düşünce 
borrows from Popper the idea of proving the supremacy of 
liberalism against socialism by empirical evidence. 
Thus, one declared aim of the journal is to provide 
substantial information to the Turkish public about the 
demise of socialism, and the strength that liberal theory 
displayed throughout the centuries. Similarly, Liberal
Atilla Yayla, "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve Liberal 
Düşünce Topluluğu" (Practical Inpasses of Liberalism and Association 
for Liberal Thinking), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 13.
132. John Gray, "The liberalism of Kari Popper," in Liberalisms: 
Essays in Political Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 
1989), 14.
133. Ibid., 16.
13‘1. This disposition is summarized as "The truth, whatever it is, can 
only be reached in practice." Cüneyt Ülsever, "Marksizmden 
Liberalizme: Pratik Teoriyi Daima Aşıyor" (From Marxism to 
Liberalism: Practise Always Transcends Theory), Liberal Düşünce, 1 
(1) (Winter 1996), 37.
133. Yayla, "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve Liberal Düşünce 
Topluluğu," 4-14; Mustafa Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm?" (Why 
Liberalism?), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 28-33; Ülsever, 
"Marksizmden Liberalizme: Pratik Teoriyi Daima Aşıyor," 34-8; Kazım 
Berzeg, "Siyaset Pratiğindeki Somut Liberalizm" (Concrete Liberalism 
in Active Politics), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (2) (Spring 1996), 152-6.
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Düşünce adopted Hayek's rejection of constructivist 
mentality and thus social engineering on the grounds that 
men can only have limited knowledge. This idea occupied a 
central place in the works of the Liberal Düşünce group. 
Thus, the concept of spontaneous order denoting an 
evolutionary mentality in human actions and achievements, 
and the related social and institutional outcomes have 
been utilized in justifying not only criticms against 
Marxism-socialism (the universal dimension), but also in 
pinpointing the ills of Turkish political development and 
in proposing reformist policies (the national dimension). 
Isaiah Berlin's emphasis on man's imperfection and thus 
his incapacity to devise full-fledged plans for the best 
order provides another theoretical support for the 
group's denial of revolutionary projects.'^^
The framework delineated —though roughly— above, 
forms the epistemological starting point for the group. 
And the categories and conceptualizations derived from 
the said epistemological approach furnish the group with 
tools for their ultimate task which is announced as 
"changing the intellectual milieu of Turkey and forming a 
balance vis-à-vis anti-liberal thoughts and trends, — 
i.e., "contributing to the liberalization of the country 
without becoming politicized. In the pursuit of this 
task the group needed to specify their liberal identity.
136. fqj- a through analysis of these thinkers from a liberal 
perspective, see John Gray, Liberalisms: Essays on Political
Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 1989).
1^ .^ Yayla, "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve Liberal Düşünce 
Topluluğu," 14.
l^ n. Ibid., 8. In this respect see also Mustafa Erdoğan, "Türkiye 2. 
Uluslararası Liberal Düşünce Senpozyumu Üzerine" (On the 2nd
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Identity of the Turkish Liberal Intellectual in the 
1990s: A Scheme of Priorities
In defining liberalism as "basically a thought of 
individual liberty"’"*® Liberal Düşünce group find their 
starting point in the individual. Unlike their 
predecessors, they locate the individual neither in the 
nation nor in the citizen vis-à-vis the state. Instead, 
they take the individual as inherently possessing an 
existence autonomous from both the nation and the state. 
This classical liberal standing leads them to define the 
latter categories by resorting to the individual.’"” In 
this pursuit, such concepts as diversity, autonomy and 
liberty are employed in sorting out the nature of social 
and political institutions. More briefly these concepts 
are perceived to be the formative elements of
individual's existence, —i.e., as the slne-qua-non in the 
continuous process of the individual's self-
international Liberal Thought Symposixim in Turkey) , Liberal Bülten 
(6) (Sxaitraier 1996), 9-10.
Yayla mentions about a number of liberal groups and/or persons, 
that for him fall short of a fully developed liberal agenda due to a 
lack of coirprehensive knowledge of the theory. In this respect, he 
delineates the specificity of the Association for Liberal Thinking as 
possessing the historical and theoretical knowledge of liberalism. 
Yayla, "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve Liberal Düşünce 
Topluluğu,", 13. See also Murat Yılmaz, "Mustafa Erdoğan ve Atilla 
Yayla ile Mülakat," 36.
’"•®. Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm," 31.
. Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm?" 30; Coşkun Can Aktan, "21. Yüzyıl, 
Türkiye ve Sivil Toplum" (21st Century, Turkey and Civil Society), 
Liberal Düşünce, 1 (2) (Spring 1996), 57-75; İhsan Dağı,
"Uluslararası Politikada Devletçilik Hareketi ve Sosyo-Ekonomik 
Maliyeti" (The Trend of Etatism in International Politics and Its 
Socio-Economic Costs), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 93-100;
Ömer Çaha, "Birey-Devlet İlişkisi Çerçevesinde Türkiye'de İnsan 
Hakları" (Human Rights in Turkey within the Framework of the Relation 
between the Individual and State), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (1) (Winter
1996), 100-7.
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determination. This self-determination refers to a stre 
to reach self-chosen individual goals in conformity with 
(again) self-chosen principles. For the group, society 
and polity can be nothing but functionaries in this 
continuous and open-ended p r o c e s s .  Although going back 
as early as to John Locke, this perception more directly 
draws upon Hayek — his bringing classical liberalism back 
in and thus related conceptualization of the ought-to-be 
sphere of the state and the ideal composition of the 
society.
As far as the composition of the society is 
concerned, the group refrains from reaching an absolute 
definition of the ^best* order. Instead, they employ the 
term ^best' for a model of society which provides 
individuals with the means to accomplish their diverse 
goals. For them the 'best* is a spontaneous society that 
is susceptible to open-ended evolution. In fact, the 
group derives its adherence to spontaneity from their
Melih Yürüşen, "Otorite ve Özerklik: İmkansız Bir Beraberlik mi?” 
(Authority and Autonomy: An Impossible Coexistence?), Liberal 
Düşünce, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 39-48; Yürüşen, "Refah Partisinin 
Yükselişine Çeşitlilik Perspektifinden Bakmak" (Viewing the Rise of 
Welfare Party from the Perspective of Diversity), Liberal Düşünce, 1 
(3) (Summer 1996), 16-8; Berzeg, "Neden Liberalim?" (Why Am I a 
Liberal?), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 23f; Erdoğan, "Niçin 
Liberalizm" 31-2; Dağı, "Uluslararası Politikada Devletin Yeri: 
Liberteryen Bir Eleştiri" (State*s Place in International Politics: A 
Libertarian Criticism), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 93-4; 
Ahmet Arslan, "Türk Laikliği ve Geleceği Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler” 
(Some Reflections on Turkish Laicism and Its Future), Liberal 
Düşünce, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 58f; Ludwig von Mises "Antikapitalist 
Zihniyet" (Anticapitalist Mentality), trans. Mustafa Metin, Liberal 
Düşünce, 1 (3) (Svimmer 1996), 107-8; Berzeg, "Siyaset Pratiğindeki 
Somut Liberalizm," 152-6.
Berzeg, "Neden Liberalim?"; Bekir Berat Özipek, "Özgürlüğü 
* Kölelik Yolu*yla Anlamak" (Understanding Freedom through *The Road 
To Serfdom*), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (2) (Spring 1996), 122-37.
Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm?" 33; Ülsever, "Marksizmden 
Liberalizme: Pratik Teoriyi Daima Aşıyor," 38.
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relativistic standing —i.e., respect for diversity which 
also means acceptance of the legitimacy of diverse 
truths. This disposition ends with a denial of full 
knowledge of the future, thus with the incompetency of 
the man to develop perfectionist plans for achieving the 
best for all times,
On the other hand, the Turkish liberal intellectual 
of the 1990s adheres to the night watchman concept of the 
state -a state that possesses instrumental existence and 
thus is a body of institutions established for the 
sustenance of peace, justice and liberty. The state is 
perceived merely as an eventual exigency of a general 
moral and legal scheme of rules that arise out of 
"legitimate moral demands of individuals against 
authority.'”'*'^ In this respect, the sphere of state is 
limited to the sustenance of the conditions that enable 
the liberty of the individuals.
Here, holding fast to the negative conception of 
liberty. Liberal Düşünce group staunchly rejects any 
positive action on the part of the state with the aim of
R. Max Hartwell, "Bir Liberalin Eğitimi" (Education of a 
Liberal), trans. Sema Coşaroğlu, Liberal Düşünce, 1 (1) (Winter
1996), 49-53; Özipek, "Özgürlüğü 'Kölelik Yolu'yla Anlamak," 122-37;
A. Nuri Yurdusev, "Laiklik ve Demokrasi: Biri Diğerinin Vazgeçilmez 
Şartı ıtu?" (Laicism and Democracy: Is One the slne-qua-non of the
Other?), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (2) (Spring 1996), 140.
Norman P. Barry, "Marksizmin Gerilemesi ve Komüniteryenizmin 
Yükselişi" (The Regression of Marxism and the Rise of
Communitarianism), trans. Mustafa Erdoğan Liberal Düşünce, 1 (1) 
(Winter 1996), 111; Berzeg, "Neden Liberalim?" 25; Erdoğan, "Niçin
Liberalizm," 32; Dağı, "Uluslararası Politikada Devletin Yeri: 
Liberteryen Bir Eleştiri," 93; Arslan, "Türk Laikliği ve Geleceği 
Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler," 58-9; Berzeg, "Siyaset Pratiğindeki Somut 
Liberalizm," 154.
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regulating the s o c i e t y T h e  main point of objection on 
the part of the group is the re-distributive policies 
which disrupt the spontaneous order. The group bases the 
model of the best society on the functioning of price 
mechanism. The group is in guard against the elimination 
of the dynamism so peculiar to the price mechanism.'“**
The Liberal Düşünce group summarizes its liberalism 
as "the pursuit of a negative project. This concept of 
negativity is present in all the articles written by the 
members of the Association for Liberal Thinking. They all 
emphasize the negative task of "instrumentalization of 
the state" and thus "humanizing political power, —i.e., 
to decrease the state's sphere in society and economy to 
a bare minimum.
The Liberal Ethos versus the Democracy of the Republic: 
Rupture or Synthesis?
This negative position towards the state has also 
determined what the group opposed in the Turkish context. 
Taking the individual as their basic category and price 
mechanism as a model, the group thinks of the dynamic 
society as the best order. The group criticizes the 
overwhelming power of the state in the economy and thus
Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm?" 32-3; Dağı,"Uluslararası Politikada 
Devletin Yeri: Liberteryen Bir Eleştiri," 94; Aktan, "21. Yüzyıl,
Türkiye ve Sivil Toplum," 66.
Aktan, "21. Yüzyıl, Türkiye ve Sivil Toplum," 63-5; Özipek, 
"Özgürlüğü 'Kölelik Yolu'yla Anlamak," 126; Berzeg, "Siyaset
Pratiğindeki Somut Liberalizm," 155.
Erdoğan, "Niçin Liberalizm?" 33.
*5°. Ibid., 32.
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over society. They perceive etatism not only as an 
economic policy, but also as a policy with social and 
political consequences. They consider etatism as a means 
to enhance the independence of the state/political elite 
from the society.
The group criticizes the static nature of central 
planning and holds it responsible for rendering the 
economy and society into passive actors. As far as the 
society is concerned, the Liberal Düşünce group thinks 
that by injecting Its democracy on the society, the 
state/government prevented the transformation from 
communitarian society to an individualistic one.^ ^^  
Interpreting the history of democratization in Turkey as 
a display of guided democracy, they arrive at the 
conclusion that the social actors in Turkey have come to 
bear a passive understanding of democracy, that is 
equating democracy with elections. The group rejects the 
social engineering that, has prevailed throughout the 
Republican history. In this respect, they are critical of 
the approach to democratization as a project to be 
carried out by the state.^ ^^
. Güneri Akalın, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik Hareketi ve Sosyo-Ekonomik 
Maliyetleri" (The Trend of Etatism in Turkey and Its Socio-Economic 
Costs), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (1) (Winter 1996), 85-92/ Aktan, "21. 
Yüzyıl, Türkiye ve Sivil Topl\am," 63-5; Osman Okyar, "Kumanda 
Ekonomisi, Güdümlü Demokrasi" (Command Economy, Guided Democracy), 
Liberal Düşünce, 1 (4) (Fall 1996), 36-45; İhsan Çolak, "Paradigmanın 
İnşası: Türk İnkılabının İdeolojisinin Oluşumu ve Recep Peker" (The 
Construction of Paradigma: Formation of the Ideology of Turkish 
Revolution and Recep Peker), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (4) (Fall 1996), 69- 
81; Berzeg, "Siyaset Pratiğindeki Somut Liberalizm," 155.
Akalın, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik Hareketi ve Sosyo-Ekonomik 
Maliyetleri," 89; Okyar, "Kumanda Ekonomisi, Güdümlü Demokrasi."
Okyar, "Kumanda Ekonomisi, Güdümlü Demokrasi"; Berzeg, "Neden 
Liberalim"; Esat Öz, "Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçiş" (Transition to 
Democracy in Turkey), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (3) (Summer 1996), 79; Rasim
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It is in this instance that Liberal Düşünce group 
may be distinguished from the preceding liberal-minded 
intellectuals. Referring to the Republican history as an 
example of the failures of constructivism, the group 
comes up with an alternative conceptualization of 
democracy. For them, democracy should not be understood 
as an end since this has the potential to lead to 
totalitarian and authoritarian policies. On the contrary 
the group adopts a 'liberal' conception of democracy. 
They take democracy as a means that would enable the 
functioning of spontaneous order.
With respect to democracy in Turkey, laicism and 
Islam have turned out to be the most frequently studied 
topics by the Liberal Düşünce group. As far as laicism 
is concerned, the group considers religion as an issue of 
civil society and thus proposes that the state should be 
neutral in this respect.While criticizing Turkish
Toprak, "Demokrasi, Laiklik, Resmi İdeoloji Üstüne" (On Democracy, 
Laicism, Official Ideology), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (3) (Summer 1996),
125-31.
Yayla, "Demokrasi ve Türkiye" (Democracy and Turkey) , Liberal 
Bülten (7) (Fail 1996), 9-10; Akalın, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik
Hareketi ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Maliyeti."
Arslan, "Türk Laikliği ve Geleceği Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler," 54- 
76; Yurdusev, "Laiklik ve Modern Uluslararası Sistem" (Laicism and 
Modern International System), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (1) (Winter 1996),
77-84; Yurdusev, "Laiklik ve Demokrasi: Biri Diğerinin Vazgeçilmez
Şartı mı?," 138-44; Arslan, "İslam, Adalet ve Refah Partisi Üzerine" 
(On İslam, Justice and Welfare Party), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (3) (Summer
1996), 3-12; Yürüşen, "Refah Partisinin Yükselişine Çeşitlilik
Perspektifinden Bakmak," 13-21; Toprak, "Demokrasi, Laiklik, Resmi 
İdeoloji Üstüne"; Arslan, "İnsan Hakları ve İslam" (Human Rights and 
Islam), Liberal Düşünce, 2 (5) (Winter 1997), 37-55; M. Hayri 
Kırbaşoğlu, "Kur'an ve İnsan Hakları Tartışmaları" (Discussions on 
Quran and Human Rights), Liberal Düşünce, 2 (5) (Winter 1997), 56-70; 
Anthony Sullivan, "Muhafazakarlık, Çoğulculuk ve İslam" 
(Conservatism, Pluralism and Islam), trans. Melih Yürüşen, Liberal 
Düşünce, 2 (5) (Winter 1997), 71-8.
Erdoğan, "İslam ve Liberalizm: Kısa Bir Bakış" (A Glance at İslam 
and Liberalism), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (4) (Fail 1996), 7-21; Barry,
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laicism on the grounds that in Turkey the state has tried 
to install an official religion, they are also cautious 
to pose themselves against a religious state . O n  the one 
hand, they consider the coming to power of the pro- 
Islamic Welfare Party (WP) as in line with democracy, - 
that is for them it is evidence of the coexistence of 
differences. In the meantime, they do not rule out the 
probability that the WP's claim to represent the nation 
may result in authoritarianism. This point stands in 
sharp contrast to the group's approach to religion with a 
view to toleration for diversity.·^’ While their rejection 
of laicism as practised in Turkey is based on faith in 
individuality, autonomy and diversity, their vigilance 
vls-a-vls the WP derives from the cognizance that 
democracy does not necessarily guarantee its own 
continuity.
Such a disposition with respect to democracy brings 
with it the second distinctive feature of the group from 
its predecessors. According to Liberal Düşünce^ the 
intellectual with liberal identity may pass judgements on 
social and political developments only from a liberal
"Piyasa, Ahlak ve Devlet” (Market, Morality and State), trans. 
Mustafa Erdoğan, Liberal Düşünce^ 1 (4) (Fail 1996), 22-35.
Erdoğan, "Laiklik, Cumhuriyet * in Dini midir?" (Is Laicism the 
Religion of Republic), Liberal Bülten^ (2) (Summer 1995), 6; Erdoğan, 
"Din, Demokrasi, Çok Kültürlülük, Sivil Toplum” (Religion, Democracy, 
Multi-culturalism, Civil Society), Liberal Bülten (6) (Summer 1996), 
8; Erdoğan, "İslam ve Liberalizm: Kısa Bir Bakış”; Yürüşen, "Refah
Partisinin Yükselişine Çeşitlilik Perspektifinden Bakmak,” 18-9.
Yurdusev, "Laiklik ve Demokrasi: Biri Diğerinin Vazgeçilmez Şartı 
mı?,” 143-4; Yürüşen, "Refah Partisinin Yükselişine Çeşitlilik
Perspektifinden Bakmak,” 16-8.
Yürüşen, "Refah Partisinin Yükselişine Çeşitlilik Perspektifinden 
Bakmak,” 18-9.
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perspective This is a break from the Republican 
intellectual who had identified himself with the task of 
enlightening the public and thus contributing to the 
progress of the Turkish state. In contrast, placing 
relativism against positivism the group rejects "one 
absolute truth,
This anti-constructivist standing has been reflected 
in articles on education. Apart from supporting the 
privatization of education in line with their opposition 
to centralization, and with a view to the sustenance of 
diversity in society, they put special emphasis on the 
"education of a liberal. This emphasis is due to a 
conviction that liberal virtues and liberal institutions 
are mutually dependent. The group proposes an education 
which will "endow the individual with the knowledge and 
comprehension that are imperative for his autonomy." They 
think that the educational framework is to be grounded on 
liberal premises, regardless of the outcomes.*^
160_ iig^  Dergi" (This Journal), Liberal Düşünce (editorial), 1 (1)
(Winter 1996), 1.
Toprak, "Demokrasi, Laiklik, Resmi İdeoloji Üstüne," 129/ 
Yurdusev, "Laiklik ve Demokrasi Biri Diğerinin Vazgeçilmez Şartı mı?" 
140.
Ülsever, "Türkiye'ye Paralı Eğitim" {Liberal Düşünce, 1 (2)
(Spring 1996), 44-8; Akalın, "Yüksek Öğretimin Finansmanı ve Harçlar
Sorunu" (Financing of Higher Education and the Problem of ) Liberal 
Düşünce, 1 (2) (Spring 1996), 49-58; İrfan Erdoğein, "Bu Eğitim Düzeni 
Değişmelidir, Ama Nasıl?" (This Educational System Must Be Changed, 
But How?), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (4) (Fall 1996), 86, 89; Neşet Toku,
"Türkiye ve Sivil Eğitim" (Turkey and Civil Education), Liberal 
Düşünce, 2 (5) (Winter 1997), 79-84; Ataç Ünlü, "Bu İşe Devlet El
Atmalı mı? Bir Yüksek Öğrenim Polemiği" (Should the State Be Involved 
in This Issue? A Polende of Higher Education), Liberal Düşünce, 2 (5) 
(Winter 1997), 85-91.
R. Max Hartwell, "Bir Liberalin Eğitimi," 49-54.
Ibid., 51,
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The liberal intellectuals of the 1990s, represented 
in the Association for Liberal Thinking and who gathered 
around Liberal Düşünce, distance themselves from the 
state and politics. But this does not amount to 
indifference. Instead, positioning themselves over and 
above politics, they claim to pursue a double task: 
"...on the one hand, responding to the need for learning 
and debate in our country, on the other hand devising 
liberal proposals for political issues. Above all, the 
group claims novelty due to its aspiration to introduce 
the 'real face' of liberalism in a country where "statism 
has been an indispensable feature of both the collective 
and official mentality," and "collectivist structures of 
thought have established their hegemony in the 
intellectual sphere."*^
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It might not be wrong to state that Turkish politics 
has displayed a milieu of trial-error between 1960-1990. 
Trial was with the proper conduct of democracy; and 
whenever error occurred the military stepped in. Just as 
the 'fallacy' caused by the DP government led to the 1960 
military intervention that suspended the trial with 
multi-party politics, street violence in the late 1960s 
resulted in the 1971 coup by memorandum. Finally, 
political turbulence in the late 1970s ended with the
"Bu Dergi," 2.
1^ .^ "Liberal Düşünce Kendine Bakıyor," 112,
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third military intervention on September 12, 1980. In
each case, efforts were made to eliminate the errors of 
the past decade by devising a new constitution or 
amending the old one.
The 1960-1990 period was important for the liberal 
intellectuals both with respect to their proclaimed 
liberalism and their relationship with the state. To 
begin with, the 1961 Constitution offered a victory at 
least at its inception to those intellectuals who had 
earlier assumed a "liberal-socialist” identity, that is 
the Forum group. Some figures in this group participated 
in the making of the Constitution. The new constitution 
contained the reforms that had been proposed by the group 
in the latter half of the 1950s. However, this did not 
amount to a victory for liberal values because of the 
bifurcated identity of the group — liberal and socialist. 
The liberal facet of their identity was dissolved to the 
advantage of the socialist, resulting in a via media 
disposition as an aversion against extremist trends. This 
can be linked both to the continuity in the self- 
identification of the intellectuals in question with the 
state, and the contention with the fulfilment of their 
liberal aspirations by the Constitution.
The attempt to fill the gap that was created by the 
liquidation of liberal identity was initiated by Aydın 
Yalçın, one of the founders of Forum. Yalçın's
intellectual and political experience provided the scheme 
of the evolution of a liberal identity in a society high- 
in-stateness. It also helped to account for the
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influences of an unstable political and social milieu on 
intellectual priorities. The liberal intellectual of the 
era as represented by Aydın Yalçın, hovered between state 
and politics. His engagement in active politics did not 
mean a rupture from his allegiance to the general 
interest represented by the state. Instead, his 
involvement in politics arose out of the traditional 
missionary standing with respect to democracy. Yalçın's 
conviction that the 1961 Constitution provided the 
institutional framework for the functioning of democracy 
led him to pose for its sustenance. However, in the 
fierce political turbulence of the 1970s, liberal 
identity in the political arena was doomed to failure. 
Upon his withdrawal from active politics. Yalçın tried to 
pursue his 'mission' of sustaining democracy by the 
proclaimed aim of laying the foundations of liberal 
thought.
Yenl Forum emerged with this aim. The identity of 
the journal was shaped more by the political dynamics of 
the period, than by liberal discourse. Arising on a 
precedent of intense hostility between the liberal 
democratic regimes of the West and the communist bloc, 
and of an ever-increasing street violence between the 
extreme right and left in Turkey, the journal eventually 
assumed a stand against extremism and most conspiciously 
against Marxism. This disposition had the potential for
The placement of liberal identity within the parameters of 
democracy at times led to the sacrifice of liberal values. This 
sacrifice was more prevalent in the periods of political and social 
disorder.
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the 'liberal' discourse to echo a negative ideology. In 
fact, not unlike what had happened in the past decades, 
the liberal identity was integrated into a 'broader' 
scheme. While this scheme was modernization in the mono­
party period and democracy in the following decades, for 
the liberal intellectual of the early 1980s, it was 
Atatürkism. Yet, all the three frameworks did not propose 
divergent identities, but were different reflections of 
the commitment to the republican values. It may be 
concluded that it was this commitment, which led the 
liberal-minded intellectual to return to a preoccupation 
with saving the state.
In the last instance the state was again "saved" by 
the military. The 1980 military intervention opened a new 
era in Turkish political life. The 1982 Constitution 
brought in a new structuration for strengthening the 
state. The period was marked by the narrowing down of 
state into the office of Presidency and the National 
Security Council with an increase in the powers of both.’^® 
This restructuration in the state was accompanied by a 
restructuration in the universities through the Board of 
Higher Education (Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu-YÖK) . As a 
reaction to the politicization in the past decade, the 
state assumed overwhelming control in the appointment of 
the university s t a f f . I n  the meantime, there was the 
emergence of a new intellectual group in the 1990s, from
Heper, "The Executive in the Third Turkish Repxiblic, 1982-1989," 
299-319; "The state and debureaucratization," 605-15.
Ayşe Öncü, "Academics: The West in the Discourse of University
Reform," in Turkey and the West, eds. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and 
Heinz Kramer (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 166-72.
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within the academia, with claims to novelty as far as 
liberal identity was concerned.
This group was formed by a number of figures from 
Yenl Forum group, which has had a bifurcated identity, 
especially in the 1980s. This time the label of "liberal" 
was accompanied by conservatism which denoted faith in 
"the creation and internalization of Turkish-Islamic- 
Western civilization."'™ Thus, reminiscent of the Forum 
experience, the liberal identity formed for itself an 
alternative medium of organization in the Association for 
Liberal Thinking and of expression in the quarterly. 
Liberal Düşünce.
Turkish liberal intellectuals in the 1990s represent 
the continuity of Anglo-American intellectual cross­
fertilization in Turkey. Terminating the traditional 
pendulum of republic and democracy, they have chosen 
liberal theory as the basis of their comprehension of 
democracy. Unlike its predecessors, the Liberal Düşünce 
group does not grapple with the problématique of having 
to express its liberal views within the parameters of 
the Republic. The pendulum seems to have swung towards 
the edge of the democracy of liberalism. This may be 
interpreted as an initial step taken by the liberal 
intellectual to free himself from the myth of democracy 
to the advantage of a liberal ethos. Inspired by the 
recourse to classical liberalism, the Liberal Düşünce 
group declare their faith in an individualist-liberal
170. Yalçın, "Yeni Bir Dönemin Başında."
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mentality which they perceive to be the basis of Western 
civilization.
The second breaking point of the Liberal Düşünce 
group can be found in their acclamation of a universalist 
identity.This identification may be interpreted as an 
escape gate for the ’liberal’ from the Republican fate. 
More briefly, his commitment to liberal theory in 
isolation eases the exhaustion of the Republican 
intellectual in search for a circle of reference for 
himself. While this circle was provided by the state to a 
large extent, which in turn put the intellectual in a 
schizophrenic position, the liberal intellectual of the 
1990s seems to deny identification with any value but his 
liberalism.
The third break may be observed in a shift in the 
’mission’ of the ’liberal’ intellectual. In the early- 
Republican era, this mission was the construction of the 
tradition of the nation. In the multi-party period, it 
turned out to be the construction and then the 
consolidation of democracy. In the 1990s, the mission 
which the intellectual takes on himself is constructing 
the liberal tradition in Turkey.
For the time being this shift connotes the 
consolidation of the role of transmitter for the 
intellectual to the disadvantage of that of legislator.
Berzeg, "Liberalizitiin İki Determinist Tezahürü: Küreselleşme ve 
Yerelleşme" (Two Deterıainistic Appearances of Liberalism: 
Globalization and Localization), Liberal Düşünce, 1 (4) (Fall 1996), 
91.
The group identifies itself first and foremost as a member of the 
Liberal International. Yayla, "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve 
Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu," 13.
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Not unlike its predecessors, the Liberal Düşünce group 
also assumes the role of a transmitter. Their 
distinctiveness lies in the fact that the object of 
transmission is sought not in the State but in the 
universal. On the other hand, though the group has not 
yet made any implicit and explicit recourse to the trend 
from which it has emerged, the culmination was the long- 
aspired goal repeatedly stated by Yalçın, that is forming 
the liberal intellectual framework for the sustenance of 
democracy in Turkey.
However, it might be too early to reach definitive 
conclusions about the liberal intellectuals of the 1990s. 
Rather, it may be argued that they walk in an open-ended 
path of universal values in a national context. Yet, it 
is possible to point at a rather hidden problem that 
seems to linger throughout their discourse: How is one to 
achieve a spontaneous order (which in their referential 
terminology corresponded to the centuries-long evolution 
of liberal thought and practices in the British 
c o n t e x t i n  a country where liberal tradition could not 
develop at all? Such a problem has the risk of falling 
into constructivism in their pursuit to form the 
liberal tradition in Turkey.
Friedrich A. Hayek, "Liberalism," in New Studies in Philosophy, 
Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, ed. Friedrich A. Hayek 
(London: Routledge, 1982), 119-51. ^
Apart from the problem that is intrinsic to the disposition of 
the group in taking just one strand of contemporary liberal thought 
which has the potential of monopolistic claims, their reference 
point (s) are not exeir^ t from controversies. Thus, in the Western 
world debates have been carried out about and among the circle named 
either as neo-liberals or new right. More specifically, there have 
been disputes on the 'true' identity of Hayekian standing which turns 
out to be the main reference point of the group, as either 
conservative or liberal.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The present study has focused on the liberal 
identity in the Turkish context with a view to the state- 
intellectual relationship. The discourse of those 
intellectuals who have undertaken the pursuit of liberal 
premises has been the object of analysis. In the conduct 
of such a task, first the historical evolution of state- 
intellectual relationship in the Ottoman-Turkish context 
has been taken up in order to provide a background to the 
nature of the liberal discourse, as well as to 
problematize the existence of and a potential for the 
formation of a liberal tradition in the Republican era. 
The periodization that has been employed in the work was 
framed with reference first to the changes in the 
Ottoman-Turkish state structure that eventually 
introduced modifications in the state-intellectual 
relationship and ultimately in the liberal disposition. 
The second reference point was the shifts and ruptures 
observed in the conceptual matrix of liberal 
intellectuals of subsequent periods. Such a periodization 
was useful to reach conclusions about transformations in 
the identity of the Turkish liberal intellectuals which 
can be referred to as modernizing, democratizing and 
liberalizing. Though each and every identity is not 
mutually exclusive, and in the final analysis all merge
into the grand project of modernization, the terms were 
instrumental in understanding the conjunctural center of 
the preoccupation of liberal intellectuals in different 
periods.
The Ottoman period, especially, the Tanzimat era 
(1839-187 6) may be perceived as the decisive turn in 
attempts at modernization with respect to their effect on 
the identity of the intellectual. The outcomes of this 
influence also provided the historical predicament for 
the liberal intellectual in the Republican era. The 
Ottoman period was significant due to a number of 
interrelated reasons. First, it witnessed the deepening 
of the state-initiated modernization attempts, which led 
to the creation and positioning of the intellectual by 
the state and within the state cadres. In the study, this 
intellectual has been categorized as the institutional 
intellectual, drawing upon Edward Shils.^ Secondly, the 
effect of Western modernity on the intellectual sphere 
was first concretized in the Tanzimat charter (1839), 
which was the starting point of the era. Thirdly, it 
prepared the grounds for the emergence of the first self- 
proclaimed liberals among Western-minded Ottoman 
intellectuals.
The Ottoman institutional intellectual was placed in 
bureaucratic ranks and entrusted with a secular identity 
within the limits offered by tradition. Thus, whereas in
Edward Shils, "Intellectuals and responsibility," in The Political 
Responsibility of Intellectuals, eds. Ian Maclean, Alan Montefiore 
and Peter Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 257-
301.
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the West the emergence of the secular intellectual was 
accompanied by an ages-long historical process beginning 
with the Renaissance period and extending throughout the 
Reformation and Enlightenment, in the Ottoman context he 
was a product of the practical concerns of the state. In 
this respect, he was held responsible for the task of 
modernizing the governmental machinery, that led him to 
be identified as intellectual-as-bureaucrat. Such a 
development solidified the predicament of the Ottoman 
intellectual; from the eighteenth century onwards, he was 
saddled with the task of reconciling modernization, which 
ultimately meant Westernization, with tradition, that is 
compliance with Islamic principles. Furthermore, the 
intellectual of the Tanzlmat era had to grapple with the 
cultural mutation that he himself was experiencing in his 
private life due to his close encounter with the West, 
which in the final analysis destined him to adopt total 
identification with the state.
The Tanzimat intellectual was subjected to the 
impact of the experience of living with a strong state 
tradition on the formation of the intellectual mind and 
identity. The state recruited the intellectual and 
obliged him to fix his intellectual agenda within the 
limits of the question of how to save the state.
The first attempts to open an escape route from the 
strains of the state arouse in the 1860s. The Young 
Ottomans gathered around the press to form an alternative 
and opposing circle for the articulation of their 
opinions. However, this did not bring about a shift in
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the internalized raison d ’être of the intellectual 
preoccupation with the well-known question of and the 
ways how to reverse the decline of the Empire. In any 
case, the continuity in the dominance of the state on the 
press did not permit the movement to present any 
prospects for the future. However, the movement was 
significant for it revealed the aforementioned tension 
experienced by the modernizing Ottoman intellectual. This 
was best exemplified in the writings of Namık Kemal 
(1840-1888). His works epitomized the effort to reconcile 
the Western-inspired ideals with tradition. He searched a 
basis for his 'liberal' stance -formulated around the 
presumption that all individuals are born with natural 
rights- in Islam which for him provided the framework for 
the apprehending the absolute good that delineated the 
boundaries of those rights.
The Young Ottoman movement did not present a liberal 
image, in any case it fell short of developing a 
consistent pattern of thought within itself. It was in 
this respect that Prens Sabahaddin (1878-1948) emerged as 
a significant figure since his works represented the 
final effort of the Ottoman intellectual to escape from 
the handicaps of concern with tradition and develop a 
consistent liberal identity. Prens Sabahaddin, both due 
to his educational background and to his aloofness from 
state service, presented a more or less unorthodox 
portrait of the Ottoman intellectual. His unorthodoxy was 
also concretized in his total opposition to the existing 
power structure of the Ottoman Empire. Nourishing on a
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state-initiated modernizing context, which solely 
addressed the institutional framework, he framed his 
opposing stance with a touch of societal consideration. 
While, proposing Anglo-American parliamentarianism as an 
institutional remedy for the ills of the day, he regarded 
social transformation from communitarian to 
individualistic structure as the first and foremost 
prerequisite. Thus, with Prens Sabahaddin the 
intellectual who had earlier been entrusted with the task 
of devising an institutional re-structuration, now came 
to assume a second responsibility, that of social 
engineering. However, the locus of social engineering was 
again found in the state. On the whole, the Ottoman 
liberal intellectual who found his most recent example in 
Prens Sabahaddin, was not privileged to present an 
exception to the traditional concern of saving the state.
It may be concluded that the Ottoman era ended up 
with a transformation in the object of education for the 
pursuit of the modernization project. While the era had 
started by the education of the modernizing intellectuals 
for the purpose of saving the state, it terminated with 
the leftover task of educating the people with the same 
aspiration. It was in such a context that the Ottoman 
liberal intellectual tried to provide his own scheme for 
transformation. However, he fell short of -or probably 
found it inappropriate- taking the individual as the 
basic category of his discourse. In its stead, through 
the course of his entanglement with society, he reserved 
the individual as an identity that was to be developed by
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the required transformation in the society and polity. 
This may be interpreted as carrying with it the first 
signs of the approach to liberalism as a project.
By the start of World War I (1914-1918), the task of 
saving the state was pursued in the battlefield and 
proved to expire its lifespan by the ultimate failure 
against the West. The War of National Independence (1919- 
1922) that followed the ultimate demise of the empire, 
served as the cradle for a new epoch in Ottoman-Turkish 
history. The early-Republican era (1923-1946) was 
significant, since it embodied behind-the-scenes 
continuities in the state-intellectual relationship 
despite hectic rejection of the Ottoman legacy and 
efforts to construct a radically different state 
structure, while hosting the glimmerings of a new liberal 
discourse.
The early-Republican era was characterized by the 
process of nation-state building. In this process the 
legacy of the state tradition was also crystallized. 
During the era, the intellectual was saddled with a 
double responsibility. He was responsible for formulating 
the intellectual grounds for the Turkish Revolution, and 
of inculcating the logic of the new regime in society. 
Such a disposition might have been a reflection of a 
social structure high-in-stateness. Throughout the early- 
Republican era it was the state which, if we may use 
Kenneth H.F. Dysons's terminology for the Turkish case.
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...determined the leading values of the political 
community with reference to which the authority 
(was) to be exercised; ...found its embodiment in 
one or more institutions and one or more public 
purposes which thereby acquired a special social 
ethos and prestige and an association with the 
public interest or general welfare; and produced a 
socio-cultural awareness of the unique and superior 
nature of the state itself,^
and thus installed itself over and above the society. The 
Republican state, constructed as such, readily undertook 
unto itself the mission of setting up the conditions for 
the upsurge of the norms and values of the Turkish 
society which were perceived to be awaiting vitalization.
Such a configuration provided the early Republican 
intellectual with a conceptual framework which was 
imposed upon him by the state itself. As was the case in 
the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire, the 
intellectual continued to preoccupy himself with 
analyzing the West, in order to highlight why the East 
failed. Not unlike his precedents, the intellectual found 
his safety belt within the state structure. This time he 
based his arguments on the logic of the Turkish 
Revolution which at times resulted in mutually opposing 
interpretations among the intellectuals.
Liberal discourse which tried to forge for itself an 
identity in Republican Turkey had its first appearances 
in the political sphere in brief experiments with the 
transition to multi-party politics. However, in the case 
of both the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) (November
Kenneth H. F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe; A 
Study of an Idea and Institution (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), 
206.
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17, 1924-June 5, 1925) and the Free Republican Party
(August 12, 1930-November 17, 1930) the result was
failure due to the structural dynamics of Turkish 
politics. First, the PRP experience which was the first 
organized, relatively independent and liberal opposition, 
has been one of the most conspicious manifestations of 
state's omnipotence vis-à-vis any kind of opposition. 
Second, the FRP presented a problematic liberal identity 
at its very inception. The fact that the state launched 
the formation and organization of the party for the 
practice of loyal opposition destined the party to act 
within the contours of the state, which worked to the
detriment of liberal premises on which its program was 
based. The tutelary nature of the FRP was evident not
only in its equivocal standing in the political spectrum 
at the time it was founded, but also in its rather facile 
self-dissolution at the time of its engagement in active 
politics.
As for liberal identity, the development delineated 
above led to an indecisive course of chosing between 
actual opposition which meant death at birth, and loyal 
opposition which meant sacrifice of liberal premises. In 
fact, the experience with the loyal opposition of the FRP 
may be interpreted also as a test on the part of the
state to incorporate liberal discourse into its fold. 
Immediately after the dissolution of the party, the state 
adopted a totally hostile stance vis-à-vis the liberal 
discourse. Yet, the party has ensured itself a specific 
place in the annals of Turkish political history.
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basically as result of its intellectual orientation which 
was provided by Ahmet Agaoglu (1869-1939), the renowned 
intellectual of the Republican era whose liberal identity 
was nevertheless rather contentious.
Apart from his active participation in the 
foundation of the FRP and after, Agaoglu was also 
significant for correctly perceiving dilemmas concerning 
the identity of the Republican intellectual, —hovering 
between the state and opposition— : "I entered the FRP as 
a revolutionary, democrat, liberal statist and Kemalist. 
...Till the foundation of the FRP, I sincerely believed 
that the RPP was a liberal, democratic party, and even as 
statist as I am."^ Agaoglu served within the state 
structure both before and after the proclamation of the 
Republic. In this respect, he represented the 
intellectual of the Republic preoccupied with the 
consolidation of Kemalist principles and reforms into an 
intellectual framework and transmitting them to the 
society. On the other hand, Agaoglu may be taken as a 
model of the intellectual in opposition, qoming from 
within the state, in the name of those very principles 
that the state determined and proclaimed. Mustafa Kemal 
appointed him as a member of the FRP/ however, he turned 
out to be a genuine opponent of the RPP. His peculiar 
standing in the party, as its theoretician, continued 
after its dissolution. In contrast to the other former
Ahmet Agaoglu, Devlet ve Fert (State and Individual) (İstanbul: 
Sanayiinefise Matbaası, 1933), 101-2.
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party members who later rejoined the RPP, Ağaoğlu chose 
to stay in opposition.
Ağaoğlu represented an isolated figure in the early 
Republican intellectual circles. His isolation may be 
linked to the absence of a liberal circle. Yet, he was 
typical in that he constructed his liberal stance on the 
raison d'être of the Turkish Revolution, which ensured 
his loyalty to the state and its principles. In his In 
the Land of the Free Men {Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde, 
1930j Ağaoğlu outlined his utopia. In the land of the 
free men of Ağaoğlu, the socio-political system was 
founded on the principle of individual freedom. He argued 
that the Turkish Revolution was in fact a struggle of the 
will against the memory for liberating the individual, 
"...and thus the community constituted by the
individuals...," from the shackles of Eastern dogmatism.
However, such an emphasis on the individual was not 
inspired by the classical liberal stance, which accords 
the individual a pivotal place in the public sphere, over 
and above any other social entity. Throughout the 
writings of Ağaoğlu, the concept of individual freedom 
was taken to be the sine qua non for sustaining a stable 
and dynamic society. This ideal society of Ağaoğlu was 
modelled on the Western nation-state. Thus, faith in the 
individual was not in the individual-as-such, but in the 
ideal individual-as-citizen of the Republic. The creation 
of the individual-as-citizen was perceived to be the 
prerequisite for the sustenance of order.
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Agaoglu had total commitment to the basis of the 
Republican regime. What pushed him to opposition were his 
views about the particular policies which the state 
pursued in the name of the regime. He participated in the 
FRP, since he thought that it would act as a medium for 
control and criticism —the imperatives of realization of 
freedom. This conception of freedom led him to continue 
with identification with the party even after its 
dissolution. However, in his writings the most appearant 
object of criticism were the etatist policies of the 
state, which gained momentum in the 1930s. While 
acknowledging that the (Turkish) state was by definition 
statist, Agaoglu rejected state intervention in the 
economy because it was too early. Agaoglu thought that 
state interference was legitimate only when the
imperative contradictions in the economy endanger social 
harmony and order. For him, the conditions of the time 
were not ripe for the state to take an active hold of the 
economy. Instead, he argued that, due to the structural 
dynamics of the period, the state should proceed as an 
organizer, rather than an active partner in the economic 
sphere.
Agaoglu's liberal stance, briefly delineated above, 
may be located in his conception of history. For him 
history could be analogized to a scene of "creative 
evolution," colored by the search for harmony among 
contradictions in different social contexts. This 
conception is most clearly observed in his interpretation 
of the Turkish Revolution -he viewed the Turkish
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Revolution not as an exceptional paranthesis in history, 
but as one contextual eventuality in the universal 
process of progress. Yet, this did not lead him to adopt 
the universal and abstract principles of classical 
liberalism. He adhered to the universally authentic 
concept of individual freedom in order to provide native 
conceptualization that would be appropriate for the 
particular political configuration of his period. It is 
in this respect that Agaoglu represented the intellectual 
of the early-Republican era who was in search of a 
liberal identity for his society.
In the early Republican era modernization was 
imposed by the state as a comprehensive project. This 
project represented the official Republican mentality of 
obliterating all that was accepted to belong to the 
Ottoman past. However, despite this proclaimed endeavour 
to a break with the Ottoman past, the period witnessed an 
admixture of continuities within change. To begin with, 
not unlike the past, in the early Republican era, too, 
the state was the leitmotive of the modernization 
attempts, though with a different institutional 
structure. Second, the Republic inherited the social 
engineering ethos that had prevailed especially in the 
last decades of the Ottoman Empire, again taking the 
bureaucracy as an instrument in the achievement of the 
task of modernization. As far as breaks with the Ottoman 
past were concerned, the split was not in the role 
attributed to the state, but in the mentality that guided 
its institutionalization. This mentality brought about
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the preoccupation with how to surpass the social, 
political and cultural orders of the Ottoman past, and 
their symbolic and structural basis. Thus, the Republican 
project of modernization proposed a double-track process. 
The first task was to remove all "tradition" that 
belonged to the Ottoman past, both from the institutions 
and for the society. The second task was to revitalize 
the 'genuine tradition' for the society. This double­
track process required that the intellectual -who 
continued in the modernizing mission of his precedents- 
assume a double identity. While acting as legislator in 
the way of ensuring institutional and social
modernization, he was to act also as the transmitter of 
logic of the subsequent reconstruction of the 'genuine 
tradition' to the society. The liberal discourse was born 
from within this modernizing mission. Its significance 
was due to its endeavour to provide alternative 
interpretations in the path towards modernity which in 
the final analysis may be linked to the emergence of the 
mission of the coming decades, that of democratization.
The two subsequent attempts to the transition to 
multi-party regime signified the rather contentious 
nature of the concept of democracy in Turkish political 
life. Perceiving democracy as a display of "enlightened 
debate,between political parties for the good of the 
society, the state resorted to repressive measures
Metin Heper, "Bureaucrats: Persistent Elitists," in Turkey and the 
West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities, eds. Metin Heper,
Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer (London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co
Ltd P\iblishers, 1993), 39.
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against 'legitimate' opposition on the grounds of the 
latter's immaturity. Yet, the PRP and FRP experiences may 
still be observed as (un)conscious attempts to oppose 
this monopolistic claim over the comprehension of and 
practice of democracy by the state.
In the 1946-1960 period, the concept of democracy 
became essential for the liberal discourse. The period in 
question was significant for the Turkish political system 
for a number of reasons. First, unlike the preceding 
period, it was marked by the decisive transition to 
multi-party politics. Second, Democratic Party's (DP) 
ascent to power (1950) led to the transition from state- 
centered polity to party-centered polity, that is the 
transfer of the political power from the state elites to 
the political elites. Last but not the least, the period 
witnessed the consolidation of Anglo-American cross­
fertilization in the intellectual sphere, which 
constituted perhaps the only acceptable legacy for the 
liberal intellectuals of the coming decades.
The intellectual flux that took place during these 
fourteen years necessitates a sub-categorization. In this 
respect, the first stage was chosen as the 1946-1950 
period. The period started by the rise of opposition from 
within the RPP and reached its logical conclusion with 
DP's acquisiton of power. This opposition was accompanied 
by the writings of Ahmet Emin Yalman -the self-proclaimed 
liberal journalist (1888-1973). Both the critical 
discourse of the DP, and the writings of Yalman took the 
'actual meaning' of the term "democracy" as their
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starting point. They rendered the Anglo-American 
democracies, which for them had proved their supremacy by 
the Allied victory in the Second World War (1939-1945), 
as the ideal model that should be adopted. The post 1946 
period also differed from the early Republican era by an 
increase in the influence of international developments 
on the domestic politics. Thus, in addition to the 
nationalist legacy of bhe past decade, the nouveaux 
opposition adopted the task of overall alliance with the 
Anglo-American world.
As far as the intellectual framework was concerned, 
this shift was reflected in the merging of the 
preoccupation with the requisites of democracy into the 
Republican responsibilicy to form the intellectual 
premises for the Turkish nation-state. In other words, 
the excessive preoccupation with the emergence of nation 
and its constituents of the previous era, continued in 
the rhetoric of the opposition which paid attention to 
the international atmosphere. Thus, in his writings 
Yalman emphasized the different nature of Turkish nation 
and nationalism from the extreme nationalism of Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy. Apart from that, the 
engagement of Yalman in such international liberal 
platforms as in the first meeting of the Union of World 
Liberals (April 9-14, 1945) and the subsequent foundation 
of the Association for the Dissemination of Free Ideas - 
that was planned to function as the National Committee of 
the union in Turkey- farther strengthened adherence to 
the Anglo-American model. The most distinguishing
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characteristic of such initiatives was their proclaimed 
raison d ’être to ensure the liberal standing vis-à-vis 
the communist one. With such a negative disposition, 
Yalman provided the first example of the Turkish liberal 
intellectuals to resort to liberalism in order to counter 
communism. However, the negative discourse which framed 
Yalman's liberal identity was built more on his 
opposition to the RPP, than anything else. This led him 
to side with the DP.
The DP took power with an "alternative" and 
"genuine" comprehension of democracy. In its discourse 
the party based this "genuineness" on the advocacy of 
freedom. However, when the party was in power, the 
discourse of freedom was delimited to economic and 
cultural policies. In fact, despite a shift in the locus 
of politics from the state to the party, the DP was in 
consensus with the RPP as regards the political 
principles of the Republican regime. This meant the 
continuity of the absolutist conception of power which 
had traditionally been legitimized on the "will of the 
nation." The DP politicized the bureaucracy with the 
proclaimed aspiration to echo the will of the nation at 
the state, which led to a party-dominant state. Thus, the 
coming to power of a party other than the party of state, 
in a country with a strong state tradition, was in the 
final analysis no more than a representational change in 
the functioning of the system.
With such a power structure at hand, the second 
stage of the period (1950-1960) witnessed the emergence
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of a new group of intellectuals who were critical of the 
democratic nature of the DP rule -the claimant to "the 
real" comprehension of democracy. This opposition bloc 
comprised a number of Western-minded intellectuals 
gathered around the fortnightly Forum. Not unlike the 
case in the preceding period The Forum group, too, 
experienced the unease in fixing its disposition as 
regards the state and opposition. The liberal 
intellectual again found himself entrusted with a twofold 
responsibility —being a part of the state on the one 
hand, and being a 'neutral enlightener' which inescapably 
presumed an opposing stance, on the other.
As in line with the general trend of the period, the 
Forum group articulated their opposition in light of 
Anglo-American democracy. The Anglo-American influence 
was not limited to the conception of democracy, but 
shaped the systematization of a flow of thought which had
theoretical and methodological bases. In viewing the
relation between the individual and the state. and
liberty and equality with respect to each other. the
group took the social democratic claims of the period as 
their theoretical reference point. The Forum writers 
displayed the Anglo-American influence also in the 
methodology they adopted. Thus, the articles analyzed 
specific issues and institutions and the proposals as 
regards the ought-to-be(s) were based not on 'abstract 
theorizing,' but on the idealization of the existing 
models, namely Western liberal democratic institutions.
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The group also ended the unease of the Ottoman- 
Turkish 'liberal' intellectual who had long experienced 
hardship in preserving the essence of tradition in the 
passage to modernity. Also, they did not take into 
consideration the early Republican task of revitalizing 
all that was national within the grand project of 
modernization. By an all-out rejection of the 
plausibility of a synthesis between the East and West the 
group argued for absolute Westernism to the detriment of 
tradition. Thus, they represented the Turkish 
intellectual's adherence to the West.
However, the group displayed a rather volatile stand 
in their relation with political power. Following the 
short experience with the Freedom Party (FP), their 
opposition against the DP rule led them to come close to 
the RPP —the party which had previously been criticized 
for its authoritarian tendency— in the late fifties. This 
was manifest in the articles explaining the rasion d'être 
of the mono-party rule and calling for opposition to 
unite in order to bring down the DP government. One may 
argue that such a shift was the outcome of merely 
practical concerns —i.e., that the FP did not have the 
potential to acquire majority-. However, for the purposes 
of the present study, this shift was an indication of the 
continuity of the Ottoman-Turkish liberal intellectual's 
concern for the state. In the Forum case, this concern 
was revealed in the conceptualization of democracy as 
requiring meticulous construction. The democratizing
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stance of the intellectual was also epitomized in such an 
approach.
The liberal identity of the Forum group remained in 
the shade of their intellectual disposition. They 
displayed consistency in their aspiration to fulfil the 
intellectual responsibility-providing a neutral ground 
for intellectual debate on issues concerning politics, 
society and economy. As far as the political preferences 
of the regular columnists of the fortnightly are 
concerned, the group failed to achieve a definitive 
identity. Above all, from the very beginning they had 
already displayed a bifurcated character under the label 
"liberal-socialist.” The oscillation between the 
"liberal" and the "socialist" constituted the first 
example of the new ambivalence that the liberal 
intellectuals of the coming decades faced regarding their 
political preferences.
The prevailing concern of the 'liberal' intellectual 
for the state was exemplified in the applause that Forum 
extended to the 1960 military intervention. Beginning 
with Turkish democracy's first experience with military 
intervention, the period between 1960-1990 displayed a 
scene of trial-error for Turkish politics. Trial was with 
the "proper conduct of democracy" and whenever error 
occurred the military stepped in. Thus, the military 
interfered with politics for the second time by the 1971 
coup by memorandum, and the subsequent military 
intervention took place on September 12, 1980. In the 
1960 military intervention, the blame was put on the
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political parties for falling into an "irreconciliable 
situation," thus disrupting Turkish democracy. In the 
1971 coup by memorandum, it was the 1961 Constitution 
that was held responsible for providing civil liberties 
to such an extent that resulted in chaos. The 1980 
military intervention was legitimized by the political 
and social deadlock that was caused by the deepening of 
this chaos.
In the 1960-1990 period, liberal identity as 
expressed in the intellectual discourse experienced a 
rather debilitating development. The 1961 Constitution 
was significant since it disclosed the nature of the 
proclaimed liberalism of the liberal-minded 
intellectuals. The Constitution embodied the premises 
advocated by the liberal intellectuals of the past 
decade, that is the Forum group. On the other hand, the 
participation of some figures in this group in the 
constitution making process, upon the call from the 
military, once again ensured the potential of close 
alliance between the intellectuals in question and the 
state.-5 Though the 1961 Constitution promised a victory
for the liberal premises of the group, it did not
constitute the upsurge of liberal identity. On the
contrary. being content with the sufficiency of the
liberal aura as fixed by the Constitution, the Forum
group expressed their standing within the contours of the
Turhan Feyzioğlu participated in the commission referred to as the 
Ankara Group, while Bahri Savcı and Muammer Aksoy took part in all 
the three commissions that were formed for the preparation of the 
1961 Constitution.
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term via media, which connoted an abhorrence of extremist 
trends.
The attempt to fill the gap that was left by the 
liquidation of liberal identity was initiated by Aydın 
Yalçın, one of the founders of Forum. Sharing the faith 
of the Forum group in the 1961 Constitution, Yalçın 
continued with his proclaimed liberal standing both in 
his writings and participation in party politics. For the 
purposes of this study. Yalçın's discourse and engagement 
in active politics represented the path that a liberal 
identity took in a society high-in-stateness. He was also 
typical for the priorities of a liberal intellectual in 
an unstable political and social milieu.
Unlike the preceding periods when the intellectual 
was destined to choose among only two alternatives, that 
is the party of the state on the one hand, and that of 
opposition on the other, the liberal intellectual of the 
era as represented by Yalçın, hovered between the state 
and party politics. Yalçın shared the conviction with the 
Forum group that the 1961 Constitution provided the 
institutional framework for the functioning of democracy. 
Thus, he engaged in active politics since he felt himself 
responsible for sustaining it, which in the final 
analysis connoted continuity in the missionary approach 
to democracy. Ironically, in the fierce political 
turbulence of the 1970s, the liberal identity was doomed 
to failure in the political arena. Thus, in the late 
1970s Yalçın continued in his commitment to sustain
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democracy through the proclaimed task of nurturing 
liberal thought in the Turkish context.
With this aim in mind Yalçın took on the publication 
of a fortnightly journal under the name of Yeni Forum 
(1979). In their allegiance to Anglo-American 
institutional framework, the Yeni Forum group was not 
different from 'liberal' intellectual groupings of the 
preceding eras. At a time of ever-increasing street 
violence between extreme right and left this allegiance 
led the group to express their liberal identity by a 
negative discourse, -especially vis-à-vis the left.
As was the case for the Republican 'liberals' of the 
previous periods, the Yeni Forum group also formulated 
their liberal disposition with a view to the Republican 
values. However, rather than basing their stand on the 
grand project of modernization and/or the commitment to 
democratization, they found their reference point in the 
term "Atatilrkism, " which for them encompassed both. It 
may be concluded that it was this adherence which led the 
liberal-minded intellectual, to become preoccupied with 
saving the state. With this concern, the group published 
a proposal for reforming "the Constitution and the 
regime," on the eve of Turkey's third experience with 
military intervention (September 12, 1980).
Thus, despite the efforts of the liberal-minded 
intellectual, the state was again saved by the military. 
The post-1980 era which started by the devising of a new 
constitution in 1982, marked a new structuration. Though 
the structuration was new, the mentality behind it -
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strengthening the state- was not novel. The period was 
marked by the narrowing down of the state into the office 
of presidency and military with an increase in the powers 
of both.^ This restructuration in the state was 
accompanied by a restructuration in the universities by 
the establishment of the Board of Higher Education (YÖK). 
As a reaction to the politicization in the past decade, 
the state ensured overwhelming control in the appointment 
of university staff. The liberal identity of the 1990s 
was born into this political and academic structure. It 
grew out of the universities with claims to the true 
comprehension of liberalism.
This group was formed by a number of figures from 
the Yeni Forum group. As reminiscent of its precedent, 
the Yeni Forum group also presented a bifurcated 
identity, especially in the 1980s. Alongside their 
proclaimed liberalism, they adopted a conservative 
discourse colored by faith in "the creation and 
internalization of Turkish-Islamic-Western civilization." 
Thus, again resembling the Forum experience, the liberal 
aspect tried to forge itself alternative mediums of 
organization in the Association for Liberal Thinking 
{Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu) and of expression in the 
quarterly Liberal Düşünce.
Turkish liberal intellectuals of the 1990s share 
with those of the preceding periods adherence to Anglo- 
American liberal tradition. They are nouveaux since they
Heper, "The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982-1989," 
Governance, 3 (3) (1990), pp. 299-319.
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seem to have put an end to the pendulum between republic 
and democracy which had shaped the liberal-minded 
intellectual identity, especially after the transition to 
multi-party politics. They have chosen liberal theory as 
the basis of their comprehension of democracy. Thus, 
unlike their predecessors Liberal Düşünce group do not 
grapple with the problématique of expressing their 
liberalism within the parameters of the Republic. The 
pendulum seems to have swung from Republic towards the 
edge of the democracy of liberalism. With a broader 
consideration, this may be interpreted as an initial step 
taken by the liberal intellectual away from the myth of 
democracy to liberal ethos.
The Liberal Düşünce group resort to the classical 
liberal standing in the formulation of their theoretical 
framework. Thus, they take not the citizen of the 
Republic, but the individual as their basic category. For 
them individualist-liberal mentality forms the basis of 
Western civilization. It is in this respect that the 
liberal intellectual of the 1990s has come to have a new 
mission -that of liberalizing. The object to liberalize 
is democracy and the task is liberalizing it from the 
state.
The evolution of liberal identity as framed in the 
intellectual discourse throughout the Republican era took 
place in a social context that is high-in-stateness. This 
had detrimental effects on the consistency in the 
conceptual matrice of liberal intellectuals not only in 
different periods, but also in the same period. However,
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for the sake of consistency in the present study, one may 
conclude with a brief categorization on the basis of the 
missonary task that the Republican intellectual has took 
upon himself. In the early Republican era, the
intellectual preoccupation was drawn with the modernizing 
mission; the following eras that began by the transition 
to multi-party period and extended till the 1990s, were 
ones when the democratizing spirit characterized
intellectual vocation. All in all, the liberal
intellectual hovered first, between the state (read as 
order) and opposition (read as freedom)(mono-party
period); and then between the state (read as the 
Republic) and opposition (read as democracy)(multi-party 
period). The liberal intellectuals of the 1990s have 
adopted a liberalizing mission. Abstaining from 
definitive conclusions, it may be argued that they walk 
on an open-ended path of universal values in a national 
context. There is, however, a dilemma at the core of 
their agenda: How is one to achieve a spontaneous order
which in their referential terminology corresponds to the 
evolution of liberal thought and practices in the British 
context,·^  in a country which for them could not develop a 
liberal tradition at all? This problem carries the risk 
falling into constructivism in their aspiration to 
construct the liberal tradition in Turkey. Perhaps it is 
safe to conclude that the tradition of Turkish liberal 
thought is most conspiciously symbolized in denial of the 
precedents, but not in a specific evolution of a strain 
of thought throughout subsequent generations.
Freidrich A. Hayek, "Liberalism," in New Studies In Philosophy, 
Politics and Economics and the History of Ideas, ed. Freidrich A. 
Hayek (London: Routledge, 1978), 119-51.
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1, 1960), 12-3.
"İktidarın Basin Hürriyeti Anlayışı" (Government's
Conception of Freedom of Press). Forum. 12 : 144 
(March 15, 1960), 1-2.
"Aydın Yalçın Meselesi ve Aydınlar" (The Issue of Aydın 
Yalçın and Intellectuals). Forum. 179 (September 
15, 1961), 1-2.
"Aydın Yalçın'ın Cevabı" (Aydın Yalçın's Response).
Forum. 181 (October 15, 1961). 3-4.
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"Orta Yolun Kaderi" (The Fate of Mid-Way). Forum. 194 
(May 1/ 1962), 3-5 .
"27 Mayıs." (May 27). Forum. 196 (June 1, 1962), 3-5.
"Şekli Demokrasiden Öz Demokrasiye" (From Formal
Democracy to Genuine Democracy). Forum. 199 (July 
15, 1962), 3-5.
"A.P. Kongreleri ve Milli İdare" (Congresses of JP and
National Will). Forum. 200 (August 1, 1962), 6-7.
"Türk Demokrasisinin Kaderi" (The Fate of Turkish
Democracy). Forum. 204 (October 1, 1962), 3-4.
"Plan ve Sonrası" (Plan and Its Aftermath). Forum. 207 
(November 15, 1962), 4-6.
"Ordu ve Politika" (Army and Politics). Forum. 209 
(December 15, 1962), 3-4.
"A.P. Genel Kongresi" (General Congress of JP). Forum.
209 (December 15, 1962), 7.
Talas, Cahit. "Kalkınma ve İktisadi Sistemler"
(Development and Economic Systems). Forum. 209 
(December 15, 1962), 15-7.
"iki Alanda da Orta Yol" (Mid-Way in Both Spheres).
Forum. 211 (January 15, 1963), 3-5.
Kerimoglu, A. "Türk ve Fransız Plancılığı: Demokratik
Plancılığın Doğuşu" (Planning in Turkey and France: 
The Birth of Democratic Planning). Forum. 216 (April 
1, 1963), 20-1.
"Huzur Çıkmazı" (The Impasse of Peace). Forum. 214 (March 
1, 1963), 3-4.
"Bundan Sonrası" (From Now On). Forum. 217 (April 15, 
1963), 3-4.
"Parlamentonun Sorumluluğu" (The Responsibility of 
Parliament). Forum. 218 (May 1, 1963), 3-4.
Güriz, Adnan. "Modern Demokrasinin Temel İlkeleri: I-
Hürriyet" (Basic Principles of Modern Democracy: I- 
Freedom). Forum. 219 (May 15, 1963), 11-4.
"27 Mayıs ve İktisadi Hayatımız" (May 27 and Our Economic 
Life). Forum. 220 (June 1, 1963), 3-4.
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"Sıkı Yönetim" (Martial Law). Forum. 221 (June 15, 1963), 
3-4.
Güriz, Adnan. "Modern Demokrasinin Temel İlkeleri: II-
Eşitlik" (Basic Principles of Modern Democracy: II- 
Equality). Forum. 224 (August 1, 1963), 9-11.
"Buhranın Asıl Kaynağı" (The Real Reason of Crisis). 
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"Onbir Yil" (Eleven Years). Forum. 240 (April 1, 1964), 
3-4 .
Articles by Aydın Yalçın published in Öncü
Yalçın, Aydın. "Yol Kavşağında Bir Öncü" (A Protagonist 
at the Crossroads). Öncü (August 26, 1960) .
Yalçın, Aydın. "İhtiyaç Sistem ve İdeolojiye midir?" 8Do 
We Need System and Ideology). Öncü (August 31,
1960) .
Yalçın, Aydın. "Demokrat Partinin Akıbeti" (The End of 
Democratic Party). Öncü (September 3, 1960).
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Committee). Öncü (September 10, 1960).
Yalçın, Aydın. "Demokrasi ve Lider" (Democracy and 
Leader). Öncü (September 14, 1960).
Yalçın, Aydın. "Esasta Anlaşalım" (We Shall Agree on the 
Principles). Öncü (September 16, 1960).
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Yalçın, Aydın. "Demokrasimizde Aksamalar" (Breakdowns in 
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Yalçın, Aydın. "Politikada İnsan Faktörü" (Human Element 
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Yalçın, Aydın. "Siyasi İşbirliği" (Political 
Cooperation). Öncü (January 31, 1961).
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Öncü (November 10, 1961).
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Yalçın, Aydın. "Yeni Türkiye Partisi" (New Turkey Party). 
Öncü (February 14, 1962).
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Yalçın, Aydın. "Niçin Çıkıyoruz?" (Why Do We Publish?). 
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"Vatanseverlik ve Sağduyunun Gür Sesi" (The Deep Voice of 
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"Rejim ve Anayasamızda Reform Önerisi" (Reform Proposal 
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"Senaryonun İç ve Dış Tezahhürleri" (Internal and
External Appearances of the Scenario). Yeni Forum. 3 
: 35 (February 15, 1981), 3-4.
"Aysbergin Ucu ve Gövdesi" (The Apex and Body of
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(Investigation of Terrorism in US Senate) 
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"Yeni Forum’un Cevabı" (Yeni Forum's Response) 
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Yeni
"Teşhis Hatasının Sakıncaları" (The Drawbacks of Wrong 
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"Yeni Yılda Milli Gündem" (National Agenda in New Year). 
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"Gençliği Hedef Alan İdeolojik Saldırılar" (Ideological 
Attacks That Target the Youth). Yeni Forum. 6 : 129 
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"Psikolojik Savaşta Karşı Önlemler Nelerdir?" (What Are 
the Counter-Measures in Psychological War?). Yeni 
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Yayla, Atilla. "Teröristlerin Islahının Kültürel ve
İdeolojik Boyutları" (The Cultural and Ideological 
Dimensions of the Disciplining of Terrorists). Yeni 
Forum. 6 : 131 (February 15, 1985), 15-7.
"Demokrasimizin Sıkıntılı Dönemleri" (Difficult Periods 
of Our Democracy). Yeni Forum. 6 : 133 (March 15,
1985) , 3-4.
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Okyar, Osman. "Türkiye'de Aydınlar Bunalımı"
(Intellectuals' Crisis in Turkey). Yeni Forum. 6 : 
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"Üniversiteler ve Çağdaş Softalar" (Universities and 
Modern Yeni Forum. 6 : 136 (May 1, 1985), 11-2.
"Komünistler, Yalan ve Aydınlar" (Communists, Lies and 
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"Orduya Komünist Sızması" (Intrusion of Communists into 
the Army). Yeni Forum. 6 : 138 (June 1, 1985), 9.
"Başarılı Bir Demokrasi İçin" (For a Successful
Democracy). Yeni Forum. 6 : 141 (July 15, 1985), 
3-4.
"Solun Fikri Perişanlığı" (The Intellectual Disarray of 
Left). Yeni Forum. 6 : 141 (July 15, 1985), 10-1.
Yayla, Atilla. "Hür Basın ve Demokratik Sistem" (Free 
Press and Democratic System). Yeni Forum. 6 : 143 
(August 15, 1985), 32-4.
"Aydınların Görevi" (The Duty of Intellectuals). Yeni 
Forum. 6 : 144 (September 1, 1985), 3-5.
"12 Eylül'ün Beşinci Yıldönümü" (The Fifth Anniversary of 
September 12). Yeni Forum. 6 : 145 (September 15, 
1985),3-5.
"Atatürkçülüğün Çetin Yolları" (Hard Routes of
Atatürkism). Yeni Forum. 6 : 146 (October 1,
1985), 3-4.
"Hayal Kırıklığı ve Pişmanlık" (Disappointment and
Regret). Yeni Forum. 6 : 147 (October 15, 1985), 3- 
4.
Doğaner, Aydın. "'Aydın' Kavramı Üzerine" (On the Concept 
of 'Intellectual'). Yeni Forum. 6 : 147 (October
15, 1985), 33-5.
"Kış Başında Bulutlanan Ufuklar" (Cloudy Horizons in the 
Beginning of Winter). Yeni Forum. 6 : 148 (November 
1, 1985), 3-4.
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"öğrenci Derneklerine Dikkat" (Attention to Students’ 
Associations). Yeni Forum. 6 : 148 (November 1, 
1985), 6-7.
Kantarcıoğlu, Sevim. "Atatürk'ün Kültür Anlayışı"
(Atatürk's Conception of Culture). Yeni Forum. 6 : 
149 (November 15, 1985), 15-20.
Yalçın, Aydın ed. Vatan Hıyanetinin Anatomisi. (The
Anatomy of Treason). Ankara: Daily News Web. Ofset
Tesisleri, 1986.
"DİSK'in Kapatılması Üzerine" (On the Closure of DİSK). 
Yeni Forum. 8 : 176 (January 1, 1987), 13-5.
Dağhan, Zafer. "Bir Konferansın Düşündürdükleri"
(Reflections on a Conference). Yeni Forum. 8 : 176 
(January 1, 1987), 46-9.
"Disk, Marksizm ve Sosyal Demokratlık" (DİSK, Marxism and 
Social Democrats). Yeni Forum. 8 : 177 (January 15, 
1987), 12-5.
"Radikal Sol Dergi Furyası" (Overflow of Leftist
Journals). Yeni Forum. 8 : 177 (January 15, 1987), 
15-8.
"Radikal Sol Dergilerin Fonksiyonları" (The Functions of 
Radical Leftist Journals). Yeni Forum. 8 : 180
(March 1, 1987), 7-8.
"Birleşik Sosyalistler Birleşiniz" (United Socialists, 
ünite). Yeni Forum. 8 : 187 (June 15, 1987), 8-10.
Yalçın, Aydın. "Yeni Bir Dönemin Başında" (In the 
Beginning of a New Era). Yeni Forum. 11 : 248 
(January 1990), 4-5.
Berlin, Isaiah. "Bir ideal Olarak Eşitlik" (Equality as 
an Ideal). Translated by Mustafa Erdoğan. Yeni 
Forum. 11 : 248 (January 1990), 29-37.
Berger, Peter L. "Ahlak Yargısı ve Siyasal Faaliyet"
(Moral Judgement and Political Activity). Translated 
by Mustafa Erdoğan. Yeni Forum. 11 : 250 (March 
1990), 36-41.
Rand, Ayn. "İnsanın Hakları" (Human Rights). Translated 
by Atilla Yayla. 11 : 250 (March 1990), 68-71.
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Rand, Ayn. "Kapitalizm Nedir?" (What Is Capitalism?). 
Translated by Atilla Yayla. Yeni Forum. 11 : 252 
(May 1990), 38-48.
Cranston, Maurice. "İnsan Hakları Nelerdir?" (What Are 
Human Rights?). Translated by Atilla Yayla. Yeni 
Forum. 11 : 253 (June 1990), 41-3.
"Y. Forum 12. Yaşına Girdi" (Yeni Forum Celebrates Its
12th Year). Yeni Forum. 11 : 257 (October 1990), 13
Teague, Elizabeth. "Açık Toplum mu?" (Open Society?) 
Translated by Mustafa Erdoğan. Yeni Forum. 12 
(February 1991), 45-6.
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Hayek, Friedrich A. "Liberal Bir Sosyal Düzenin İlkeleri" 
(Principles of a Liberal Social Order). Translated 
by Atilla Yayla. Yeni Forum. 12 : 263 (April 1991), 
25-34.
Höffe, Otfried. "Adalet Bir Değiştokuş mudur?" (Is
Justice a Barter?). Translated by Ahmet Arslan. Yeni 
Forum. 12 : 264 (May 1991), 27-34.
Rand, Ayn. "Kollektif Haklar" (Collective Rights).
Translated by Mustafa Erdoğan. Yeni Forum. 12 : 265 
(June 1991), 29-31.
Popper, Karl. "Şimdiye Kadar Elde Edebildiğimiz
Dünyaların En İyisi" (The Best World We Could Ever 
Achieved). Interview by George Urban. Translated 
by Murat Aygen. Yeni Forum. 12 : 267 (August 1991), 
47-9.
"Entellektüel Kirlenmenin İzleri" (The Traces of
Intellectual Corruption). Yeni Forum. 12 : 264 
(May 1991), 13.
Yalçın, Aydın. "Atayurt'ta Arayışlar" (Searches in
Ätayurt). Yeni Forum. 13 : 278 (July 1992), 20-7.
Nesipzade, Nesip. "Bağımsızlık Sorunu-I" (The Problem of 
Independence-I). Yeni Forum. 13 : 278 (July 1992), 
34-8.
Nesipzade, Nesip. "Bağımsızlık Sorunu-II" (The Problem of 
Independence-II). Yeni Forum. 13 : 219 (August
1992), 21-7.
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Yalçın, Aydın. "Washington'da Dağlık Karabağ Toplantısı" 
(Dağlık Karabağ Meeting in Washington). Yeni Forum. 
13 : 280 (September 1992), 34-9.
"Dergimiz 15. Yılında" (Our Journal Celebrates Its 15th
Anniversary). Yeni Forum. 14 : 292 (September 1993), 
6 .
Yayla, Atilla. "Hocam, Arkadaşım, Meslektaşım Aydın 
Yalçın" (Aydın Yalçın: My Teacher, Friend, 
Colleague). Yeni Forum. 15 : 306 (November 1994), 
20-3.
Erdoğan, Mustafa. "'Arkadaşım' Aydın Yalçın" (Aydın 
Yalçın: My 'Friend'). Yeni Forum. 15 : 306 
(November 1994), 24-5.
Demirer, M. Arif. "Siyaset Adamı Aydın Yalçın" (Aydın 
Yalçın as Politician). Yeni Forum. 15 : 306 
(November 1994), 10-9.
Articles Published in Liberal Düşünce Dergisi and Liberal 
Bülten
Erdoğan, Mustafa. "Laiklik, Cumhuriyet'in Dini midir?"
(Is Laicism the Religion of Republic?). Liberal 
Bülten. 2 (Summer 1995), 6.
"Bu Dergi" (This Journal). Liberal Düşünce. 1 : 1 (Winter 
1996), 1-3.
Yayla, Atilla. "Pratikteki Açmazlarıyla Liberalizm ve 
Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu" (Practical Impasses of 
Liberalism and Association for Liberal Thinking). 
Liberal Düşünce. 1 (Winter 1996), 4-14.
Berzeg, Kazım. "Neden Liberalim?" (Why Am I a Liberal?). 
Liberal Düşünce. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 15-27.
Erdoğan, Mustafa. "Niçin Liberalizm?" (Why Liberalism?). 
Liberal Düşünce. 1 (Winter 1996), 28-33.
Ülsever, Cüneyt. "Marksizmden Liberalizme: Pratik Teoriyi 
Daima Aşıyor" (From Marxism to Liberalism: Practice 
Always Transcends Theory). Liberal Düşünce. 1 
(Winter 1996), 34-8.
Yürüşen, Melih. "Otorite ve Özerklik: İmkansız Bir 
Beraberlik mi?" (Authority and Autonomy: An
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Impossible Coexistence?). Liberal Düşünce. 1 : 1 
(Winter 1996), 39-48.
Hartwell, R. Max. "Bir Liberalin Eğitimi" (Education of a 
Liberal). Translated by Sema Coşaroğlu. Liberal 
Düşünce. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 49-53.
Arslan, Ahmet. "Türk Laikliği ve Geleceği Üzerine Bazı
Düşünceler" (Some Reflections on Turkish Laicism and 
Its Future). Liberal Düşünce. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 
54-76.
Yurdusev, A. Nuri. "Laiklik ve Modern Uluslararası
Sistem" (Laicism and Modern International System). 
Liberal Düşünce. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996),77-84.
Akalın, Güneri. "Türkiye'de Devletçilik Hareketi ve
Sosyo-Ekonomik Maliyetleri" (The Trend of Etatism in 
Turkey and Its Socio-Economic Costs). Liberal 
Düşünce. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 85-92.
Barry, Norman P. "Marksizmin Gerilemesi ve
Komüniteryenizmin Yükselişi" (The Regression of 
Marxism and the Rise of Communitarianism).
Translated by Mustafa Erdoğan. Liberal Düşünce. 1 : 
1 (Winter 1996), 108-11.
Dağı, İhsan. "Uluslararası Politikada Devletin Yeri: 
Liberteryen Bir Eleştiri" (The Place of State in 
International Politics: A Libertarian Criticism). 
Liberal Düşünce. 1 : 1 (Winter 1996), 93-100.
Çaha, Ömer. "Birey-Devlet İlişkisi Çerçevesinde
Türkiye'de İnsan Hakları" (Human Rights in Turkey 
within the Framework of the Relation between the 
Individual and State). Liberal Düşünce. 1 : 1 
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Ülsever, Cüneyt. "Türkiye'ye Paralı Eğitim" Liberal 
Düşünce. 1 : 2 (Spring 1996), 44-8.
Akalın, Güneri. "Yüksek Öğretimin Finansmanı ve Harçlar 
Sorunu" (Financing of Higher Education and the 
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56.
Aktan, Coşkun Can. "21. Yüzyıl, Türkiye ve Sivil Toplum" 
(21st Century, Turkey and Civil Society). Liberal 
Düşünce. 2 (Spring 1996), 57-75.
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Anlamak" (Understanding Freedom through 'The Road To 
Serfdom'). Liberal Düşünce. 1 : 2 (Spring 1996), 
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Yurdusev, A. Nuri. "Laiklik ve Demokrasi: Biri Diğerinin 
Vazgeçilmez Şartr mı?" (Laicism and Democracy: Is 
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Berzeg, Kazım. "Siyaset Pratiğindeki Somut Liberalizm" 
(Concrete Liberalism in Active Politics). Liberal 
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Erdoğan, Mustafa. "Din, Demokrasi, Çok Kültürlülük, Sivil 
Toplum" (Religion, Democracy, Multiculturalism,
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Erdoğan, Mustafa. "Türkiye 2. Uluslararası Liberal 
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Arslan, Ahmet. "İslam, Adalet ve Refah Partisi Üzerine" 
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Yürüşen, Melih. "Refah Partisinin Yükselişine Çeşitlilik 
Perspektifinden Bakmak" (Viewing the Rise of Welfare 
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ÖZ, Esat. "Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçiş" (Transition to
Democracy in Turkey). Liberal Düşünce. 1 : 3 (Summer 
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Mises, Ludwig von. "Antikapitalist Zihniyet"
(Anticapitalist Mentality). Translated by Mustafa 
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Toprak, Rasim. "Demokrasi, Laiklik, Resmi İdeoloji
Üstüne" (On Democracy, Laicism, Official Ideology). 
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Yayla, Atilla. "Demokrasi ve Türkiye" (Democracy and
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(Command Economy, Guided Democracy). Liberal 
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